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Abstract 
REFLECTION, REFRACTION, AND REJECTION: COPPER SMELTING 
HERITAGE AND THE EXECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Bode J. Morin 
 
This dissertation examines the global technological and environmental history of 
copper smelting and the conflict that developed between historic preservation and 
environmental remediation at major copper smelting sites in the United States after their 
productive periods ended. Part I of the dissertation is a synthetic overview of the history 
of copper smelting and its environmental impact. After reviewing the basic metallurgy of 
copper ores, the dissertation contains successive chapters on the history of copper 
smelting to 1640, culminating in the so-called German, or Continental, processing 
system; on the emergence of the rival Welsh system during the British industrial 
revolution; and on the growth of American dominance in copper production the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. The latter chapter focuses, in particular, on three of the most 
important early American copper districts: Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula, 
Tennessee’s Copper Basin, and Butte-Anaconda, Montana. As these three districts went 
into decline and ultimately out of production, they left a rich industrial heritage and 
significant waste and pollution problems generated by increasingly more sophisticated 
technologies capable of commercially processing steadily growing volumes of 
decreasingly rich ores. 
Part II of the dissertation looks at the conflict between historic preservation and 
environmental remediation that emerged locally and nationally in copper districts as they 
went into decline and eventually ceased production. Locally, former copper mining 
communities often split between those who wished to commemorate a region’s past 
importance and develop heritage tourism, and local developers who wished to clear up 
and clean out old industrial sites for other purposes. Nationally, Congress passed laws in 
the 1960s and 1970s mandating the preservation of historical resources (National Historic 
Preservation Act) and laws mandating the cleanup of contaminated landscapes 
(CERCLA, or Superfund), objectives sometimes in conflict – especially in the case of 
copper smelting sites. The dissertation devotes individual chapters to the conflicts that 
developed between environmental remediation, particularly involving the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the heritage movement in the Tennessee, Montana, and Michigan 
copper districts. A concluding chapter provides a broad model to illustrate the 
relationship between industrial decline, federal environmental remediation activities, and 
the growth of heritage consciousness in former copper mining and smelting areas, 
analyzes why the outcome varied in the three areas, and suggests methods for dealing 
with heritage-remediation issues to minimize conflict and maximize heritage 
preservation.
 ix 
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INTRODUCTION 
Essential for social identity and collective purpose, heritage enriches us through 
remembered precursors and prospective heirs.  But these enduring benefits blind 
us to a mounting backlash.  Age-old aversion toward husbanding the past today 
grows more virulent.  Nature conservation arouses similar hostility, but animus 
against heritage is harder to counter.  Environmentalists can threaten global 
extinction; heritage advocates warn merely of lower quality of life.  To many that 
seems a lesser, even a negligible threat. 
-David Lowenthal, 2000 (“Stewarding the Past in a Perplexing Present” in 
Values and Heritage Conservation, 18) 
 
 In its simplest form, this is a heritage dissertation.  It examines the debates over 
which things a community should save, how the final decisions are influenced and 
negotiated, and what, if anything, should ultimately be remembered about the past.  
These are not, however, simple or uncontested questions because the significance of past 
events and historical materials are not accepted equally.  This dissertation uses a specific 
genre, industrial heritage, and the complicated perceptions of value in an often disheveled 
and blighted landscape to explore these questions.  Industrial heritage poses challenges 
other types of heritage do not.  In terms of merely preserving industrial structures, 
complications of process-interpretation and structural-deterioration exist in forms and 
scales that simply do not affect historic house museums or living-history farms.  Further, 
industrial sites can encompass entire landscapes and, because of increasingly complex 
and historically significant operations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, often 
include some hazard or hazardous waste threat to human health or the environment.  Both 
of these situations tend to complicate the industrial setting leaving a tangled legacy in 
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need of both commemoration and remediation, ultimately making heritage preservation 
quite complex and expensive.  This dissertation will explore how a community that 
desires to preserve and commemorate its history, articulates and negotiates that desire in 
the face of sometimes overwhelming opposition.  In this case, the opposition comes from 
a well-funded organization, often with the support of development-oriented community 
groups, aimed at remediating the waste streams that emanated from that very same 
historic landscape, with the historic resources in question standing in the way of the 
simplest and most linear forms of remediation. 
 Peter Howard defines heritage broadly as anything, including material objects, 
ideas, customs, and practices, anyone wants to save or remember for any reason.1
                                                 
1 Peter Howard, Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity (New York: Continuum, 2003), 6. 
  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, heritage is simply reflected in the recognition that historical 
events represented by surviving material culture have helped shape the present, and that 
those material things and events that have the most relevance, integrity, and significance 
are worthy of remembrance and some sort of commemoration, documentation, or 
preservation.  Scholars such as David Lowenthal and Mike Wallace place heritage in a 
broader social context by critiquing its practice when used selectively to promote 
nationalist ideals or false identities, and extolling its virtues when used to articulate 
positive or negative historic events that shaped the present.  This work, however, will not 
judge the specific choices communities make or argue the significance of their choices.  
Rather it will accept that heritage practice, as broadly defined, is good for a community 
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and that the better a community can define, manage, and protect its heritage, the stronger 
its identity will be. 2
 
 
Dissertation Format 
 This dissertation will consider historical events leading to industrial heritage 
conflicts by examining the broad technological and environmental history of copper 
smelting, then look more specifically at important historic copper mining and smelting 
communities in Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana.  Each of these three districts has 
existing heritage plans which are enriched and contested in various ways by the 
environmental consequences of its mining periods.  This dissertation will focus 
specifically on the issues of smelting technology, waste generation, environmental 
remediation, and smelting landscape preservation.  Part I, comprising Chapters 1-4, will 
explore the technological and environmental histories of copper smelting that led to 
American domination of copper production from the 1880s to the 1980s.  Chapter 1, The 
Basics of Copper and Smelting, focuses on copper uses, ores, and general smelting 
practices.  Chapter 2, A Short History of Copper Smelting through 1640, develops the 
five-thousand year history of the copper smelting blast furnace, culminating in the 
emergence of standard practices in 16th-century Germany, and examines the early 
recognition of smelter waste and environmental degradation.  Chapter 3, The Welsh 
System, develops the nearly 200-year dominance of the Welsh smelting system based on 
                                                 
2 See: David Lowenthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
─The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and 
Mike Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1996). 
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the perfection of reverberatory furnace practice, and discusses concerns about and early 
lawsuits related to waste streams emanating from the concentration of 19th-century 
smelting activity in Swansea, Wales.  Chapter 4, The American System, discusses the 
adaptation of European copper smelting technology in the United States, and significant 
increases in copper demand brought on by electrical applications.  The chapter then looks 
more closely at smelting technology in the three American copper districts based 
chronologically on when each district started large-scale copper mining and smelting: the 
Michigan Copper Country on the Keweenaw Peninsula in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula 
(1840s), the Ducktown district in southeast Tennessee (1850s), and the Butte-Anaconda 
district in southwest Montana (1880s).  
 Part II looks more closely at these three districts, exploring the histories of the 
districts leading to significant early waste disposal problems and the discovery of new 
environmental problems after each location had largely stopped mining and smelting that 
ultimately led to a listing on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL).  The chapters 
also examine for each district, early, pre-Superfund heritage plans and later heritage-
environmental conflicts and their resolutions as communities attempted to preserve 
elements of their past while remediation professionals worked to clean up the landscape.   
Chapter 5, Montana, discusses the placing of the Butte-Anaconda district on the NPL in 
1983 and the heritage discussions, plans, and preservation projects that occurred over a 
fifty-year period.  Chapter 6, Ducktown, discusses the district’s principal responsible 
party’s efforts to keep the location from being officially labeled “Superfund” in the 
1990s, and the privatization of both the cleanup activities and later heritage decisions.  
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Chapter 7, Quincy Smelter, discusses the Michigan Superfund project that began with a 
NPL-listing in 1986, but whose last remaining historic smelter was not considered for 
remediation until 2004, when efforts to include it in the national park fell short and 
asbestos issues grew more important.  The Smelter’s ultimate fate was still not officially 
determined as late as July, 2009.  The Conclusion introduces the Model, a predictive 
method to explain the historical processes rural mining districts undergo as mining peaks, 
diminishes, and ends, leaving communities with lower population, greater economic 
distress, contaminated landscapes, and poor images, and the efforts of those communities 
to respond to these problems.   
 Ultimately, this dissertation will demonstrate that, despite the well meaning intent 
of federal laws designed to protect both heritage and the environment, not all people 
share the same values, perceptions, or interpretations of the landscape, and conflicts will 
most certainly rise without clear, predictable outcomes.  But a community with a strong 
organization, knowledge of laws and practices, and persistence has the best chance of 
protecting their cultural resources under threat from remediation.   
 
A note on site selection 
This dissertation aims to examine the conflicts between heritage planning and 
environmental remediation.  While conflicts between the two are played out under a 
variety of circumstances, copper smelting proves the ideal subject, not only because 
copper was one of the most important and heavily mined metals throughout history, but 
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because its extraction and processing have led to some of the worst environmental 
degradation.   
Copper was responsible for the first major mining boom in the United States and 
quickly led to U.S. global production-dominance because of the nation’s vast reserves 
and innovative adaptation of European technology.   Further, copper mining and smelting 
led to some of the largest Superfund projects in the country, including one whose 
estimated costs should exceed one billion dollars.  While iron was the most important 
metal historically and was mined and processed on a much larger scale than copper, its 
ores tended to be richer and generally much less toxic to human health than copper ores.  
Further, iron’s heritage is well established with many preserved blast furnaces, steel 
facilities, bloomeries, foundries, blacksmith shops, and several heritage trails and state 
and national parks.  Other metal production, such as gold and silver mining and smelting, 
tended to be on a smaller scale than copper, largely because of their rarity, and therefore 
less of an environmental impact, and lead, although more toxic than copper, was only 
produced at about one-third the rate of copper in the 20th-century, never generated the 
historic-interest of copper mining.  Its major mine sites were only just being considered 
for NPL listing in mid-2009.   
 The three sites selected for this study represented significant copper mining and 
smelting regions that pursued heritage planning amidst Superfund cleanups.  Both the 
Michigan and Montana copper districts led global production at one time and had (have) 
high historical integrity.  Both had multiple heritage projects that documented and 
commemorated their histories, and both had landscapes considered toxic enough to 
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warrant Superfund cleanups, although the Michigan district was significantly less 
contaminated than Montana’s.  Montana’s heritage community was (and is) dominated by 
local groups and Michigan’s by a formal combination of local groups, Michigan 
Technological University, and the National Park Service.  The Tennessee copper district 
was for short periods the second or third leading copper producing region in the country, 
and, while it never produced at the rate of either Michigan or Montana, it developed 
important by-product processes including the largest sulfuric acid plant in the world.  
While its contamination problems were nearly as bad as Montana’s, except for scale, its 
cleanup company negotiated to keep its district away from an official Superfund 
designation but still followed all Superfund remediation protocols—but not the heritage 
considerations required for federal agencies. 
 Other important copper districts that warranted consideration for this dissertation 
included the mining district in Ely and Elizabeth, Vermont.  This region had a very long 
history of copper production from the 1820s to the 1920s, at times rivaled the Tennessee 
district in terms of production, and has had an on-going Superfund remediation project 
since 2001.  Unlike Michigan, Montana, or Tennessee, however, its heritage component 
is being managed by the State Historic Preservation Officer as mandated by the National 
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), in the manner that the NHPA and the Superfund law 
intended.   While the project is not controversy-free, it is in many respects following the 
model for federal projects involving heritage that the other three sites should have 
followed, and as such, does not present as great a conflict as the other districts.  Some 
Arizona copper sites could also have been considered because of their production 
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dominance following Montana.  However, Arizona mining and smelting landscapes, 
several of which are still active, have not generated Superfund attention like the other 
three sites.  Similarly Utah, which has led copper production for much of the 20th century, 
is still active and thus not covered by Superfund.  Swansea, Wales, could have been 
considered for an international comparison, because for over a century its copper smelters 
dominated global copper production and generated the first documented pollution 
lawsuits.  But its smelting landscape is not in conflict.  Its community decided after the 
final decline of metallurgy in the region to demolish much of its historic copper smelting 
landscape and promote the region’s proximity to the ocean as its primary tourist draw 
rather than its industrial heritage.  While all of these sites are or were important 
producers, none of them attempted to use their histories, and hence heritage, to revitalize 
their economies to the extent the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana copper districts 
have. 
 
Scholarly Context 
Most scholarly work on the history of mineral districts through the 1980s has 
focused on the opening and peak periods of production, with perhaps minor consideration 
for their slow decline.  This dissertation focuses on the after-effects of mining and 
smelting production and adds to a growing body of literature examining landscapes and 
waste-streams as an important feature of historical inquiry.  The Environmental History 
movement, begun in the 1980s, seeks to explore the relationship between human activity 
and nature.  Important works like William Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis (1991) and 
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Richard White’s Organic Machine: the Remaking of the Columbia River (1995) interpret 
landscape- change and perceptions of landscape, as a direct construction or reflection of 
human agency, especially as the land itself became less of a wilderness and more of a 
commodity with American westward expansion.  More specific to mining contexts, 
Duane A. Smith’s Mining America (1987) and Richard Francaviglia’s Hard Places 
(1991) look at significant changes mining made to the landscape.  Smith’s work is a 
history of the mining industry’s actions and attitudes toward the environment and charts 
the evolution of wanton waste disposal practices of 19th- and early 20th-century mines that 
had evolved by the later 20th-century to at least minimal consideration of remediation.  
Francaviglia’s work seeks to understand and contextualize the current, abandoned 
landscape of former mining activity, including former communities, unused structures, 
and significant waste piles.3
Adding to the broader studies above, the following works look at specific copper 
mining locations in a broad context and consider the generation of colossal waste streams 
and sinks.  Fred Quivik’s dissertation, Smoke and Tailings, an Environmental History of 
Copper Smelting Technologies in Montana 1880-1930 (1991), explores the social, legal, 
and technological history of responses to early and major smelter smoke and concentrator 
tailings discharges into the environment surrounding Butte and Anaconda, Montana.  
Timothy LeCain’s dissertation, Moving Mountains: Technology and the Environment in 
Western Copper Mining (1998), explores the idea of mining efficiency that evolved from 
   
                                                 
3 William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis : Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) ; 
Richard White, Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); 
Duane A. Smith, Mining America: The Industry and the Environment. 1800-1980 (Lawarence: University 
of Kansas Press, 1987); and Richard V. Francaviglia, Hard Places: Reading the Landscape of America's 
Historic Mining Districts (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991). 
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an early conservation principle at mining universities into a corporate-economic goal of 
lowering costs and expanding throughput, ultimately leading to considerably more 
production and production waste.   Gavin Bridge’s dissertation, Regulating Nature: the 
Ecological Origins and Environmental Implications of Restructuring in the U.S. Copper 
Industry (1997), and Kip Curtis’ dissertation, An Ecology of Industry: Mining and Nature 
in Western Montana (2001), both explore western mining from the perspective of 
significant and destructive landscape change.4   Even Cronon touches on copper mining 
in “Kennecott Journey,” in Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America’s Western Past 
(1992).  He places the 1990s ghost town of Kennecott, Alaska, into an historic 
environmental context exploring the effects of distance, isolation, and local resources 
(organic and inorganic) on the Euro-American mining community, and the effects of the 
mine on urban areas in the Continental U.S. concluding that “the mere existence of … 
minerals did not in and of itself determine the events that took place [in Kennecott].”5
 While these works largely examine the formation and consequences of large 
mining waste streams and dumps from an environmental history perspective, a few 
authors have approached similar landscapes and worked to define their value as it exists 
today, largely from a heritage context.  Mary Elizabeth Curran’s master’s thesis, The 
Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and Resiliency (1996) 
explores the idea that the long-term residents of Butte were less concerned about the 
   
                                                 
4 Fred Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in 
Montana 1880-1930" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1998); Timothy J. LeCain, "Moving 
Mountains: Technology and the Environment in Western Copper Mining" (PhD dissertation , University of 
Delaware, 1998); and Kent Curtis, "An Ecology of Industry: Mining and Nature in Western Montana" 
(PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 2001). 
5 William Cronon, "Kennecott Journey: The Paths out of Town," in Under an Open Sky: Rethinking 
America's Western Past (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 48. 
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toxins in the landscape than they were with their history and heritage.  David Robinson’s 
“Heaps of History” (2000), describes Toluca, Illinois, residents who sought historic 
landmark status for “Jumbo,” a large coal waste pile, because of its prominence on the 
landscape and heritage value to the community.  In “Living in Anthracite: Mining 
Landscape and Sense of Place in Wyoming Valley” (2001), Goin and Raymond discuss 
the loss felt by eastern Pennsylvania residents when their historic coal waste piles 
disappeared because of remediation efforts and, with them, the loss of historic context for 
one of the last remaining historic coal breakers and the loss of historic identity for the 
communities.  Don Hardesty, echoing similar sentiments, decries the loss of historic data 
in the complete remediation of mining and other industrial waste dumps in “Issues in 
Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites” (2001).6
Further, Fred Quivik’s important articles from 2000 and 2001 focus on waste 
streams.  The first, “Landscapes as Industrial Artifacts: Lessons for Industrial 
Archeology” (2000), reflecting his dissertation, argues that industrial archeology had long 
looked only at the productive side of manufacturing and that there is almost as much to 
learn from the waste streams and the destructive side of manufacturing.  In a second 
article, “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of 
Hazardous Materials: An Assessment of Superfund's Record” (2001), he argues that, 
despite federal laws mandating that all activities executed with federal involvement or 
   
                                                 
6 Mary Elizabeth Curran, "The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and 
Resiliency" (Master's Thesis, University of Montana, 1996); David Robertson, "Heaps of History: Toluca 
and the Historic Longwall Mining District," Journal of Illinois History 3,  Autumn (2000), 162-184; Peter 
Goin and Elizabeth Raymond, "Living in Anthracite: Mining Landscape and Sense of Place in Wyoming 
Valley, Pennsylvania," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 25-49; and  Donald Hardesty, "Issues in 
Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 19-28. 
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funding consider and mitigate potential impacts to cultural resources eligible for the 
National Register of Historic Places, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 
general, and under Superfund specifically, has a poor record regarding legally-required 
heritage protection.7
 Except for Quivik’s “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources” article, 
these works mostly describe historic waste generation, landscape change, environmental 
history, or current heritage values associated with the contaminated industrial landscape.  
They do not explore the gap between environmental remediation and heritage 
management beyond raising awareness.  This dissertation will bridge that gap, looking at 
the broad technological history of copper smelting that led to significant environmental 
problems, then, taking a cue from Quivik’s “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural 
Resources” article, examine the conflict that develops when remediation officials have to 
negotiate with heritage planners at sites that deserve to be both remediated and preserved.    
 
 While all the works cited here inform and enrich this dissertation, other heritage 
concepts are needed to fully understand how communities in historic mining districts 
whose mining wastes have been determined contaminated enough to warrant managed 
remediation by the Environmental Protection Agency or state environmental agencies, 
engage their landscape.  These include the notions of perception and value, which often 
inform each other and help direct actions.  For example, to a person or group who values 
heritage, a landscape full of old building and mining structures is perceived as an 
                                                 
7Fredric L. Quivik, "Landscapes as Industrial Artifacts: Lessons from Environmental History," IA: The 
Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology 26, no. 2 (2000), 55-64,  and ———, "Integrating the 
Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous Materials:  An Assessment of 
Superfund's Record," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 47-61. 
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important historical asset and potential economic resource.  Hence, they fight to preserve 
them.  A person or group disinclined toward heritage and more inclined toward new 
development may see old buildings or a landscape full of mining ruins as blight and a 
hindrance to progress and, in the event of serious contamination, something that should 
be remediated no matter what the cost.   
In the report “Values and Heritage Conservation” (2000) on the changing value of 
values in conservation decisions, Getty Conservation Institute editors Avrami, et al., state 
that “values are critical to deciding what to conserve… [and] the real source of the 
meaning in heritage.”8  Material culture, they continue, “has different meanings and uses 
for different individuals and communities.  Values give some things significance over 
others and thereby transform some objects and places into heritage.” 9  The 2000 report 
and the follow-up report, “Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage” (2002), recognize 
not only the importance of value to individuals and communities, but that through a 
recent democratization trend, new groups, such as professionals from other fields and 
special interest associations, tend to make heritage decisions “complex negotiations to 
which diverse stakeholders bring their own values.”10
                                                 
8 "Values and Heritage Conservation," ed. Erica Avrami, Randall Mason, and Marta de la Torre (Los 
Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute, 2000), 14. 
  Avrami, et al., ultimately 
recognize that divergent social groups “will continue to ask more and more from material 
culture—and heritage in particular—as they negotiate identities, form communities, and 
seek a more salutary and prosperous future.  The extent to which groups at all levels do 
9 Ibid., 1, 4, and 7. 
10 "Assessing the Values of Cultural Heritage," ed. Marta De la Torre and Randall Mason (Los Angeles: 
Getty Conservation Institute, 2002), 3, and "Values and Heritage Conservation," 68. 
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this cooperatively or competitively is perhaps the greatest cultural and social question of 
next century.”11
 Another approach to understanding heritage focuses on two organizational 
directions in planning and management applied by Jon Price in 2006: the official, 
professional, state-sanctioned or top-down approach and the community-driven, local, or 
bottom-up approach.  Price writes: 
   
Official top-down heritage interpretation…is concerned with the development of 
the visitor, and concepts of historical validity.  It has a didactic intent, and is 
concerned to place its subjects in context in a perceived and social 
continuum…[and] tends to deal with broader context of the industrial activity and 
places the activity and its context in juxtaposition with examples of comparable 
experience elsewhere. 
 
Community-led interpretation, on the other hand is concerned with the validation 
of recent experience…to explain the behaviour and activity of preceding 
generations to present generations, and it places its subjects in a polarized context 
of ‘then’ and ‘now’… and tends to deal directly with the detail of process, 
whether strictly industrial…or ancillary domestic. 12
 
 
 In each of the three regions studied in this dissertation, both forms appear.  
Bottom-up, community-led heritage and interpretation planning is led by grass-roots 
efforts, local museums, and historical societies, and top-down interpretation is 
represented by National Register of Historic Places districts and nominations, Historic 
American Engineering Record documentation projects (in two districts), a National 
Historical Park, and, in one district, the EPA and a cleanup company.  No district had just 
one type of organization; each had varying degrees of top-down and bottom-up heritage 
                                                 
11 "Values and Heritage Conservation," 14. 
12 Jon Price, "Interpreting Industrial Heritage," in Heritage Interpretation, ed. Allison Helms and Marion 
Blockley (New York: Routledge, 2006), 111-112. 
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planning that argued, with varying degrees of success, for preservation amidst 
remediation planning.   
 In addition to concepts of value and perception, I also propose a few terms to help 
elucidate this work.  Successful mining districts largely had periods of increasing 
production after they were established, longer periods of high production, and ultimately 
a period of decline.  In all three sites examined here, the period of decline was followed 
by a documentation of serious environmental contamination and a Superfund cleanup.  
The declining mining period, when a region was not as economically productive as it 
once was, experienced dwindling population levels that led to a blighted, abandoned, and 
demolished landscape.  Often, the remaining population was forced to deal with 
economic downturns and significant contamination that led to a general, community-wide 
sensation of loss or an ethos of defeat that could trigger heritage projects to commemorate 
the past. 
In other respects, the term “glory days” could be used to describe periods of high 
production, booming mining towns, and general success for miners, mine owners, and 
townspeople.  However, the term is never used in a contemporary sense.  It is always 
used to refer back to a period more prosperous than the present.  In some respects, it is 
this idea that many locally-driven, bottom-up heritage projects, to the consternation of 
historians like David Lowenthal, hope to use to lure and educate tourists about the 
importance of their once important district.  These are the glorified, heroic landscapes 
that heritage projects try to recapture or celebrate in some way. 
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 The ethos of defeat is often worsened not only by contamination, but the attention 
generated by on-going environmental remediation.  To end this ethos, however, 
remediation becomes necessary to both clean and remove the stigma, often to the 
detriment of the heroic landscape.  But heritage is also a means of alleviating defeat by 
drawing attention from declining mineralogical importance to remembering the heroic 
period.  Inevitably, neither remediation nor remembrance can be executed without 
negotiation and compromise, especially in historically significant contaminated areas.  
Some environmental treatments may be modified and some heritage lost, leaving a 
compromise landscape. 
 
Legal Framework  
 Heritage protection and environmental remediation are important components of 
modern western societies, both adding value to historic places which, at times, include 
very seriously devalued post-industrial landscapes.  As such, nations write laws and 
establish practices to promote heritage and remediate contamination and assign agencies 
to enforce their laws.   
The United States, Great Britain, and many other nations have heritage laws and 
professional standards of practice to identify and protect the material things, places, and 
traditions of the past based on the inherent values of each country.  In most nations, a 
relative value is based on the significance of a particular artifact, structure, landscape, or 
tradition; but heritage can be significant on a personal, local, regional, national, or global 
level.  Value and significance are determined by the meaning a particular cultural object, 
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location, or practice has to the culture identifying and protecting it.  The home of the first 
president of the United States, for example, is a key physical representation of the roots 
of this nation.  As such, it has great symbolic value and hence great significance on a 
national level and is protected, preserved, and interpreted in a manner befitting the most 
important structures in this country.    
 Heritage laws and policies evolved in the United States based on and stemming 
from traditions established for the preservation of important ecological sites, and the 
primary responsibility for national heritage thus rests with the National Park Service, an 
agency whose purview encompasses the protection of significant landscapes and sites of 
historical importance and/or natural beauty.  Over a century, the United States developed 
a system to identify and document structures and landscapes of regional and national 
significance, and to preserve and interpret significant structures and landscapes held 
privately, regionally, and federally.  The U.S. Antiquities Act of 1906 first permitted the 
official designation of historic landmarks and created penalties for harm caused to 
federally-owned cultural resources.  Sixty years later, the National Historic Preservation 
Act of 1966 (NHPA) authorized the formation of the National Register of Historic Places, 
created and assigned duties to the State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO), and 
established rules for managing historic resources on federal property.   
 While some states have state-level registers of historic structures and communities 
have historical societies and preservation boards, the most important list for heritage 
designation in the United States is the National Register of Historic Places.  To be 
eligible for listing, a privately- or publically-owned site must meet certain criteria of 
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regional or national significance, be in its original location, and largely be free from 
major ornamental or structural changes since its time of importance.  Sites on the 
National Register that meet an even higher level of national significance can be elevated 
to National Historic Landmark status.  As of 2008, over 80,000 properties, representing 
over 1.4 million individual resources, are listed on the National Register, but only 2,400 
of them meet the criteria for National Historic Landmark status.13  While these 
designations provide little legal protection for privately-owned sites, a listing at a 
minimum requires some form of documentation that proves a site’s significance and 
authenticity, thereby fulfilling an important heritage step by creating a record of an 
important structure or landscape. 14
 The most important parts of the NHPA for this dissertation are Sections 106 and 
110.
   
15
                                                 
13 See “Welcome to the National Register of Historic Places” at www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm, accessed 
September 29, 2008. 
  Section 106 requires that all undertakings or projects executed with federal funds 
or requiring federal permits consider and mitigate the potential damage to cultural 
resources worthy of inclusion on the National Register.  Further, Section 110 designates 
the heads of each federal agency to be responsible for and develop plans and procedures 
to protect historic resources eligible for the National Register within their own agencies.  
The NHPA (established and) requires State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPO) in 
each state to determine National Register-eligibility of potentially impacted cultural 
resources and approve mitigation efforts, and provides for a National Advisory Council 
to address national heritage issues, advise the president and congress on historic 
14 If a privately-owned site on the National Register is altered or changed so much that it no-longer meets 
the requirements for listing, the only penalty is de-listing. 
15 "National Historic Preservation Act of 1966," in Public Law 102-575 (1966). 
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preservation, and resolve conflicts.  If, for example, the Air Force desires to construct a 
new hangar building at a base in the United States and the desired location includes the 
archaeological remains of an 18th-century Native American campsite meeting the 
National Register eligibility requirements, then the Air Force must consult with SHPOs 
and reach agreements to mitigate the damage to that site.  Mitigation, however, does not 
necessarily mean cancelling a project, but, based on the site’s significance, mitigation 
could mean, at a minimum, excavation to recover material culture and spatial data prior 
to construction or, at a maximum, if the site proved to be associated with a significant 
historical figure for example, finding other ways to execute the hangar project without 
impacting the site.   
 Privately owned sites or those owned by states or municipalities fall under 
different consideration.  While no specific federal laws exist to formally protect 
privately-owned heritage sites in this country, tax incentives encourage private historic 
preservation efforts, and community historic districts can enforce protective covenants 
for included properties to ensure they are maintained appropriately.   
 Overall, laws and practices exist to protect heritage in the United States especially 
if the federal government is involved through, licenses, permits, projects, or financing, 
but the relative value of individual heritage sites or traditions to the acting agency are 
almost inconsequential.  The laws require consideration of impacts by federal projects on 
all heritage, as determined eligible by the National Register criteria, in the belief that the 
preservation of the historic things, places, and traditions of the past is in the best interest 
of the Nation.  
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 A second set of United States laws enacted in the latter half of the 20th century 
stemmed from a national response to the lasting effects of industrialization and its 
impacts on human health.  These laws evolved in part, from a history of nuisance 
complaints against polluters dating as far back as the 17th century.  For example, early 
19th-century Welsh farmers, whose crops and livestock had died because of smelter 
smoke from Swansea, were among the first to use nuisance laws to attempt to limit 
industrial pollution.  Early 20th-century American farmers, state governments, and federal 
agencies similarly sought injunctions against or damages from large copper smelting sites 
because of significant pollution injuries to property.  The fact that the majority of the 
early cases brought by individuals were settled, dismissed, or lost by the plaintiffs, and 
the governments’ cases largely resulted in negotiated settlements, suggests that economic 
growth was more important to the nation as a whole than then known pollution nuisance 
until late in the 20th century when the more serious effects of contamination became 
much more identifiable and quantifiable. 
 While these cases highlighted the potential impact of industrial activity on human 
health, they did little to alter the expansive growth of the economy and spread of ever 
more complex industrial activity.  Not until the mid 20th-century did people in the United 
States begin to question the lasting effects of industrial activity on the landscape, 
especially as environmental disasters and deaths from contamination seemed potentially 
preventable and studies demonstrating the effects of long-term exposure to more invisible 
toxins became more alarming.  Beginning in the 1940s, Congress passed laws regulating 
the output and transportation of hazardous substances and, in 1970, created the 
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Environmental Protection Agency, whose mission, simply stated, was to protect human 
health and the environment.  It was to execute its mission by establishing pollution 
standards, monitoring industrial effluent, accessing fines, and prosecuting pollution 
violators. 
 The Clean Water Act (1972), that substantially expanded the 1942 Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, and the Clean Air Act (1970), that substantially expanded the Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1955, went a long way to curb current and future pollution by 
setting limits to discharges and establishing penalties for violations.  The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) established rules for the transportation 
and disposal of hazardous wastes and provided conservation standards for natural 
resources.  While all three of these acts had implications for current and future pollution, 
they did little to remediate the continued effects of past pollution and existing hazardous 
waste deposits.  While the 1977 Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act collected 
taxes from active coal mining to be used for abandoned mine reclamation efforts, it 
wasn’t until 1980 that the government addressed a broader spectrum of neglected waste.   
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), more commonly referred to as “Superfund,” to identify 
significant sites of past pollution, prioritize the sites based on potential damage to human 
health, and plan for and execute the remediation of those sites.  Further, if the original 
polluters, their later corporate owners, or current land-holders were economically viable 
or legal entities, then the EPA, which administers Superfund, could label them a 
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) and attempt to force them to manage the cleanup or, 
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at a minimum, seek to recoup the cost of the clean up.  In those instances where a PRP 
could not be identified, CERCLA and the 1986 Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) provided public money, the super-fund, raised from 
chemical and petroleum industry taxes, to pay for the remediation of significantly 
polluted sites. 
 For a site to be remediated under Superfund, federal studies called Preliminary 
Assessment/Site Inspection (PA/SI) must first determine the extent of the contamination 
or confirm findings from other state or federal studies.  These studies establish a threat 
ranking based on potential public health impacts for individual sites and, if significant 
enough, lead to listing on the National Priorities List (NPL) that officially defines a 
location as a Superfund site.  The next step, if the site requires a long-term permanent 
solution, is a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) the EPA or PRP 
conducts to outline the threat and optional treatments.  The final choices of remediation 
options, after considering public comments and opinions, are listed in the Record of 
Decision (ROD), a legal public document that the EPA and PRP are mandated to follow.  
Following the publication of the ROD, work plans, safety plans, and public involvement 
plans are created to execute the ROD, usually completed under the broad heading of 
Remedial Design and Remedial Action (RD/RA).16
                                                 
16 "Cleanup Process," U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/index.htm, accessed July 11, 2009. 
  One key component of the RD/RA is 
the Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARAS) which require the 
EPA to identify and enforce other federal and state statutes that apply to the clean up and 
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federal undertakings.  Often these include RCRA, the Endangered Species Act, and 
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act.   
 Some of the 11,000 sites listed on the National Priorities List are military bases, 
warehouses, or transportation sites, but the majority of them were listed because of long-
term industrial activity and contamination.  Because of this longevity, many of these 
places also hold historic significance, as defined by the National Register criteria, to 
American economic, social, and industrial history.  Arguably, much of America’s 
importance on the world stage can be attributed to its rapid growth and industrial output 
between 1850 and 1950.   
Prodigious American production affected the outcome of two world wars, 
changed the structure of global wealth, shifted the seats of world power, firmly 
established a middle-class, and, by and large, created the consumer economy.  All of this 
was done over a century with little regard for the destination of the non-commercial by-
products of production.  Factories dumped waste water into rivers and oceans, vented 
caustic gasses into the atmosphere, and allowed chemicals to seep into soils and 
groundwater.  Mines and smelter sites, often in sparsely populated areas, simply left their 
waste tailings and slag wherever they could and usually only considered them again if 
they interfered with production or could be recycled for additional profits. 
 Many old industrial sites therefore have dichotomous legacies.  On one hand, they 
hold significance to American history and mark economic, social, and technological 
development and, as such, are important heritage sites.  On the other hand, they are 
responsible for many of the most egregious pollution releases requiring extensive clean-
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ups and incurring considerable cost.  Federal laws articulated by the NHPA and 
CERCLA exist to protect or correct both legacies for the betterment of the public.  
CERCLA, despite its specific health-relevance to contaminated communities, is not 
exempt from the provisions of Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA, and as such, the EPA, 
is required to consider historic resources it encounters.   
However straight forward the National Historic Preservation Act is, federal 
agencies are mission-driven, shaped by the personalities of their various staffs, and not 
necessarily inclined to appreciate local heritage as much as the communities they work in 
do.  Further complicating heritage practice in contaminated communities, the EPA in 
general does not have a strong institutional understanding of heritage.  It has a small two-
person heritage staff within its compliance and enforcement division that serves the 
remaining 17,000-person EPA.17   In an almost too simplistic approach, the heritage staff 
distributes a pamphlet titled, “Historic and Archaeological Resource Protection for 
USEPA Personnel” with chapters titled, “Why Should you care about Historical and 
Archaeological Resources?” (Answer: it’s the law, regulations require it, it’s policy, and 
it’s a good idea), and “What are ‘Cultural Resources’?”18
                                                 
17 "Who Are We and How Are We Organized?"  http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm, accessed July 
11, 2009. 
  There are few other training 
resources available for EPA, or state-level environmental departments for that matter, to 
access heritage policy beyond a single preservation-remediation course taught by the 
private National Preservation Institute and a book by Tom King, titled  Cultural Resource 
18 "Historic and Archaeological Resource Protection for USEPA Personnel," ed. Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance (Washington, DC: U.S. EPA, 2007), 1-6. 
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Laws and Practice (2008), outlining regulations affecting cultural resources including 
CERCLA although it is mostly geared toward heritage professionals.19
 While the EPA is not positioned institutionally to respond to heritage issues at 
Superfund sites, many communities are equally unfamiliar with or not positioned well to 
use the law.  Without a strong voice from the community to force EPA compliance with 
Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA, confrontations become one-sided and heritage is often 
lost, or only minimally considered.   
 
To provide a background for understanding how copper production historically 
created environmental problems that would eventually lead to remediation efforts, the 
opening section of this dissertation addresses the broad history of copper smelting. This 
portion of the dissertation is mainly synthetic, drawing on the work of numerous scholars.  
However, it does two things that previous scholarship has not.  First, it provides a broad 
synthetic account of copper smelting and its environmental impacts from antiquity to near 
present.  Past studies have focused merely on specific smelting sites in specific times and 
even broader studies like Charlie Hyde’s Copper for America have focused only on 
specific nation-states.  Second, through specially constructed flow charts, the chapters in 
Part I attempt to provide a basic idea of how often-very-complicated historic smelting 
technology operated and a clearer understanding of how and why each of these 
technological processes created environmentally hazardous materials.  
                                                 
19 See: Thomas King, Cultural Resource Laws and Practice (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2008). 
and "CERCLA and NPA Coordination for Superfund Sites," NPI, http://www.npi.org/sem-cercla.html, 
accessed July 11, 2009. 
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PART I 
 
 
 
 
An examination of the broad technological and environmental history of copper 
smelting from the earliest furnaces to the development of the German and Welsh 
systems to the culmination of modern practice in the United States.  
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CHAPTER 1.  THE BASICS OF COPPER AND SMELTING 
 
 Copper smelting could be one of the oldest industrial professions.  Unlike other 
early manufacturing pursuits such as fire-building, stone shaping, pot-making, house-
building, and clothes-making, however, copper production was much more complex. The 
extraction of chemically bound copper from its stone matrix required an expectation, 
even if not defined or entirely understood, that complex chemical and thermodynamic 
processes applied to certain types of rocks would yield repetitive results.  Copper’s 
earliest known uses date to the sixth millennia BCE, likely the result of working 
relatively pure, but rare native copper.  The first purposely smelted copper dates to only 
3500 BCE.20
 Copper and copper alloy production were a significant metallurgical process from 
the time they originated.  The metal’s cost fluctuated based on production and supply 
levels accentuated by wars and economic depressions, but some demand for copper 
always existed and tended to increase throughout history and new uses for the metal 
developed and populations grew.  Arguably, copper and its alloys were the most 
important metals from 3500 BCE until the advent and diffusion of bloomery iron forges 
and rudimentary small batch steel making late in the second millennium BCE.  Further, 
easily melted and cast copper-based metals rivaled iron’s full importance until the advent 
and diffusion of blast furnaces between the 6th and 15th centuries CE.
   
21
                                                 
20 R. F. Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 1st ed. (London: Institute of Metals, 1976), 7-8.   
    
21Ibid., 40, 58, and 65. 
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Copper attained this importance because it was not only more plentiful than gold 
and silver, but its bronze and brass alloys were considerably stronger, relegating the early 
precious metals chiefly to ornamentation and commerce.  While considerably less 
plentiful than iron, its chief rival, copper had a notably lower melting point, so founders 
chose it and its alloys for virtually all cast metal objects requiring certain strength 
characteristics from bells to sculpture to cannon until the second millennium CE when 
cheap cast iron started to become widely available.22
 While few can argue against the benefits of selecting a strong, ductile, non-
corrosive, easily cast metal like bronze over wrought iron during the Iron Age, the 
disadvantages of iron become nearly inconsequential given its much wider availability 
compared to copper and its much lower price, estimated at only 20% of that of bronze 
during the Roman period. 
   Bronze, a copper alloy, was 
generally stronger than and as ductile as wrought iron, but less strong than steel.  Despite 
the preponderance of iron on the planet, pre-modern steel-making could only be done in 
small batches with rare phosphorous-free iron ore in a forge crucible and was generally 
limited to weapons and tools. 
23
                                                 
22 Tin, zinc, and lead all have considerably lower melting points than copper and founders could have 
selected them individually for some uses, but, by themselves, their very low tensile strength rendered them 
largely useless for any functioning tool or weapon.  Tylecote, Ibid. p. 38, suggests that while pewter, a 
lead-tin alloy, was used in some applications as early as 1100 BCE, lead overall was not an important metal 
until the Iron Age. 
  While it is difficult to quantify the number of early Iron Age 
iron ore deposits compared to then known copper ore deposits, a comparison of 20th 
century pig-iron production to 20th century copper production gives a general indication 
of just how much more plentiful iron is.  The average yearly world production of pig iron 
23Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, Man and the Earth (New York: Fox, Duffield & Company, 1905), 48. 
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from 1910-2004 was 421,276,596 metric tons; the average yearly production of copper 
from 1900-2004 was 4,473, 058 metric tons.24
 
  In other words, based on 20th century 
data, copper production was just about one percent (1.06%) that of iron.    
Copper Properties 
 Historically, uses for copper expanded as its specific properties—ductility, alloy- 
ability, corrosion-resistance, and conductivity—were successively exploited.  The first 
copper users prized the ductility of largely pre-industrial native or refined pure copper.  
Because of its softness and density, copper could be hammered and hardened into shapes 
such as crude knife blades, points, and tools but also formed and polished into colorful 
decorative and religious objects.   Due to the greater availability of native copper and a 
scarcity of native gold in parts of pre-industrial sub-Saharan Africa, copper became as 
precious a decorative metal for some tribes as gold was for others.  Indeed, copper’s 
aesthetic value to African tribes propelled its use in the Dutch and British slave-trades; 
the metal formed one leg of a mercantile triangle the sent copper from Europe to Africa 
to buy slaves who were sent to the Americas to produce sugar and rum (and profits) for 
European consumption. 25
                                                 
24 "Pig Iron Statistics," U.S. Geological Survey, http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/, accessed March 13, 
2008, and   "Copper Statistics," U.S. Geological Survey, http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/, accessed 
March 13, 2008. 
  North American native copper played a similar role for 
25 Eugenia W. Herbert, Red Gold of Africa: Copper in Precolonial History and Culture  (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin, 1984), 123.  
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aboriginals here.  As the only metal available for tool and weapon use, it found its way 
into extensive trade routes throughout the continent.26
 The discovery that molten copper easily combines with other metals to form 
alloys, such as bronze and later brass, that have much greater strength and ductility than 
pure copper presented new opportunities.  These alloys were used in the Bronze and early 
Iron ages for weapons, tools, coins, and structural and decorative objects, but copper’s 
general rarity in the Earth’s crust made them considerably more expensive and limited 
their use following the advent of iron.  The lower melting points of copper (1083° C) and 
bronze (999° C), however, made them the primary cast metal until the refinement and 
technological diffusion of the blast furnace and the technological ability to reach 
temperatures high enough to melt and cast iron. 
 
 Contributing to copper’s utility, especially in the early industrial age, was its 
superior corrosion resistance over wrought and cast iron and steel.  From the dawn of the 
Iron Age, copper found use in metal applications in corrosive environments such as naval 
weapons, instruments, and architectural fixtures and piping.  Pure copper’s malleability 
allowed it to be rolled thin, providing long-wearing, non-corroding panels for preventing 
wood rot and infestation on roofs and ship bottoms.  Loosely related to this third 
property, copper and its alloys are also non-sparking and were (and are) used to make 
tools for use in potentially flammable or explosive environments. 
 Copper’s fourth property differs significantly from the first three.  Up until the 
1850s, copper and its alloys were used primarily for their physical properties alone: 
                                                 
26 Susan R. Martin, Wonderful Power: The Story of Ancient Copper Working in the Lake Superior Basin 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 185. 
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malleability, strength, low melting point, and corrosion resistance.  Copper’s fourth 
primary property, and arguably the most significant, is its thermal and electrical 
conductivity.  Silver is a near perfect conductor of heat and electricity, often serving as 
the reference point for determining/assessing conductivity in other materials.  Copper is 
considerably closer to silver than any other element with a thermal conductivity 94% of 
silver’s and an electrical resistance of 1.67 micro-ohm/cm compared to silver’s 1.59 
micro-ohm/cm.  Gold, an even rarer metal than silver, is a distant third in thermal 
conductivity (71%) and resistance (2.35 micro-ohm/cm).  No other materials are even 
comparable.   
 Using the earlier approach to demonstrate elemental rarity, the average annual 
world production of silver from 1900-2004 was 9,111 metric tons, while gold was 1,191 
metric tons.27
 
  Therefore 20th-century silver production was only 0.20 % of copper and 
gold only 0.02%.   While not as perfect a conductor, copper’s greater availability made it 
the choice for thermal, communication, and electrical applications as they were 
developed in the 19th century and diffused in the 20th century. 
Copper Compounds 
 In general, copper is found throughout the earth in three primary forms, each a 
copper mineral or compound surrounded by non-copper waste compounds often referred 
to as gangue.  If the grouping of metal compound and gangue can be mined and extracted 
                                                 
27 "Silver Statistics," U.S. Geological Survey, http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/, accessed March 15, 2008, 
and "Gold Statistics," U.S. Geological Survey, http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/, accessed March 15, 
2008. 
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profitably, the combination is called ore, and the ratio of recoverable copper to the 
remaining elements and compounds determines the leanness or richness of the ore 
body.28
Native copper is largely pure but still considered a copper mineral.  It is found 
either as large, multi-ton masses or as small inclusions within larger stone deposits.  
While native copper exists in many locations around the globe, only the Lake Superior 
copper range proved to be commercially minable in the industrial and modern periods.  
Other native deposits, while too small to be worked economically, tended to be indicators 
of larger copper ore deposits, such as those in Africa and Chile.   
   
 Lake Superior native copper was found in three primary deposit types.  First, 
some copper precipitated from volcanic flows as large masses or into fissures and cracks 
between already hardened rocks.  Native American miners sought this copper because it 
was accessible with modest stone tools through relatively shallow mines.  Later, 
following attempts by the French and English, these mass copper deposits formed the 
initial objective of the first large American mining boom.  The other two native copper 
types, formed as tiny amygdaloid (almond-shaped) inclusions in a much larger basalt 
deposit or small pebble-sized inclusions dispersed throughout a conglomerated sandstone 
matrix called conglomerate, ultimately proved to be the more lucrative copper mining 
deposits in Michigan. 
 The other two primary forms of copper ore historically and currently are chemical 
compounds of copper and other dominant and trace elements.  The two chief compounds 
                                                 
28 Allison Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, Its Alloys, and Compounds (New York: 
Hafner Publishing, 1970), 21. 
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are oxides (copper plus oxygen) and sulfides (copper plus sulfur).   Chemically combined 
in those compounds are often other elements that need to be removed in the roasting or 
smelting process because of their detrimental effects on the final metal or their individual 
economic value.  An inclusion of arsenic, for example, a common trace element found in 
many copper compounds and a significant, pre-bronze hardening agent for early copper 
users, of just 0.4% will reduce the electrical conductivity of the final metal by 50%.29
On the other hand, small amounts of gold and silver, also found in combination 
with copper, are often recoverable in the smelting process leading to enhanced 
revenues.
   
30  In some cases, the recovery of an ancillary element grew so significant that it 
made copper the by-product.  The Ducktown Sulfur, Copper, and Iron Company, for 
example, was founded to produce copper but ultimately earned more income from the 
sale of sulfuric acid.31
 While the first large-scale American copper mining endeavors worked native 
coppers, the vast majority of the world’s copper, dating back to the Bronze Age, came 
initially from oxide and later sulfide ores.  By the mid 1950s, chemists had identified 165 
different copper compounds, but only 16 were considered rich enough for commercial 
extraction.
 
32
                                                 
29Charles P. Bacha, Joseph L. Schwalje, and Anthony J. Del Mastro,  Elements of Engineering Materials 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), 144. 
  Nearly all non-native ore bodies originally formed as sulfide deposits, many 
with sections close to the surface directly exposed to the air or covered by an easily 
identifiable iron-rich gossan layer.  Through the weathering action of rain and wind, 
30 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 14. 
31 Stuart W. Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee," ed. Division of Geology, the State 
of Tennessee Department of Conservation, Information Circular (Nashville, Tenn: State of Tennessee, 
1966), 26. 
32 Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, Its Alloys, and Compounds, 21. 
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many of the exposed or near-surface sulfide ore bodies were converted to oxides as the 
sulfur was leached out or reacted with oxygen.33  This process tended to leave oxide ores 
near the surface of many ore beds that were easy to mine and smelt and became the first 
copper ores sought by the earliest copper smelters.34   Just below the oxidized layer was 
often a layer of sulfide ore that had been enriched by the copper leachates of the upper 
layers.35
 
  Then, below the rich sulfide layer, less rich sub-layers of the original deposit 
that, although often very large, ultimately became too lean to mine.   (See Table 1.1 and 
Figure 1.1)  
Melting and Smelting 
 All copper produced, with the exception of hammered native copper, was initially 
processed in a molten state.   In general, most smelting throughout history, including the 
practice used with Michigan’s native copper, has been a thermodynamic process to 
physically and chemically drive off waste materials and purify the metal.   Initially, some 
form of concentration or pre-smelting sorting was applied to reduce the levels of waste 
the smelters would need to process.  These steps included crushing ore and physically 
removing waste materials or using chemicals to leach copper from low-concentration 
ores.  More complex compounds, however, often required more extensive concentrating  
 
                                                 
33  Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 8; Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, 23; and 
H. O. Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924), 65. 
34 William Gowland, "The Metals in Antiquity," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great 
Britain and Ireland 42 (1912), 239, and Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 8. 
35 Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, 23; Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 8. 
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Table 1.1 
Copper Compounds36
 
 
Mineral Composition Copper content 
Native Copper Cu 100%  
Sulfide Minerals 
 Chalcocite Cu2S 79.8 
 Covellite CuS 66.4 
 Bornite Cu5FeS4 63.3 
 Tennantite Cu12As4S13 51.6 
 Enargite Cu3(As,Sb)S4 48.3 
 Tetrahedrite Cu12Sb4S13 45.8 
 Chalcopyrite CuFeS2 34.5 
Oxide Minerals 
 Cuprite Cu2O 88.8 
 Tenorite CuO 79.9 
 Atacamite Cu2Cl(OH)3 59.5 
 Malachite CuCO3Cu(OH)2 57.3 
 Brochantite Cu4SO4(OH)6 56.2 
 Azurite 2CuCO3CU(OH)2 55.1 
 Antlerite Cu3SO4(OH)4 54.0 
 Chrysocolla CuSiO3.2H2O 36.0 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, 22. 
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Figure 1.1 Typical Sulfide Deposit. Ergani Maden, Turkey.  (After Tylecote 1976, 8) 
 
and smelting to drive off contaminates and gangue materials.  These processes sometimes 
required multiple steps and could take up to several weeks to complete. 
 With the exception of small deposits of native copper on the surface, such as 
glacially dislodged float copper, all copper minerals and ores needed to be mined or 
otherwise physically removed from the ground.  These processes could be as simple as 
chiseling pieces off large exposed masses, as complex as hard rock underground mining, 
or as extensive as open pit mining very lean ores.  Once above ground, the ores went 
through some form of concentrating to remove gangue and limit the waste material 
entering the smelter.  Early, small-batch copper makers simply hand-removed the waste 
materials, while later more complex mills crushed or pulverized the ores and first used 
water and then, as techniques advanced, chemicals to separate the copper compounds.  
With the exception of a few 20th century processes, all separated copper compounds were 
Iron-rich Gossan Layer 
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then subjected to extensive heat during smelting, to melt the mineral and remove gangue.
 The smelting process usually required several basic steps, depending on ore type, 
and ultimately coalesced into two distinct smelting traditions based on either a blast 
furnace smelter, that mixed the ores directly with the fuel (discussed in Chapter 2), or a 
reverberatory smelter, that separated the fuel from the copper and directed, or 
reverberated, the heat from combustion over the pooled copper ore to melt it without 
cross contamination (discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
Native and Oxide Smelting 
 Native copper from Lake Superior required relatively simple smelting.  The large 
masses of pure copper were placed in removable-top reverberatory furnaces, melted, 
slagged, and drawn off into ingots or other useable shapes.  As the dominant form of 
copper changed from large masses of pure native copper to ores, the smelting process 
changed as well.  Michigan’s pure amygdaloidal and conglomerate coppers were found in 
a gangue mixture where they comprised only 1-3% by weight.  These coppers required a 
mechanical form of concentrating after mining, generally at a stamp mill.  Then the 
concentrated materials, now 60-80% copper, were melted in a reverberatory furnace to 
avoid direct fuel contact, skimmed of slag, “rabbled” or paddle-mixed to induce the 
oxidation of any remaining impurities from the gangue, then “poled” by placing green 
hardwood into the molten copper to remove any remaining oxygen left from the rabbling.  
40 
 
The oxygen combined with the wood’s carbon to form carbon dioxide and was exhausted 
through the stack leaving pure copper to be drawn off into shapes or ingots.37
 The general process for smelting oxide ores of copper was nearly as simple as the 
native copper process.   Oxides, often of relatively high copper concentrations, were 
generally charged directly with a carboniferous fuel in a blast or stack furnace where the 
carbon atoms, freed during combustion, easily combined with the oxygen in the copper 
ore, resulting in an oxygen-free metal and carbon dioxide waste gas.  Often smelters 
varied the mixture of ores charged into the furnace to achieve better results, such as 
adding self-fluxing rock to avoid the need for additional non-ore fluxes to form and draw 
off slag.
   
38 Sulfide ores were occasionally used in the mix, likely in a reverberatory 
furnace, to create sulfur dioxide waste gases to encourage some oxygen removal, and 
metallic copper matte, an intermediate smelter product anywhere from 40-90% pure, that 
would then need further refining.39
2CuO + C → 2Cu + CO2
  The general formula for oxide reduction, in this case 
for tenorite, is: 
40
Sulfide Smelting 
 
 Native copper and oxides, however, were minority ores; sulfides were (and are) 
considerably more plentiful and have accounted for up to 90% of ores mined.  The 
sulfides were also more complicated to smelt and generally served as the impetus for 
                                                 
37 Henry D. Conant, "Copper-Smelting Practice in Lake Superior Region," Mining and Engineering World 
35 (1911), 294. 
38 Edward Dyer Peters, Modern Copper Smelting (New York: The Scientific Publishing Co., 1898), 608. 
39 Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper, 245. 
40 Joan Day and R. F. Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals (London: The Institute of Metals, 
1991), 133. 
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most technological developments in copper metallurgy.41  Sulfur, in even small amounts, 
reduces the ductility of copper and increases its melting point, just the opposite of small 
amounts of tin.  Because most copper ores contain significant amounts of sulfur, it 
became imperative to remove as much of it as possible.  As a result, sulfide smelting 
evolved into a multi-stage process.  Following concentration, sulfides ores were roasted 
to drive off the majority of the sulfur.  Because sulfur is flammable, roasting was often a 
self perpetuating operation that ultimately ended on its own when most of the sulfur had 
been driven off as sulfur dioxide.  Without additional heat to speed up the process, like 
the Welsh used in a reverberatory furnace, roasting the ore in open heaps, a hallmark of 
smelting for 5000 years, could take many weeks.42  The roasted ore was then melted, 
sometimes with fresh ore (as with oxide smelting) to facilitate waste removal, in a 
furnace to “fuse” the copper.  Slag, made up of mostly gangue and other waste products, 
was skimmed off.  This 40-90% pure, intermediate copper, referred to as “matte” or 
“regulus,” and required a second, higher temperature firing in a furnace to further oxidize 
remaining waste products to produce a 95-99% pure copper called blister if it came from 
a reverberatory furnace or black if it came from a blast furnace. 43
                                                 
41 A. K. Biswas and W. G. Davenport, Extractive Metallurgy of Copper (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1980), 1. 
  For most needs, this 
copper required a further refining step to increase the purity to 99.9% and eliminate the 
detrimental effects of other minerals on the copper. 
42 William Henry Greenwood, A Manual of Metallurgy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875), 57. 
43 Peters, Modern Copper Smelting, 224.  This is a quite generalized version of the process which, prior to 
the industrial revolution, could require multiple roastings and intermediate smeltings prior to a series of 
refining smelts to purify the metal.  In some cases, this process could take up to one year.  
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 During the initial roasting, some of the copper sulfides are converted to copper 
oxides when the sulfur is driven off: 
2CuS + 3O2 → 2CuO + 2SO244
These new oxides then combine with additional (fresh) sulfides, as described above, to 
form pure copper and more sulfur dioxide: 
 
2Cu2O + Cu2S → 6Cu + SO245
 As evident from these simple equations and Table 1.1, copious amounts of sulfur 
are often combined with copper in the sulfide ores.  For nearly 5400 years, this element 
was permitted to drift off from the roasting process into the atmosphere.  Sulfur dioxide 
smoke, when oxidized to form sulfur trioxide, condensed in the upper atmosphere and 
returned to the earth in the form of acid rain, often distributed over wide areas:   
 
SO3 + H2O → H2SO4  (sulfuric acid)  
By the late 19th century, smelters had perfected the industrial recovery and oxidation of 
sulfur and its conversion into sulfuric acid.  But sulfur recovery was not a universally 
accepted or desired practice for smelters until governments forced the issue and a market 
developed for sulfuric acid.  Until then, blowing smoke and acid rain emanating from 
copper production destroyed crops, forests, and generally weakened surrounding 
ecosystems leading to some of the earliest environmental lawsuits.  In addition to sulfur, 
arsenic and lead are common elements found in copper compounds, and mercury and 
acids are often combined in gangue or used in the smelting or refining processes.  As 
                                                 
44 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 133.  These equations represent generalizations 
for a simple sulfide ore.  Later, medieval- and industrial-period processes evolved to work complex 
chalcopyritic ores and will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
45 Ibid., 133. 
43 
 
smelting got progressively more sophisticated and as ores got leaner, new material 
combinations and chemical processes were developed to ensure greater efficiency in 
copper recovery, often utilizing hazardous compounds that, after use, were often 
discarded into the local landscape.   
 In addition to smoke and chemical pollution, a portion of the copper escaped 
processing and ended up in concentrations posing a potential threat.  Although copper 
ingestion was less probable, harmful, and lethal than lead historically, copper, in small 
doses is a necessary component of several bodily proteins.  Copper deficiency in 
newborns can lead to death, but an excess of copper, called copper toxicosis, can lead to 
gastro-intestinal disruptions, epidermal reactions, or fatal liver disease. 46
The more dangerous by-products of copper smelting, however, were, as 
mentioned above, the atmospheric distribution of sulfur-heavy smoke from the roasting 
and smelting processes leading to respiratory ailments, some cancers, and extensive 
environmental degradation, and the release of lead, arsenic, and mercury, each a lethal 
neurological or carcinogenic toxins. 
   
 
 
                                                 
46 I. Herbert Scheinberg, "Human Health Effects of Copper," in Copper in the Environment, ed. Jerome O. 
Nriagu (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 19 and 25. 
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CHAPTER 2.  A SHORT HISTORY OF COPPER SMELTING 
THROUGH 1640 
 
In that remote age when man was unacquainted with metals, and his implements 
and weapons were fashioned of wood, of stone, and of bone, he has been 
regarded as a mere savage, scarcely, if at all, removed in intelligence from the 
wild animals with which he had to contend; and although this may perhaps be 
near the truth as regards the man of early Paleolithic times, it is hardly a fair 
designation for the man of the later stages of the Neolithic period, 
notwithstanding that even he had made but little advance in what are termed the 
civilized arts…Such were the men who were the first rude metallurgists.47
 -W. Gowland, 1912 (“Copper and Its Alloys in Early Times,” 11) 
   
 
 Four significant events in the early development of metallurgy first occurred in 
and around southwest Asia and likely spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere.  Some 
of these developments, but not all, also occurred independently, but later, in the Western 
Hemisphere.  The first was the recognition that metals, especially copper, which, in pure 
native form is estimated at 200 times more prevalent in the earth’s crust than native gold 
and 625 times more prevalent than native silver, held specific advantages for lithic-based 
societies.48
                                                 
47 W. Gowland, "Copper and Its Alloys in Early Times," Journal of the Institute of Metals 7 (1912), 11. 
  While native coppers were not necessarily stronger or sharper than the stone 
tools and weapons they would eventually replace, they were malleable and shapeable 
with stone hammers and, with repeated heat treating, hammering, and quenching, could 
be worked and reworked into useful implements with relatively tough edges.  The 
adoption of native copper occurred at different times in different regions, but it is likely 
48 Clair C. Patterson, "Native Copper, Silver, and Gold Accessible to Early Metallurgists," American 
Antiquity 36, no. 3 (1971), 297.  These values do not take into consideration Lake Superior native coppers 
which did not lead to a smelting tradition until the 1840s and, of course, were not available to Near Eastern 
metallurgists.  Considering all available copper in the earth’s crust, according to Patterson, native copper 
would be around 12,000 times more prevalent than gold and 5000 times more prevalent than silver.  
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that Africa, southwest Asia, China, Russia, and North and South America each adopted 
metal use independently.49
 The second major step and likely one of the most significant developments for 
early civilizations was the innovation of smelting and the extrication of metallic copper 
from ore.   The first smelters occurred in southwest Asia and, over two thousand years, 
likely diffused along trade networks across the Mediterranean, Europe, Africa, and East 
Asia.  While scholars debate the trade routes used for the diffusion of metallurgy and 
argue whether or not China, Africa, and Europe separately developed smelting at about 
the same time as or shortly after Southwest Asia, archaeological evidence clearly 
suggests that pre-colonial South America did develop an independent smelting tradition, 
but that North America, home to the world’s largest deposits of native copper and a cold 
working and annealing tradition, did not.
   
50
 The third step was the addition of alloying elements, initially accidental, that 
significantly increased the hardness and reduced the brittleness of copper to make the 
metal considerably more useful than stone or pure copper for tools, weapons, hardware, 
and implements.  The first arsenical copper alloys and tin-bronzes produced 
systematically in large quantities likely came out of the Middle East but spread quickly 
throughout the rest of the Eastern Hemisphere.  Interestingly, China and the British Isles 
with rich copper and tin deposits probably skipped a copper age altogether and, when 
   
                                                 
49R. F. Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 1st ed. (London: Institute of Metals, 1976), 2, and William 
Gowland, "The Metals in Antiquity," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and 
Ireland 42 (1912), 236. 
50  See Paul T. Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1995), and Robert Raymond, Out of the Fiery Furnace: The Impact of Metals on the History of 
Mankind (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986). 
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smelting technology finally reached there, went directly into a bronze age.51
 The fourth step was the development of sulfide ore smelting.  With this 
innovation, copper smelting grew considerably more complex, requiring multiple 
preparatory steps before charging a furnace, but the development, as shown in Chapter 1, 
also significantly increased the amount of copper available to ancient societies.   With 
much more widespread metallurgical activities, increased weapons production, and 
elaborate economic systems based on trade, civilizations grew more powerful and 
wealthy, ultimately contributing to the formation of kingdoms and empires. 
  
Archaeological evidence suggests that South America also reached a bronze age before 
Spanish colonization, but, unlike Europe, Asia, and Africa, would not develop an iron age 
prior to contact.   
 
Early Smelting 
 Copper smelting’s exact origins are a mystery.  Some late 19th- and early 20th- 
century British metallurgists insisted that metal smelting began accidently in a campfire 
ringed with copper oxides and went so far as to give the dimensions of that first fire.  
Others stipulated that the campfire had to be located on a hill or used on a very windy day 
to take advantage of increased air velocity.52  More practical scholars, however, argued 
that even wind-blown hillside campfires could not produce enough heat to reduce copper 
from ore.53
                                                 
51 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 25-26; Gowland, "The Metals in Antiquity," 252. 
  The more likely “accidental” discovery scenario placed the location at a 
52 Gowland, "Copper and Its Alloys in Early Times," 24. 
53 H. H. Coghlan, "Some Experiments on the Origin of Early Copper," Man 39, July (1939), 106. 
48 
 
pottery.   Kilns, which had been around longer than smelters and operated with a similar 
flue-draft as reverberatory furnaces would, generated enough heat under the right 
conditions to fuse clay and melt certain stone types.  Since powdered copper oxide glazes 
were prized for their blue coloration, the first copper was likely reduced from an excess 
of glaze at a pottery or from experimentation after the probably kiln-discovery of metallic 
lead, whose oxides were also used for glazing material and reduced at a significantly 
lower temperature than copper oxides.54
 Many metal historians place the origins of copper smelting in the 6th millennium 
BCE in Anatolia (modern Turkey) or neighboring Iran based on scattered 
archaeologically dated slags.  Although the scale of production at these sites strongly 
suggests some form of organized metallurgical activity, these remains cannot be 
conclusively associated with smelting because the slags could have resulted from a 
native-copper melting process, and no associated furnaces or artifactual evidence have 
been documented from that period.   The earliest undisputed evidence dates the birth of 
smelting to sometime prior to 3500 BCE. 
    
55    Analyses of copper artifacts from this 
period reveal certain chemical compounds that could only be created through an ore-
reduction process.  Further complicating the temporal origins of metallurgy, no complete 
remains of a smelting furnace are found before the Egyptian “New Kingdom” period 
from the 14th to 12th centuries BCE.   By this time, however, the Eurasian trade networks 
had spread copper smelting across much of Europe and China. 56
                                                 
54 Ibid., 197. 
 
55 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 5. 
56 Ibid., 29. 
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Early Metallurgy 
 Copper as a pure metal is generally too soft for practical tool making and weapon 
use and tended to be employed initially for ornamentation or simple implements, such as 
pins, that did not require high-strength.  The primary means to modify the form of pure 
copper, hammering with stone tools, often caused brittleness, resulting in a weak 
structure and ultimately an unusable edge.  Early metallurgists in the Middle East, and 
independently in North and South America, however, soon discovered that the 
combination of hammering and annealing increased copper’s characteristic hardness.57
 Despite the advances made in working pure copper, its hardness and durability 
was still lower than some stone tools.  In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, pure copper 
was replaced by copper produced from arsenic-contaminated ore as early as 3500 BCE.  
Copper Age smelters learned through trial and error that certain ore-types produced a 
superior final metal even if they were not exactly sure why.   These arsenic 
“contaminated” coppers, referred to as arsenical copper or sometimes arsenical bronze, 
  
Annealing, a practice in wide use today, involved the slow heating of a metal to a specific 
temperature range that reduced or “relaxed” the stresses inherent in a hammered metal’s 
surface.  These steps produced a stronger material which, following repeated hammering 
and annealing, could be worked into functional tools or weapons with much more durable 
edges and would not fail as easily under high impacts. 
                                                 
57 Frank Hamilton Cushing, "Primitive Copper Working: An Experimental Study," American 
Anthropologist 7, no. 1 (1894), 94; Susan R. Martin, Wonderful Power : The Story of Ancient Copper 
Working in the Lake Superior Basin, Great Lakes Books (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 
123. 
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could be hardened with stone hammers faster and remained stronger than pure annealed 
copper, resulting in even tougher and less brittle edges. 58
 As copper’s importance increased, techniques of smelting and metal working 
spread.  One key feature of the early metal trade was the advent of the crucible furnace to 
remelt copper ingots.  Copper workers took raw standardized ingots—the direct, 
relatively pure product of the smelters—and placed them in ceramic crucibles (bowls).  
They either covered the crucibles with charcoal in a furnace or placed them in an open 
charcoal mound to melt the copper under a blast.
    
59
 The next major change in copper production, and arguably the most important to 
date, occurred with the combination of tin and copper to produce bronze.   The addition 
of small amounts of tin more than doubled the hardness and strength of pure copper while 
lowering its melting point, making the alloy much more advantageous for working and 
  While this was not a significant 
technological departure from smelting furnaces, it was a notable event because it created 
a two-step process and, with large crucibles, ultimately led to a means for melting and 
casting greater volumes of molten metal than a single smelter heat produced.  Later metal 
workers used the process (or a similar one) to create specific alloys or recover precious 
metals found in many copper ores.   The key trade-advantage was that these simple 
crucible furnaces could be built anywhere fuel was available, allowing smelter-produced 
ingots to be shipped/traded from copper mining regions to nearly any other location, 
thereby expanding trade and ultimately leading to the earliest metallic currency: 
standardized copper ingots.   
                                                 
58 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 6. 
59 Ibid., 18.  Ingots, as referred to here, are the relatively pure-copper product of smelting furnaces.   
51 
 
casting.60   Many late-19th-century metallurgists and anthropologists simply assumed that 
tin was a similar, albeit rarer, copper ore contaminant as arsenic.  Later archaeologists, 
however, found little evidence of tin-contaminated ore in the Middle East.61  The major 
tin deposits available in the Bronze Age were located in Italy, Bohemia, Saxony, Malaya, 
Nigeria, China, and Cornwall, while South America had deposits in Bolivia.  Evidence 
suggested that early bronzes were mostly arsenical alloys containing minute amounts of 
tin, possibly the result of trace tin-contamination.  True high-tin bronzes, containing 7-
10% tin, which indicate an intentionally created alloy, did not occur until the advent of 
extensive Mediterranean Sea and Danube River trade networks after 3000 BCE.  
Tylecote, Childe, and, to a lesser extent, Dayton suggested that these first, high-tin 
bronzes likely occurred as a result of copper-age smelting spreading to Saxony or 
Cornwall where both copper and tin deposits occur.  While they differ on the origin, all 
three believe that early European metallurgists developed the first bronzes and then 
brought the technique to the Near East when the Europeans began trading tin.62
 
   With the 
growth of tin-alloyed bronze production, arsenical coppers slowly disappeared because 
changes in smelting techniques required to make high-tin bronze tended to oxidize the 
more volatile arsenic early in the process.   
 
 
                                                 
60 See Appendix A for comparative strength details.  
61 Ibid., 14; Gowland, "The Metals in Antiquity," 239. 
62 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 14; V. Gordon Childe, "The Danube Thoroughfare and the Beginning 
of Civilization in Europe," Antiquity 1, no. 1 (1927), 90; J. E. Dayton, "The Problem of Tin in the Ancient 
World," World Archaeology 3, no. 1 (1971), 61. 
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Early Furnaces 
 By the time the first complete smelting furnaces appear in the archaeological 
record between the 14th and 12th centuries BCE, smelting technology had been evolving 
for several millennia, the smelting process had been somewhat standardized with similar 
furnaces and ingot shapes occurring throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, and bronze had 
been in wide use for over a thousand years.  The earliest Bronze Age furnaces were 
generally short, cylindrical shafts roughly two feet tall and two feet in diameter with a 
hemispherical-concave floor, a single tuyere (forced-air nozzle) opening in the furnace 
wall near the bottom, and a slag hole off the front.63  A bellows, likely an animal-skin bag 
or pot, forced air through the tuyere into a charcoal fire in the shaft, and generated 
enough heat to melt the copper ores mixed with the charcoal.  Metal workers then tapped 
the slag, the lighter non-copper waste by-product, at various times during the heat while 
the molten copper settled into the furnace floor.  (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2)  When cooled, 
the metal solidified into a plano-concave ingot, typically 20 – 30 cm (8-12 inches) wide 
and around 3.8 cm (1.5 inches) thick, weighing about 6 kg (13.2 lbs).64  This general 
shape and size eventually became a standard trade currency leading to the advent of 
coins.65
By 1500 BCE, Bronze Age smelters, in an early and significant process 
innovation, were tapping molten copper out the front of the furnace.  This new technique 
offered greater efficiency and fuel savings because the furnace did not have to be cooled  
  (See Figure 2.3)    
                                                 
63 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 29 
64 W. Gowland, "Presidential Address: Copper and Its Alloys in Prehistoric Times," The Journal of the 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 36, Jan-June (1906), 18; Tylecote, A History of 
Metallurgy, 30. 
65 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 29 and 31. 
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  Figure 2.1 Early smelter demonstrating skin-bag bellows.  (After Gowland 1906, 15) 
to remove an ingot from the inside.  Further, the furnace lining remained intact and the 
furnace could be recharged with ore much quicker, approaching a near continuous 
operation and considerably increasing productivity.  Tapping molten copper from the 
furnace into an external ingot-mold ultimately led to a second standard ingot shape, the 
larger, 30-40 kg (65-85 lbs) “ox-hide.”   (See Figure 2.4)  
 Whether smelting had several points of near simultaneous invention or a single 
inventor and multiple diffusers, the process had spread across Europe and Asia by the 2nd 
millennium BCE, leading to expanding demand and pressure on known copper oxide and 
tin ore deposits and a significant increase in cost of bronze.  To alleviate some of the 
growing supply problems, early metallurgists developed new alloys based on specific 
properties needed for specific items.  Weapons and tools, for example, required the 
strength and durability of bronze, but cast artwork, coins, and some implements could use 
softer, less expensive alloys.  Lead, a soft, easily-smelted and highly prized material  
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Figure 2.2 Side view of “New Kingdom” era smelter demonstrating an air-blast tuyere 
and the origination of the plano-concave ingot created when molten copper settled in the 
furnace base.  Not shown here is the notch for drawing off molten slag, although slag 
removal was not necessary to create a plano-concave ingot.  The glassy, hardened slag 
could simply be chipped off the ingot top after the ingot was removed and cooled. (After 
Rothenberg 1990, 39) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Comparison between a typical early Bronze Age plano-concave ingot 
(left) and a typical late Bronze Age ox-hide ingot (right).  (After Tylecote 1976, 31, and 
Bass 1961, 87.) 
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produced in greater amounts than all other non-ferrous metals combined through the 19th 
century AD, became a key component of emerging metal technologies.  In addition to its 
eventual use in architectural, plumbing, and household vessels, it found its way into cast 
bronze artwork, which often had high lead concentrations.  Coins, too, were often bronze-
lead or leaded bronze-gold alloys.66  In a similar fashion centuries later, Romans reacting 
to the high price of tin significantly expanded production of the copper-zinc alloy, brass, 
which produced a softer alloy than bronze and was used mostly for growing coin 
production and mirrors. 67
 The next significant development was the shift to sulfide ores.  As shown in 
Figure 1.1, an enriched layer of copper sulfide often existed below oxide layers of typical 
  
                                                 
66 J. H. Gladstone, "On the Transition from the Use of Copper to That of Bronze," The Journal of the 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 26 (1897), 313; Gowland, "Presidential Address: 
Copper and Its Alloys in Prehistoric Times," 40. 
67 Gowland, "Presidential Address: Copper and Its Alloys in Prehistoric Times," 32. 
Figure 2.4 Typical late Bronze Age and Roman era smelting furnace capable of 
producing an ox-hide ingot.  Note separate slag and metal tap holes.  (After Tylecote 
1976, 21) 
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deposits.  While the first copper sulfide use is as undateable as the origin of smelting, 
Austrian and Irish archaeological sites from 1200 BCE and southwest Asian sites as early 
as 2500 BCE demonstrate clear evidence of roasting, a necessary component of sulfide 
ore processing.68   Since many copper ore deposits have been worked for centuries, 
however, it is unclear exactly when early miners reached sulfide layers.  Nonetheless, the 
advent of sulfide ore smelting does not seem to be treated with much reverence in 
historical accounts of the early metal age despite its importance in significantly 
increasing the availability of copper.  Patterson, for one, simply suggests that the growth 
of empires around 3000 BCE required a significant increase in the production of weapons 
and tools and that bronze production expanded equally.  This growth eventually 
consumed known deposits of easily smelted oxide ores, exposing the more complex, 
albeit richer, sulfide deposits below.69
 By the start of the Iron Age (1500-1000 BCE), the key components of copper 
sulfide smelting and working had been established: mining-roasting-smelting and 
alloying, casting, and working.  But iron’s vast availability, ease of smelting, and key 
strength properties saw it replace copper and bronze for many items, primarily hammered 
weapons, tools, and hardware.  Early ironmasters, however, could not reach iron’s 
melting point and for most castings, especially sculpture, copper alloys still dominated.  
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 29; Patterson, "Native Copper, Silver, and Gold Accessible to Early 
Metallurgists," 286. 
69 Patterson, "Native Copper, Silver, and Gold Accessible to Early Metallurgists," 310. 
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Trade and Empire 
 Trade and empire-building played key roles in the evolution and diffusion of 
copper smelting technology from its inception through the Middle Ages.  Extensive trade 
networks developed in the ancient world, supplying regions poor in some products and 
raw materials from richer regions in exchange for other goods and materials.  Copper-rich 
regions traded for tin and other alloying ingredients and exported copper, bronze, and 
eventually brass throughout the Eastern Hemisphere.  Like many other trade-goods, 
copper ingots evolved into currency which, like precious metals, eventually developed 
into coins.  Trading cultures likely first used the Mediterranean Sea but later ventured up 
the Danube River, exploring and prospecting for minerals to feed growing demand.  The 
Danube, according to Childe and Dayton, became a key throughway to Central Europe 
after Ice Age glacial barriers retreated in the early Bronze Age, opening easy overland 
routes to Europe from the Near East.  Several writers, including Dayton and Childe, 
argue that the Eastern metallurgists took copper smelting up the Danube and there 
developed the first bronzes sometime after 3000 BCE. 70
 Coinciding with the growth of trade, increasing populations, and stronger metallic 
weaponry, regions began to organize politically and dominate neighboring regions, 
ultimately leading to the formation of kingdoms, then empires.  With the growth of 
  While the origin of tin in the 
first bronzes is debated, tin ores in Saxony and Bohemia proved significant during the 
Bronze Age. 
                                                 
70 Dayton, "The Problem of Tin in the Ancient World," 61; V. Gordon Childe, "The Danube Thoroughfare 
and the Beginning of Civilization in Europe," 81.  While both writers agree that non-Europeans developed 
the first high-tin bronzes from European tin, they differ on the origin of the non-Europeans. 
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empires, the need for metals expanded dramatically.  While the Egyptians, Trojans, 
Phoenicians, and Greeks each increased the world’s demand for copper and bronze, the 
extensive military, civilian, and political organization of the Roman Empire raised 
demand for copper and other metals to a scale never before reached and not to be seen 
again for nearly 800 years.  The growth of the Roman Empire caused a substantial 
expansion of the organization and production of metal extraction and working, including 
a substantial increase in zinc, tin, copper, lead, iron, bronze, and brass use.71   In addition 
to Italian, Cypriot, and Middle Eastern mines, the Romans opened or expanded extensive 
mineral deposits in Rio Tinto (Spain), Germany, Hungry, and Cornwall (United 
Kingdom).  The Romans used copper alloys for general construction, adornment, and art, 
and to supplement iron and steel weapons and armor and, in significant amounts, in 
coins.72   One “tentative” estimate is that the total copper produced by the Romans 
between 250 BCE and 350 CE represented close to 10% of all the copper produced from 
the dawn of the copper age through 1900.73
 
  
Early Environmental Degradation  
 With the great expansion of empire and metal works came environmental 
consequences and landscape degradation, some of which were recognized at the time.  
                                                 
71 Andrew Wilson, "Machines, Power, and the Ancient Economy," The Journal of Roman Studies 92 
(2002), 17.  
72 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 53.  
73 S. Hong et al., "A Reconstruction of Changes in Copper Production and Copper Emissions to the 
Atmosphere During the Past 7000 Years," The Science of the Total Environment 188, no. 2-3 (1996), 185.  
This estimate carries a rather large margin of error.  The authors refer to their conclusions as “tentative” 
and their data, which were developed using secondary sources suggesting copper production based on slag 
waste at Roman sites and the author’s own research into copper pollution recorded in Greenland ice, as 
merely “approximations.”       
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The most obvious change related to deforestation.  Mining and smelting activities 
required considerable quantities of wood for roasting, furnace fuel, and mine-timbering.  
One scholar estimated that given the amount of slag on Cyprus, metal production was 
capable of completely deforesting the island 16 times over a 3500 year period.74  Based 
on Rio Tinto slags, another scholar estimated a total timber requirement of 100 million 
tons for charcoal production alone over the course of ancient and Roman mining.75
 Another more recent study examined the toxic effluent of mining and smelting in 
the Rio Tinto estuary over 5000 years.  This study concluded that elevated levels of 
copper and zinc already existed in water and sediments more than 2000 years before 
large-scale 19th and 20th century open-pit mining.  Oysters and clams, they found, 
survived amid these toxic conditions, suggesting a direct link between mining 
contaminants and human intake.
   
76   Similar studies have been conducted in Tuscany, 
examining unusually high arsenic levels near mining and smelting sites (discussed 
below), and in Jordan and Cyprus, tracking the bio-accumulation of 5000 years of copper 
and lead production.77
                                                 
74 Michael Rice Jones, "Oxhide Ingots, Copper Production, and the Mediterranean Trade in Copper and 
Other Materials in the Bronze Age" (MS. Thesis, Texas A&M, 2007), 128.  As summarized by Jones, the 
chief criticism of this account is the word “deforestation.”  The critics claim that some sort of woodland 
management was paramount to sustain works for so long and that the island was likely never completely 
deforested.   None, however, seem to be arguing against the copious amounts of wood consumed given the 
amount of slag. 
 
75Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production, 194. 
76R. A. Davis Jr et al., "Rio Tinto Esturary (Spain): 5000 Years of Pollution," Environmental Geology 39, 
no. 10 (2000), 1115. 
77 See Andreal Manasse and Marcello Mellini, "Chemical and Textural Characterisation of Medieval Slags 
from the Massa Marittima Smelting Sites (Tuscany, Italy)," Journal of Cultural Heritage 3, (2002), 187-
206; J. P. Grattan, D. D. Gilbertson, and C. O. Hunt, "The Local and Global Dimensions of Metalliferous 
Pollution Derived from a Reconstruction of an Eight Thousand Year Record of Copper Smelting and 
Mining at a Desert-Mountain Frontier in Southern Jordan," Journal of Archaeological Science 34, no. 1 
(2007), 83-110; F. B. Pyatt et al., "The Heavy Metal Content of Skeletons from an Ancient Metalliferous 
Polluted Area in Southern Jordan with Particular Reference to Bioaccumulation and Human Health," 
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 The more serious and pressing environmental problem of metal production, 
however, was not mining but the pervasive smoke emanating from smelting works.  Early 
copper and bronze works used open roasting and smelting processes that, prior to the 20th 
century, lost up to 15 percent of its metal.78   This copper tended to be vaporized and 
dispersed into the atmosphere with little immediate effect on human heath, but long-term 
soil contamination and bioaccumulation posed more significant lingering problems.79  
The effects of sulfur smoke from open roasting and smelting processes should have 
created critical concerns for people living near metal works.  While sulfur-specific 
criticism does not enter the written record until the second millennium AD, early writers 
did complain about the dangers of mining and smelting related-air pollution in general.  
Nriagu, for instance, noted that Xenophon and Lucretius observed the noxious emissions 
from metal mines in Greece, and that Pliny declared that smelter emissions were 
dangerous to animals, especially dogs.80  While these examples are not specific to copper, 
all metal working, including precious metals, iron, lead, and copper contributed to a 
Roman edict forbidding metal works in the city because of unhealthy emissions.  These 
conditions ultimately led to the oft quoted Roman law, “Aerem corrupere non licet” or 
“polluting air is not allowed.”81
                                                                                                                                                 
Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 60, no. 3 (2005), 295-300; and F. B. Pyatt, "Copper and Lead 
Bioaccumulation by Acacia Retinoides and Eucalyptus Torquata in Sites Contaminated as a Consequence 
of Extensive Ancient Mining Activities in Cyprus," Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 50, no. 1 
(2001), 60-64. 
    
78Hong et al., "A Reconstruction of Changes in Copper Production and Copper Emissions to the 
Atmosphere During the Past 7000 Years," 248.  
79 See Pyatt, “Copper and Lead Bioaccumulation,” (2001), 60-64. 
80Jerome O. Nriagu, "Global Metal Pollution: Poisoning the Biosphere," Environment 32, no. 7 (1990), 8.   
81E. Borsos et al., "Anthropogenic Air Pollution in Ancient Times," ACTA Climatologica Et Chorologica 
(Universitatis Szegediensis, Szeged, Hungary: Universitatis Szegediensis, 2003), 8.  
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 The Roman Empire provided the highest expression of metal working to date.  
Copper, bronze, brass, lead, and eventually iron all reached peaks of efficiency and 
production.  Following the fall of Rome, however, the western world slipped into the 
dark ages and smelting declined.  The Rio Tinto mines, for example, had produced 
copper, gold, silver, lead, and tin for nearly 3000 years before Spain fell to the Visigoths 
in the 5th century CE.  The Visigoths likely used central European mines for metals, 
leaving the Rio Tinto sites abandoned and unworked.82    Similarly, Italian and Cypriot 
copper mines and works saw production declines and stoppages following the fall of the 
empire.83  Coins, an important use for non-ferrous metals, provide further evidence of a 
significant drop in copper production because Roman coins continued in circulation for 
hundreds of years following the empire’s decline before new European states began 
minting their own.84
 Following the fall of the Roman Empire, Western copper production declined 
significantly, but in the East, Chinese dynasties grew more powerful and increased 
copper production through the first millennium, dominating world metal production.  
China’s earliest copper works date to 2500-2000 BCE, possibly the result of trade routes 
through Russia to southwest Asia.  Like Saxony and Cornwall, China had tin deposits 
quite close to copper deposits, and when smelting developed there, China jumped right 
into a Bronze Age.  Tylecote suggests that China’s great advances in metallurgy, such as 
the first blast furnaces and water-powered bellows, supported the growth of its dynasties 
   
                                                 
82F. R. Morral, "A Mini-History of the Rio Tinto (Spain) Region," CIM Bulletin 83, no. 935 (1990), 150. 
83Mellini and Marcello, "Chemical and Textural Characterisation of Medieval Slags,” 187. 
84 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 59. 
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and empires and eventually spread to Europe.85  Like Rome, demand for metals grew 
with large-scale political organization, and China’s metallurgists responded with 
significant advances.86   China’s output levels during the Sung Dynasty in the 9thcentury 
had been unequaled since the first century BCE.   But the Mongol invasions of the 14th 
century eroded the empire, discontinued coin usage, and with it, large-scale production of 
metals.87
 
   
The German Method 
 Despite the decline in Roman copper production and the abandonment of sites in 
Spain, Tuscany, and Cyprus, many copper mining and smelting operations likely 
continued to produce metal, albeit on a lesser scale, during the migration period.  The 
dominant European political groups in the mid and late first millennium were Germanic 
and Slavic tribes from Central and Eastern Europe, and Moors from southwest Asia and 
Africa.  Not empire builders like the Romans were, these groups at first were more 
transient and migratory.  Even after their populations grew, stabilized, and became more 
settled, they tended to control much smaller territorial areas than Rome. 
 From the fall of Rome until the resumption of large-scale metal production in the 
late medieval period, little, according to Tylecote, is known about non-ferrous 
metallurgy.88
                                                 
85Ibid., 70. 
  Although it is unclear exactly where migration-period cultures obtained 
their metals, by the turn of the first millennium CE, Germany had clearly begun 
86Ibid., 36. 
87Martin Lynch, Mining in World History (London: Reaktion, 2002), 14.  
88 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 69 
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dominating Western mining and metallurgy.  Whether or not the Bronze and Iron Age 
Bohemian and Saxon mines continued to be worked immediately after the fall of Rome is 
unclear, but by the 9th and 10th century significant non-ferrous ore bodies were worked in 
the region.  
These new mines soon altered the course of German metallurgy.  Lodes in both 
Saxony’s Harz Mountain and the Saxon/Bohemian Freiberg region were primarily silver, 
but also contained significant copper, tin, and lead.89   Much of the silver and copper 
from these regions was converted into currency that, some suggest, contributed directly to 
the financing of the Renaissance.90   Demand for metals was so high beginning around 
1000 CE, and the German lodes so rich, that miners and metallurgists overcame such 
significant production obstacles as dewatering mines and separating the rich mix of 
metals from their complex ores.   Ultimately, these developments led to the emergence of 
new metallurgical and mining techniques and the diffusion of German practices between 
1000 and 1220 AD to new copper mines and smelters in Tuscany, Sweden, Hungary, and 
several Saxon/Bohemian areas.91
 The German or Continental Method of copper smelting named to distinguish the 
process from later Welsh Methods, likely evolved between 1000 and 1220 CE from a 
concentration of mining and smelting activities in the mountains around Saxony linked to 
significant copper and bronze production centers. Technologically, roasting, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, remained an open-air process, and the smelters largely resembled the 
 
                                                 
89 Raymond, Out of the Fiery Furnace: The Impact of Metals on the History of Mankind, 98-99. 
90 Ibid., 102. 
91 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 69-70. 
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furnaces used by the Romans with few significant changes other than an increased stack 
height and masonry construction.92  (See Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6)   
 
Figure 2.5 German multiple-bin ore roasting ca. 1550.  (After Agricola93
 
 1950, 350)   
While the physical components remained the same, just an order of scale larger, 
key aspects of the overall process evolved dramatically.  Newly formed kingdoms, some 
perpetually short on cash, strove to maximize mining, especially of metals that could be 
turned into coin.94
 
  Metallurgists developed more efficient processes to retrieve 
recoverable amounts of precious or useful base metals (that could also be significant 
wealth generators), to minimize copper lost to slag and waste materials, and to further 
purify copper leading to better performing final alloys.    
                                                 
92 Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production, 172, and Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 93.  
Tylecote states that these furnaces were merely adaptations of Roman iron furnaces. 
93 Hoover Translation of Agricola, Georgius. De re metallica. (New York: Dover Publications, 1950).  
94 Lynch, Mining in World History, 30.  
65 
 
 
Figure 2.6 German smelting ca. 1550s.  Note similarities to the late Bronze Age furnace 
in Figure 2.4.  Except for stack height and the arrangement of the furnaces to better use 
water power for air blasts, the process appears little changed.  (After Agricola 1950, 389.) 
 
 One of the significant process changes standardized by 1400 CE was the water-
powered blast.  This feature produced higher temperatures, greater output capacity, and 
the potential for more continuous operation.  The timing of the first water-powered blast 
in the West is unclear.  Rome may have used water power for mine pumping and ore 
processing, and, although not formally documented, they may have used it to power 
bellows as well.95  These features, however, may have been lost in the Dark Ages, only to 
be “re-discovered” or re-introduced later in the millennium.96
                                                 
95 See Andrew Wilson, "Machines, Power, and the Ancient Economy," The Journal of Roman Studies 92 
(2002), 1-31. 
 (See Figure 2.7) 
96Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 64. 
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Figure 2.7 Water-driven bellows ca. 1550s used to power smelting furnaces, similar to 
those in Figure 2.6, located on opposite side of wall.  (After Agricola 1950, 359) 
   
Early German Technologies 
 The basic German smelting process was similar to the Roman, flowing from 
roasting, to blast furnace smelting, to refining, but, unlike the ancient methods, it required 
several more steps to recover precious metals and purify the copper.  Following mining 
and concentrating, iron-rich copper sulfide ore was calcined or roasted in heaps to drive 
off some sulfur as sulfur dioxide smoke.  Sulfur, which is flammable, would continue to 
burn once ignited for up to 30 days according to Tylecote or 10 weeks according to 
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Greenwood.97
Next, smelters tapped the molten matte from the furnace, and, after it cooled, they 
broke up the matte and resmelted it several times in combination with new ore, iron 
pyrites (sulfide), and quartz flux to enrich the copper content and encourage the 
formation of iron oxides that combined with the quartz to form slag.  During these early 
operations furnace operators also added lead or lead ores to alloy with silver.  This lead-
silver combination had a lower melting point than the copper and flowed out of the 
furnace before any copper melted.   The easily melted lead would then be similarly 
separated from the silver, flowing out of a liquation furnace at a low temperature, leaving 
behind relatively pure silver.   
  These now partially desulfurized ores, still containing some un-roasted 
sulfides, would be reduced in a blast furnace over a 12-hour period to a matte, a partially 
smelted intermediate metallic compound containing copper sulfides, iron sulfides, and 
slag.   
After numerous smelting operations, the resultant matte “cakes” were mostly CuS 
(60-90% copper) and iron sulfide.  The matte was then subjected to four additional 
roastings, each one hotter than the last, to further drive off sulfur and oxidize copper and 
iron.  Halfway through the roasting process, the crushed pieces were remelted or “fused” 
in another blast furnace, where most of the remaining iron was converted to oxide and 
slagged.  The copper matte was then roasted three more times to drive off the last 
remaining sulfur, leaving behind a full copper oxide that was then sent to a blast furnace 
for final smelting resulting in a 90-95% pure “black” copper.  This copper, however, was 
                                                 
97 Ibid., 90; William Henry Greenwood, A Manual of Metallurgy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1875), 
50.  Other sources claim that roasting could take months.  The variation is likely due to differing heap sizes. 
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still not pure enough for most uses and required a final refining that usually included the 
introduction of green wood poles into the reverberatory furnace’s molten copper pool to 
induce any remaining oxygen to bind with the wood’s carbon and form carbon dioxide.98   
This very long and complicated process is diagramed in Figure 2.8.  By the 19th century, 
Swedish metallurgists had improved the German Method by reducing the several early 
furnace meltings to a single fusion in a large blast furnace after the initial roasting and a 
single final fusion after the intermediate roastings.99
 
    
Spread and Diffusion 
 Like the Romans, German miners carried or transferred their mining and smelting 
technology throughout Europe.   Unlike the Romans, however, German miners operated 
between independent, autonomous political entities with economies based primarily on 
trade.   Many of the medieval German smelters settled in mining regions of other states or 
were recruited by states hoping to emulate German metal productivity.  Other smelters 
helped establish a basic industry abroad and then returned home.  A second critical 
method of transfer, not used by Rome, occurred through published manuscripts 
describing mining and smelting techniques.  Theophilus’ On Divers Arts (1100) and 
Agricola’s De Re Metallica (1556) were both medieval German metallurgical texts, and 
Vannoccio Biringuccio’s Pirotechnia (1540) was an Italian text describing similar 
contemporary metallurgical procedures.   
                                                 
98 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 93. 
99 Greenwood, A Manual of Metallurgy, 50-54. 
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Figure 2.8 German Copper Smelting Process ca. 1550 (Source: Author) 
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Figure 2.8 Notes:   
 
A.  Fuel (Charcoal) is required at each roasting and smelting phase and quartz flux is 
added to the blast furnaces to bind with the iron oxides and facilitate slag formation and 
removal. 
 
B.  The initial roast only partially converts the iron pyrite and chalcopyrite (copper-iron 
sulfide) found in the ore to oxides and releases sulfur dioxide. 100
[4FeS4 + 11O2→2Fe2O3 + 8SO2] 
   
[4CuFeS2 + 7O2 → 2Fe2O3 + 4CuS + 4SO2] 
 
C.  Between blast furnace steps, the matte is cooled, broken up, and put in the next 
furnace with fresh ores, new iron pyrites, and quartz flux to convert the fresh ore and 
remaining unroasted chalcopyrite to CuS, convert the iron pyrite to iron sulfides and 
slaggable iron oxide, and release sulfur dioxide  [CuFeS2 + 5O2 + 2FeS4 → CuS + FeS + 2FeO + 
4SO2].  Often copper-rich iron oxide slag is returned to one of the blast furnace steps. 
 
D.  Between roasting steps, the matte is broken and crushed and fed into the next roaster, 
operating at a higher temperature, before being fused in the blast furnace.  These steps 
convert all the CuS from (B) and (C) to copper oxide, the remaining iron sulfide to iron 
oxide, and the free sulfur to sulfur dioxide [CuS + FeS + 3O2 → CuO + FeO + 2SO2].  Here, 
too, copper rich slag may be returned to an earlier blast furnace step. 
 
E. The final blast furnace step completes the smelting process by reducing the copper 
oxide to black copper and carbon dioxide [CuO + CO → Cu + CO2].  This copper required a 
refining step to reach 99-99.9% purity.   
 
Day and Tylecote cite three additional key Middle Age German texts, Nutzlich 
Berbüchlin and Probierbüchlien, both anonymous revisions of earlier metallurgical 
works, and Ercker’s Beschreibung Allerfürnemstem Mineralischen (1574), which in 1683 
John Pettus translated into English as Fleta Minor, indicating Britain’s reliance on 
continental techniques for post-medieval metallurgy. 101
                                                 
100 Chemical equations from Craddock, Early Metal Mining and Production, 149-150.  These are general 
equations for chalcopyrite, a common copper ore, and not necessarily consistent among German method 
smelters. 
    
101 Joan Day and R. F. Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals (London: The Institute of Metals, 
1991), 2. 
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 Despite the resources and information contained in published works, access was 
limited not only to those with the ability to read, but, outside of Germany, to those 
readers who could understand and interpret German or Latin.  Therefore most 
implementations of continental smelting methods tended to require the movement of 
skilled workers.  In addition to work at Massa Marittima in Tuscany and other historic 
Roman copper districts throughout the Mediterranean, German workers ventured to other 
areas that would eventually come to dominate world copper production, be recognized 
for significant pollution, and in the 20th and 21st centuries become important heritage 
sites.  The first, Falun, Sweden, like the reopened mines in Tuscany, was a German 
mining and smelting success and used and improved the continental method over several 
centuries.  The second, in the Lake District, United Kingdom, would, for many reasons, 
ultimately fail to implement German methods.  Welsh metallurgists would eventually 
borrow an element of German technology, the reverberatory furnace, and use it to create 
a completely new system that would rival, and then dominate world copper production 
for a century.  (See Chapter 3.) 
 
Massa Marittima, Tuscany 
 Etruscans and Romans mined and smelted copper, lead, and silver ores in 
Tuscany starting in the 8th century BCE and ending with the decline of Rome.  German 
miners and metallurgists restarted mining and smelting in the region in 1115 CE when the 
region became part of the Holy Roman Empire.102
                                                 
102Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 69. 
  Tylecote claimed the process used 
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there at the time was a precursor to the method Agricola described two centuries later and 
suggested it was the first documented procedure to include the intermediate matting step.  
That is, after initial calcining, furnace workers smelted the ore in a shaft furnace several 
times to create an impure matte, as described above, which was then refined in a 
reverberatory furnace.103  The region successfully implemented a system of manufacture 
based on imported German methods though at least the 14th century.104
 Recent attempts have been made, like the studies of the Rio Tinto estuary 
discussed above, to link high arsenic levels in the rivers flowing from Massa Marittima 
and its associated smelting areas to medieval copper smelting, focusing on the disposal of 
slag and the airborne disbursement of arsenic from historic roasting and initial smelting 
processes. The findings, however, have ultimately proved inconclusive.
   
105
 
 
Falun, Sweden 
 Falun, one of the longest-lived mining districts in the last two thousand years, and 
now a World Heritage Site, first began copper production in the 8th century CE and 
continued into the late 20th century.  The oldest surviving document, however, dates only 
to the 1288 formal incorporation of a mining firm.  While Massa Marittima was part of 
the German-dominated Holy Roman Empire, Sweden was independent, but still attracted 
and sustained German workers from the 13th century.  As German copper output began to 
wane in the 15th and 16th centuries, the 800 year old Swedish metal industry, including 
                                                 
103 R. F. Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, Second ed. (The Institute of Materials, 1992), 83. 
104 Manasse, "Chemical and Textural Characterization of Medieval Slags from the Massa Marittima 
Smelting Sites (Tuscany, Italy)," 187. 
105Pilario Costagliola et al., "Impact of Ancient Metal Smelting on Arsenic Pollution in the Pecora River 
Valley, Southern Tuscany, Italy," Applied Geochemistry 23, no. 5 (2008), 1254-1255. 
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copper from Falun, came, for a short time, to dominate world output.  By the mid 17th 
century, Falun was producing 70% of the world’s copper, and its exports helped finance 
Sweden’s involvement in the Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648).  Falun ultimately housed 
140 smelting furnaces and numerous ore roasting stalls using the system originally 
installed by the Germans. 106
 The high and lengthy production in Falun left considerable toxic residue on the 
landscape.  Ek and her group found high concentrations of mining- and smelting-related 
copper, lead, and zinc in regional soils especially near mine sites suggesting airborne 
disbursement.  They also found high concentrations of copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, and 
sulfur in lake sediments, likely from waste dumping or leaching.   More dramatic, 
however, the group estimated that the considerable emissions of sulfur dioxide from 
roasting and smelting processes over 800 years peaked around 1630 and only 
significantly declined with the advent of sulfur recovery and sulfuric acid production in 
1850.
   
107
Ek’s study supports Brovallius’ claims in his 1743 treatise, Some findings and 
comments on the smoke from the roasters in Falun, that the sulfur smell of the roasters 
could be detected 80 km from the city and that the process completely devegetated the 
area around the mine.
   
108
                                                 
106ICOMOS, "Evaluations of Cultural Properties," ed. Bureau of Cultural Properties World Heritage 
Convention (UNESCO, 2001), 96-97. 
   Similarly, the Swedish naturalist Carl von Linne wrote in 1734:   
107Anna S. Ek et al., "Environmental Effects of One Thousand Years of Copper Production at Falun, 
Central Sweden," Ambio 30, no. 2 (2001),  97. Falun Smelters released an estimated 40,000 tons of 
SO2/year during peak production years from 1620-1640. The authors, however, caution that these numbers 
represent less than 10% of national SO2 peaks in the 1970s.   
108 Ibid., 98. 
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“Never has any poet been able to describe Styx, Regnum Subterraneum and 
Plutonis, nor any theologus hell as gruesome as we can see it here. For outside a 
poisonous, acrid and sulfurous smoke rises and poisons the air far and wide so 
that one cannot without pains go there. The smoke corrodes the earth, so that no 
plants can grow around”109
 
   
Similar descriptions, albeit on a lesser scale, could probably be applied to smaller and 
shorter-lived copper smelting sites from the Roman period onwards. 
 Massa Marittima, Falun, and several Saxon mine sites all benefited from the 
growth and standardization of German mining and smelting techniques partially due to 
similar mining conditions and rich, accessible lodes.  In fact, these were some of the 
longest-lived and most productive copper sites in the pre-modern era.  But not all efforts 
to transplant the German system were successful.  Most notably, the attempt to introduce 
continental-style smelting techniques to Britain, a region with nearly as long a mining 
and smelting tradition as Germany, failed.   
 
UK-Lake District 
 The output of German mines in Saxony and Bohemia began to slow by the mid-
16th century partially due to the combined effects of wars, revolutions, and reformations.  
But attempts to introduce the fuel-intensive German process into Britain in the 1560s, 
during a period of dwindling British timber supplies and high wood demand from navy 
ship-builders and ironmasters’ blast furnaces, proved challenging.   This was because 
conditions in England differed significantly from the continent, not simply because of a 
                                                 
109 Quoted in Ibid., 96. 
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lack of fuel, but the rich British copper deposits the Germans tired to exploit proved too 
deep to reach at the time.   
 The attempt to import continental techniques into England took several decades.  
The first attempt to introduce a copper industry into Britain failed to lure German 
smelters, forcing Henry VIII to continue to rely on continental sources for copper and 
brass.   Further attempts to initiate German mining also failed under both Edward VI and 
Mary I.110  But in 1561, responding to brass demands from woolen textile card-makers, 
Elizabeth I finally succeeded.  By 1564, Germans had established a mining, ore-dressing, 
and a six-furnace continental smelting operation in Keswick in the Lake District.111  Like 
their European counterparts, smelters in Keswick roasted sulfide ores in the open air and 
melted them in a water-powered blast furnace, then roasted the output six more times, 
followed by eight more meltings, with lead added during one of the heats to extract 
silver.112
 The introduction of the German method, however, was beset with difficulties 
from the start.   The imported German miners, for a variety of reasons, did not include a 
refining phase in the production process.  Whether charcoal shortages drove this decision 
or the miners simply wanted to take black copper back to Germany for final processing to 
   The chief difference was the use of coal- and peat-fuel early in the process to 
conserve wood resources and reserve charcoal for only the final smeltings.   
                                                 
110 Bruce Donald Maxwell, Elizabethan Copper : The History of the Company of Mines Royal 1568-1605 
(London: Pergamon P., 1955), 11. 
111 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 135. 
112Ibid., 135. 
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bolster a declining industry at home, the copper produced in Keswick was not suitable for 
brass production and ultimately did not curb imports, mostly coming from Sweden.113
The accessibility of ore also proved to be a problem.  Much of the rich British 
copper ores were located well below the water table, unlike the German lodes that tended 
be found in mountainous regions where mines could be drained of water using gravity 
and a series of tunnels.  Without a means to dewater mines, the accessible Lake District 
copper ore soon diminished.
 
114  Other areas with known deposits, like Cornwall, suffered 
partially because of deep lodes and a lack of local fuels.  Ultimately, high-fuel costs led 
to high Lake District copper prices, and the unrefined, low quality of its black copper led 
to limited demand and poor sales.115
 The Keswick copper mines and smelters operated, like the rest of the industry in 
England, on a “small and erratic scale” until the 1640s.
   
116   A second smelting district 
opened in Neath, southern Wales, to work some of the Cornish ores.  Here, too, German 
miners, traveling from Keswick, established a system based on continental methods.  But, 
here too they ultimately suffered from a lack of accessible ore and constant fuel 
shortages, although, Tylecote speculates, the operation may have used an experimental 
reverberatory furnace.117  However the contributions made to the British industry are 
measured, by 1610 all the German works had closed and the miners returned home.118
                                                 
113 Ibid., 136-137. 
   
114 G. Hammersley, "Technique or Economy; the Rise and Decline of the Early English Copper Industry," 
Business History 15, no. 1 (1973), 2. 
115 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 8. 
116 Hammersley, "Technique or Economy; the Rise and Decline of the Early English Copper Industry,"  1. 
117 Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, 94.  
118Ibid., 9. 
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 In any case, by 1640 two key problems—the lack of adequate fuel supplies and 
water associated with deep ore lodes— had killed the British copper industry.  These two 
obstacles would be addressed with the successful adoption of coal fuel and the 
implementation of the steam engine pump over the next century.   While British 
historians see these two components as “revolutionizing” the industry, it was also the full 
implementation of another German technology, the reverberatory furnace, that allowed 
coal to “revolutionize” British copper production.   The combination of coal with 
reverberatory furnaces led to a new smelting process that ultimately became know as the 
“Welsh” system.119
 
  
                                                 
119 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 139. 
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CHAPTER 3.  THE WELSH SYSTEM 
Copper was won from its ore by smelting operations which seem rather indecisive 
when compared to the way in which great pigs of iron were regularly born out of 
the belly of the blast furnace.  (Editor’s note accompanying Diderot’s 1766 plates 
on copper smelting) 
 - Charles Gillispie, 1959  
 
 In A Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industries (1959), historian of 
science Charles Gillispie suggested that 18th-century copper production was somehow 
less decisive, assured, or even dramatic than iron production.120
 Gillispie, enlisting Denis Diderot to further his point, quoted the 18th-century 
encyclopedist, although more a philosopher than a technician, who decried the benighted 
traditionalism of men of ores (implying copper smelters) for remaining “stubbornly 
  Given the complexity of 
copper smelting and the countless process variations based on ore types and fuel and flux 
choices, this appeared true especially when compared with much larger, productive, yet 
simpler iron blast furnaces.  Iron production required only three inputs into the top of a 
furnace—iron ore, carboniferous fuel, and limestone flux—and one input into the lower 
part of the furnace—forced air—to produce significant quantities of metal in just one 
relatively short heat lasting only a matter of hours.  Copper production, after evolving for 
5000 years, still required no less than six, but often more than twelve, steps including 
multiple and varied inputs, multiple roastings, and multiple heats that could last, in total, 
up to a month or more.   
                                                 
120Charles C. Gillispie, ed., Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industry (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1959), Plate 139.  Gillispie, while not quoting directly, may be paraphrasing Diderot’s other 
writings by using the word “indecisive” to describe 18th century copper smelting, which by 1959 should not 
have been considered indecisive at all, especially by a historian of science, but rather very complex, 
specific, and determined.  
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attached to their old methods…because there are none whose methods are less 
enlightened.”121
 
  While clearly a metaphor for social evolution during the Enlightenment, 
Diderot either did not grasp or chose not to recognize the significant changes to copper 
smelting developing in his own lifetime.  It is true that the first application of coke to 
blast furnaces (1709) merely half a century before the publication of Diderot’s 
Encyclopédia significantly changed iron making, but the application of the reverberatory 
furnace in Wales and the rapidly evolving Welsh smelting system in Diderot’s own time 
had a similar effect on copper production.  While the reverberatory furnace was not a new 
development in the late 17th century, the Welsh system’s reliance on it was, and the new 
methods ultimately led Wales to world production dominance in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, especially as productive regions using the German system began declining. 
The Reverberatory Furnace 
 The reverberatory furnace was not a new invention when incorporated into the 
Welsh system.  In fact, different industrial processes had used some variation of this 
furnace for thousands of years.  Its key features included a separate combustion chamber 
that isolated fuel and its potential contaminants from the materials being melted in the 
hearth and a heat distribution system that reflected heat off the furnace ceiling down onto 
the hearth without mixing the combustion gases with the melt.  In most cases, the furnace 
relied on a natural draft created by a tall stack (flue) located opposite the combustion 
chamber to draw air into the fire, distribute heat along the furnace ceiling, and vent the  
                                                 
121Ibid, Plate 140.  Translated, quoted, yet uncited by Gillispie accompanying a plate on copper smelting.  
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waste gasses.  (See Figure 3.1)  These 
features kept the hearth materials free 
from impurities found in the fuel and, 
as such, permitted use of a much 
greater diversity of fuels and, in most 
cases, resulted in a much purer metal.  
In addition, the flue-draft arrangement 
allowed smelters to locate furnace sites 
virtually anywhere because they did not have to be tied to streams for water power to 
drive blast-furnace bellows. 
 Coghlan suggested that early pottery kilns, the likely source of the first copper 
smelters, evolved into reverberatory-style furnaces with separate combustion and hearth-
chambers and a flue chimney providing the draft.122  By the Roman period, pottery kilns 
had evolved into fairly sophisticated furnaces with reflective square-vaulted or circular-
domed hearths, heated from below by a separate fire box directing heat (and smoke) 
through a grated floor.  A small opening in the top of the dome served as a smoke release 
and flue.123
                                                 
122 H. H. Coghlan, "Some Experiments on the Origin of Early Copper," Man 39, no. July (1939), 107. 
  (See Figure 3.2)   
123 Henry Beauchamp Walters and Samuel Birch, History Ancient Pottery, Greek, Etruscan, and Roman, 2 
vols. (London: J. Murray, 1905), 444. 
Figure 3.1 Typical Reverberatory 
Furnace Arrangement (Source: Author) 
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 Theophilus was the first known 
western writer to describe a furnace 
primarily using reverberated or reflected 
heat.  These furnaces, found in glass 
production, dated to the 12th century and 
operated similar to Roman pottery kilns with 
separate fire boxes, but were longer and 
more rectilinear with only a slightly concave 
ceiling.  The heat of combustion, instead of 
being directed through the hearth floor from below, traveled along the furnace ceiling 
reflecting downward similar to later, true-reverberatory furnaces.124   (See Figure 3.3)    
While Theophilus did not specify the draft arrangement of the glass furnace, he described 
a brass-making crucible furnace that, like a reverberatory furnace, drew air into the fire 
through an induced draft from the furnace flue.125
 The earliest intentional application of reverberatory furnaces to metallurgy 
remains a mystery.  Since the technology existed and was widely known prior to the 
Roman Empire, it is likely that early metallurgists knew of the glass-maker’s and potter’s 
furnaces and their ability to reach high melting temperatures.  While metal works would 
have found two main features of the reverberatory furnace, a separate fuel box and a 
natural flue-draft advantageous, the chief drawback to the potters furnace, its high fuel  
 
                                                 
124 Theophilus, On Divers Arts; the Treatise of Theophilus, trans. John G. Hawthorne and Cyril Stanley 
Smith, Dover Publications, Inc.  1979 reprint ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 50. 
125 Ibid., 141. 
Figure 3.2  Roman Era Pottery Kiln 
(After Walters 1905, 444) 
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Figure 3.3 12th Century Glass Furnace.   
(After Hawthorne and Smith in Theophilus 1963, 50) 
 
consumption, may have rendered it too expensive to adapt, especially while the blast 
furnace and abundant wood resources proved adequate.  A further problem could have 
been the complexity of the reduction and oxidation reactions which may have been too 
difficult to control (if understood at all) in early reverberatory furnaces.  They would still 
plague the furnace in the late 17th-century British copper industry.   
 Given these limitations, metallurgists for millennia tended to focus on improving 
known blast-furnace technology.  But the advantages of the reverberatory furnace 
eventually overcame the difficulties, and the first metallurgical application of the furnace 
likely occurred when users required a less contaminated, purer metal or alloy than a blast 
furnace could produce.  British metallurgical historian R.F. Tylecote suggests that metal 
Fire 
Ash 
Pit 
Hearth 
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workers at Massa Marittima (Italy) used a reverberatory furnace for copper refining 
possibly as the early as the 12th century, and that the melting furnace depicted in the 14th 
century York Minster Bell Founder’s Window (UK) is reverberatory.126   Similarly, 
Jenkins cites two German reverberatory furnaces used primarily for bronze melting and 
smelting in gun-foundries as early as the 1480s, and a Leonardo da Vinci sketch of a 
furnace with a separate fire-box dates from that same period.127
 In any case, by 1540 the reverberatory furnace had become a known and 
advanced feature of some metal works as evident by the discussion in Biringuccio’s 
Pirotechnia.  Biringuccio notes the furnace’s use in roasting and smelting ores and in the 
remelting and production of bronze.  He also describes Leonardo da Vinci’s plan to use 
reverberatory furnaces to cast a bronze colossus horse for the Duke of Milan.
      
128  
Agricola, however, does not mention the reverberatory furnace directly in De re 
Metallica (1556), but hints at it by including a drawing of a domed roasting furnace with 
a separated fire box inside the hearth.129  In another section, Agricola describes a Saxon 
furnace, “not unlike a baking oven,” fueled through a hole in the back of the hearth used 
to smelt lead.130
                                                 
126 R. F. Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, Second ed. (The Institute of Materials, 1992), 83-84. 
  Baking ovens of the period looked very similar to Roman pottery kilns 
with domed roofs and offset fires, the technology was well suited and well timed for new 
development with new fuels. 
127 R. Jenkins, "The Reverberatory Furnace with Coal Fuel," Transactions of the Newcomen Society 14 
(1934), 68.   
128 Vannoccio Biringuccio, The Pirotechnia of Vannoccio Biringuccio (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 
1966),151, 281, 285.  Leonardo da Vinci never completed the sculpture because a war with France led to 
the occupation of the castle. 
129 Jenkins, "The Reverberatory Furnace with Coal Fuel," 68. 
130 Georgius Agricola, De Re Metallica, trans. Herbert Hoover (New York,: Dover Publications, 1950), 
391. 
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The Welsh System 
 The Welsh system evolved in the United Kingdom over the 18th century based on 
three developments: (1) the successful adoption of the coal-fired reverberatory furnace in 
place of German-system blast furnaces, (2) a significant legal reversal, and (3) growing 
demand for copper in specific markets.   Historians have well documented the British 
wood crisis of the 16th and 17th centuries and the significant boost coal-fuel provided to 
industrial output and technological development in Britain.  The adoption of the 
reverberatory furnace was part of this transition.  A key component of the 16th- and 17th-
century failure of German process blast-furnaces in the British copper industry was 
inadequate fuel for the furnaces and insufficient capability to dewater deep mines.  
Smelting English and Cornish copper with coal-fired reverberatory furnaces and the 
eventual pumping of mine waters with Welsh-coal-fired steam engines solved both of 
these bottlenecks in United Kingdom copper production. (See Figure 3.4) 
 Nearly as important, the British government reversed the 1568 monopolies it had 
granted to the Society of the Mines Royal and the Society of the Mineral and Battery 
Works to operate mining and smelting works, and manufacture brass.131
                                                 
131 G. Hammersley, "Technique or Economy; the Rise and Decline of the Early English Copper Industry," 
Business History 15, no. 1 (1973), 3. 
  Prior to 
instilling a patent system in the 17th century, the crown used monopolies to protect 
investments and encourage new development, ultimately intending to end the country’s 
reliance, in this particular case, on imported copper.  As discussed in Chapter 2,   
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however, attempts to create new copper production systems failed, and the monopolies 
actually stifled new development instead of encouraging it.  In 1689, Parliament passed 
the Mines Royal Act, substantially limiting the rights and powers of the former 
monopolies.  This act, combined with improving reverberatory smelting techniques, 
finally made copper production “commercially possible” for many small producers and 
led to substantially increased output starting in the 1690s.132
                                                 
132 Joan Day and R. F. Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals (London: The Institute of Metals, 
1991), 140 
   
Figure 3.4  Location of British and Welsh Coal and Copper Deposits  
(After Day and Tylecote 1991, 132) 
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 In the early 17th century, Parliament shifted from assigning monopolies to 
granting patents to encourage industrial development.  Like monopolies, patents 
protected early innovators, but unlike monopolies, the patent system permitted others to 
develop alternative industrial processes for the same ultimate output.  Even though many 
of the alternative methods were efforts to sidestep royalty payments to patent holders, 
new technologies and innovations followed.   
 The emergence of three new key markets for copper in the 18th century further 
contributed to the evolution of the Welsh system.  First, several copper smelters began 
operations in the late 17th and early 18th centuries focused on producing a purer copper to 
be used in the growing brass industry.  While smelters were scattered throughout western 
England, Wales, and Cornwall, the production of brass tended to be centered on Bristol 
and the Bristol Brass Company, which dominated the regional industry for most of the 
18th century.  Royal Mint contracts formed a second key new market for copper but the 
copper-alloy coins produced for the Mint did not require as high a grade of copper as 
brass works.  The dominant contractor was the Governor and Company Copper Miners in 
England or, more commonly, the English Copper Company.  This market, however, was 
not as regionally fixed as the brass market and tended to have facilities closer to London.  
The third market to develop in the late 18th century was the ship sheathing and cladding 
industry centered in northern Wales.  It used copper sheet to protect wooden-hulled ships 
from rot and marine encrustations.  Here, too, a very pure copper was not required, but 
substantial rolling and nail-production processes were. 
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 Despite new market demands and a continuing fuel shortage, the reverberatory 
furnace was not an immediate success.  Yes, it could be fired with multiple fuels, giving 
it a distinct advantage over blast furnaces, but for the first twenty years of its use in 
copper smelting, it proved difficult to operate and did not eliminate the impurities in the 
ore necessary for good brass.133
 Day and Tylecote date the first successful reverberatory copper smelter to the late 
1680s in Bristol.  There, lead smelter operator Lord Grandison invoked his patent rights 
and forced Clement Clerke to stop smelting lead with coal in a reverberatory furnace.  
Undeterred, Clerke simply developed a very similar copper smelting system and was 
issued a patent in 1687 for “a new invention, being severall sorts of furnaces, vesels, 
wayes and meanes that never before were knowne.”
   
134  Although Clerke’s Bristol copper 
works failed to survive beyond 1697, it left behind two important legacies.  John Coster, 
the technician largely credited with successfully implementing Clerke’s copper 
reverberatory furnaces, left the company shortly after 1687 and, by 1691, had opened the 
Upper Redbrook works in southeastern Wales.  The second legacy was the Lower 
Redbrook works, opened by the English Copper Company in 1691 in nearly the same 
location as Coster’s, with patent rights purchased from the Clerkes.135
                                                 
133 G. Hammersley, "The Effect of Technical Change in the British Copper Industry between the Sixteenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries," Journal of European Economic History 20 (1991), 161. 
  This feature of 
locating competing works in direct proximity to each other became a hallmark of the 
industry since companies could rely on a density of skilled labor and the knowledge base 
of a stable technical community.   
134 Quoted in Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 138. 
135 Ibid., 139. 
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 Coster’s Upper Redbrook system relied mostly on reverberatory furnaces with the 
exception of the final refining, which used a shaft furnace because his copper was 
primarily destined for the Esher Brassworks outside London, which required a highly 
pure metal still not attainable in a reverberatory furnace alone at the time.   While 
Tylecote considers the Upper Redbrook arrangement a transitional step between the 
continental system and the Welsh system, he also suggests that the use of the blast 
furnace could have been a means to either avoid paying patent royalties to the Clerkes or, 
more likely, an indication that he was prevented from using the system patented by the 
Clerkes.136   The English Copper Company, on the other hand, purchased inventions from 
and ultimately hired Gabriel Wayne, a former colleague of Coster, to manage its Lower 
Redbrook works.  Beginning in the 1690s, Wayne produced coinage copper for the Royal 
Mint using multiple reverberatory roastings and smeltings similar to the Clerke patent.  
Although the smelter was a key producer, ore-supply problems prompted Wayne to leave 
a few years later for Bristol, where he opened a smelter in Conham just north of the city 
in 1696.137
 In 1706, a fourth significant smelter operation opened at Crew’s Hole outside 
Bristol to access cheap coal and feed growing copper demand.  If Tylecote felt the Upper 
Redbrook works was a transitional site, then he would have clearly believed that the 
Crew’s Hole works demonstrated, by 1725, the first concrete elements of Welsh system.   
Not only were its furnaces bigger than the three earlier works, but the smelting process 
had evolved more completely. A Crew’s Hole smelter run began by roasting a selection 
   
                                                 
136 Ibid., 143. 
137 Ibid., 141.   
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of high-sulfur ores in a large reverberatory furnace before mixing the ores with higher 
grade unroasted ores, lime, silica, and slag from previous runs in a reverberatory melting 
furnace.  The resultant matte was broken up and furnace-roasted for up to 24 hours before 
the temperature was increased to melt the roasted matte.  The copper was then slagged, 
allowed to cool, and broken up again while some of the rich slag was saved for the next 
furnace heat.  This process was repeated up to 20 times until the necessary grade of 
copper was reached.  This copper was then refined in a small reverberatory furnace 
fueled in the first part of the heat with coal and then charcoal, before the copper was 
poled to reach a high purity.138
 By 1754 the basic elements of the Welsh system had been developed, but as an 
industry, it was still in its formative stage.  Through the end of the century, new British 
copper smelting districts opened, but these failed to fully mature because the cost of fuel 
was too high (Cornwall), the cost of ore was too high or ran out (northern Wales), or both 
(London).  While Cornwall and London never posed much threat to the growing southern 
Welsh smelting industry, the Anglesey region in northern Wales did.  Controlled by 
Thomas Williams, the new Parys Mine Company built or took over several smelting 
operations in and around Liverpool in the 1780s, to add to its growing mining interests in 
Anglesey.  The company also acquired the Upper Banks works in Swansea in 1782.  
With the growth of the ship-cladding market for tropical-going naval ships and, later, 
merchant vessels, the Parys Mine group developed new smelting procedures for copper 
destined for rolling mills, then patented processes for rolling copper sheet and 
  
                                                 
138 Ibid, 145. 
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manufacturing copper nails and bolts.139   Just as mine production was beginning to 
decline in Anglesey, Williams died, and in 1802 the company began, like many others, to 
focus its attention on its Swansea works.  Within 12 years it had closed most of its 
northern Welsh mines and smelters, maintaining only works in the south.140
 One by one, the major British copper smelting works located outside of southern 
Wales either closed altogether, or by 1800, had moved to or purchased additional works 
in southern Wales.  The English Copper Company bought a Swansea works in 1739, the 
Pays Mining Company in 1782, and Bristol Brass in 1793.  Appreciating the advantages 
of southern Wales, more than 15 separate copper smelting works operated along the 
Tawe River in or near Swansea between 1717 and 1928, and over 13 other major 
industrial works opened including important steel and tin-plate works. 
   
141  By 1845, 
Swansea smelters were producing 55% of the world’s copper and, at its peak in 1860, the 
industry operated 600 furnaces in the region.142  The population of the area also boomed 
growing from 900 in the 1540s to 10,117 in 1801 to 152,619 in 1911.143
 
   
Swansea 
 
 The River Tawe and its port city Swansea offered significant advantages to 
industries relying on shipping-based imports and exports.   The river itself provided deep 
                                                 
139 J. R. Harris, "Copper and Shipping in the Eighteenth Century," The Economic History Review 19, no. 3 
(1966), 558. 
140 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 156-157. 
141 City and County of Swansea, A Short History of the Hafod Works (Welsh Assembly Government, 
2007), 6-7 (insert).   
142 Gerald Gabb, Lower Swansea Valley Factsheet 7: The Rise and Fall of the Copper Industry (Swansea: 
Swansea Museum's Service, unknown date), 4.  In mid century, eight other Welsh smelters operated in 
Llanely and Neath, and eight northern English smelters operated in Amlwch (Anglesey), Liverpool, St. 
Helens, and Cheadle.  (Percy, 1861, 307) 
143 Swansea, A Short History of the Hafod Works, 2 (insert). 
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water access a significant distance up-stream, allowing works to be built farther up from 
the port city.  With the growth of industry, the region offered smelter owners and 
mangers access to industrial labor and technical expertise.  Most important for copper 
works, Swansea’s regional coal fields were closer to Cornish and Devon copper deposits 
than any other coal region.  However, the key to the success of southern Wales lay not 
simply in geographical advantages, but in the development of a system of smelting based 
on the nuances of local fuels, the importation of new ore from sources from around the 
globe, and the creation of new markets for copper.   
 The growth of capitalism and steam-power were particularly important to 
Swansea.  Steam-power made the manufacture of smaller market-goods much cheaper.  
Inexpensive silver-plated, stamped-copperware, for example, became much more 
accessible as a silverware substitute, and stamped copperware pans and other utensils 
became affordable to the working classes.  The spread of the steam-engine and steam-
locomotives and steamships increased the demand for copper boiler plates, copper piping, 
and brass cylinders.  Cheap copper and the even cheaper Muntz metal (36-45% Zinc) 
made copper sheathing for building roofs and ship’s hulls available on a much greater 
scale, and the spread of the international slave trade required substantial inputs of copper 
trinkets and trade goods—all driving the need for increased copper smelting and 
encouraging attempts to improve the industry.144
 The advantages to copper smelters in the Swansea district were manifold, 
especially as world demand for copper grew and continental copper production fell.  The 
  
                                                 
144 Stephen Hughes, Copperopolis : Landscapes of the Early Industrial Period in Swansea (Aberystwyth, 
Ceredigion: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales, 2000), 36, 38. 
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first successful reverberatory smelter to operate in the area ran from 1694 to 1717 in 
nearby Neath, home to a short-lived 16th century German smelter works.  After the latter 
works closed, two of the partners opened a smelter in Landore in 1726, about one mile up 
the Tawe from Swansea-proper.  The new owners, including John Morris, successfully 
operated the site over twenty years, firmly establishing both the smelting district and the 
wealth of the Morris Family, who would become one of the dominant Swansea family 
firms.145
 District growth and continental decline through the 18th century continued, and by 
1810, the United Kingdom produced four times the combined copper output of the former 
major producers: Germany, Sweden, and Norway.
  In 1734, the Costers opened a Neath smelter to process matte produced at their 
Hayle (Cornwall) works.  This site was purchased by the English Copper Company in 
1739, at the same time the Coster family began constructing the White Rock works in 
Swansea.    
146
 Many of the Welsh smelter works, including those in the Tawe River valley were 
ultimately managed by a succession of family firms and partnerships, often for many 
generations.  The Costers and Clerkes, mentioned above, were two of the earliest.  John 
Williams of the Parys Mine Company, his son, or a descendant company dominated by 
the Pasco Grenfell family owned the Upper and Middle Bank works, Landore II, the Rose 
  By the mid-19th century, Swansea 
and the River Tawe Valley were a congested mass of smelter firms and workers housing 
with a substantial pollution problem.  (See Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1)   
                                                 
145 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 150. 
146 Hughes, Copperopolis : Landscapes of the Early Industrial Period in Swansea, 2.  Hughes reports that 
for the decade from 1801-1810, the UK produced 65,000 tons of copper to Sweden’s 7,000, Norway’s 
4,8000, and Germany’s 3,7000. 
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Figure 3.5  Swansea and the  
River Tawe Valley 1840.  
(After Hughes 2000, 15)  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Growth of Copper Smelter 
Industry in Swansea (1717-1928) 
 
 
 Smelter 
Company 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
Landore I 1717 1748 
Cambrian Works 1720 1745 
White Rock 1737 1928 
Forest 1746 1850s 
Middle Bank 1755 1924 
Upper Bank 1757 1928 
Rose 1780 1878 
Birmingham 1793 1833 
Landore II 1793 1876 
Hafod 1810 1924 
Nant-rhyd-y-
Vilias 
1814 1817 
Morfa 1835 1924 
Landore III 1853 1855 
Little Landore 1863 1896 
Llansamlet 1866 1905 
 From: Swansea, A Short History of the 
Hafod Works, page 6-7 inserts. 
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works, and the important Mofra works.147  Similarly, the Morris family or its descendant 
companies owned, at one time, Landore I and II, the Forest works, and important copper 
battery works.148
 The most visible and probably dominant family in Swansea, however, was made 
up of the decadents of smelterman John Vivian.  The Hafod Works, founded by Vivian 
and his sons in 1810, was owned and controlled by the family-firm for its entire 
existence, and the family also purchased the White Rock Works across the river and 
opened additional works in Neath.   The Vivian’s works became, by the mid-19th century, 
the largest smelting operation in the world, challenged in size only by the adjacent Morfa 
works.  As the largest firm, Hafod became most studied and documented works in the 
district and also the primary focus of pollution lawsuits.  
  
 
Welsh System Smelting 
 By the mid 19th century, the Hafod works epitomized the Welsh system.  Its 
smelting furnaces were all reverberatory, but it also used blast furnaces for some 
operations, including refining of copper-rich reverberatory furnace slag—an idea 
borrowed from the Michigan copper district.  Hafod also minimized its use of outside 
fluxing agents by employing a variety of ore mixes imported from throughout the world.  
                                                 
147 Swansea, A Short History of the Hafod Works, 8 (insert). 
148 Hughes, Copperopolis : Landscapes of the Early Industrial Period in Swansea, 17. 
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 Many metallurgical writers documented the Welsh system as practiced at the 
Hafod works in the 1840s and 1850s.  The system used two primary types of 
reverberatory furnaces.  (See Figure 3.6)  The larger calcining furnace was used at 
temperatures below the ore’s melting point for initial roasting to release sulfur, and the 
smaller melting furnace operated at much higher temperatures.  The Vivian’s ultimately 
used four different furnace types based on the two main designs in their process.149
  
   
 
 Another important key in the Welsh system was the complex mix of ores charged 
into the furnace to minimize extra materials needed to create slag and maximize the 
                                                 
149 John Percy, Metallurgy. The Art of Extracting Metals from Their Ores (London,: J. Murray, 1861), 314-
322. 
Figure 3.6  Typical Welsh calcining and melting reverberatory furnaces.   
(After Greenwood 1875, 26, 31, 31) 
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removal of waste material from the copper.  After ores arrived in Swansea, smelters 
assayed the rock to determine its copper, iron, sulfur, and silica or quartz content.  In 
1852, James Napier listed 62 different ores from Cornwall and Devon ranging in content 
from 3.6% to 19.1% copper and 37 different ores from Ireland, Wales, Cuba, Chile, New 
Zealand, and Australia ranging from 8.2% to 58% copper.150  Ten years later, Snowden 
Piggot described a more formalized classification system used at Hafod to rate ores based 
on copper content.151
 
   (See Table 3.2)  
Table 3.2 Ore Classification System used in Swansea in the 1850s. 
 
The basic Welsh process consisted of six primary steps.  (See Figure 3.7 at the 
end of this discussion.)  In the first step (1), smelters mixed the ores based on assayed 
composition.  In the 1850s these included yellow ore, iron pyrites, and hematite from 
                                                 
150 James Napier, "On Copper Smelting," The Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 4 (1852), 48-
49. 
151 A. Snowden Piggot, The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Copper" (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 
1858), 289-290. 
152 Napier, "On Copper Smelting," 454.  Based on Procédés Métallurgiques by M. Le Play, Napier 
described Class III ores as having a low sulfur content requiring no calcination and provided the copper 
content listed.  He also described Class V ores as similar to I with few metallic impurities, listed Class VI 
ores as rich oxides, and Class VII as cobbing, or yard scrap copper. 
Ore Class Copper 
Content 
Description 
I 3-16 % Copper pyrites, high silica gangue 
II 15-25% Richer copper pyrites 
III 12-20%152 Copper pyrites with little additional iron pyrite  
IV 20-30% Copper oxides and carbonates 
V ~80% Rich Chilean and Australian oxides, silica gangue 
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Cornwall; copper and iron pyrites from Devonshire; both  high- and low-grade Cuban 
pyrites; Irish copper oxides (by-product of acid-making); and red oxide and blue and 
green carbonates from Burra-Burra, Australia. This mix was roasted in an oxygen-rich 
environment in a large calcining furnace for up to 24 hours mainly to remove a 
considerable portion of, but not all, the sulfur, which combined with oxygen to form 
sulfur dioxide.  The ores were then quenched with water and pushed through holes in the 
furnace hearth into bins below.153
 In the next step (2), smelters fused the mix in an “ore furnace.”   In general, 
smelter operators wanted only 7-9% copper content going into the first furnace to ensure 
a high slag volume that would remove much of the iron from the melt and ensure the slag 
was largely copper free.
 
154  Smelters took the calcined ore from step (1) and added fresh 
Class III ores and slag recovered from step (4).   This mix was melted in the closed “ore 
furnace” to keep oxidation down, resulting in a matte output, referred to as “coarse 
metal,” nominally 35% copper.  The slag from this step was discarded, and the metal was 
tapped into a vat of water to granulize it in preparation for step (3).155
 The third step (3) was a second 24-hour calcination process to further remove 
sulfur.  The fourth step (4) was the first metallic fusion in the “coarse-metal furnace.”  
This complex step started with calcined granulated coarse metal and added Class IV 
carbonate and Class V oxide ores, as well as rich slags from the roaster (5), fine metal, 
 
                                                 
153 Percy, Metallurgy. The Art of Extracting Metals from Their Ores, 322. 
154 Ibid.,327; Napier, "On Copper Smelting," 193.  A matte content of 50% usually resulted in substantial 
copper remaining in the slag.  By the late 1850s, the Vivians discovered that producing a higher copper 
content matte would save considerable fuel and that the resultant high-copper slag could be refined in a 
blast furnace, a system already in practice for a decade by smelters refining Michigan copper. 
155 Percy, Metallurgy. The Art of Extracting Metals from Their Ores, 323-324. 
99 
 
and refinery (6) furnaces.  The slag produced in this step, which contained some copper, 
was returned to the first fusion furnace in step (2), and the metal was drawn off into pigs 
of “white-metal” that were 75% copper.156
 The Welsh called the fifth step (5) “roasting,” despite the two calcining (or 
roasting) steps already accomplished and the melt that occurred later in this step.  Here 
the white-metal pigs were placed in a melting furnace with the doors open and allowed to 
melt slowly over an eight hour period, fostering oxidation and final sulfur expulsion.  
Any slag produced was saved and returned to step (4).  After slagging, the metal was 
allowed to cool in the furnace to a pasty mass that emitted, according to Percy, a 
“frizzling sound” as gases escaped.  The furnace temperature was then increased and the 
copper, now 95% pure, was melted, slagged, and tapped into pig molds.  As it cooled, the 
copper continued to off-gas, this time leaving a pock-marked surface from bursting gas 
bubbles in the solidifying metal, giving rise to the term “blister copper.”
 
157
 The final step in the basic Welsh process was, as in the Continental system, 
refining in a reverberatory furnace.  Here the blister copper pigs were melted and held for 
15 hours in an oxygen rich environment to encourage any last impurities to oxidize.  Slag 
was skimmed and sent to step (4).  After 15 hours, the molten surface of the copper was 
covered with coal or charcoal and poled with a birch or oak log.  These carbon sources 
combined with any lingering oxygen to form CO2 and purified the metal to 99%.
  
158
                                                 
156 Ibid., 325. 
  
Overall, the process took several days to complete from the first roast to pure metal. 
157 Ibid., 325. 
158 Ibid, 325. 
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 The primary diversion from this process occurred if the initial mix of ores 
entering the calciner or coarse-metal furnace resulted in a copper too rich in iron, usually 
16% iron to 57% copper.  In this case, the metal had a bluish surface giving rise to its 
name, blue metal.  Blue metal pigs from the coarse metal furnace were fused a second 
time, pulling the additional iron from the copper with the slag.  The slag was collected 
and returned to the coarse metal furnace (4), and the copper tapped into pigs was 
sufficiently iron-free white-metal, ready for the roaster.159
 The 1850s represented the height of the Welsh system, but also saw a significant 
shift in world development.  Part of the success of the Swansea smelters came from the 
inability of remote mining districts to adapt and perfect complex Welsh copper smelting 
and refining technologies, thus ensuring a steady ore-import market for southern Wales, 
even after local sources began to wane.  However, just as Cornish ore deposits began to 
diminish, the first transoceanic electric communication cable kicked off a remarkable 
increase in demand for copper world wide.   This demand would be met largely by new 
deposits found in the United States. 
 
                                                 
159 Ibid, 327. 
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Figure 3.7 Welsh Copper Smelting Process ca. 1850, all reverberatory 
furnaces. (Source: Author) 
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Effects of Copper Smelting in Swansea 
“Delightful Hafod, most serene abode! Thou sweet retreat, fit mansion for a god! 
Dame Nature, lavish of her gifts we see, And Paradise again restored in thee.” 160
 
 
 -anonymous poet, 1737 
“Landore.  A spot rich in the renown of its metal and chemical works, but to the 
casual visitor, ugly with all the ugliness of grime, and dust, and mud, and smoke, 
and indescribable tastes and odours.” 161
 -S.C. Ganwell, 1880 
  
 
 The Welsh were not the first to suffer smelter pollution, but the concentration of 
works in South Wales created critical environmental, legal, and technical problems far 
greater than any smelter location had previously witnessed.  (See Figure 3.8)  Although 
commentators from Roman times through the 18th century noted unpleasant odors, dead 
vegetation, and health problems in areas around smelter works, it was not until chronic 
problems associated with the high output of the Welsh system that communities were 
forced to address environmental issues of copper smelting.  Even Charles Darwin 
remarked that while visiting Chilean copper mines, “no smoke, furnaces, or great steam-
engines, disturb the solitude of the surrounding mountains [as at Swansea].”162
 Smoke was the greatest environmental concern for smelter communities and 
nearby farmers.  In addition to the chemical composition of the gasses in the smoke 
described by Piggot (See Figure 3.7), the dusts and solid matters contained toxins and   
  
                                                 
160 Swansea, A Short History of the Hafod Works, 4 (insert). 
161 Ibid., 4 (insert). 
162 Charles Darwin, Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited 
During the Voyage Round the World of H.M.S. Beagle, Eleventh Edition, reprinted ed. (London: John 
Murray, Albemarle Street, 1913), 276. 
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heavy metals, such as copper, lead, silver, antimony, and arsenic, that disbursed with the 
smoke and settled over wide areas.  While the gaseous chemicals formed sulfurous, 
sulfuric, arsenious, carbonic, and hydrofluoric acids after reacting with moisture in the 
air, the solids tended to settle on the soil killing plants and being ingested by livestock.163
 Nineteenth-century health complaints by residents living near smelters included, 
“a dry sensation in the throat, a bitter, metallic taste in the mouth, loss of appetite, 
   
                                                 
163 Edmund Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," Technology and 
Culture 38, no. 3 (1997), 660. 
Figure 3.8  Swansea ca. 1860  
(After Swansea 2007, 12) 
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shortness of breath, tightness across the chest, smarting eyes, and frayed tempers.”164  In 
1822 Doctors coined the term “metal fume disease” to describe influenza-like symptoms 
found in smelter workers.165  More recent studies have confirmed the risk of acute 
respiratory diseases and suggested that increased mortality from non-malignant 
respiratory problems existed in populations working in or living near a primary copper 
smelter.166
 Reaction to excess smoke, however, was mixed.  Some 17th-and 18th-century 
British communities initially resorted simply to zoning smelters outside of town or into 
an area where prevailing winds would direct the smoke away from population 
concentrations.  Some companies, under the threat of litigation, sought technological 
solutions or simply bought affected land.
  
167  Individuals, however, often resorted to the 
courts and sued the offending sites for nuisance violations.  The primary nuisance in 
these cases were the “noxious vapors” that caused either injury to property visible in 
denuded forests, wilted vegetation, failed crops, and sick or dying livestock, or immediate 
or long-term injury to human health.168
 The first noxious vapors case was agued in 1608 between neighbors after one 
opened a pig sty on his property leading to the landmark ruling that stated one should 
   
                                                 
164 Quoted in Noga Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind : Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 51. 
165 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 678. 
166 Margaret E. Mattson and Tee L. Guidotti, "Health Risks Associated with Residence near a Primary 
Copper Smelter: A Preliminary Report," American Journal of Industrial Medicine 1 (1980), 365. 
167 Piggot, The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Copper, 297.  Land purchases were likely later 19th-century 
solutions and a practice American smelter companies would employ to avoid smoke and pollution lawsuits 
in the days before the Clean Air Act.   
168 Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind : Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State, 39. 
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“use your own (property) so as not to harm another.”169  Although this case set a 
precedent that would stand for 200 years, actual judgments against smelters would 
generally prove more difficult.  The corporation of Liverpool, however, did win one of 
the earliest successful smelter nuisance cases in 1770.  It forced the Macclesfield Copper 
Company to relocate its smelter outside of town.170
Only five of twenty recorded cases, however, resulted in judgments against a 
smelter company in Britain, mostly in the form of damage awards, although one case 
resulted in an injunction against further smelting in that location.
   
171  One of the more 
notable failures was a case brought by a consortium of farmers against Vivian and Son’s 
Hafod works in 1834.  The farmers claimed that smoke from the smelters destroyed 
crops, caused health problems, and sickened and killed their livestock by causing 
“Effryddod” or Welsh crippling disease.  The farmers ultimately lost the case because 
they failed to prove that the Hafod smoke was the primary cause of their problems and 
not, as the defendants’ attorneys argued, poor farming. 172  A second suit by the same 
group a year later resulted in a partial judgment against Pasco Grenfell of the Middle 
Bank smelter works.  The judgment acknowledged some damage from smoke, but, 
because the plaintiffs could not prove exactly what was damaged specifically by 
Grenfell’s smoke, the judge only awarded the farmers a single shilling. 173
                                                 
169 Quoted in Ibid., 41. 
 
170 Edmund Newell and Simon Watts, "The Environmental Impact of Industrialization in South Wales in 
the Nineteenth Century:  'Copper Smoke' and the Llanell," Environment and History 2, no. 3 (1996), 312. 
171 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 670-671. 
172 Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind : Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State, 50. 
173 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 672. 
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 Confusion about the actual health problems associated with copper smoke tended 
to complicate lawsuits against smelter firms.  In 1842 a royal commission report claimed 
that smelter smoke inhalation posed no adverse health affects, and an 1845 commission 
reported that smelter smoke had kept Swansea free from the cholera epidemics in the 
early 1830s.  Morag-Levine suggests that there may be some truth in this latter claim as 
the sulfur- and arsenic-laced smoke may have served as a chemical fumigant and 
disinfectant. 174   A questionable 1928 British medical report perpetuated confusion, 
claiming that smelter smoke was “disinfectant and salutary, although ignorant people 
have a prejudice against [it].”175  Further, a bath in the sulfurous “yellow-scum covered” 
quenching water from the first fusion (step 2) of the Welsh smelting process was said to 
cure mange in dogs.176
 The smoke also provided a haunting beauty for some.  Percy wrote in 1861, “A 
dense cloud of white smoke perpetually hangs over the copper-works of Swansea and the 
vicinity, and occasionally beautiful effects are produced in the landscape when the rays of 
the sun fall upon it, especially towards evening.”
  
177  Dr. Thomas Williams of Swansea in 
an 1854 study titled Report on the Copper-Smoke, its Influence on the Public Health, and 
the Industrial Diseases of Copper-men wrote that smelter stacks “emit gracefully-
gyrating, white, smoky, and fleecy columns, which circlingly and wideningly ascend to 
the upper regions of the atmosphere, there to be lost in the purity of invisible air…”178
                                                 
174 Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind : Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State, 50-51. 
  
175 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 680. 
176 Percy, Metallurgy. The Art of Extracting Metals from Their Ores, 324 
177 Ibid., 335. 
178 Cited in Ibid., 339, as an example of delusional thinking regarding smelter smoke. 
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 Despite a growing recognition of the potential health threats of smelter smoke, 
however, the economic benefits of smelters to local communities and workers and the 
general financial gains associated with the copper industry in southern Wales over-
shadowed environmental and health problems.  In 1914, Pyrites, possibly a local 
company newspaper, wrote “…its sulphurous canopy has transformed verdant hillsides 
into desert wastes…But the mischief done has been more than compensated by the 
immense trade “opening” which the copper trade gave to Swansea…But for it the towns 
on the Tawe would have remained just a popular little bathing creek with a little 
additional identity owing to its porcelain manufacture…”179
I touched the tall tress with my vapoury hand, 
  Even more compelling are 
selected verses from The Song of the Copper Smoke, published in 1871 (cited by Newell) 
that presaged later legal rulings regarding smelter smoke lawsuits in the United States : 
And their leaves drop off, like courtiers bland… 
You may search the vale and mountain high, 
There is not a flower to gladden the eye. 
 
The widow’s lone bosom I thrill with joy, 
As I fill the hands of her orphan boy, 
The miner I help in the sunless cave, 
By me rich merchants their fortunes save, 
Barristers, bankers, and even clod-hoppers 
Would feel very small if they hadn’t “some coppers.”180
 
 
 Thus, not surprisingly, lawsuits brought by individuals or organized groups of 
farmers often failed to cross the “public nuisance” threshold applied by juries and courts 
more sympathetic to smelting companies and the economic growth of their 
                                                 
179 Gabb, Lower Swansea Valley Factsheet 7: The Rise and Fall of the Copper Industry, 5.  Gabb cited this 
apologist quote from “Pyrites,” likely a company journal or local newspaper. 
180 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 667. 
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communities.181  Despite the lack of court-orders to desist or pay damages, many people, 
smelter operators included, knew about and acknowledged the health-hazards posed by 
copper smoke.  Percy quotes John Henry Vivian, of Hafod Works, who stated in the 
1820s that the suppression of smelter smoke would be advantageous to the town and 
neighborhood.182  Later, Percy not only acknowledged that all the Swansea smelter 
owners lived outside of town beyond the reaches of the smelter smoke, but that 
apologists, such as Thomas Williams (quoted above), who did not accept the smoke as an 
“unmistakable nuisance [or who] pretend that it is not, must either have a peculiar 
constitution or lie under some strange delusion.”183
 Knowing smelter smoke danger and facing few government restrictions, smelters 
ultimately handled the nuisance issue in one of three primary ways before going to court.  
They either did nothing, settled out of court if a case seemed strong enough, or, under a 
more serious threat of lawsuit or, more often, if the prospect of a financial return on by-
products existed, applied or attempted a technological solution.
 
184
The first attempt at by-product recovery from smelter smoke came in the late 18th 
century from a partnership between John Champion and the Macclesfield Copper 
Company, the same company that lost the first nuisance judgment against a smelter.  John 
Champion, a descendant of the 1690s Neath smelting works manager, developed a 
system at a northern Welsh mine site to recover sulfur from initial calcining operations by 
roasting ore in long kilns, collecting and condensing the smoke, and returning the 
   
                                                 
181 Ibid., 671. 
182 Percy, Metallurgy. The Art of Extracting Metals from Their Ores, 339 
183 Ibid., 339-340. 
184 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 664. 
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“cleaned” ore to the mine for sale.   While the market for sulfur had yet to fully develop 
by the 18th century, the process improved the ore quality, lessened the destruction of local 
vegetation near smelters, and remained a notable component of the Anglesey works in the 
late 18th century.185
 The first technological approach with sulfur-recovery-potential processing came 
from Gossage towers that were successfully condensing and recovering hydrogen 
chloride from alkali works smoke in the mid 19th century using a cool water spray.  The 
challenge of adapting this water-spray method to copper smelters, however, was the 
difficulty of combining sulfur dioxides with water. 
 Despite this nascent attempt, however, successful and profitable 
sulfur recovery was still a century away.   
186  John Henry Vivian proposed an 
adaptation of this process in response to an 1821 prize for “obviating the inconvenience 
arising from the smoke produced by smelting copper ores.” 187
                                                 
185 Day and Tylecote, The Industrial Revolution in Metals, 155.  Although the Macclesfield smoke case 
(1770) and the sulfur-recovery process (1778) have been noted by several scholars working with primary 
materials, none have linked the two.  The sulfur-recovery process was located at a mine-site, some distance 
from Liverpool, but it is hard to imagine that smelting a lower-sulfur ore, thereby reducing the effects of 
smelter smoke, would not weigh heavily on a decision to partner in a sulfur-recovery process.    
  This system used a series 
of long flues and chambers with water showers to encourage the condensation of sulfur, 
arsenic, and copper.  While this system was only moderately successful and not awarded 
the prize, the long flue concept, generally combined with a single tall stack, garnered 
favor.   In this arrangement, some, but not all of the by-product toxins precipitated from 
the smoke before reaching the top of the stack, affording a partial recovery of by-product 
chemicals.  As stack heights increased, precipitate increased, but the taller stacks also 
186 Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind: Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State, 48.  Sulfur 
trioxides, on the other hand, easily combined with water to form acid.  Creating SO3 from SO2 became the 
first technological hurdle to acid manufacture from smelter smoke. 
187 Quoted in Newell and Watts, "The Environmental Impact of Industrialization in South Wales in the 
Nineteenth Century:  'Copper Smoke' and the Llanell," 313. 
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dispersed smoke and particulates over a wider area.  Despite a decline in the use of tall 
stacks in the 1830s because of fears of lawsuits from a wider population distribution, they 
would eventually become a landscape feature synonymous with copper smelters.    
 Of the available technologies, new furnace designs offered the most promising 
systems for solving the problem of smelter smoke.  Under the right conditions, smelters 
knew that sulfur dioxides could be oxidized to sulfur trioxides, which combine much 
easier with water to produce acid in the furnace.   The presence of carbon from coal 
smoke, however, prevented the right reactions from occurring, requiring new furnace 
designs to separate the coal smoke from the copper gases.  But, because the separation in 
a reverberatory furnace was difficult and expensive, most smelter operators never 
attempted to install separators, and those that did ultimately abandoned them because of 
limited success.188   In the 1880s some Swansea smelters attempted using an electrical 
current passed through the flue to encourage precipitation.189
 
   While this technology 
proved more successful, it was in many ways too late for the British copper industry, 
which had begun a sharp decline in the 1880s as major new copper works opened in the 
United States.   
Slag 
 Unlike smelter smoke, smelter slag in Swansea was not considered a health 
hazard.  Instead it was regarded as a visual nuisance, a production disposal challenge, or, 
at best, a minor by-product.   Swansea smelters produced copious amounts of “clean 
                                                 
188 Ibid., 315. 
189 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 678. 
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slag,” the copper-free waste of the melting furnaces.  After all, smelters preferred only 
9% copper content in the initial stages leaving over ninety percent of what they processed 
as waste.  Waste slag was not entirely a disposal problem, however, and had some 
beneficial function.  Crushed, it was used for road beds and for new furnace and building 
foundations.  By the 1860s, molten slag was cast into tiles, slabs, and bricks and used in 
smelter-building and worker-housing construction, retaining walls, and culvert linings.190
 Despite some functional uses, slag remained a significant disposal problem as 
growing “hills of refuse” moved further and further from the works and, when combined 
with the effects of smoke, created a visually powerful landscape setting.
 
191  The often 
quoted Daniel Webb wrote in 1812, “about a mile or two towards Swansea the 
appearance is frightful, the smoke of the copper furnaces having entirely destroyed the 
herbage; and the vast banks of scoriae surrounding the works, together with the volumes 
of smoke arising from the numerous fires, gives the country a volcanic appearance.”192
 
   
 As previously described, both the German and Welsh systems for smelting 
sulfides required extensive procedures and multiple steps, indicating a much greater 
complexity than is often suggested by simple descriptions and diagrams of the system.  
Often these processes required several alternate roastings and meltings lasting weeks with 
a variety of ores added at critical times to remove specific waste products or recover 
valuable by-products before any actual smelting took place to produce matte, black, or 
                                                 
190 Piggot, "The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Copper, " 299, and Hughes, Copperopolis : Landscapes of 
the Early Industrial Period in Swansea, 53. 
191 Piggot, "The Chemistry and Metallurgy of Copper," 299. 
192 Newell, "Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920," 665. Scoriae is slag. 
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blister copper.  Despite this complexity, global demand for the red metal continued to 
grow as new industrial uses were introduced and the industry spread beyond its 
traditional locales despite early German and later British attempts to control the market.  
Because of the use of the coal, which was significantly cheaper and more plentiful than 
charcoal, the Welsh process tended to be the most successfully exported technology to 
newly developing copper smelting areas around the globe.  Although German blast 
furnaces were simpler to build and operate, they tended to be relegated to slag remelting 
until technological developments significantly increased their productivity.  By the start 
of large-scale American copper production, coinciding with growing industrial demands, 
the Welsh system reverberatory furnace had come to dominate copper smelting, and most 
new smelting ventures implemented some version of it.  
 In many ways the Welsh system developed in Swansea was a transitional 
industrial one.  Lying at the end of 5000 years of traditional production and traditional 
markets, it turned copper into a global commodity before giving way to modern demand 
and ever increasing technological sophistication.  Its technological systems were new, but 
its markets, at least initially, were not.  On the world stage, it only lasted a short time and 
only a few key features persisted.  Soon the complex ore mixes and multiple furnace 
types were gone, especially as new techniques were developed to handle very low-grade 
porphyry ores first in the United States, then around the world.  But the elements that 
persisted included the reverberatory furnace, the tall smoke stack, and environmental 
degradation.  
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 Pollution problems associated with southern Welsh smelting highlighted the 
potential dangers to human health and property.  The idea of environmental degradation 
became codified in contemporary literature describing the Welsh system, and in many 
ways, was transferred with Welsh technology and practices to developing copper regions 
around the world.  Initially, as in Wales, the economic benefits of copper smelters often 
overshadowed their environmental problems.  In the United States, for instance, most 
early large-scale copper mining and smelting occurred in the remote, sparsely populated, 
and largely “under-regulated” West.  Attempts to limit pollution did not occur until 
lawsuits forced the issue, and then the primary solution was for smelter-operating 
companies to simply purchase the affected land.  It would take the 1970 Clean Air Act to 
formally set legal standards for smelter air emissions.  That act occurred too late, 
however, to prevent much of the damage.  Growing recognition that smoke, slag, and 
other chemical releases caused long-term environmental problems forced the United 
States to “rethink” environmental response and, under the aegis of the federal Superfund 
program, attempt to clean or at least mitigate the damage caused by smelting among other 
industrial activities. 
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CHAPTER 4.  THE AMERICAN SYSTEM  
 
The continued success of the south Wales smelters stemmed from their ability to 
tap the increasing supply of ore from a widespread group of overseas 
producers…Indeed, the smelters played a key demand-side role in the growth of 
copper mining industries in Latin America, Australia, southern Africa, North 
America, and elsewhere.  However, it was the development of smelting and 
refining in these…regions which led to a relative decline in British copper 
production from the 1860s, and an absolute decline from the late 1890s.   
 - Edmund Newell, 1990 (Copperopolis, 75) 
 
While the principals of the various smelting and leaching processes are for the 
most part of European origin, and have long been known, modern practice is 
essentially American and was evolved on this side of the Atlantic. 
 -Frederick Laist, 1947 (Seventy-five Years of Progress, 126) 
 
 There was never a truly American system of copper smelting.  After the decline of 
British copper production and the very short dominance of Chile, the United States 
became the world’s largest copper producer (and consumer) and maintained that lead for 
nearly a century.  Two primary factors drove this ascendancy: the discovery of significant 
American copper deposits and the adoption and modification of existing European 
technologies to fit the new deposits.  The “Americanization” of the smelting industry was 
further propelled by the persistent need to overcome high labor costs with automation and 
by the general growth of large-scale corporations with available capital to foster 
technological improvements and create significant economies of scale.  The scale of 
operations became increasingly important as rich copper deposits declined and very large 
deposits of exceptionally lean ores remained or were discovered.  These lean ore bodies 
often contained as little as 0.5% copper and required ever greater technological 
improvements to eliminate up to 99.5% waste and further reduce labor and processing 
costs to make the extraction and production of such lean copper ores economically viable.   
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In fact, complex copper smelting would only succeed when enough capital existed to 
invest heavily in technologies and adapt those processes to the local geology.  Both of 
these conditions coalesced in the late 19th century as very large American copper deposits 
opened, demand significantly increased, and, to disseminate information and encourage 
innovation, a technical community developed from expanding mining colleges, mining 
journals, and industry-wide conferences.  While technological improvements often led to 
ever increased production, few engineers at the time considered the lasting environmental 
effects of such successful metallurgical applications on such lean ores.   The elimination 
of such a high proportion of gangue, or waste rock, on such a massive scale posed not 
simply a short-term disposal problem for mining companies, but a significant long-term 
pollution problem for the United States. 
 This chapter will examine these broad historical and technological trends in 
American smelting leading to the successful development of mining districts in 
Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana, and the evolutionary technological and economic 
changes in smelting required to maintain profitability as ore bodies diminished.   It will 
then look more closely at the three individual regions chronologically and the specific 
smelting technologies used to exploit their particular copper deposits and then introduce 
the environmental histories and consequences of their respective smelting technologies.   
 
Smelting USA 
 By the late 19th century, the Welsh system in Britain had evolved into a somewhat 
inflexible process as the availability of regional copper diminished.  As we have seen, at 
the zenith of copper production in Swansea, smelters relied on a variety of ore-inputs to 
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maximize the productivity of existing equipment and technologies, but the Welsh 
industry ultimately failed to adapt new technology to new ore-types as global supplies 
changed.  Several British authors have argued that this inflexibility was at the core of the 
decline in British copper smelting.  Tylecote suggested that Swansea profit margins were 
so high for the “monopolistic” smelters who set the price for imported ores from 
underdeveloped nations, that they had no incentive to change their system until it was too 
late and their own workers had been recruited by those very underdeveloped nations to 
create a rival smelting industry.193  Newell argues that new technologies, specifically in 
America, significantly reduced the fuel-to-ore ratio, reversing the economies Swansea 
reaped from its nearby coal fields. 194
 As available ores and the borrowing potential of future growth dried up in 
Swansea, so did capital to reinvest into new equipment and processes.  By the middle of 
the 19th century, copper mines in Cornwall and Devon had reached the ends of their 
productivity, and the international regions providing Swansea’s other ores, namely Chile 
and Australia, had adapted matte-smelting and late-refining technologies in an effort to 
retain a greater portion of the capital earned from copper production.
  Smelting at or near the source of ore became the 
dominant regional organization in the industry.   
195
                                                 
193 R. F. Tylecote, A History of Metallurgy, Second ed. (The Institute of Materials, 1992), 150. 
  While the 
194 Edmund Newell, "Copperopolis: The Rise and Fall of the Copper Industry in Swansea District," 
Business History 32, no. 3 (1990), 91. 
195 In the early 19th century, the adoption of Welsh smelting technology was hampered in Australia and 
Chile by an inadequate supply of fuel and technical capability.  When smelters overcame these difficulties 
overseas, an industry emerged heavily influenced by the Welsh. Since these nations were primary export 
nations, however, the industry tended to remain small, whereas the United States, whose rapidly growing 
demand could be met entirely by its rapidly growing production, tended to innovate to a much greater 
degree to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding electrical industry.  See Peter Bell and Justin McCarthy, 
"Early Copper Smelting Technology in Australia," Conference paper presented at Third International 
Mining History Conference (Golden Colorado: 1994) and Luis  Valenzuela, "The Chilean Copper Smelting 
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Swansea industry continued refining some foreign copper matte through the 1960s and 
became a primary British zinc producer,196
 In many ways, American dominance in copper smelting began with the opening 
of Montana copper mines and smelters in the 1880s.  The earlier Michigan mines 
produced relatively pure copper and, although its smelters based their methods on 
Cornish and Welsh models,
 ores in general stayed much closer to mines.  
Further complicating Swansea’s dwindling supplies, early and mid-19th century smelting 
technologies and business models crossed the Atlantic to the United States where East 
Coast smelters created a local industry and began competing directly with Britain for 
South American, Central America, and Cuban ores.   
197
                                                                                                                                                 
Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Phases of Expansion and Stagnation, 1834-58, " Journal of Latin 
American Studies  24, no. 2 (1992), 507-550. 
 they did not advance the practice mainly because they 
didn’t have to.  In fact, Michigan smelters would ultimately adopt new technologies, such 
as electrolytic refining, only after they had been successfully implemented elsewhere and 
the economics of local smelting justified it.  Tennessee, which also began mining in the 
1840s, imported smelting technology based primarily on German rather than Welsh 
models, but like Michigan did so without significantly contributing to new methods until 
the turn of the century when radical changes to smelting practice had begun elsewhere 
196 Stephen Hughes, Copperopolis : Landscapes of the Early Industrial Period in Swansea (Aberystwyth, 
Ceredigion: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales, 2000), 63.  According 
to Hughes, between 1860 and 1914, 11 of the 14 smelters that stopped producing copper in Swansea were 
converted to zinc smelters until stiff competition from modernized American, Canadian, and Australian 
zinc works forced the closure of all but one of them by 1926.  The one remaining zinc works, modernized 
with government funds, continued on until 1960.  
197 Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 62.  The chief adaptation to Welsh reverberatory furnaces built to smelt 
Michigan mass copper was a door in the top to load large pieces.  While this could be considered the first 
step in the Americanization of smelting because it was a significant modification to a known practice, it did 
not increase the capacity of the furnace, was not replicated in other districts, and merely simplified the act 
of melting large pieces of copper.  
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and local environmental and political conditions warranted it.  It was not until the 1880s 
when Montana smelters imported labor-intensive Welsh and German practices and found 
them costly and impractical for their labor pool and ore-type, that smelter practice 
significantly changed in the United States.  Further, the scale of production with 
traditional-sized furnaces proved too small for the demands of a rapidly expanding 
electrical industry and, as richer ores gave way to leaner ones, improved efficiencies had 
to be reached in order to produce copper economically and meet consumption needs.   
 
Beginnings 
 Although the Americanization of copper smelting began in the 1880s, attempts to 
create and sustain an American copper industry began as early as 1648.  Gary W. Van 
Lingen, in his 2002 master’s thesis, compiled a near-complete list of documented copper 
smelters operating in the United States from the mid 17th to the mid 19th century.  Most of 
these smelters were located in or near mining regions in Vermont, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Maryland, smelted mostly under contract, and were short-lived or relatively 
marginal producers due to a lack of sustained ore, difficult transportation, or limited 
capital.198
                                                 
198 Vermont copper mining and smelting rebounded in the mid and late 19th century, continued in some 
fashion until the mid 20th century, and at times rivaled the output in the Ducktown district in Tennessee. 
  More successful and heavily capitalized copper smelting emerged first at two 
Revere Copper Company works in the Boston area, then at the Baltimore and Cuba and 
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Baltimore Copper companies in Maryland, and then in some capacity in Belleville, New 
Jersey, in the mid 19th century.199
The pivotal event in the early success of the Boston, Baltimore, and Belleville 
smelters was the ill-timed formation of the Swansea Smelter Association in 1840 to pool 
ore purchases to force prices down and control the sale of copper on the open market.
 
200  
This action, accompanied by a new British tariff on imported ores and American 
transportation improvements to anthracite coal fields, effectively created an opening in 
the global market for American smelters who emulated Welsh business models and 
imported ores from South American, Central American, and Cuban mines to process and 
sell to a growing U.S. market.  Although these were three of the largest non-ferrous 
smelters operating in the United States in 1860s, between 1866 and 1872 they were all 
forced out of the smelting business as mine owners in the rapidly expanding Michigan 
copper district used their political clout, with support from Tennessee mine owners, to 
obtain tariff protection from the imported ores on which the Maryland and Massachusetts 
smelters depended.201
 
  
                                                 
199 Gary W. Van Lingen, "The Interpretation of Archaeological Remains at the Pittsburgh and Boston 
Copper Harbor Copper Mining Company's Second Campsite:  Evaluating a Structural Component and Its 
Potential Uses and Contexts" (Master's Thesis, Michigan Technological University, 2002), 160-161.  
200 Otis Young, "The American Copper Frontier 1640-1893," The Speculator 1, no. 2 (1984), 8. 
201 Hyde, Copper for America, 56.  While the Boston and Canton (MA) smelters closed for good in 1872, 
both the Baltimore works and New Jersey smelters would experience intermittent revivals as copper 
demand and ore prices permitted.   The Baltimore smelters closed for good in 1892 (Hyde, 56) and the New 
Jersey Works in 1934 (Van Lingen quoting Whiteman, 160).   Despite the end of smelting, both the Revere 
Canton (MA) works and Baltimore Canton (MD) works continued as prominent copper-brass rolling and 
manufacturing mills, both ultimately becoming part of the Revere Copper and Brass Company empire, 
whose 20th century holdings included operations in Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, Illinois, Alabama, 
Texas, Michigan, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, and New Jersey.  See Isaac Frederick Marcosson, 
Copper Heritage; the Story of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated (New York,: Dodd, Mead, 1955).   
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The American Century 
 These early East Coast copper mining and smelting efforts in the U.S., based on 
emulating European business and technological models, were superseded when 
significant ore discoveries were made in Michigan and Tennessee in the 1840s, Montana 
in the 1870s, and Arizona and Utah in the 1890s.   From 1883 until the 1980s, the United 
States led all other nations in copper production and consumption as the rapid 
development of electricity and electrical applications around the globe coincided with 
increased capacity in American copper production.  In many ways copper smelting in the 
late 19th and 20th centuries, though dominated by American companies, was an 
international technology borrowing successful devices and techniques from earlier copper 
and other metallurgical applications and adapting them to new conditions and new 
deposits.  If the original German and Welsh processes were focused on perfecting a 
single technological system that could accept varied ore types, the new methods were 
much more focused on adapting technology to fit the ore.  The American system was 
defined by a much greater technological flexibility, especially as the quality and quantity 
of the ore changed. 
Driving the “Americanization” of smelting technology was the need to both 
overcome critical skilled labor shortages and profitably process the vast fields of low 
grade ores once the relatively small, high grade deposits had been exhausted.  Lasky’s 
Law stated that each 0.1% decrease in (copper) ore grade yielded an 18% increase in 
reserve size.202
                                                 
202 Ronald Prain, Copper : The Anatomy of an Industry (London: Mining Journal Books, 1975), 272. 
  After the 1880s, the most significant new ore bodies consisted of very 
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large deposits of very low grade porphyries, often less than one percent copper.  Even the 
rich Montana ores, which in the early 1880s averaged from 25-60% copper, dwindled to 
less than 8% by 1910, and the pure Michigan multi-ton copper masses gave way to 2-5% 
conglomerate and amygdaloid lodes.  As the richness of mined ore dropped, 
technological improvements sustained production until the ore bodies became too lean to 
mine and process profitably.     
 The demand-side of this evolution included a relatively new technology: 
electricity transmitted through copper wires to generate power, illuminate, and 
communicate.  American demand for electricity and copper exploded in the late 19th 
century, driving the need to find and exploit greater and greater copper deposits.    
American demand grew so fast in the 19th century that much of the output of the 
expanding U.S. mines and smelters remained in the country, effectively creating a second 
global market able to set prices separate from the London Metal Exchange, which had 
been the prime market for copper traded across the world for centuries.  (See Figure 4.1) 
 
Figure 4.1.  United 
States Copper 
Production and 
Consumption 1880-
1933.  With the 
exception of short 
periods in 1880, 1921, 
and 1933, the U.S. 
maintained a 
substantial trade 
surplus in copper on the 
global market.  (After, 
Gates 1950, 201.) 
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American Smelting Technology  
Technology was the key to both increased demand (electricity) and dramatically 
increased supply.  Most early attempts to adapt European smelting technology in the 
United States were decidedly German, focusing on the blast, shaft, or cupola furnace.203  
(See Figure 4.2)  The blast furnace held several advantages over the reverberatory.  Not 
only did the blast furnace consume less fuel, it was simpler to operate and construct, 
required fewer laborers, could be run nearly continuously, and operated very similar to 
furnaces in the substantially larger American iron industry.  The blast furnace could 
handle large chunks of ore, too big for efficient reverberatory smelting, and often 
required fewer steps to produce copper than the reverberatory.  Further, its requirement 
for cleaner burning fuels than coal because of the direct contact between ore and fuel, a 
problem for the British copper industry, was easily met by the United States charcoal 
industry until the adaptation and diffusion of coke.204
                                                 
203 Blast, shaft, and cupola furnaces each operated on the same principal of air forced or “blasted” into the 
hearth of a fire-brick lined furnace stack.  Crews charged the furnaces through a door higher in the stack 
with copper ores or mattes; fuels of coke, coal, or charcoal; and often a flux.  The blasted air provided 
plenty of oxygen to the burning fuel creating temperatures high enough to melt the metal, waste rock, and 
flux, which were drawn off through tap holes near the bottom.  Blast furnaces were generally fixed to their 
location on a substantial foundation with no access to the furnace bottom except through the furnace top.  
Shaft furnaces were the same as blast furnaces, but the term was used initially to describe an Agricola top-
loaded blast-furnace compared to an ancient mound-furnace, and later to describe cylindrical furnaces 
when the shape of the “blast furnace” became much larger more rectangular in the late 19th century.  
Cupolas for smelting copper were initially small cylindrical blast furnaces on pedestal legs with removable 
bottoms.  They were largely portable although by the 20th century, they resembled large rectangular blast 
furnaces with access to the furnace-bottom from below.  Despite these technical differences, the literature 
from the mid-19th through 20th centuries often uses the three terms indiscriminately.  
  In addition, cupola-styled blast 
furnaces were largely portable, could be ordered directly out of a catalog, and were 
considerably less expensive to operate than reverberatory furnaces.  
204 Copper: From Mine to Finished Product, (New York: Anaconda Copper Mining Company, 1920), 21. 
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The two primary disadvantages to the blast furnace were that it needed to be 
charged with larger pieces of high-grade ore, and until the late 19th century, it was 
relatively limited in size which limited its output.  As the richness of American ores 
diminished in mining districts, ore concentration required finer crushing and flotation to 
recover metals.  At this point, blast furnaces became less effective because the dust-sized 
pieces of ore slipped down though the fuel charge, clogging the hearth, or blew out the 
stack with the blast.  Additionally, wet flotation-concentrated ores reduced the efficiency 
of blast furnace heat, but had less effect in a reverberatory where the fire was separate 
from the ores and the hearth was much larger.  Briquetting, a process of binding fine ore 
Figure 4.2 Three blast furnace types used in the United States to process copper.  
Including (from the left) a typical bottom-dropping cupola furnace, an oval Herrshoff 
furnace that became the prime pyritic smelter in Tennessee after 1900, and an 
advertisement for a rectangular blast furnace that became the standard blast furnace 
style used in Michigan and Montana until the 1920s.  (After  Peters (1908) 267, 265, and 
advertisement page X.) 
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materials into sizes adequate for blast furnaces, often required an additional plant, thus 
obviating the economic advantage of blast furnace smelting. 
    Copper blast furnaces were also limited in size.  Through the end of the 19th 
century, the furnaces could not be constructed with a bosh (the furnace hearth where air is 
added to the heat) wider than 36” and still maintain adequate air pressure and 
temperatures required for efficient smelting.  Air blasted into the bosh from tuyeres 
needed to penetrate the mass of materials collecting in the furnace hearth.  Too little air 
and the center of the hearth received less heat, altering the fusion process and at times 
allowing a set mass to clog up the furnace.  Too much air and the temperature nearest the 
tuyeres would be too high to effect an efficient fusion resulting in greater copper losses in 
the slag.  This deficiency created bottlenecks in production as greater throughput became 
necessary to maintain economies of scale.   
 Despite the disadvantages of the 19th-century blast furnace, most initial attempts 
to smelt copper in the United States focused on cost and simplicity and used that furnace 
type.  Of the thirty-two sites Van Lingen identified, he found evidence that, at a 
minimum, fifteen used or attempted to adopt Continental process blast furnaces.  Four 
used Welsh system reverberatory furnaces, one likely used a crucible furnace, and twelve 
used unidentified processes.205
                                                 
205 Van Lingen, "The Interpretation of Archaeological Remains at the Pittsburgh and Boston Copper Harbor 
Copper Mining Company's Second Campsite:  Evaluating a Structural Component and Its Potential Uses 
and Contexts," 160-161 
   Van Lingen argued that, in addition to the simpler and 
less expensive operations of a blast furnace in the early 19th century, experienced German 
smelter workers were more desirable than British for patriotic reasons, and that they 
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were, until the mid-19th century, easier to recruit as the German and Swedish copper 
industries peaked and declined a century earlier than the British industry.206
 While the blast furnace may have been the initial choice of most small-scale 
copper smelters through the mid-19th century, the explosion of American copper demand 
and production in the following decades compounded the need for technological 
adaptation and advancement using both the Welsh and Continental styles of smelting.  To 
combat the problem of blast furnace throughput, very large and heavily capitalized turn-
of-the-century American smelters introduced rectangular furnaces with 8’-87’ long 
opposing banks of tuyeres, never reaching distances greater than 57” apart, to get 
significantly increased capacity while maintaining proper air flow.  (See Figure 4.2)  
Further, relatively cheap and abundant coke from the vast American coal fields replaced 
charcoal fuel in the blast furnace in the late 19th century, and large, enclosed, roasting 
furnaces capable of burning off sulfur rapidly reduced the ore roasting step from weeks 
and months to just a few hours. 
  Whatever 
the choice of smelting method, with the exception of works in New Jersey, Baltimore, 
and Boston, copper smelters through mid-century usually did not survive more than a few 
years or make much of an impact on U.S. copper supplies. 
In Welsh style smelting, a Detroit reverberatory furnace smelting Michigan 
copper in the 1870s operated at a capacity of 10 tons per day, and an early 1880s 
reverberatory furnace in Butte produced 15-18 tons of copper per day.  By 1901, 
however, the daily output of a single enlarged and improved reverberatory furnace in 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 165 
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Montana had reached 100 tons per day, and by 1904, 250 tons per day.  Early 20th 
century improvements further increased single-furnace production in Arizona to 600 tons 
per day.  By the 1930s, Arizona reverberatory output had increased to 1600 tons per day 
per furnace, and by 1949 Canadian furnaces had reached 2000 tons per day.  To remain 
economically viable, each furnace expansion required increased automation and handling 
controls, but generated considerable fuel economy with no relative increase in labor 
cost.207
 
   (See Figure 4.3)  
 
 
 
                                                 
207 N.H. Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States," Transactions of the American Institute of Mining 
Engineers 9 (1881), 683; Frederick Laist, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of 
Ores," in Seventy-Five Years of Progress in the Mineral Industry, 1871-1946 (New York: The American 
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, 1948) 129-131; Charles Kuzell, "The Development of 
Modern Copper Smelting," Transactions of the Metallurgical Society of AIME 218, no. August (1960), 
582; Allison Butts, Copper: The Science and Technology of the Metal, Its Alloys, and Compounds (New 
York: Hafner Publishing, 1970), 89. 
Figure 4.3 The 
evolution of the 
reverberatory 
furnace, 1800-1924.  
Advances made after 
1878 occurred in 
American mining 
districts.  (After 
Hofman 1924, 178) 
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Michigan Smelting with Simplified Welsh Technologies 
 Historians have argued that processing pure Michigan copper into a molten state 
should be considered more of a melting process than a smelting process.  However, the 
act of melting pure copper with its attached waste rock in the presence of air tended to 
change the chemical affinity of the copper for other elements, resulting in a copper-oxide 
rich compound that required, like all traditionally smelted ores, additional processing to 
return it to a pure state.  Ironically, Michigan copper initially became more contaminated 
because of the smelting process.  Smelting the pure native copper of Michigan’s Copper 
Country, located on the Keweenaw Peninsula, however, would still be a fairly simple 
process.  (See Figure 4.4)  After early attempts to adapt Continental style blast and cupola 
furnaces with poor results, regional smelters successfully modified Welsh reverberatory 
furnaces to first melt large pieces of mass copper, then adapted the systems to handle 
much smaller copper particles as the large mass-copper deposits declined.  Later, as the 
copper content of the later ores diminished further, Michigan smelters began 
incorporating technological advances developed in the Western United States for low-
grade ores.   
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Mining companies first attempted smelting in Michigan very shortly after the opening of 
the district in 1844.  The region’s remoteness and navigational barriers at Sault Ste. Marie 
created a critical need to establish some sort of localized smelting capability.  Not only 
was shipping on the upper Great Lakes limited to the ice-free months from April to 
December, but the impassable falls at the Sault required all upcoming goods to be 
offloaded from a lower-lakes vessel, transported above the falls,  and loaded onto one of 
the few upper-lakes vessels, with the process reversed for copper and south bound 
travelers.  The resultant cost of shipping copper ore from the Keweenaw to Boston 
smelters in the late 1840s ran between $18 and $20 per ton.  The cost to ship one ton of 
ore from Chile to Boston, however, was only $15, and just $6 to ship the same ton from 
Figure 4.4 Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula Copper Country (Source: Author) 
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Cuba to Baltimore.208  To reduce some of the expense, mines usually built mills to 
concentrate the rock and remove as much waste material as possible.  While in some 
cases they were able to achieve fairly high rates of concentration, in general the mines 
still sent considerable gangue south.  Despite the high cost of transporting copper rock 
and waste from the Upper Peninsula, only four documented attempts to smelt ore and 
fully eliminate excess shipping costs occurred locally before 1860, and each failed 
largely because their associated mines failed to produce enough copper or generate 
enough capital to justify further investment.209  Of those four smelters, however, little 
was recorded beyond rudimentary descriptions of their attempts because neither the 
smelters nor the mines associated with them developed beyond a season or two.210
Meanwhile, the more successful mines sought a smelting outlet for their copper 
externally.  Initially, they shipped large copper masses to the Baltimore and Cuba 
Company and Boston’s Point Shirley Works.  To handle the unique multi-ton masses 
produced by the early Michigan mines, the Baltimore smelter installed a side door on one 
of its reverberatory furnaces to load large pieces but damaged the lining so much while 
dragging the copper that the resultant repair costs forced them to withdraw after several 
 
                                                 
208 William Bryam Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars : An Economic History of the Michigan 
Copper Mining Industry, Studies in Economic History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) 4, 
202, 216.  At the time, copper sold for between $0.18 and $0.22 per pound or $360 to $440 per ton, but the 
total cost to set up production and actually produce copper withheld the first dividends until 1849 and then 
by only a single company.  Only two companies paid dividends between 1854 and 1861.   
209Larry D. Lankton, Beyond the Boundaries , 119. 
210 The Albion, Suffolk, and Isle Royale and Ohio mines and the Pittsburgh and Boston Company all 
attempted early smelting without success.  See James B. Cooper, "Historical Sketch of Smelting and 
Refining Lake Copper," Proceedings of the Lake Superior Mining Institute 7 (1901), 44; Charles T. 
Jackson, "Geological and Mineralogical Report," ed. United States Senate (Washington D.C.: 1849), 443-
444; Patrick Martin, "Technical Report on the Archeological Survey of Isle Royal National Park,"  
(Houghton, MI: Michigan Technological University, 1986), 15; and Donald Chaput, The Cliff; America's 
First Great Copper Mine, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Sequoia Press), 18. 
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trials.211   The Point Shirley works discovered it needed to cut the large mass pieces, an 
expensive and time consuming task, before charging them into its blast furnace.  The 
extra labor generated a smelting fee of an astonishing $80 per ton.212   Just a few years 
later, Detroit smelters would charge less than $19 per ton.213
 Prompted by the failure of early Keweenaw smelters and the expense of East 
Coast smelting, two individuals affiliated with Michigan copper mining successfully 
developed refining methods a little closer to the Keweenaw using reverberatory furnaces.   
The first was C.G. Hussey, a Pittsburgh doctor and partner in the Pittsburgh and Boston’s 
Cliff, the first profitable copper mine in Michigan.  Hussey, first successfully smelted a 
charge in a reverberatory-like “canon furnace” at the Fort Pitt Foundry in 1848, by taking 
down the side, loading the furnace, and rebuilding the wall.  The smelting worked, but 
was expensive and left a considerable amount of copper inside.  Hussey’s second 
experiment, to suspended a copper mass inside a shaft furnace by chain, failed when the 
chain broke because of the heat and dropped the mass to the furnace bottom, destroying 
it.
   
214
                                                 
211 Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States,” 679. 
  Later in 1848, after hearing reports of a German silver reverberatory smelter with a 
removable roof, Hussey hired Welsh smelters to build two reverberatory furnaces with 
removable roofs in Pittsburgh to lower mass pieces in for melting.  (See Figure 4.5)  
Egleston reported in 1881 that the results of the first casts from the new (1848) furnace 
212 Ibid., 680. 
213 Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars : An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining 
Industry, 28. 
214 Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States," 680. 
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Figure 4.5 Michigan Removable-Top Furnace (After  Eggleston (1881) Plate II) 
were “in every respect as good as those now made” thirty years later.215
 in 1851.  One night, according to Egleston, a Pittsburgh native absconded with a boat 
load of slag from one of Hussey’s waste piles.  After taking it back to an experimental 
furnace he’d built, the “thief” discovered a significant quantity of oxidized copper 
remaining in the slag and made an offer to purchase all the waste-material.  Although the 
person ultimately won a short-term contract to treat the slag in a cupola, Hussey, now 
aware of the process and its simplicity, erected his own cupola at his site that same year 
and thereafter treated his slags in-house.   
   Curiously, the 
second part of the Hussey system, a cupola furnace, resulted from a clandestine operation 
                                                 
215 Ibid., 681. 
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Hussey’s successful furnace arrangement, including a cupola furnace to treat 
reverberatory slag, was ultimately copied in Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, and even 
Baltimore.216  Not only did the model of a reverberatory furnace for primary smelting and 
a cupola for slag remelting become the prominent form of processing all Michigan ores 
for 75 years, but the cupola practice was adopted in Swansea almost a decade after it was 
implemented in the United States.217  Although the Cliff Mine and Hussey’s other 
Michigan investments eventually closed, the smelter company he created in Pittsburgh 
expanded into copper and other metal fabricating and still operated in 2009.218
 The second and ultimately more successful smelter operation began in Detroit in 
1850.  While Hussey succeeded in creating a vertical operation investing in mines, mills, 
smelters, and eventually rolling and fabrication mills, the Detroit and Waterbury works, 
under the direction of John Grout, became the leading contract smelter, processing most 
of the copper from Michigan mines not owned by Hussey’s Pittsburgh and Boston 
Company.  Detroit sat in an ideal location on the primary transportation route from the 
east coast to the Keweenaw in “a position by which all travel and business to and from 
the mines must of necessity pass.”
   
219
                                                 
216 Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States," 681-682.   
  In fact all the copper rock shipped out of the 
217 The first charge into the smelting furnace in Wales usually required a copper content of less than 10% to 
ensure a considerable slag to remove iron without much copper oxide formation.  Because of this, a lot of 
fuel was spent heating and melting 90% waste.  With the cupola process, a richer charge could be used in 
the first fusion in the reverberatory furnace, and the resulting copper-rich slag could be smelted in the 
cupola.  This proved so successful, that John Vivian patented the process in 1859.  (See Chapter 3) 
218 Hyde, Copper for America, 24, and Christine E. Davis, "Archaeological Survey and Land-Use History 
of The Pittsburgh Technological Center Site, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,"  (Survey Report, Pittsburgh: Urban 
Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 1989), 26-27. 
219 "The Detroit and Lake Superior Copper Co.'s Smelting Works," Detroit Post and Tribune Newspaper 
1879, Supplement, 1. 
134 
 
Keweenaw until 1850 sailed right past Detroit en route to smelters in Baltimore, Boston, 
or Pittsburgh.   
 Like Hussey, John Grout’s first copper smelting experiments began in 1848 with 
a failed attempt to work a cupola furnace.  While the details of this test and the next two 
years of Grout’s work are unknown, existing accounts of cupola smelting demonstrated 
the particular difficulty of working large copper rock pieces in such a furnace while 
reverberatory smelting was proving successful.  Grout eventually opened the Detroit 
works in 1850 with financial backing from Waterbury, Connecticut, home to several 
large brass works having trouble securing a consistent supply of high quality copper    
The new Detroit smelting works looked remarkably similar to the Hussey works 
in Pittsburgh and began smelting Lake Superior copper in the fall of 1850.220   Both ran 
removable-roof reverberatory furnaces for the primary melt and cupola furnaces for 
refining copper-rich slag, and both groups hired experienced Welsh smelter workers to 
run their works.221   In the early years, the Detroit smelter operated only seasonally and 
on a contract basis for many of the smaller mines.  One month prior to the opening of 
navigation, workers would start repair and preparation work on the furnaces so that by 
the time the first vessel of the season arrived, the works would be prepared.222  Initially, 
the Detroit works operated a single reverberatory furnace and one cupola, but doubled in 
size by 1853.223
                                                 
220 Cooper, "Historical Sketch of Smelting and Refining Lake Copper,” 45-46. 
   
221 Henry D. Conant, "Copper Smelting in Michigan," The School of Mines Quarterly 42, no. 4 (1911), 286. 
222 "Wrought in Fire: Story of the Old Waterbury Copper Mill," Detroit News, March 29, 1896. 
223 "Detroit and Waterbury Copper Smelting Works," The Mining Magazine 1 (1853), 298. 
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 The three new smelting works on or near the lower Great Lakes in the early 
1850s, including a Cleveland site operated by Hussey’s brother, proved pivotal to 
handling the growth of the copper industry that decade.  Michigan copper production 
increased dramatically from 1850 to 1860 rising almost 1000%, then nearly doubling 
every decade until the turn of the century.  (See Table 4.1)   However, with the two  
Hussey sites dedicated to only a couple of mines and the new Park McCurdy smelter in 
Pittsburgh, and the Baltimore and Boston works securing only modest amounts of 
Michigan ores, the Detroit works held a virtual 
monopoly on Lake Superior copper smelting.  
During that time, it earned a reputation for 
innovation.  Egleston reported: “Almost all the 
experiments and improvements which have been 
made in copper refining in the United States since 
the method was first started in  Pittsburg, have been 
made there.”224  By 1861, the Detroit works had 
expanded to a capacity of nearly 3000 tons 
annually, capable of smelting roughly half of all 
Michigan copper and nearly 40% of all U.S. 
production.225
                                                 
224 Ibid., 682. 
 
225 Silas Farmer, The History of Detroit and Michigan; or, the Metropolis Illustrated; a Full Record of 
Territorial Days in Michigan, and the Annals of Wayne County, 2d ed. (Detroit,: S. Farmer & co., 1889), 
818. 
Table 4.1 
Michigan Copper Production  
(After Gates (1951) Table 6, 197-
198) 
Year Production 
(tons smelted) 
% of 
US 
1850 641 88 
1855 2,904 86 
1860 6,035 75 
1870 12,311 87 
1880 24,869 82 
1890 50,705 39 
1900 72,731 24 
1910 110,882 20 
1920 80,672 13 
1930 84,691 12 
1940 45,198 5 
1946 21,663 3.6 
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 Through much of the 1850s copper mining in Michigan centered on the 
Keweenaw County mass copper mines with primary shipping out of Eagle River.  
However by 1860, copper mining had begun shifting on the peninsula.  Reflecting 
Laskey’s Law, as productivity in the mines producing the large mass copper pieces began 
slowing down, mining efforts significantly increased on the much larger amygdaloid and 
conglomerate lodes, with copper contents of only 2% to 5%, found in the areas 
surrounding Portage Lake in Houghton County, 30 miles south of Eagle River.  The 
companies working the new lodes would ultimately become some of the wealthiest 
mining corporations of the 19th century.   Reflecting the opening of new lodes and 
transportation routes through the Sault, Michigan production doubled from 1855 to 1860, 
then doubled again from 1860 to 1870.226
 The success of the Hussey system implemented in Detroit changed the economics 
of smelting, especially when coupled with improved transportation and a significant 
increase in copper production from mines that would ultimately become very stable 
producers.  There was now enough production from the new mines to warrant the capital 
expense of establishing a local smelter and, with a proven smelting system and much less 
expensive transportation to import fuel thanks to the opening of the Sault canal and 
navigation improvements on the Keweenaw, the Portage Lake Smelter at Hancock 
opened in 1860 with four reverberatory furnaces and two cupolas.
  (See Table 4.1)   
227
                                                 
226 Ibid., 197. 
    From 1860 until 
1867, the Portage Lake Smelter competed with the Waterbury and Detroit for all copper 
smelting outside of the mines associated with Hussey despite two very short-lived 
227 Cooper, "Historical Sketch of Smelting and Refining Lake Copper,” 46. 
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attempts to establish other regional smelting works at Lac La Belle and Ontonagon, 
Michigan.   
 In 1867, a significant consolidation occurred in the industry.  The Lac La Belle, 
Ontonagon, Park-McCurdy, Baltimore and Cuba, and Cleveland works had all closed 
while Hussey’s Pittsburgh works slowed as the output of its associated mines declined.  
At the same time, the two other working smelters, the Portage Lake and the Waterbury 
and Detroit, merged forming the Detroit and Lake Superior Copper Company (D&LS) 
which held a virtual monopoly on Michigan copper smelting for the next twenty years.  
(See Table 4.2)   Despite early economics that favored Detroit because of cheaper labor, 
fuel, and transportation costs, the Hancock works expanded as its costs decreased.228   By 
1875, the Hancock smelter operated eight reverberatory furnaces with three cupolas and 
processed nearly 80% of the company’s work, while the Detroit works operated only four 
reverberatory furnaces and two cupolas and processed the remaining.229
 
   
Early Michigan Smelting Technology 
 All of the successful smelters processing Michigan copper from 1850 to the 1920s 
followed a system similar to Hussey’s original plan.  (See Table 4.2)   Mass mines 
shipped large pieces of copper as single pieces (requiring a removable roof smelter) and 
smaller copper pieces, called barrel work, packed in barrels for shipping to smelters.  The 
growing mines nearer Portage Lake shipped smaller, non-mass copper from  
                                                 
228 Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining 
Industry, 43. 
229 Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States,” 685. 
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Table 4.2 
Michigan Native-Copper Smelters 1844-1971 
Unsuccessful, Small, or Short-lived Michigan-Copper Smelters* 
Start Year Company Location Closed Notes 
1844 Pittsburgh and Boston Copper Harbor, MI 1844 Unconfirmed 
1845 Baltimore and Cuba Locust Point, 
Baltimore, MD 
1866 Primary ore 
imported 
1845 Revere and Sons Point Shirley, 
Boston, MA 
1872 Primary ore 
imported 
1846 Albion Copper 
Company 
Gratiot River, MI 1847 Unsuccessful 
1847 Suffolk Mine Eagle River, MI 1848 Unsuccessful 
1848 Ohio and Isle Royal 
Mine 
Isle Royal, MI 1850 Unsuccessful 
1850 Baltimore Copper Canton, 
Baltimore, MD 
1892 Primary ore 
imported 
1858 Park, McCurdy, and Co. Pittsburgh, PA 1862 Short-lived 
1863 Ontonagon Ontonagon, MI 1867 Short-lived 
1865 Lac La Belle Lac La Belle, MI 1865 Unsuccessful 
1880 Lake Superior Native 
Copper Works/ 
Houghton Rolling Mills 
Houghton, MI 1890s Small, Short-lived 
 
Successful, long-run, Michigan Native-Copper Smelters** 
Start Year Company Location Closed Notes 
1848 Pittsburgh and Boston Pittsburgh, PA 1890s C. G. Hussey 
1850 Pittsburgh and Boston Cleveland, OH 1867 J. G. Hussey 
1850 Waterbury and Detroit  Detroit, MI 1887 Became D &SL in 
1867 
1860 Portage Lake Smelter Hancock, MI 1908 Became D &SL in 
1867 
1886 Calumet & Hecla 
Smelter 
Hubbell, MI 1969 Initial D&LS 
partner 
1889 Dollar Bay Smelting 
Wks 
Dollar Bay, MI 1919 D&LS partner in 
1891 
1891 Calumet & Hecla 
Buffalo Smelter 
Buffalo, NY 1914 Calumet and Hecla 
1898 Quincy Smelter Ripley, MI 1971 Quincy Mining 
Company 
1903  Michigan Smelter Houghton, MI 1954 Copper Range 
Mining Company 
 
*See Chaput (1971), Conant (1911), Cooper (1901), Egleston (1881), Hyde (1996), Jackson (1849), 
Martin (1986), and Wilson (2008). 
**Each of these successful smelters initially emulated the Hussey reverberatory-cupola system.  See 
Brignola (2006), Chaput (1971), Conant (1911), Cooper (1901), Egleston (1881), Hyde (1996), 
Trepal (2006), and Wilson (2008).  The White Pine copper smelter operated from 1955 to 1997, but 
processed sulfide ores and resembled more traditional smelting systems outside of Michigan. 
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conglomerate and amygdaloid lodes which as fine, milled, or mechanically crushed ore, 
70-75% copper.230  The significant impurities in Michigan copper at the time included 
iron from milling equipment such as stamp shoes, and geologic inclusions of nickel, 
silver, cobalt, zinc, and lead and eventually arsenic that existed in veins that cross cut 
later copper lodes.231
 Mines usually installed milling, or concentrating, equipment almost immediately 
after they started mining in an attempt to reduce the waste material they would need to 
transport to smelters.  Michigan milling consisted primarily of Cornish stamp mills and 
rollers that crushed and ground the hard rock and some sort of intensive water-washing to 
separate the heavier metal pieces from the lighter gangue, resulting in wastes called 
stamp sands in Michigan and tailings in other parts of the county.  In general for the 
Michigan mines, whose most productive copper ores averaged around 2% copper, the 
mechanical concentration process improved the ore’s richness in some cases up to 
75%.
  
232
                                                 
230 Egleston, "Copper Refining in the United States,” 686. 
   Stamp mills were generally located on waterways for two important reasons.  
First, they required a significant quantity of water to wash, separate, and transport 
crushed rock through the mill and second, the waterways provided a convenient sink to 
dump the considerable amount of stamp sands generated after recovering only 25% of the 
materials contained in them, of which only 2% was copper.  
231 Henry D. Conant, "The Historical Development of Smelting and Refining Native Copper," Mining 
Congress Journal 17 (1931), 532. 
232 Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines, 12, and Laist, 
"Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of Ores,” 127.  Compared to other types of 
copper smelting this is a fairly high number.  Welsh sulfide smelting required a higher waste content to 
maximize slag to remove iron and minimize copper loss.  Smelters generally wanted less than 10% copper 
content entering the furnace.  (See Chapter 3.) 
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 Following milling, the concentrated rock traveled to one of the contract smelters 
through the 1880s and 1890s, but in the 20th century it was likely to go to a captive 
smelter of one of the mining companies.  Initially smelters fired reverberatory furnaces 
with wood, but by the 1880s, like the Welsh, they used bituminous coal shipped in on 
vessels that would ship out finished copper.   However, unlike the traditional Welsh 
process that included multiple reductions and fusions, and refining, the Michigan process 
only required a single fusion in the melt stage and a single reduction during the refining 
stage.  Most of the conglomerate and amygdaloid smelters were side charged with ore 
and rich slag between 12 and 30% copper, limestone flux, and black copper (oxide) 
obtained from the cupola furnace.  Slag, mostly removed during the fusion stage, 
included the limestone, ore gangue, portions of the firebrick lining, impurities that could 
include nickel, silver, cobalt, zinc, lead , iron, and up to 30% copper oxide.    
 After slagging, smelters rabbled the molten bath with 20 foot long iron paddles.  
Rabbling, essentially the splashing of molten copper inside the hearth with the furnace 
doors open, encouraged air flow, oxygen absorption, and the oxidation of any remaining 
impurities that could then be skimmed off the surface as new slag.  Unfortunately, molten 
copper also had an affinity for oxygen, and any time the bath was exposed to air, such as 
during slagging and rabbling, copper oxides tended to form too.  Smelters often coated 
the copper’s surface with charcoal, a pure carbon, to encourage the breakdown of copper 
oxides by the formation of carbon dioxide.   
 The final stage, also the reduction stage, involved treating the copper bath with a 
10 inch diameter, 15-20 foot green, hardwood pole in the same furnace.   The rapid 
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combustion of the pole with the furnace doors closed pulled the remaining oxygen out of 
the copper oxide, leaving behind a pure metal and vented carbon dioxide.  Smelters then 
cast the copper into either ingots for remelting or brass/alloy production, large cakes for 
rolling into sheets, or rectangular bars for wire and rod manufacture.  The rich slag 
removed from the reverberatory furnace was charged into a cupola, which by the 1880s 
was fired with coke, and smelted.   Workers tapped the cupola slag and discarded it, 
while the copper that converted to a black oxide in the furnace, was tapped, cooled, and 
recharged into a later reverberatory heat.233
 
  (See Figure 4.6) 
Captive Smelting 
 Although the general technological system for smelting Michigan coppers would 
remain largely unchanged through the 20th century, except for expanded-capacity 
furnaces, advanced coal use, and the addition of electrolytic refining, the system of 
smelting under contract for mining companies or purchasing ores outright began to 
change in 1886.   Out west, Montana mining firms were erecting their own smelters very 
near mine sites, and the iron and steel, railroad, and oil industries began vertically 
integrating by purchasing all the components of production.  While some contract 
smelting would continue on the Keweenaw after the turn of the century, the general trend 
was for mining companies to establish their own smelting works and control the entire 
process from mining and milling to smelting and refining.   
                                                 
233 Ibid., 897-927. 
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 The Calumet and Hecla (C&H), which began mining as two separate companies 
on the richest lode in the region in 1865, established the first captive smelter in the area at 
Hubbell on Torch Lake in 1886. (See Figure 4.4)  Constructed initially as a joint venture 
with the Detroit and Lake Superior smelter, the capacity of the new works ultimately 
forced the closure of the D&LS Detroit works in 1887.  By 1892, C&H had bought out 
the remaining D&LS joint-venture shares, taking full operational and business control of 
the Hubbell smelter.  With five years smelting experience, C&H opened a second works 
in Buffalo, New York, to take advantage of lower regional fuel costs and greater 
electrical capacity.234
 The Tamarack and Osceola Copper company established the second captive 
smelter in Dollar Bay, Michigan, in 1889.   This small smelter merged with the Detroit 
    
                                                 
234 Hyde, Copper for America, 54-55, and Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars : An Economic 
History of the Michigan Copper Mining Industry, 73. 
Figure 4.6 Native Copper Smelting Practice on the Keweenaw Peninsula ca. 
1910 (source: Author)  
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and Lake Superior in 1891, forming the Lake Superior Smelting Company (LSSC), 
controlled by the Tamarack, Osceola Consolidated, Isle Royal, and Ahmeek mining 
companies.  LSSC operated its Hancock and Dollar Bay smelters full time through 1903, 
when the Copper Range Consolidated Copper Company opened the Michigan smelter.  
By 1908, LSSC had closed its Hancock works, which it had used only provisionally since 
1903.  Ultimately C&H took control of the Osceola Consolidated and Ahmeek mines and 
became the majority owner in the Lake Superior Smelting Company in 1907.  The 
mining company used the Dollar Bay works to smelt the copper of its subsidiary mining 
interests through 1919 and to experiment with new techniques emerging from the 
West.235
 The Quincy Mining Company (QMC), formed in 1846, prospered from 1856 
when it discovered the Pewabic lode on its property.  It paid dividends to stock-holders in 
1862-1864 and then every year from 1867-1920.
   
236   By 1910, it had expanded control 
over the Pewabic lode by purchasing the adjoining Pewabic, Franklin, Mesnard, Pontiac, 
and Arcadian mines.237  The 1891 Pewabic mine purchase included a stamp mill on the  
shore of Portage Lake and its associated stamp sand dump that stretched several hundred 
yards into the lake.  The Franklin Mine, which Quincy purchased in 1908, operated an 
adjacent mill and Portage Lake-tailings dump.238
                                                 
235 C. P. Wilson, "A Brief History of Copper Smelting on Portage Lake," Unpublished graduate paper 
available at Michigan Technological University Archives, (Houghton, MI: Michigan Technological 
University, 2008), 4-6. 
   
236 Larry D. Lankton and Charles K. Hyde, Old Reliable : An Illustrated History of the Quincy Mining 
Company (Hancock, Mich.: Quincy Mine Hoist Association, 1982), 152-153. 
237 Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines, 72. 
238 Lankton and Hyde, Old Reliable : An Illustrated History of the Quincy Mining Company, 54. 
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 Until 1898, Quincy contracted with the Waterbury and Detroit or one of its 
subsequent incarnations for all of its mineral reduction.  In 1898, after years of 
discussion, the firm constructed a smelter on land formed by the waste tailings of the 
Pewabic mill and the recently burned Franklin mill.239  Initially, the site included three 
reverberatory furnaces, a cupola building, and ancillary structures, but shortly thereafter 
Quincy added a fourth reverberatory furnace.  By 1904, a fifth reverberatory furnace with 
a greater capacity operated on low grade ores in a building attached to the primary 
reverberatory house.   The smelter works was so successful that between 1887 and 1901, 
Quincy’s per-ton smelting charge dropped from $15.30 to $10.06, resulting in a $50,000 
savings in just two years of operation, roughly equivalent to one-third of the smelter-
construction costs.240
 Quincy Mining Company production peaked between 1909 and 1911 and, despite 
high profits during WWI, the firm never fully recovered.  Through the post-war 
economic decline and the 1920s, the firm lost money, eventually closing its mines and 
smelter operations in 1931during the Great Depression.  By 1937, the firm had begun 
processing copper again, and through WWII, with government-set prices, began to see a 
profit, especially with reclamation efforts, modeled after a C&H program, to recover 
copper wasted from earlier, inefficient stamp milling practices with a dredge, fine 
crushing, and flotation or leaching concentration.  Despite an end to Quincy mining in 
1945, the smelter continued to process recovered copper until the company’s stamp sands 
   
                                                 
239 Patrick Martin and Gianfranco Archimede, "The Quincy Mining Company Smelting Works, 1898:  
Historical Land Use Survey Project," (Houghton, MI: Michigan Technological University 2002), 3. 
240 Charles K. Hyde, "Historic Report on the Quincy Mining Company,” (Washington, D.C.: National Park 
Service, 1978), 174. 
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were exhausted in 1967, and its contract work, that came after the Michigan Smelter 
closed in 1948, ended.   In 1968, the large number 5 furnace was fitted with natural gas 
burners and used to melt scrap copper until 1971, when the Quincy chose to shut down 
rather than abide by new state directives to install pollution controls.241
 In 1903, Copper Range mining company, with a growing concern about emission 
controls, hired a Montana firm (with former Michigander Frank Klepetko consulting just 
after completing the Washoe smelter in Anaconda, Montana) to design an advanced new 
smelter with a single flue system to vent smoke and gases from the all of its furnaces.  
While the Quincy smelter largely developed out of a fifty-year smelting tradition on the 
Keweenaw, the Copper Range adopted a much more contemporary practice and hired 
outside designers to implement its works.  The designers, following a pattern very similar 
to Montana smelters, arranged buildings on a hillside to take advantage of gravity and 
eliminate as much labor as possible, and placed the stack at the top of the hill to 
consolidate smoke effluent.  The single stack vented smoke higher in the atmosphere, 
presumably away from air currents that led into living areas, and allowed for a single dust 
collection system.  The routing of hot gases away from the furnaces also permitted the 
construction of waste-heat boilers to recover some lost heat, which was often used to 
create steam to run electrical generators.
  
242
                                                 
241 Martin and Archimede, "The Quincy Mining Company Smelting Works, 1898:  Historical Land Use 
Survey Project,” 11. 
  This practice was also adopted at Quincy and 
C&H.  Copper Range operated the Michigan Smelter until the post-war economic decline 
242 Trepal, "The Calumet & Hecla Smelting Works: 1887-2006,” Unpublished graduate paper available at 
Michigan Technological University Archives, Houghton, Mich., 15.  The steam turbines powered by waste 
heat boilers provided enough electricity for C&H’s entire smelter plant needs, and Quincy’s generated 
enough electricity to not only power the smelter, but send additional electricity up to its mines, offices, and 
residences. 
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forced its closure in 1948.  While the mining company’s attention began to focus on a 
copper sulfide ore lode in Ontonagon County, it continued to mine native copper until 
1967, and contracted with Quincy for smelting. 
  The formation of the Lake Superior Smelting Company in 1891 largely ended the 
era of private contract smelting in Michigan.  Although the Hancock works continued to 
smelt copper under contract through most of the 1890s and the privately-held Lake 
Superior Native Copper Works smelted smaller mine batches intermittently through some 
point in the late 1890s,243
 
  the construction of the C&H Buffalo works in 1892, the 
Quincy Smelter in 1898, and the Michigan Smelter in 1903, and the acquisition and later 
legal consolidation of many of the smaller mines into either the Calumet and Hecla, 
Quincy, or Copper Range Consolidated Copper companies effectively dealt a death blow 
to the independent contract smelter.  The three consolidated companies came to dominate 
particular micro regions of the mining district, with each relying on a single regional 
smelting operation to process its entire copper mineral after C&H closed its Buffalo 
works in 1914 and the Dollar Bay works in 1919.  While a few smaller smelters 
continued past 1914, by the end of the decade the mines controlling them would be 
absorbed by one of the big three and their respective smelting operations shut down. 
Captive Smelting Technology 
 In general, Michigan copper smelting largely continued to use coal-fired 
reverberatory furnaces for primary smelting and refining through the end of mining.  
                                                 
243 Ibid., 7. 
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While Quincy remained a fairly conservative company and made few operational 
changes to its smelter, Copper Range, C&H, and LSSC all made substantial changes to 
their smelting operations to maximize efficiency and take advantage of advancing 
smelting techniques.   
In 1894 C&H constructed an electrolytic plant and smelter in Buffalo, likely to 
take advantage of cheaper Niagara electricity to reprocess rich smelter slags and recover 
silver from the ore.244   The electrolytic process, developed in Europe, involved applying 
a negative charge to a series of thin pure-copper cathode sheets that then attracted 
individual copper molecules dissolving off a series of thick, positive-charged 90-99% 
matte or blister copper anodes in an acidic bath, resulting in a thick, 99.95% pure metal 
cathode.  Non-copper materials eventually settled to the bottom of the tank and, if they 
had value such as silver, could be recovered by processing the “tank-mud.”245  Although 
the English and German developers attempted to keep their electrolytic processes secret, 
they had been adopted in the US by 1883, and three successful electrolytic copper plants 
operated in Baltimore, and Great Fall and Anaconda, Montana by 1894.246
                                                 
244 Conant, "The Historical Development of Smelting and Refining Native Copper,” 532 
  In 1914, 
C&H closed its Buffalo smelter plant and moved its equipment and electrolytic works to 
its Hubbell Smelter.  For many copper smelters, especially ones working already pure 
copper, silver extraction often justified the expense of constructing and operating an 
electrolytic plant and when the silver content of its ores declined, C&H closed its Hubbell 
site in 1923 and ended the only Michigan copper electrolysis refining system.  
245 Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper, 349 
246 Titus Ulke, "Notes on the History of Electrolytic Copper Refining in America," Electrochemical 
Industry 1, no. 7 (1902-3), 240. 
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  At the Dollar Bay works in 1898, LSSC constructed a large-capacity 
reverberatory furnace to handle its low-grade ores, but kept its smaller furnaces.  It 
tapped the copper from the melt stage directly into the one of smaller furnaces it now 
used solely for refining.  Ultimately, this sped production, allowing the two processes of 
melting and refining to continue simultaneously in linked dedicated furnaces.  This 
arrangement was copied by C&H in Buffalo in 1900 and Hubbell in the 1920s, by Quincy 
by 1920, and formed the basic arrangement for the Michigan Smelter design in 1903.247
 Two coal-based advances appeared on the Keweenaw during the 1910s and 
1920s.  The first, the use of pulverized coal fuel was the second critical smelter 
innovation to come out of Dollar Bay.   In 1914, based on successes in the cement 
industry and Canadian copper smelters, LSSC discovered that pulverized coal sped the 
melting process and resulted in a higher grade of refined copper.
   
248  Following the 
company’s lead, the Michigan Smelter constructed a pulverized coal plant in 1921 and 
C&H, in 1923.249
 The second and more significant coal-innovation called for adding coal or coke to 
the reverberatory charge to create a “slight” reducing atmosphere during the initial 
 Curiously, the Quincy apparently chose not to use pulverized coal, 
which required on-site production and quick-use to retain the coal’s volatility perhaps 
because the company had little capital to spare for a pulverization plant in the 1920s. 
                                                 
247 Conant, "The Historical Development of Smelting and Refining Native Copper,” 532. 
248 Ibid., 532. 
249 Alessandra  Brignola, "The Michigan Smelter at Cole Creek, Houghton: An Introduction,"  Unpublished 
graduate paper available at Michigan Technological University Archives, Houghton, Mich., 2006, 7, and 
Dan Trepal, "The Calumet & Hecla Smelting Works: 1887-2006," 15. 
149 
 
melt.250  While the gangues oxidized in the furnace and formed slag during the melt 
stage, the coal retarded the copper from oxidizing and joining the slag.251  The now 
“clean” slag came out of the reverberatory furnace without copper oxides and needed no 
further treatment and the smelters could eliminate their blast furnaces.  While it is unclear 
when or where this process developed, the Michigan Smelter discontinued operating its 
blast furnace in 1922 and C&H by the late 1920s.252  Quincy also considered eliminating 
its blast furnace in the 1920s, but company records indicate that instead of eliminating 
copper oxide formation with coke additions, it simply reprocessed its copper-rich slag in 
a reverberatory furnace rather than change processes, and eliminated its blast furnaces.253
 Quincy tended to keep its smelting processes relatively consistent, but it did 
increase efficiencies with significant improvements in materials and materials handling.  
In 1906, Quincy constructed a briquetting plant to combine crushed limestone with low 
grade ore in a large enough size for smelting in its blast furnace.  While this type of 
process was a critical factor in the continued use of western blast furnaces, it only proved 
a modest success on the Keweenaw and was largely abandoned within a few years.
 
254
                                                 
250 Endicott R. Lovell and Herman C. Kenny, "Present Smelting Practice," Mining Congress Journal 17 
(1931), 534. 
  
More successful was Quincy’s addition of a Walker Casting machine in 1920.  Until 
1920, all copper was hand-ladled out of the furnaces and poured into ingot, cake, or bar 
molds.   The Walker Caster, invented in 1897, permitted Quincy smelter workers to place 
251 Conant, "The Historical Development of Smelting and Refining Native Copper,” 532. 
252 Brignola, "The Michigan Smelter at Cole Creek, Houghton: An Introduction,” 7. 
253 "Quincy Mining Company Annual Report for 1923,"  (Hancock, Michigan: Quincy Mining Company, 
1923) 
254 Martin and Archimede, "The Quincy Mining Company Smelting Works, 1898:  Historical Land Use 
Survey Project,” 9. 
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a variety of empty molds on a rotating turnstile that directed the molds under the tap-
spout of the Number Five furnace.  As the turnstile rotated further, the machine dumped 
the chilling copper into a water-filled chamber where an electric conveyor transported the 
copper bars, ingots, or cakes to pick-up areas where workers would deliver them to 
storage sheds.255
 
  
A Word about Stamp Sands 
 The waste streams from Michigan copper, as with all other significant copper 
districts, were immense.  However, its smelters did not produce excessive sulfur smoke 
because its ores were relatively clean and did not require extensive chemical processing 
to recover its metal.  Few, if any, lawsuits were filed because of damage to properties, but 
mill-tailings proved to be a major problem.  Ores with copper contents averaging 2-3% 
during the peak periods of production meant miners hauled 97-98% waste up from 
underground.  Milling enriched the 2-3% copper rock to 60-80% copper concentrate, with 
copper companies dumping about 95% of mine haulings directly into a lake.  Later, they 
recovered it, reclaimed any copper remaining in the tailings, and dumped the now finer 
sands right back into the lake.  This volume does not include poor rock, which is the 
valueless material that had to be tunneled through underground to get to the ore veins and 
which was disposed on the surface.  Two percent of what was originally mined remained 
with the copper in the concentrate and was eventually removed from the smelting process 
as slag.  In brief, for every ton of copper produced, 32 tons of tailings and two-thirds of a 
                                                 
255 H. O. Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924), 276. 
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ton of slag, on average, were left in the local environment.  In 1916, the single year of 
greatest production, Michigan’s copper country produced 13,342 tons of copper, 427,000 
tons of tailings, and 8,900 tons of slag.  For the period from 1845-1946, the entire 
Michigan District produced 9.65 million tons of copper, 309 million tons of tailings, and 
6.43 million tons of slag, based on an average copper content of 3%.256
 
  A small portion 
of the total slag resided near smelters in Boston, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and 
Detroit, and the tailings numbers do not account for failed mining ventures.   
Copper Basin, Tennessee 
 Unlike the rather continuous development in Michigan copper, external political 
conflicts and slack economic development marred and disrupted production in isolated 
southeast Tennessee through the late-19th century.  The Civil War ended the first phase of 
regional mining and smelting, and post-war transportation problems ended the second 
before railroads finally opened the region to large-scale development in the third phase 
and by-product production propelled the district’s growth in the 20th century.   
 
Phase I and II Mining and Smelting 
With the forced removal of the Cherokee Nation in the 1830s, partially initiated 
by the Cherokee refusal to cede Georgia gold lands to the government, the north- 
Georgia, east-Tennessee, and western-North Carolina region opened for mineral 
                                                 
256 Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars : An Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining 
Industry, 199-200.  The EPA reported an estimated 200 million tons of tailings dumped into Torch Lake 
alone from the 1868 to 1968.  See EPA, First Five Year Report, 2003, p. 11. 
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speculation and land development.  In 1843 prospectors, broadening their search north of 
the recent gold rush in Dahlonega, Georgia, stumbled onto cuprite crystals in south east 
Tennessee they initially mistook for gold.257   Four years later, a German miner made the 
first copper ore shipments out of the region to the Point Shirley Works in Boston.258
Appalachian copper deposits stretched from Georgia to Vermont but were most 
prominent and profitable across seven accessible veins in the Ducktown district of 
southeast Tennessee, also known by the more geologically specific term, Copper Basin.  
(See Figure 4.7)   
  
The Ducktown deposits had a traditional sulfide profile with an iron-rich gossan 
layer covering an enriched oxide layer up to 60% copper, above a secondary enriched 10-
20% oxide layer, all sitting over massive 2-3% iron pyrite (FeS2) and chalcopyrite 
                                                 
257 Horace J. Stevens, The Copper Handbook, vol. 10 (Houghton, Mich.: Horace J. Stevens, 1911), 260. 
258 Hyde, Copper for America, 20. 
Figure 4.7 Tennessee Copper Basin (Source: Author) 
153 
 
(CuFeS2 ) sulfide layers.  Early miners shipped the rich oxide ores to Swansea and Boston 
smelters profitably, but the secondary layer required an initial local smelting to a 40-50% 
copper matte to make the trip out of the district profitable, and the 2-3% copper massive 
sulfides would need to be fully smelted and refined locally.259
The remote district became accessible when, in 1850, a railroad passed through 
Cleveland, Tennessee, 33 miles west and investors funded the Ocoee Toll and Plank 
Road, better known as the Copper Road, from Ducktown to Cleveland in 1853.  In 1850, 
the Hiwassee Company officially started mining.  By 1852, three other mines operated in 
the district and by 1854, fourteen.
    
260  Despite the arduous and expensive two-day ox-cart 
journey to transport copper ores and mattes out of the district, the region developed, and 
by 1860 seven smelters operated in the basin.261
 The few references to Ducktown smelting in the 1850s indicate primarily 
charcoal-fired, German-based blast furnaces augmented by reverberatory calcining 
furnaces and occasional “Welsh or Swansea pattern” smelters.
   
262
                                                 
259 Robert Edward Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1946), 61. 
  Despite the 
consolidation of the 14 active mines into two major corporations following the economic 
panic of 1857, and an 1860 rolling mill opening in Cleveland, Tennessee, the district 
could not weather the loss of personnel during the Civil War as young Southerners joined 
the Confederacy, Northern workers returned home, and investors withdrew operating 
capital for the duration.  From 1861-1863, the Confederacy bought all the copper the few 
260 Karen Daniels, Tennessee's Historic Copper Basin Area: An Overview (Benton, Tenn: Polk County 
Publishing, 1992), 3. 
261 Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time, 85. 
262 Ibid., 67. 
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open mines produced until the Union Army destroyed the Cleveland Rolling Mill and 
effectively ended copper production in the district.263
 In 1866, the two pre-war consolidated companies, the Burra-Burra, named for the 
recently organized Australian copper district, and the Union Consolidated both reopened 
with German miner J.E. Raht at the helm of both.  Raht also supervised the only 
remaining independent mine, the Polk County, for a few years after the war before it 
closed.
   
264   Raht hired his brother August to run the smelting complexes that reopened at 
the Burra-Burra’s Isabella and Tennessee mines and at the Polk County mine.  At some 
point in the late 1860s smelting at the Tennessee and Polk slowed down or stopped 
altogether, and J. E. Raht made a significant investment at Isabella.  Not only did Raht 
build a new refinery in 1871, but he had funded experiments and designs based on an 
1866 patent taken out by his other brother William for a Bessemer-style refining process 
for copper matte.265
 With dwindling ore quality, climbing fuel prices, and poor/expensive plank road 
transportation out of the district, neither the Polk County nor the Burra-Burra mine 
remained viable past 1872.
     
266
                                                 
263 Hyde, Copper for America, 20-21. 
  This left the Union Consolidated in control of the entire 
output of copper and the only smelter and refining complex at Isabella.  Pressing on 
under Raht, however, the company invested in mining equipment and smelting upgrades, 
264 Ibid., 20-21, and Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time., 149. 
265 Many historians believe that William Raht’s involvement was in name only and that August Raht 
actually developed the Bessemer process. 
266 Ken Rush, "Copper Mining Companies of the Basin," Unpublished paper available in Ducktown, 
Tennessee: Ducktown Basin Museum, 1993, 7. 
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ultimately settling on a standard of practice closely resembling the German system with 
American-modified Welsh refining.   
 
Phase I and II Smelting Technology 
 Like the Continental system, Tennessee practice used a first roast to expel sulfur.  
This occurred on an open cordwood bed and, according to one source, produced up to 
one million pounds of yellow gas per roast.267  The first reduction to produce matte took 
place in “small square blast furnaces” with two tuyeres entering the back wall.  The 
second roast was carried out up to five times to expel sulfur and was followed by a 
second reduction, this time for black copper. The final reduction occurred in a 
reverberatory furnace for blister copper, followed by a refining stage in a second 
reverberatory furnace.  All Union Consolidated furnaces used charcoal fuel, but by 1876 
both blister and refining reverberatory furnaces were fired with gas, and Raht 
implemented a compressed air blast into the molten refinery bath to oxidize impurities, 
emulating the Bessemer process developed by his brother.268
 Part of the reason for the conversion to gas was the enormous quantity of wood 
consumed for mining, roasting, and smelting in Tennessee.  An 1872 visitor to the region 
reported in the Cherokee Scout (NC) that the fuel consumed by the Isabella smelter 
reached 60,000 bushels of charcoal per month.
  (See Figure 4.8) 
269
                                                 
267 "Editor of 1872 Writes About Ducktown Mines," Cherokee Scout (Murphy, NC), September 5, 1935, 4.  
Although this account was likely accurately reported, it is probably an exaggeration because an 
Engineering Mining Journal article about the same process a few years later reports an initial roast charge 
of only 500 tons or one million pounds.  (See: Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time, 151) 
  According to a Department of  
268 Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time, 151. 
269 "Editor of 1872 Writes About Ducktown Mines,” 5. 
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Figure 4.8 Tennessee Copper Smelting Practice (Source: Author) 
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Agriculture report in 1875, Tennessee forests averaged between 30 and 70 cords per acre 
although some dense, old-growth forests could reach as many as 700.270
typical forest yield of 50 cords per acre, the likely monthly wood consumption per 
smelter roughly equaled 18 acres of forest land. 
  Assuming a 
charcoal production rate estimated by Gordon and Malone at 50 bushels per cord, a 
conservative average charcoal consumption of 45,000 bushels per smelter-month, and a 
271  Further, estimating the number of 
smelters running, the district had operated 63 smelter-years by 1878.272
the region’s smelters consumed a significant quantity of available wood which, when 
coupled with open-heap roasting, mine timbering, building construction, plank-road 
construction and repair, home heating, and boiler operation, ultimately led to severe 
timber shortages.  Related consumption estimates suggested that mining in total stripped 
between 47 and 50 square miles of the region for fuel and other uses by 1879.
  At 18 acres per 
smelter-month, smelting likely consumed a total of 13,600 forested acres or 21 square 
miles by 1878.  With the basin’s size of 36 square miles, not all of which was forested, 
273
 
   
                                                 
270 "Report of the Secretary of Agriculture for 1875," ed. U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1875), 291-294. 
271 Robert B. Gordon and Patrick M. Malone, The Texture of Industry : An Archaeological View of the 
Industrialization of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 231. This is a very rough 
estimate.  Some smelters ran reverberatory furnaces which consumed more fuel than blast furnaces; some 
early furnaces were fired directly with wood which Barclay estimated consumed three-times the amount of 
cord wood as charcoal; and not all smelters ran their furnaces all the time.  Barclay further noted that a 
single furnace at the Eureka works consumed 300 bushels of charcoal per day, or 9,000 per month. 
(Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht’s Time, 68) Assuming that each smelter ran an average of five furnaces 
each day, then 45,000 bushels of charcoal were consumed per site per month. 
272 One smelter operated in 1854, two in 1855, three smelters in 1856, seven in 1860/61, likely three in 
1862, none in 1863, three in 1866-68, two in 1869-71, and one in 1873-1878.  Years in between were 
averaged to come up with 63 smelter-years. 
273Rush, "Copper Mining Companies of the Basin,” 7, Stuart W. Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid 
Industry in Tennessee," ed. Division of Geology The State of Tennessee Department of Conservation, 
Information Circular (Nashville, Tennessee: State of Tennessee, 1966), 4. 
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Phase III Mining and Smelting  
When we consider what may yet be peering into the possibilities of the future 
when the locomotive shall appear in their midst, bringing in its trains of coal from 
Chattanooga or Knoxville, and whilst they are amazed at the timidness of capital 
which fails to see a golden opportunity, they are yet buoyed up with the hope that 
ere long their best hopes in this direction will be fully realized.  Without a railroad 
we fear that Ichabod is written upon their unequalled and inexhaustible mineral 
deposits.274
 
 
This quote from an 1872 Cherokee Scout article appeared the same year the Burra-Burra 
mine closed and four years after the Polk County Mine closed.  While the Union 
Consolidated would have its best year in 1878, it too could not sustain production with 
the increasing wood-fuel shortages.   Despite attempts to lower fuel costs, the Union 
Consolidated could not continue to operate profitably and, with Michigan production 
reaching new heights and a greater than 50% drop in the price of copper since 1872, the 
Union Consolidated closed in 1878, ending all copper production in the district.275
 In 1890, after more than a decade without copper mining, the north-bound 
Marietta and North Georgia Railroad built a line to the Copper Basin, meeting the new 
Knoxville Southern Railroad.  With copper prices on the rise since 1885,
  
276 coal fuel now 
available, and cheap transportation, copper mining and smelting returned to the district 
with the incorporation of the Ducktown Sulpher, Copper, and Iron Company (DSCI) in 
London, England, in 1891 and the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) in New York in 
1899.277
                                                 
274 "Editor of 1872 Writes About Ducktown Mines,”, 6. 
  DSCI began with the holdings of the former Union Consolidated mining 
275 Christopher J. Schmitz, World Non-Ferrous Metal Production and Prices 1700 - 1976 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1979), 270. 
276 Ibid., 270. 
277 Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 746 and 1661. 
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company that included the Isabella mine and smelter complex, and TCC bought the 
former Burra-Burra, Polk County, and independent mine holdings. 
 Shortly after reopening the Mary Mine and the Isabella Smelter, DSCI installed a 
100-ton/day coke-fired Herreshoff blast furnace.278  (See Figure 4.2)  In 1893, it installed 
a second Herreshoff and by 1901 operated four furnaces and was producing three million 
pounds of copper annually.279  Despite new fuels and equipment, DSCI continued the old 
practice of open-heap roasting that ultimately posed several significant problems.  First, 
heap roasting methods required several weeks to process an amount of ore that the new 
blast furnaces smelted in only a few days, creating a significant bottleneck in 
production.280
  TCC similarly started operations with mining, smelting, and open-heap roasting 
at the McPherson and Polk County mines near Ducktown in 1901, and by 1903 operated 
three blast furnaces and more than 150 roasting sheds.  By 1906, TCC had consolidated 
its smelting operations at Copperhill (likely in 1904), operated a five-mile railroad  
  Second, the sulfuric waste gases from the process quickly dispersed in the 
basin and killed vegetation in much the same way Swansea smelters did earlier in the 
century.  The Tennessee situation, however, was exacerbated by several decades of 
rampant timber-harvesting leading to very distinctive, lunar landscape. (See Figure 4.9 
and 4.10)   
                                                 
278 Though of German decent, J. B. F. Herreshoff worked in New York and developed several innovative 
smelting furnaces and processes based on existing designs and principles.  (Peters, Modern Copper 
Smelting, 266) 
279 Robert Edward Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963 (Knoxville, Tenn.: R. E. Barclay, 1975), 5, 
and Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee,” 4. 
280 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 5. 
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Figure 4.9  Open heap roasting in the Ducktown District ca. 1900. 
Large heaps of sulfur-rich copper ores, partially covered, were ignited on a 
bed of wood and allowed to burn for several weeks as most of the 
combustible sulfur burns off.  (With permission of the Edward Oscar Boak 
collection, Ducktown Basin Museum.) 
Figure 4.10 Isabella, Tennessee ca. 1920.  Effects of several decades of 
timber harvesting and open-heap roasting have left this once heavily 
wooded southern landscape completely denuded of any vegetation. (With 
permission of Ducktown Basin Museum) 
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between its smelter and Ducktown mines, and smelted in seven blast furnaces. 281
 
  
Continued open-heap roasting, however, now significantly increased by TCC, proved 
problematic for local farmers. 
 Environmental Consequences and Technological Solutions 
 Although the issue of smelter smoke had been largely settled in the United 
Kingdom by the mid 19th century, the impact of expanding American smelter capacity 
generated new nuisance conflicts between agriculture interests and mining companies in 
this country.  In the first decade of the 20th century, farmers and ranchers filed several 
lawsuits against Montana, California, Utah, and Tennessee copper smelters.  Although R. 
E. Barclay claimed the State of Georgia brought suit against DSCI as early as 1895, the 
first well documented court cases began in 1903 and 1904.  In both the consolidated 
Swain v. the TCC & Cole v. DSCI (1903) case and the Madison v. DSCI (1904) case, 
landowners lost their attempts to legally end open heap roasting when Tennessee state 
courts ruled that the mining companies’ benefit to the county outweighed their 
damages.282  In the Madison case, the ruling cited 12,000 jobs and a full half of the 
county’s tax income generated by two companies.283
                                                 
281 Ibid., 33-36. 
  In 1906, however, in a much more 
significant case, the State of Georgia sued TCC and DSCI in front of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, arguing that its sovereignty over its own land and air was compromised by smoke 
282 A.W. Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co. et al. and Thomas L. Cole v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron 
Co. Limited, et al., (1903) 
283 Daniels, Tennessee's Historic Copper Basin Area: An Overview, 9. 
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from Tennessee open heap roasting which killed its farmers’ crops.  The court ultimately 
declared an injunction against smoke releases.284
 Concurrent with mounting environmental protests, both companies sought control 
over the open-heap roasting problem which, for them, was more of a production flow 
problem than an environmental nuisance.  As early as 1899, DSCI experimented with 
pyritic smelting, the direct charging of green (unroasted) ores into its Herreshoff blast 
furnace and using the heat of sulfur and iron oxidation to reduce the ore to a matte, 
thereby executing two smelting steps in one phase.  Since sulfur was flammable and 
sulfur and iron oxidation generated significant heat, roasting could be sped up in a self-
contained blast furnace by charging smaller amounts and igniting the charge.  The 
combination of retained heat in the furnace and added heat from oxidation and reduction 
processes in a partial pyritic process meant minimal new fuel was needed.  Slag removed 
the iron oxide, leaving a 10-20% copper first fusion copper matte which would be cooled, 
broken up, and re-charged with new ore and flux into a second furnace resulting in a 35-
50% matte that would be sent to refining.
   
285
In 1902 DSCI successfully arrived at a workable ore-flux formula and in October, 
1903, ended heap roasting altogether and fully implemented partial pyritic smelting of all 
its ores.
  
286  By 1905, a short time after luring a smelting manager away from DSCI’s 
Isabella works, TCC transitioned completely to pyritic smelting, abandoned all open-heap 
roasting, and constructed a 325-foot stack to disperse smoke over a wider area.287
                                                 
284 Ibid., 13. 
  Like 
285 Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 664 and 747.  
286 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 6. 
287 Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 747, and Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 37. 
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most American smelting innovations, pyritic smelting had its roots in Europe.  Sticht 
reports in Peter’s Modern Copper Smelting (1898) that experiments in pyritic smelting 
dated back to the 1860s in Russia, with significant advances by Englishman John 
Hollway at Rio Tinto, Spain, in 1878.288  Hofman reported successful applications in 
Montana, Colorado, and Tasmania by 1895.289
 Despite the end of production bottle necks and a symbolic end to open heap 
roasting, the new methods did not entirely alleviate the smoke problem.  In fact, 
according to Barclay, the problem was exacerbated by an increased density in sulfur 
dioxide gas, increased output, and new tall stacks that, like Swansea, eliminated smoke 
locally but with higher air currents, disbursed smoke regionally, ultimately leading to 
much wider ranging impacts and more distant lawsuits.
 (See Figure 4.8) 
290
to enjoin the defendant Copper Companies from discharging noxious gas from 
their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff's territory. It alleges that in 
consequence of such a discharge a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards and 
crops is going on, and other injuries are done and threatened in five counties of 
the State…But the plaintiff now finds, or thinks that it finds, that the tall chimneys 
in present use cause the poisonous gases to be carried to greater distances than 
ever before and that the evil has not been helped. 
   In summarizing the majority 
opinion in the State of Georgia v. TCC, Justice Holmes wrote that Georgia wished: 
291
 
  
                                                 
288 Robert Sticht (Contributing Author), "Pyritic Smelting-Its History, Principals, Scope, Apparatus, and 
Practical Results," in Modern Copper Smelting, ed. Edward Dyer Peters (New York: The Scientific 
Publishing, Co., 1898), 400. 
289 Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper, 144. 
290 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 6-7. 
291 State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company and Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, & Iron Company, 206 
U.S. 30 (1907).  The other significant event stemming from the 1907 State of Georgia lawsuit was the 
recognition of environmental damage and the need for some sort of remedy.  Karen Daniels suggests that 
this suit initiated the conservation movement in SE Tennessee.  In the 1920s reforestation efforts began in 
the district and continued into the 21st century.  (See Daniels, Tennessee's Historic Copper Basin Area: An 
Overview 1992, 13) More on this in Chapter 5.  
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The Supreme Court issued an injunction but postponed enforcement pending the 
completion of auxiliary sulfuric acid production plants at the smelters that would, in 
theory, eliminate all sulfur and other poisons from the smoke.  As early as 1872, August 
Raht observed that Ducktown needed an acid recovery plant to stay viable, but sufficient 
technology did not exist that early.292
 Chamber sulfuric acid is produced by the oxidation of sulfur dioxide, obtained in 
this case by burning sulfide ores in the presence of oxygen, its conversion into sulfur 
trioxide, and the chemical combination of sulfur trioxide and water to form sulfuric acid 
(H2SO4).  In the three-phase chamber process that includes Glover Towers, Acid 
Chambers, and Gay-Lussac Towers, nitrogen compounds are used to induce sulfur 
oxidation through intermediate compounds of nitrogen, sulfur, hydrogen, and oxygen and 
the subsequent removal of nitrogen compounds from exhaust gases.
  By the turn of the century, however, several 
proven European technologies existed, and in the midst of the Georgia lawsuit, DSCI 
built an experimental, but failed, contact acid plant.  By 1909, however, both DSCI and 
TCC successfully operated chamber acid plants. 
293
 In 1908, TCC built a successful chamber acid plant at Copper Hill, which Stevens 
claimed was the largest ever built.  The system routed blast furnace gases through dust 
chambers to a “nitrate apparatus” where nitrogen oxides were introduced into the hot gas.  
The nitrogen enriched gas passed into the bottom of one of two octagonal, 30’ diameter 
  Throughout the 
process, sulfur dioxides are gradually oxidized and eliminated by nitrogen compounds, 
forming sulfur trioxide and nitrogen-rich gas. 
                                                 
292 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 39. 
293 Andrew Miller Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture (New York: Reinhold Pub. Corp., 1936), 13-14. 
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by 50’ high Glover Towers where it encountered a combination of chamber acid and 
nitrous vitriol, an acid from the Gay-Lussac towers, trickling down from the top.  The 
Glover tower encouraged nitrogen from the nitrous vitriol and steam from both acids to 
pass into the hot flue gas, thereby concentrating the chamber acid and de-nitrated nitrous 
vitriol.  The combination, now essentially a simple concentrated sulfuric acid, was 
collected from the tower bottom and reused in the Gay-Lussac Tower.294
 The partially oxidized sulfur dioxide flue gas, nitrogen compounds, and some 
sulfur trioxide passed from the Glover Tower through lead-lined flues to a 4.6 million 
square foot chamber for further oxidizing, hydrating, and condensing.  Through the 
process, the quantity of sulfur dioxide gradually lessened from 7%, as the gases passed 
through several separate chambers converting to sulfur trioxide, to less than 0.1% at the 
Gay-Lussac tower.  Water mist was introduced into the chamber top and combined easily 
with the sulfur trioxide, forming sulfuric acid that condensed on lead sheets and was 
collected in pans below the chamber and sold.  The nitrogen-rich, de-sulfured gases 
passed from the chambers to one of ten Gay-Lussac Towers that trickled concentrated de-
nitrated sulfuric acid from the Glover Tower downward absorbing up to 86% of the 
remaining nitrogen in the up-flowing de-sulfured gas.  The now nitrogen-rich sulfuric 
acid, or nitrous vitriol, was collected from the bottom of the Gay-Lussac towers and used 
in the Glover Tower to introduce nitrogen compounds to the flue gases.  The de-sulfured 
 
                                                 
294 Ibid., 144-145, and Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 1665. 
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and now mostly de-nitrated gases passed from the system and were vented into the 
atmosphere.295
 
  (See Figure 4.11 and 4.12)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
295 Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture, 143-145, and Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 1666. 
 
Figure 4.12 Chamber Acid Process for sulfuric acid production as 
used in Tennessee from the 1910s to 2000. (Source: Author) 
Figure 4.11  Tennessee Copper Company Chamber Acid Plant showing 
acid-forming chamber facility on the hilltop with acid storage tanks and rail 
cars in the middle ground ca. 1920. (With permission of Ducktown Basin Museum.) 
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Although the TCC acid plant was the largest in the world at the time, none of the prime 
processes had American roots.  French chemist Joseph-Louis Gay-Lussac invented the 
Gay-Lussac tower in 1823 but found little use for his device until it was paired with the 
Glover tower, invented by Englishman John Glover in 1859.296  Both sets of towers were 
lead-lined structures to keep the acid from deteriorating any structural elements, then 
lined with fire-brick and packed with flint, coke, broken wine bottles, or any other 
chemically neutral barrier to slow the ascent of smoke and the descent of acid.297  Small 
lead chambers were first created in England in 1746 for sulfuric acid production with 
improvements in the late 18th century.298  Contact acid production developed in Britain in 
1831 for converting SO2 into SO3 by drawing sulfur dioxide and air into a tube filled with 
heated platinum or later vanadium oxide and causing the oxygen molecules to join the 
sulfur.299
 As soon as DSCI’s chamber acid plant went into operation, the company made 
more money from sulfur recovery and acid production than copper, relegating copper to a 
by-product of acid production.
 
300  As soon as TCC’s plant went on line, TCC signed a 
10- year contract with International Agriculture Corporation for TCC’s entire output of 
sulfuric acid.301
                                                 
296 Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture, 23-24. 
  In 1909, 53% of all sulfuric acid was used in agriculture fertilizers, 
which dropped to 28% in 1918 when explosives took 36% and the steel, petroleum 
refining, and chemical/drug industries used about 9% each.  Through the mid-1930s, the 
297 Alfred G. Lock and Charles G. Lock, A Practical Treatise on the Manufacture of Sulphuric Acid 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1879), 100. 
298 Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture, 23. 
299 Ibid., 24, and Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee,” 18. 
300 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 8. 
301 Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 1666. 
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fertilizer, petroleum, chemicals, coal, and steel industries were the top five users in that 
order.302
 
  
Other Smelting Technologies  
 Completing the smelting process, TCC by 1911 and DSCI by 1920, adopted 
Bessemer-style converters for the final refining of pyritic-smelted copper matte.  Until 
1920, DSCI sold all of its copper as high-grade matte, but TCC, with its new high 
capacity Copperhill smelter works, likely installed its first converters in 1904.303  By 
1911 the company operated 4 converter stands with 15 shells that produced a 99.4% pure 
copper that TCC sold mainly in Europe as blister copper, although some blister copper 
pigs were sold to Baltimore Copper Smelting and Rolling Co, a latter incarnation of the 
1860 Baltimore Copper Company, for electrolytic converting.304
 Although historian Barclay and engineers Hofman and Charles Christensen 
recognize August Raht’s contributions to the copper industry by using forced air to 
oxidize iron and sulfur, most credit M. Manhès work in Lyon, France, for successfully 
creating Bessemer blister copper from matte in 1880.
   
305
                                                 
302 Fairlie, Sulfuric Acid Manufacture, 20. 
  Franklin Ferrel built the first 
U.S. Bessemer copper plant at the Parrot Smelter in Butte Montana in 1883.  By 1885, 
the refining process involved charging a Bessemer converter with molten 40-50% copper 
matte and blowing air through tuyeres into the copper bath, oxidizing the last iron that, in 
303 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 9. 
304 Stevens, The Copper Handbook, 1664. 
305 Barclay, Ducktown Back in Raht's Time, 149; Hofman, Metallurgy of Copper, 203; and Charles 
Christensen, "History of Converting," The Mining World 33 (1910), 1037. 
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combination with siliceous materials in the converter lining, formed slag.  Any remaining 
sulfur in the copper was oxidized and vented.306
 The only other significant smelting developments in the Tennessee copper basin 
occurred in the early 1930s, when both companies began phasing out their blast furnaces.  
By the 1920s the copper content of the region’s ores had dropped, contributing to a 
significant need for enhanced concentration before the materials could be smelted.  In 
1920, the same year it installed its first converter, DSCI built the first flotation plant in 
the district.  Unfortunately, flotation-concentrated ore is not smeltable in a blast furnace, 
and the company sold this copper simply as high-grade concentrate.  In 1925, DSCI 
reorganized as the Ducktown Chemical and Iron Company (DCI), and after adding a 
second flotation plant in 1927, it built an iron sinter plant, which permitted the recovery 
of significant quantities of iron from its ores.  For the first time in thirty-six years of 
calling itself an “iron” company, DCI actually sold iron.
 
307  In 1931, DCI officially ended 
blast furnace operations, and all recovered copper was sold as concentrate while the acid 
plant produced acid from the sulfur-rich sinter plant gases.308
 In the 1920s TCC also began a program to eliminate its blast furnaces.  Called the 
“all-milling” plan, the company built a flotation plant and a four-roaster iron sinter plant 
  By 1936, the company’s 
raw materials were dwindling, and it could not compete economically with its much 
larger neighbor and sold out, leaving TCC the sole producer in the area.   
                                                 
306 Christensen, "History of Converting,” 1036-1037. 
307 Maher, “The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee,” 17. Iron sinter is created by first roasting 
flotation-concentrated iron-rich pyritic ores to release sulfur gas and create calcine (roasted ore 
concentrate).   Gases are transferred to the acid plant, and the calcine is sintered on a traveling grate in a 
high-heat process that drives off any remaining sulfur and changes the structural characteristic of the 
material, which assays 70% iron and was sold to the steel industry.    
308 Barclay, The Copper Basin, 1890 to 1963, 9-11. 
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in 1923.  By the mid-30s TCC had completed its transition, which included the 
incorporation of the already “all-milling” DCI.  With a second acid plant built at the start 
WWI, new iron sinter plants constructed in the early 1930s, and a U.S. Government-built 
acid plant on its property in WWII, TCC had successfully diversified.  It now sold 
copper, different grades of acid, iron sinter, copper sulfates, fungicides, insecticides, zinc 
concentrates, organic chemicals, sodium hydroxide, ferric sulfate, and granulated slag.309  
Despite the apparent success of the “all-milling” program, TCC built a reverberatory 
furnace at its smelter in 1940 and returned to smelting and refining copper.310
 
  
Montana-Richest Hill and Biggest Smelter on Earth 
 The Michigan copper smelting industry experimented with advanced techniques 
but in the end, by and large, smelted its copper in basically the same way it had at the 
beginning because Michigan ores neither warranted nor permitted great infusions of new 
technology.  Tennessee’s high-sulfur, high-iron ores led to the early 20th-century adoption 
of pyritic smelting and colossal acid plants.  Montana, on the other hand, advanced not 
only the scale of smelting, but also developed and refined  existing European 
technologies, many of which made their way back to Tennessee or burgeoning new 
districts in Utah and Arizona. 
 Like Ducktown, gold prospectors first explored the Butte area.  Unlike the 
Tennessee district, however, Montana prospectors discovered placer gold deposits often 
interlaced with copper.  They established a mining camp in 1864 and built the first 
                                                 
309 Ibid., 44. 
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regional smelter in 1866.  Despite constructing a second furnace in 1868, most of the 
gold-copper placers were worked out by 1869.311  Although a few quartz mines and mills 
remained open, Butte was practically abandoned until 1875 when miners discovered 
silver ore lodes several hundred feet below the surface.  Silver proved to be a slightly 
longer-lasting metal in the district than gold, and 12 mines operated in 1877. 312   Silver 
mining, however, led to significant changes in the region.  The burgeoning industry 
required a metallurgical infrastructure, and many mines built mills and smelters, before 
the railroad reached the region in 1881.  More important, 100 feet below the silver lodes, 
sat the richest copper veins in the world.313
 Initially all Montana copper ores were simply concentrated.  The mines tried to 
import Cornish stamps used in Michigan, but the hard chalcocite (Cu2S), the primarily 
ore, was ultimately too brittle for stamping and led to significant milling losses.
  (See Figure 4.13)  Although copper was 
continually recovered in small quantities from the 1860s, the district remained primarily a 
precious metal mining camp through the early 1880s.  
314  
Eventually the region settled on rollers, crushers, and water separation to process the ore 
and eliminate gangue, and sent concentrates and high-content ores to Swansea, Freiberg 
(Germany), and Baltimore for smelting and refining.315
                                                 
311 Ralph I. Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,"  (Butte, Montana: State of 
Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology: Montana College of Mines, 1953), 1-2. 
  However, like all other copper 
districts, as the rich ore gave way to poorer ores, and mining companies introduced matte  
312 Hyde, Copper for America, 81. 
313 Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,” 2-5. 
314 Laist, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of Ores,” 128. 
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smelting and sent partially smelted copper to Baltimore, Swansea, or Black Hawk, 
Colorado, for finishing and refining.  Most of the early 1880s smelters operated on Welsh 
principles with some combination of 45’ “long-hearth,” hand-rabbled reverberatory 
roasters and 18’reverberatory matting furnaces.316
 William Clark’s Colorado and Montana Smelter, in partnership with the Boston 
and Colorado Smelting company from Black Hawk, Colorado, opened the first dedicated 
copper smelter in Butte in 1879.  Following the opening of the next smelter, the Montana 
Copper Company’s Colusa Smelter in 1880, came the Parrot Smelter in 1881.  Sometime 
after 1881, the founder of the original Colusa smelter opened the Bell Smelter, featuring 
   
                                                 
316 Ibid., 8, and Laist, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of Ores,” 129. 
Figure 4.13 Butte-Anaconda Copper District Montana (Source: Author) 
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the first successful blast furnaces in the district for copper matte smelting.317  In 1884, 
William Clark built a second smelter, this one called Clark’s Colusa Smelter to 
distinguish it from the Montana Company’s.318
 In 1887 a Boston capitalist formed the Boston and Montana Copper and Silver 
Mining Company and bought several properties from William Clark including “Clarks 
Colusa” mine and its smelter which was renamed the “Lower Works” by the company.  
In 1888 Boston and Montana purchased Montana Copper Company’s Colusa smelter, and 
renamed it the “Upper Works,” and ran both sites until it opened the Great Falls 
Reduction Works, 150 miles north of Butte in 1893 and closed its local smelters.  A 
second Boston group formed the Boston and Butte Mining Company in 1888 to develop 
several mines and opened a smelter that same year.  In 1890, the Boston and Butte 
smelter successfully expanded its reverberatory matting furnaces to 50’ long.  In 1887 
William Clark bought the 1883 Butte Reduction Works that he operated until 1910, when 
it, like the Colorado and Montana, Parrot, and 1892 Montana Ore Purchasing Co., were 
purchased by the expanding Anaconda Copper Company and closed. 
 
319
 In 1881, the second year Marcus Daly ran the Anaconda Mine in Butte, he 
returned a short-lived profit from silver mining.  In 1882, just as the Anaconda’s silver 
lode ran out, a narrow, but promising, copper vein appeared.
 
320
                                                 
317 Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,”  6-8. 
  By 1883, Daly was 
working one of the richest copper sulfide veins in the world, measuring between 50 and 
318 Hyde, Copper for America, 85. 
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100 feet wide and assaying between 12 and 50%.  In addition to encouraging significant 
improvements and expansions in the mine, Daly convinced his investors to build a 
smelter, not in Butte, where he believed land was too expensive and water too difficult to 
come by, but at a site on Warm Spring Creek, 26 miles west, that would eventually be 
named after the company. 321
The first Anaconda smelter, opened in 1884, included the world’s largest 
concentrating mill, thirty-four hand-rabbled long-hearth reverberatory roasters, twenty-
six matting furnaces, two seventy-ton blast furnaces, and two large 115- and 175-foot tall 
smoke stacks, with a total site capacity of 450 tons of processed ore per day, with all 
matte initially shipped to England for refining.
   
322
Although the Lower Works burned in 1889, Daly rebuilt it, increased its capacity 
to 3000 tons of ore per day, and added ninety-six Bruckner roasters, twenty-eight matting 
furnaces, four Wethey roasters, eight McDougall roasters, six 8’ blast furnaces, and three 
tall stacks to vent the works.  In a move to further retain all capital from copper 
production and complete refining in Anaconda, he installed a fifteen-stall upright 
  By 1886, the capacity of the smelter 
complex had increased to 1000 tons of ore per day, and Daly replaced the labor intensive 
hand-rabbled reverberatory furnaces with forty new Bruckner Roasters.  In 1887, due to 
technological and space limitations of the works, Daly built a second smelter, designated 
the “Lower Works” and renamed the original site the “Upper Works” just like the Boston 
and Montana smelters is Butte.   
                                                 
321 Hyde, Copper for America, 84. 
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Bessemer converter plant at the Upper Works, built the nation’s third electrolytic refining 
plant between the two works, and added a converter plant to the Lower Works.323  The 
combined capacity of both works reached 4000 tons of ore per day.324
 
  (See Figure 4.14)  
With the new converters and refiners, copper shipped from Anaconda left at 99.97% pure 
and finally challenged the purity of Michigan Lake copper.  
                                                 
323 Laist, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of Ores,” 129 and Shovers et al., Butte 
& Anaconda Revisited, 31. 
324 Fred Quivik, "The Anaconda Company Smelters:  Great Falls and Anaconda," The Speculator 1, no. 2 
(1984), 40. 
Figure 4.14 Anaconda Upper Works Smelter with Lower Works stacks in the 
background and electrolytic plant in the middle ground off to the right ca. 1895.  
(With permission of Butte-Silver Bow Archives.) 
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Although electrolysis was discussed above in conjunction with Calumet and 
Hecla’s Buffalo Smelter, and Bessemer converting with the Tennessee Copper Company 
plant, both processes were refined in Montana before they were installed in Michigan or  
Tennessee.  As noted above, the first U.S. electrolysis plant was in Baltimore and the 
fourth in Buffalo, but the first plant directly associated with a copper mine was developed 
by Michigander Frank Klepetko of the Boston and Montana smelting company at Great 
Falls in 1893.   Similar to the Buffalo site, Great Falls with its new hydroelectric plants 
offered great potential for inexpensive electricity and, with increasing consternation over 
smelter smoke in Butte, the Boston and Montana Company built a large smelter and 
refinery at the falls and closed its Upper and Lower Butte works.325
   The new 1893 Great Falls smelter included twenty-four Bruckner roasters, eight 
reverberatory matte furnaces, and two five-ton upright converters.  By 1902 the site 
included eighteen 6-hearth McDougall-Evans-Klepetko roasters, five gas-fueled matting 
furnaces, five blast-furnaces, twelve upright converters, one anode-casting reverberatory 
furnace with a Walker Caster, a 312-tank electrolytic plant, and four reverberatory 
refining furnaces and was second in production only to Anaconda, which by 1915 would 
purchase the Boston and Montana Company and the Great Falls refinery.
  
326
According to Jonathan Leitner, the ability to home-refine Montana’s copper 
matte, previously sent primarily to United Kingdom, proved the decisive blow to the 
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already declining British copper industry.327  Sharp declines in British production 
occurred in the 1890s as both Great Falls and Anaconda smelters added electrolysis, and 
again in the 1910s when Anaconda’s capacity was greatly increased.328
 
  (See Figure 4.1) 
Technological Advances in Montana  
 At the Parrot smelter, in 1884, Andrew Davis built the first Bessemer converter 
plant for copper in the United States.  It included three “egg-shaped” upright converters 
and a small cupola for remelting intermediate mattes.  Despite two very different general 
arrangements, upright and horizontal, all converters operated essentially the same, and, 
according to Laist, outside of modest improvements in charging and capacity, few 
significant technological changes occurred with them through the 1950s, with the 
exception of improved lining materials that decreased the frequency of lining changes 
from every 6 or 7 charges to once every few years. 329
 Following system improvements in refining, Montana smelters turned to 
improving roasting.  Like pyritic smelting, roasting improvements were executed largely 
to improve production flow and eliminate labor rather than to curb or control smoke 
emissions.  The first attempts at roasting mechanization were largely efforts to rabble ore 
in modified reverberatory furnaces.  The first radical design change came with the 
 (See Figure 4.15 below) 
                                                 
327 Jonathan Leitner, "Red Metal in the Age of Capital: The Political Ecology of Copper in the Nineteenth-
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Pearce-Turret, whose 36’-diameter circular hearth had mechanical rabbles that rotated 
around a central shaft.  The device had up to six circular stacked shelves to increase 
production, but its poor operating performance limited its wide-spread use.330
 The most successful of the new roasters, however, adopted the rotating circular 
shelf concept of the Pearce-Turret. The new devices were first developed by McDougall 
in Liverpool, England, in 1870, and featured several stacked, cylindrical, shelves, most 
not larger than 10-15 feet in diameter.  In the U.S. successful adaptations included the 
Wedge, Herreshoff, and the Evans-Klepetko developed at Great Falls.  The McDougall-
Evans-Klepetko married multiple-shelf circular hearths with a pyritic process in an 
enclosed and insulated circular tower.  It used the heat of sulfur and iron oxidation to 
roast the ores on separate, non-rotating, enclosed shelves, with each shelf essentially 
becoming a separate hearth.  Mechanical rabbles rotated by a central shaft directed ores 
to chutes that dropped them onto the next lower shelf.  Without a separate fire box, the 
roasters took up considerably less floor space, required fewer workers to tend, and 
consumed virtually no fuel.
  The much 
simpler Bruckner Cylinder, a large, horizontal cylindrical tub that rotated on rollers and 
tumbled ores over each other like a household dryer, saw much greater use, but its 
separate firebox used considerable amounts of fuel.   
331
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  (See Figure 4.15) 
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 Montana smelters also made advances in roasting in the late 19th century.  Not 
only were the hand-rabbled, hand-charged long-hearth reverberatory roasters labor 
intensive, but the smoke from so many smelting sites, some of whom still heap-roasted 
large pieces or even stall-roasted ore-concentrates, taxed the residents of the growing 
town of Butte.  As early as 1885 citizens complained about the smoke destroying wild 
flowers and strawberries, but to no avail.  Attempts to control the smoke or dissipate it 
with tall stacks largely failed, especially as output and heap roasting continued to increase 
through the 1880s as Montana surpassed Michigan’s copper production.   In 1891, the 
city passed an anti-smoke ordinance that ended all heap roasting and required all smelters 
to erect a minimum 75’-tall stack.332
                                                 
332 Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana,” 11-12. 
 
Figure 4.15 Upright 12’-wide Bessemer Converters of the Washoe Smelter for 
refining smelted copper matte from the reverberatory furnace (left) and a typical 
McDougall-style Wedge Roaster 33’ high used to burn sulfur out of sulfide copper 
ores using the heat of sulfur oxidation to propel the process (right).   
(Adapted from Shovers 39 and Hofman 95) 
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The Dominance of Anaconda  
By 1899, Marcus Daly’s acquisition of other high-output Butte mines and the 
limitations of the existing Upper and Lower smelting works in Anaconda, drove the need 
for smelter expansion.333  Daly authorized $20 million and hired Frank Klepetko from 
Great Falls to design and build the new facility that would become the Washoe 
smelter.334  Daly, who directed Klepetko to design a single new complex using the latest 
equipment to maximize efficiencies and provide for future expansion in each department, 
died before construction began in 1900.   Klepetko selected a 230-acre site on an 
Anaconda hillside from 200 to 700 feet above the valley floor to take advantage of 
gravity, similar to what he would do at the Michigan Smelter a couple of years later.  The 
new, complete plant had concentrating, roasting, blast furnace and reverberatory 
smelting, converting, and electrolytic refining departments all linked by internal 
transportation with an original throughput of 5000 tons of ore daily.   It was the largest 
smelting plant ever built and in 1902, consumed 750 tons of coal, 2500 tons of lime flux, 
778,000 kw of electricity, and 60 million gallons of water each day.  By 1908, the smelter 
processed 12,000 tons of ore and produced 600,000 pounds of copper and 9000 tons of 
slag and tailings per day, doing so at 39% less cost than the older works.335
                                                 
333 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 21, and Hyde, Copper for America, 102. 
  With the 
completion of the Washoe smelter, the Upper and Lower works became known simply as 
the Old Works and were torn down. 
334 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 35, and Hyde, Copper for America, 102.  
335 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 35, and Hyde, Copper for America, 102. 
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 According to Laist, few 19th century technological changes in smelting rivaled 
Anaconda’s effort to radically increase the size of its furnaces.  In 1904, Anaconda 
Copper Mining Company (ACM) took two of its 1901, 50’-long reverberatory furnaces 
and joined them back to back with a single fire-box at one end and single flue at the other 
creating in effect the largest reverberatory furnace ever built.  With such a large size, the 
Washoe smelters discovered they could continuously charge the furnace at the fire-box 
end and that the latent heat of the furnace “greatly accelerated fusion” and effected a 50% 
reduction in fuel needs per ton of copper smelted, all with little increase in personnel 
needs.   The new furnaces, now producing 250 tons of copper per day, became the 
standard in the industry and were copied in Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Mexico.336
Echoing the changes in reverberatory smelting at the turn of the century, blast 
furnaces, which did not undergo radical operational changes, simply got bigger as well.  
While the distance between blast furnace tuyeres never got much wider than 57” to 
ensure adequate air pressure, the average furnace length grew to 8’ from a 36” cylinder.  
The biggest blast furnace at Anaconda appeared in 1906, was 87’ long, and smelted 2500 
tons per day.
   
337
 
 
Montana Smelting 
 By 1910, Anaconda’s gigantic smelter operated sixty-four Evans-Klepetko 
roasters, eight reverberatory furnaces over 100’ long, three Mathewson 87’ blast 
furnaces, one briquetting plant, and eight 12’ horizontal converters.  Its concentrated ores 
                                                 
336 Laist, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Smelting and Leaching of Ores,” 150 
337 Ibid., 135. 
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were smelted in the large reverberatory furnaces for 45% copper matte.  The matte was 
sent to the converter department and refined to 99% pure blister copper, remelted in a 
smaller reverberatory and cast into anodes that were taken to the electrolysis department 
and purified to 99.97%.   The blast furnaces were charged with coarse ores, concentrate, 
reverberatory and converter slag, and 10-lb briquettes.338 The entire smelter process 
generated between 3000-4500 tons of slag daily that was blasted with water to granulate 
it, then sluiced to dewatering ponds, and transported to a single colossal waste pile the 
company used from 1902-1976.339
 
  (See Figure 4.16, 4.17, and 4.18)  
Environmental Problems and Responses  
 In addition to concentrator slag and tailings, the site generated considerable 
smoke.  From nearly the start of smelting at the Washoe, regional farmers complained 
about the smoke problem and damage to crops and livestock.  In response to by local 
agriculturists, the works replaced four small(er) stacks with a single 300’ stack on a 
plateau 700 feet above the valley floor in 1903.  The stack connected to the rest of the site 
by a 2300’ flue system designed to cool the smoke, catch dust, and recover arsenics 
before they exhausted the top.  The stack complex included a roasting furnace and small 
reverberatory furnace to process arsenical dust and a series of long-narrow rooms, called 
kitchens, to encourage further arsenic condensation and recovery.340
                                                 
338 Copper: From Mine to Finished Product, 21, and Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 39-40. 
   
339 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 41. 
340 Ibid., 41, and Quivik, "The Anaconda Company Smelters:  Great Falls and Anaconda,”  42. 
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Figure 4.16 Anaconda Washoe Smelter ca. 1950s  with separate concentrating, 
roasting, reverberatory furnace, zinc, leaching, and blast furnace buildings on the 
hill side and arsenic recovery, dust collection, and smoke stack on the hill top 
linked by a flue. (With permission of Marcus Daly Historical Society) 
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Figure 4.17 Diagram of Washoe Smelter, ca. 1950.  (After, Shovers et al. 1991, 36) 
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Figure 4.18 Montana Smelting Practices, ca. 1905 (Source: Author) 
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 Undaunted, in 1905 farmers brought a second suit against the Washoe and 
Anaconda claiming damage to crops and livestock.  Despite admitting to “some 
damages” and agreeing to pay, Anaconda claimed the farmers grossly over-estimated 
financial losses.  In his ruling, Federal District Judge Oliver T. Crane agreed with the 
Tennessee state judge in the Madison case, maintaining that the benefits from smelting 
outweighed the damages to farmers, who relied on mining and smelter workers to 
purchase their goods.  He awarded the farmers a meager $350 in damages.341   In 1909, 
however, at the behest of Teddy Roosevelt, the United States attorney general sued 
Anaconda for damages to Federal lands modeled after the successful Georgia v. 
Ducktown case, and proposed a similar acid plant solution.342  Unfortunately, an 
economic demand for sulfuric acid and fertilizer did not exist at the time in the West, and 
Anaconda agreed to independent monitoring and equipment upgrades such as new 
Cottrell precipitators.343  Despite poor potential for fertilizer sales, the company added a 
100-ton chamber sulfuric acid plant in 1914 to recover sulfur from the smoke, expanding 
it to 98,000 square feet in 1919 producing 215 tons per day.344
 In 1914, Anaconda bought the International Smelting and Refining Company, 
expanding its operations into Arizona, Utah, Indiana, New Jersey, and Mexico.  In 1915, 
Anaconda, which had been keeping its many separate mines and holdings under the 
   
                                                 
341 Katherine Aiken, "Western Smelters and the Problem of Smelter Smoke," in Northwest Lands, 
Northwest Peoples : Readings in Environmental History, ed. Dale Goble and Paul W. Hirt (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1999), 505-506. 
342 Fred Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in 
Montana 1880-1930" (PhD, University of Pennsylvania, History and Sociology of Science, 1998), 399. 
343 Ibid., 350. 
344Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited., 41. 
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Amalgamated Copper Company, reorganized as a single company, the Anaconda Mining 
Company (ACM), in an effort to economize management and better fight lawsuits.  In 
1917, the smelting works expanded to process all the copper produced from new mines 
and included one-hundred roasters, eleven blast furnaces, eight reverberatory furnaces, 
and seven converters.  The increased capacity, however, overwhelmed the existing dust 
collection system by an estimated 50%.  Responding to new lawsuit threats and the need 
for increased handling capacity, ACM constructed, not just the largest smoke stack ever, 
but the tallest masonry structure ever built. The new stack measured 585’ tall, sixty feet 
across the top and 75 feet across the bottom.  (See Figure 4.14)  It featured a new Cottrell 
electrostatic plant that used high voltage electricity to more effectively precipitate and 
capture 90% of the arsenic from the flue gases.345
 
 
20th Century Evolution of Anaconda  
 Other improvements and processes at the Washoe works included a plant that 
manufactured zinc from Butte ores from 1915 to 1972.  ACM also operated a brick plant 
from 1922 to 1980, a fertilizer plant that used acid from the chamber plant to create 
fertilizer with phosphate rock from 1923 to 1961, and a ferro-manganese plant from 1941 
until the 1950s.  In 1923, it built a flotation plant to concentrate the poorer ores and, like 
smelters in Tennessee and Michigan, started phasing out its blast furnaces.  In 1933 it 
                                                 
345 Ibid., 41. 
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installed waste-heat boilers on its reverberatory furnaces and converted the steam to 
electricity, producing up to 30% of the site’s mechanical power.346
 Also in 1923, in a move to expand operations, diversify, and more fully vertically 
integrate as its Butte mine values and ore reserves start to decline, Anaconda purchased 
the Chuquicamata mine in Chile, one of the richest porphyry deposits on earth, and soon 
after bought the El Teniente and Potrerillos mines too.
   
347  Anaconda would ultimately 
purchase brass rolling mills, copper foundries, uranium mines, aluminum, lead, and zinc 
works, and a host of other end-product manufactories in an attempt to be completely 
integrated and the largest non-ferrous company on the planet.348
  Following a failed attempt at underground block caving in the early 1950s, 
Anaconda turned to open-pit mining in Butte and opened the Berkeley Pit in 1950.  This 
was a deep new surface mine created to excavate the large low-grade copper deposit that 
sat below portions of the city of Butte and other district cities.  The pit not only forced the 
relocation of several neighborhoods and the destruction of popular parks, entertainment 
venues, and more than a dozen underground mines, but it also destroyed the late 19th-
century smelting district that once housed the Butte and Boston smelter, Montana Ore 
Purchasing Company smelter, and Boston and Montana upper and lower works.
   
349
                                                 
346  Ibid., 42-44. 
  
Although the public outcry about the loss of town sites in the 1950s was muted by the 
promise of jobs and extending the life of the declining district, by the 1970s, talk of pit 
expansion and the removal of Butte’s central business district prompted the first elements 
347 Hyde, Copper for America, 172. 
348 See Marcosson, Copper Heritage; the Story of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated. 
349 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited, 13. 
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of an organized protest movement, one that would play a major role in redefining the city 
over the next thirty years, especially as the pit became the national archetype of mining-
related environmental disasters.  In 1976, the Atlantic Richfield Oil Company (ARCO) 
bought Anaconda after losses stemming from the 1973 expropriation of ACM’s Chilean 
operations devalued the mining company.  Anaconda had replaced its reverberatory with 
electric furnaces to cut emissions in the 1970s, but in 1980 closed its smelter for good.350
 Important advances made in mining and milling techniques in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, including open pit excavation and the extensive use of flotation, 
opened significant porphyry deposits in Utah and Arizona and new smelters were built at 
or near the mines.  New copper lodes were also opened in Alaska, Nevada, and New 
Mexico and stand stand-alone smelters operated in Tacoma, Washington, and El Paso, 
Texas, to process much of the new ores.  Despite accelerated production and 
consumption, few major technological changes occurred in copper smelting following the 
general demise of the blast furnace in the 1920s, until the wider use of electric furnaces in 
the 1970s and flash smelting in the 1980s.
 
351
 American copper smelting evolved from relatively small-scale European 
technologies into some of the largest metallurgical applications on the planet.  Although 
European smelters developed technologies to smelt and refine copper over many 
centuries, their greatest technological advances came late, at a time of declining European 
   
                                                 
350 Ibid., 41. 
351 Electric furnaces passed a current through the molten bath of a continuously fed charge.  The natural 
resistance of the material generated enough heat to maintain high furnace temperatures and continually 
remelt new charges.  Flash smelting blows dried concentrate and oxygen into a hot-furnace hearth and, like 
pyritic smelting, uses the heat of sulfur and iron oxidation to melt the charge.  See A. K. Biswas and W. G. 
Davenport, Extractive Metallurgy of Copper (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 156. 
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mine production.  The United States, however, with rapidly expanding electrical 
applications that ushered in the modern world, created a demand for copper never before 
seen.  To meet the demand, miners and smelters adapted old and new European 
technologies to produce copper faster and cheaper, and make available the extensive 
deposits of very low-grade ore that, prior to the end of the 19th century, the world had had 
little use for.  While none of the three sites discussed in this work mined very low grade 
ores, they each adopted, and in some cases advanced or even perfected, technologies that 
allowed them to reap first the richest ore deposits, then, with ever advancing 
technologies, some of the leanest deposits in their regions.    
While many histories of the copper companies and copper producing regions 
explore the technological and economic developments of their productive years, few, 
until the 1990s, fully considered the after effects of this production and the waste streams 
generated from ores with 2% or less copper.  Part II of this dissertation will examine what 
happens in copper-producing regions after copper companies ceased, or very 
substantially reduced, mining and smelting operations.  One of the legacies was typically 
a degraded environment, the product of a century or more of producing mine tailings, 
slag, acid rain, and deforestation.  In some copper mining and smelting districts, the 
degradation was severe enough to get portions listed as “Superfund” sites and involved in 
federal environmental remediation efforts.  Another legacy was, ironically, a growing 
interest in preserving elements of the same industrial heritage that had caused the 
environmental degradation and using it to promote heritage tourism as a replacement for 
the now-lost industrial payrolls. 
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PART II 
 
 
 
 
An examination of the historic and contaminated copper mining and smelting 
districts in Montana, Tennessee, and Michigan, and the efforts to both clean and 
preserve the significant heritage landscape.
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 CHAPTER 5.  DUCKTOWN 
 
Observations were made on the condition of the vegetation in the region 
surrounding Ducktown and Copperhill, Tennessee in the neighborhood of the 
copper smelters during the month of September, 1913…The area affected by the 
acute form of injury is probably larger than it was in 1905 and 1906… In the 
worst affected area little herbage is found, and the hills look like a desert with a 
greatly eroded appearance…Repeated acute injury of this sort kills the twigs of 
trees and finally brings about the death of whole trees.   
  -George Grant Hedgcock, 1914 (“Injury by Smelter Smoke,” 70-71) 
 
…the landscape opens up, and suddenly there is a vast, raw plain, cooking in the 
summer sun.  No trees, no plants, no signs of life, just a great expanse of dry red-
clay hills cut deep with massive gullies…so strange, so sudden, so out of place.   
 -Wilton Barnhardt 1987 (“The Death of Ducktown,” 36) 
“It’s sort of sad.  I’ve grown up with the painted cliffs and red hills and, in a 
curious way, they’re quite lovely and unique….It’s our history and we’re proud of 
it…They ought to leave it to show what man can do to nature [and] what man can 
undo.” 
 -Loraine Lee, 1987 (Quoted in “The Death of Ducktown,” 41) 
 
April 11, 2008 
 The final drive into Ducktown, Tennessee, from Chattanooga is rather 
unremarkable especially given the striking, thirty-mile climb that follows the Ocoee river 
gorge up from Cleveland (Tenn.).  One would hardly know that this stretch of river was 
once classified as ecologically dead and not expected to fully recover for decades.  Dead, 
however, is a relative term.  The fall of the river over 30 miles powers three Tennessee 
Valley Authority hydro-electric plants, offers recreational kayakers and rafters occasional 
white water, and hosted the 1996 Olympic paddling course.  Fish and aquatic plants and 
insects, however, are sparse here.  Heavy metals, arsenic, and acids washed into this 
watershed from over a century of copper mining and smelting operations in the 
Ducktown district.  Some contamination resulted from the direct effluent of processing 
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operations, but the majority came from serious and significant erosion caused by several 
decades of open sulfide ore roasting that, combined with mining-driven lumbering 
operations, left a completely denuded landscape of dirt hills and sediment-filled valleys. 
 Today the Ducktown area is a bucolic, forested hill top looking like any other 
small town in eastern Tennessee accessible by a four-lane highway exit ramp.  Unlike 
Copperhill, its sister-city at the southern edge of the Copper Basin five miles south, 
Ducktown has a small commercial strip, a fast-food restaurant, and a hotel but no railroad 
station for excursion train stops.   Driving east on U.S. 64, the only hint of any sort of 
past industrial activity are the signs bolted to chained gates that read “McPherson Mine” 
or “London Mill” or, one half-mile off the highway in downtown Ducktown, “Burra 
Burra Mine” and “Ducktown Basin Museum,” the latter with its collection of historic 
buildings and equipment largely invisible from the road.   
 The imagery changes along state highway 68 south to Copperhill.  The large flag-
topped head frame of the Central Shaft towers above the trees shortly before the 
“Smelters” gristmill store and fireworks stand.  Continuing south along the highway into 
Copperhill, however, the extensive, chaotic, partial remains of the Tennessee Copper 
Company smelter and acid plant loudly announce recent and not-so-recent industrial 
activity, while a quarter-mile beyond the plant, quaint downtown Copperhill’s copper-
accented street lights, heritage signs, and mineral gift-shops quietly suggest a past worth 
remembering.   
 A mere thirty-five years ago, however, the landscape of the Tennessee copper 
basin looked entirely different.  Despite the cessation of all open-air ore roasting by 1905, 
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the area remained sharply denuded and moon-like, with very little vegetation as late 
1973.   Locals claimed that the 50 square mile basin was the only man-made landscape 
visible from space and among the myriad national articles and photographs about the 
district is a now-famous two-page National Geographic aerial image showing the 
sparsely populated built environment completely engulfed by totally barren red-sand 
hills.352
Copperhill. 
  While an abomination to some, many locals, but not all, who grew up with this 
landscape mourned its passing.  Like the belching smoke of Pittsburgh’s blast furnaces, 
the denuded landscape was a symbol of the region’s prosperity and a significant 
component of its identity.   Although attempts to preserve a small 30-acre portion of 
barren hillside have succumbed to successful revegetation (See Figure 5.1) and 
remediation efforts, preserving and celebrating the basin’s remaining mining heritage 
remains a key development strategy for Ducktown and  (See Figure 5.2) 
 
Shutdown 
 Through mid-century, the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) added additional 
plants in Copperhill to produce a variety of chemicals.  In fact, its byproduct operations 
were so successful that by 1950 copper was relegated to the third leading product 
manufactured after sulfuric acid and iron sinter.353
                                                 
352 Gordon Young and Emory Kristoff, "The Tennessee Valley Today," National Geographic 143, no. 6 
(1973). 858-859.   Despite extolling the resurgence of the Tennessee Valley largely through TVA efforts 
and a caption that described the success of revegetation, the key words to describe the image in 2008 
included:  desolate landscapes, destruction of woodlands, and nature vs. technology.  See "A Barren 
Landscape Was Created after Miners Cut Down Forests for Fuel. Location:  near Copperhill, Tennessee, 
Picture Id: 620678, www.nationalgeographicstock.com/ngsimages/explore/. 
  In the 1950s TCC’s chemical line
353 M. -L. Quinn, "The Appalachian Mountains' Copper Basin and the Concept of Environmental 
Susceptibility," Environmental Management 15, no. 2 (1991), 183. 
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Figure 5.1 Effects of remediation.  Aerial photo of Ducktown on the left was taken 
in 1944; the photo on the right was taken in 2008 from the point marked on the 
photo on the left.  (Aerial photo with permission of Ducktown Basin Museum, photo on the right 
taken by author.) 
Figure 5.2 Map of Tennessee Copper Basin showing selected heritage and 
remediation sites. (Source: Author) 
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grew even further after it added an organic sulfonating plant in 1952 and a sodium 
hydrosulfite plant in 1956.  In 1964, the company closed its last chamber acid plant and 
constructed its fifth contact acid facility at Copperhill to compliment existing contact 
plants built in Isabella and Copperhill between 1929 and 1954.354  The former Ducktown 
Sulfur Copper and & Iron (DSC&I) dismantled and either scrapped or moved its Isabella 
chamber plants before being purchased by TCC in the 1930s, and TCC ultimately 
removed the remaining chamber and defunct contact plants in the 1970s.355
 In 1963, in a move that foreshadowed later oil company takeovers of copper 
companies, Cities Service Corporation, the Oklahoma-based predecessor of CITGO 
Petroleum, bought the Tennessee Copper Company, continued underground mining and 
chemical production, and in 1976 began open-pit mining northwest of Copperhill. 
 
356  In 
1982, the recently organized Tennessee Chemical Corporation (TChC)357 acquired the 
Copperhill and Isabella processing plants and remaining active mine assets from Cities 
Service, while Occidental Petroleum purchased the rest of Cities Services including its 
substantial oil refining and distribution network.  In 1987 Tennessee Chemical ended 
copper mining in the state and in 1989 declared bankruptcy.358
                                                 
354 Stuart W. Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee," ed. Division of Geology The State 
of Tennessee Department of Conservation, Information Circular (Nashville, Tennessee: State of Tennessee, 
1966), 6-7, 18-19. 
  In 1990, Boliden 
Intertrade, a Swiss corporation, purchased the Copperhill plants from bankruptcy and 
355 "Report for the Extent of Lead Contamination at the Former Isabella Lead Chamber Acid Plant, 
Ducktown, Tennessee," Waggoner Barge, Sumner, & Cannon, Inc. (Nashville, Tennessee: Glenn Springs 
Holdings, Inc., 2003), 2. 
356 Maher, "The Copper-Sulfuric Acid Industry in Tennessee," 6. 
357 Tennessee Chemical Corporation will be referenced in the text by TChC so as not to confuse it with the 
Tennessee Copper Company referred to as TCC. 
358 Milton H. Hamilton, "North Potato Creek VOAP Order," in Site ID 70-508, Case No. 99-0480, ed. 
Division of Superfund (Nashville, Tennessee: State of Tennessee, Department of Environment and 
Conservation, 2001), 5. 
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entered into an agreement with the U.S. EPA not to sue (or be sued for environmental 
damages of TCC or TChC) and continued operating the acid plant through 2000 and the 
organic chemical facilities through 2008.359  Properties not associated with Copperhill 
remained in the bankruptcy estate of the Tennessee Chemical Corporation.360
 When Boliden Intertrade stopped producing acid and significantly reduced its 
workforce, it eliminated all but 300 of what had once been as many as 2000 jobs in the 
1970s, resulting in a considerable drop in the local economic benefits from mining and 
chemical production.  Where the 1906 Madison vs. DSCI lawsuit cited 12,000 jobs 
associated directly or indirectly with mining and half the county’s taxes paid by DSCI 
and TCC, by 2001 the U.S. Government was the largest single employer in the county 
and controlled almost one-third of all land through the U.S. Forest Service.  With 
inexpensive housing and open forest lands and the Ocoee River offering hiking, biking, 
rafting, and kayaking, tourism became the primary income-generator for the county, a 
fact not lost on community leaders looking to create opportunities and accessible 
landscapes for short-term visitors.
  
361
                                                 
359 "Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue (Boliden Intertrade)," ed. U.S. EPA (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
EPA, 1990), 1, and John H. Hankinson  jr., "Administrative Order on Consent for Removal Action at the 
North Potato Creek Watershed," in CERCLA Docket No. 01-11-C, ed. Region 4 U.S. EPA (Atlanta, 
Georgia: U.S. EPA, 2001), 4, and "Copper Basin Mining District, " U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/copper/, accessed March 9, 2009. 
  Mining and agriculture, the two largest economic 
sectors in the county historically, had significantly lost influence by 2003 as locals 
360 "Report of Inventory and Characterization of Former Mining and Processing Areas and Materials 
Located on Public and Private Lands," ed. Waggoner Barge, Sumner, & Cannon, Inc. (Ducktown, 
Tennessee: Glenn Springs Holdings, Inc., 2004), p. 2-2. 
361 "Community Involvement Plan for the Copper Basin Mining District," ed. Community Involvement 
Partnership (Polk County, Tennessee: U.S. EPA, Tennessee Department for Environment and 
Conservation, Glenn Springs Holdings, Inc., 2001), 3-4. 
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focused efforts on developing a second home/retirement market to capitalize on the 
“environmental resources of the area.”362
 Although Occidental Petroleum sold Cities Service in 1983 to the Southland 
Company, which by 1990 had sold it to the national oil company of Venezuela, 
Occidental remained the last viable district stakeholder with historic liability.
 
363
In 1987 the EPA began investigating the site [the Copper Basin] and documented 
its negative environmental impact.  Since the only remaining stakeholder was 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental agreed to remediate the site in 
good faith in keeping with the company’s commitment to environmental 
stewardship.
  
According to the 2009 website of Glenn Springs Holdings, an Occidental Petroleum 
environmental subsidiary company:    
364
 
 
Despite the seemingly effortless transition into remediation suggested by the above 
statement, fourteen years passed before Occidental Petroleum, EPA, and the State of 
Tennessee executed a formal consent agreement to clean up the basin.  In fact, according 
to relevant authorities close to the negotiations, the EPA pushed hard to have the region 
placed on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL), but Occidental fought the listing, 
fearing extensive litigation and attorney fees.  The two reached agreement only after 
Glenn Springs, which had been working in the basin since 1997, finally “voluntarily” 
agreed to fund the clean-up, abide by EPA rules and guidelines, and reimburse EPA and 
the State of Tennessee for costs incurred.  The EPA, in turn, agreed to let Occidental 
                                                 
362 "A Future Use Plan for Redevelopment of the Abandoned Mine Lands in Copperhill Tennessee," ed. 
Waggoner Barge, Sumner, & Cannon, Inc. (Ducktown, Tennessee: Glenn Springs Holdings, Inc., 2003), 3-
4. 
363 Southland Company is the parent to the 7-11 chain of convenience stores and sought ownership of Cities 
Service to provide a steady supply of gasoline to its stores. "Citgo Company History," CITGO Petroleum 
Company, www.citgo.com/aboutcitgo/companyhistory.jpg, accessed March 4, 2009. 
364 "Copper Basin," http://www.glennsprings-copperbasinproject.com/history.htm, accessed March 7, 2009. 
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manage the clean up and keep the operation from being federalized in an historic 
memorandum of understanding signed in 2001, and the State’s Voluntary Cleanup, 
Oversight and Assistance Program (VOAP) kept Glenn Springs from potential long-term 
state-liability.365
 
   
Early Reaction to Environmental Degradation and Response 
 It is true that citizens of Lower Wales and Southwest Montana complained about 
and sued copper smelters over lost vegetation and sick animals, and that smelter smoke 
court cases, newspaper accounts, and mining textbooks often cited barren landscapes 
surrounding smelters.  Few regions, however, experienced the debilitating effects of 
landscape  
change as great as the Ducktown district.  As noted in Chapter 4, the loss of woodlands 
surrounding Tennessee copper mining and smelting locations completely shut down the 
industry in 1878, and, following a resumption of mining and smelting in the 1890s and 
legal and technical efforts to reduce sulfur emissions, district companies and Federal 
agencies began coordinating efforts to solve the landscape problem in the 1920s.   While 
Michigan copper regions harvested significant amounts of timber for mining operations 
and Montana smelter smoke led to considerable vegetation loss, efforts to combat these 
problems usually resulted in court orders or municipal actions ending the injurious 
practice or damage awards to affected parties, not complete shutdowns.  Tennessee 
                                                 
365 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (1),  Conversation with a Relevant Authority (2), and "Copper 
Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements toward a Common Goal," ed. U.S. EPA 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. EPA, 2005), 6.  Relevant Authority is a term used to protect the identity of 
individuals providing information during an oral interview.  It is a university requirement. 
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observers chronicled the problem more completely, and companies took actions to 
actually remediate the problems well before any other district. 
 This is not to argue that Tennessee corporations were more environmentally 
conscious than other mining companies.  Rather the Tennessee copper district operations 
caused significant problems outside the region, especially noticeable after Franklin 
Roosevelt created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933.  TVA’s jurisdiction 
extended over the entire Tennessee River drainage, including Davis Mill Creek and North 
Potato Creek, both of which ran through the Copper District, fed Ocoee River hydro-
electric plants, and ultimately emptied into the Tennessee River.  While the extra-regional 
awareness created by TVA resulted in funding for studies and remediation efforts, the 
conservation movement actually began in the region in the late1920s, and it is difficult to 
define what early drivers were present in Tennessee that didn’t exist in other regions.  
Karen Daniels argues that the 1907 Georgia Supreme Court case created regional 
awareness and ignited the conservation movement,366 but court cases occurred in other 
areas, including Montana, Utah, and California that did not coalesce into a sense of 
community responsibility and a need to remediate the after-effects of smelting.367
 Tennessee’s landscape itself may have contributed to a stronger sense or 
perception of loss.  The barren, red-soil lunar landscape of the Ducktown district sat in 
stark contrast to the thickly wooded green Appalachian forests that visitors traversed to 
   
                                                 
366 Karen Daniels, Tennessee's Historic Copper Basin Area: An Overview (Benton, Tenn: Polk County 
Publishing, 1992), 13. 
367 Twentieth century regional conscience in Montana, however, was hard to gauge because by 1930 the 
Anaconda Company held considerable political power in the state, had sent its Copper Kings to the U.S. 
Senate, and owned several newspapers.  Although similar power-structures existed with the largest smelters 
in Swansea, neither Michigan nor Tennessee mining/smelting companies enjoyed such influence. 
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reach the district, strongly emphasizing the devastation.  Similarly, Southern residents in 
general found greater identity with their Southern Culture and its agricultural roots than 
with industrialization often associated with Northern culture, and for a short time in the 
1930s, a group of Tennessee scholars and writers called the “Fugitives” promoted an end 
to creeping industrial materialism and a return to traditional Southern agrarian values.  
While this particular group did not foster much change and was largely washed out by the 
depression, it did contribute to a controversial agrarian manifesto, I’ll Take My Stand: the 
South and the Agrarian Tradition, and reflected some deeply seated beliefs.368
Thus landscape devastation would have caused greater concern.  Further, 
Michigan mines and smelters followed by Montana mines and smelters each led global 
copper production, creating a stronger regional/state-wide industrial identity and pride for 
the productive output of their districts.  Big mines led to big production and greater 
population densities and diversities including the establishment of mining colleges that 
continued as technological universities after the end of most mining.  Tennessee mines 
and smelters never produced at the rate of either Michigan or Montana, had more visible 
environmental problems and landscape degradation, and with strong regional agricultural 
identities, state and regional residents were more likely to react to landscape change than 
industrial production.  In any case, writers, mostly non-locals, described the landscape-
changes earlier than in other copper smelting districts, and companies tried to remediate 
the environmental effects earlier than other districts.  Later local residents would try to 
 
                                                 
368 B.C. Hall and C.T. Wood, The South (New York: Scribner, 1995), 224. 
203 
 
preserve the desolate landscape as an element of their historic identity, earlier than their 
counterparts in other copper regions.   
 A short review of popular imagery from the 20th century of the three districts also 
demonstrates key identity issues for the areas.  Where regional Montana photographs and 
postcards show mining activities, smelting equipment, downtown buildings, and people, 
and regional Michigan photographs show miners, industrial structures, and shipping, 
popular Tennessee imagery is dominated by the denuded landscape.  Both Montana and 
Michigan regions are depicted by the built environment.  Tennessee is depicted mostly by 
environmental destruction.369
 The denuded Ducktown landscape was a direct result of mining and smelting 
operations, but M. –L. Quinn added twelve reasons why the landscape itself was partly to 
blame for the devastation.  From isolated mountains with poor transportation routes, to 
high sulfide and pyrite concentrations, and high rainfall, humidity, and temperature 
inversions, the environment itself was not a passive victim, according to Quinn, but rather 
contributed to it own desecration.
  Not until the Superfund era and greater environmental 
consciousness did popular views begin to focus on environmental decline in Montana, 
mostly at the Berkeley Pit, while in Michigan this still has not occurred despite the 
Superfund cleanup. 
370
Environmental susceptibility is an identified condition whereby the environment 
of a particular location, because of the location’s natural features, is especially 
   
                                                 
369 This quick and unscientific study was conducted by searching for images and postcards at the Library of 
Congress website www.memory.loc.gov and www.google.com on April 3, 2009, under the terms 
“Ducktown, Tennessee; Copperhill, Tennessee; Butte, Montana; Anaconda, Montana; Houghton, 
Michigan; and Calumet, Michigan.”  
370 Quinn, "The Appalachian Mountains' Copper Basin and the Concept of Environmental Susceptibility," 
185-186. 
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vulnerable (is predisposed) to injury from specific human activity.  Susceptibility, 
therefore, is a function of a site’s natural features, but the basis for its 
determination is the manner in which those features interact, or could interact, 
with a particular human activity.371
 
 
 In any case, the estimated loss of 50 square miles of forest and vegetation was formally 
recorded in 1929, and in 1944 the TVA estimated that Basin lands eroded at a rate of 39 
ac-ft/mi2/year while the rest of the Ocoee River drainage averaged only 0.44 ac-ft/mi2/year.  
Further, by 1951, TVA had documented that in two separate 5 and 15 acre parcels, 
erosion had consumed a total of 1.8 and 1.9 feet of topsoil and subsoil over 17 years.  All 
of that sediment, much of it contaminated with acids and heavy metals, found its way into 
the Ocoee River.372
 Despite an early and clear understanding of vegetation loss and the effects of soil 
erosion especially during heavy rains, efforts to re-forest the basin and control sediment 
loss did not begin until 1929, when the Ducktown Sulfur, Copper and Iron Company 
(DSCI) sought advice from the U.S. Forest Service.  With the Department of Agriculture 
it planted and/or distributed 3000 trees in 1930 with the assistance of the University of 
Tennessee extension service, and continued this practice in subsequent years.  Although 
no clear reason for the company-sponsored revegetation emerges from the literature, 
Edward Johnson cited a 1929 Forest Service report that included a discussion of financial 
returns from timber production based on market demands and wood quality.  While 
Johnson does not state whether this was the prime reason for tree-planting or a secondary 
benefit, the late 1920s economic decline in copper and acid production that ultimately led 
 
                                                 
371 Ibid., 189. 
372 Jack A. Muncy, "A Plan for Revegetation Completion of Tennessee's Copper Basin," ed. Division of 
Land and Economic Resources (Norris, Tennessee: Tennessee Valley Authority, 1986), 6. 
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to the 1936acquisition of DSCI by TCC, may have forced the company to look for 
alternate means of income as its economic position declined.  In 1973, a Cities Service 
report stated: 
The land reclamation program carried out over more than 35 years by TCC and 
subsequently Cities Service has been carried out in the interest of better utilization 
of our natural resources (land) by putting it into productive forest land use as well 
as reducing possible siltation of surface waters in the Basin. This program has 
been carried out as a Company Policy and has been in no way connected with 
legal or administratively imposed requirements from any governmental body or 
Agency.373
 
   
Despite limited culpability or admission of responsibility, the company may also have 
been succumbing to political pressure or reacting to negative accounts of the landscape, 
problems with the TVA, or the potential threat of lawsuits. 
 Through the 1930s and 1940s, several groups including the Tennessee Extension 
Service, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Plant Industry, Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC), Federal Soil Conservation Service, TVA, and universities in Tennessee, Georgia, 
and North Carolina studied and worked to continue reforesting efforts the area but with 
only partial success because many early plants did not survive long enough to reproduce 
and establish new ground cover and forests.374
                                                 
373 "Engineering Report on Land Reclamation: Copper Basin - Polk County, Tennessee," Cities Service 
Company (Copperhill, Tennessee: Cities Service Company, 1973), 7. 
  Between 1939 and 1950, the TVA, which 
had done little direct work on the Copper Basin erosion problem in the 1930s despite 
direct siltation effects on its two (at the time) downstream hydro-electric plants, took the 
lead in research, and with an established CCC camp in 1941 planted trees on the 
perimeter of the worst affected areas and experimented to determine which tree and shrub 
374 Muncy, "A Plan for Revegetation Completion of Tennessee's Copper Basin," 9. 
206 
 
species grew best in the basin’s acidic soils.375   In 1943, TVA built a third hydro-electric 
plant on the Ocoee.  This one, just a few miles downstream from the basin, included a 
large reservoir to stem the flow of sediments and heavy metals to its further down-stream 
plants.376  According to Muncy, however, by 1973, sediment completely filled the 
Number Three hydro-plant reservoir, requiring occasional sluicing of sediments 
contaminated with heavy metals and acids downstream.377
 TCC largely took control of the revegetation efforts from TVA in the 1950s and 
hired a professional agriculturalist to continue its tree planting program.
   
378  Through the 
1970s a variety of programs continued, each with some degree of success as acre by acre, 
the 32,000 acres of denuded landscape slowly shrank to 20,000 in 1943 to 12,000 in 1986 
to close to 1,500 in 2000.379  While successful experiments with the “miracle legume” 
kudzu in 1956380 proved the plant to be a “competitive threat” to other flora,381
                                                 
375 Ibid., 10. 
 most new 
plantings included some combination of loblolly pine, Japanese fleece flower, or weeping 
lovegrass.  Each of these demonstrated resistance to district toxins especially when 
augmented with new fertilizers, planting techniques, and, in the 1970s, rapid aerial 
seeding and feeding.  Between 1950 and 1969, 4.5 million trees were planted, and 
376 M. L. Quinn, "Should All Degraded Landscapes Be Restored? A Look at the Appalachian Copper 
Basin," Land Degradation & Rehabilitation 3 (1992), 118. 
377 Muncy, "A Plan for Revegetation Completion of Tennessee's Copper Basin," 8. 
378 Ibid., 12. 
379 Kenneth J. Seigworth, "Ducktown-a Postwar Challenge: Can Man Correct a Century of Land Abuse in 
Tennessee's Copper Basin?  A Start Has Been Made," American Forests 49, November (1943), 522; 
Muncy, "A Plan for Revegetation Completion of Tennessee's Copper Basin," 19; and "Copper Basin 
Reclamation Project," Tennessee Valley Authority, http://www.tva.gov/environment/land/copper.htm, 
accessed March 11, 2009. 
380 Mouzon Peters, "Healing the Scars in the Copper Basin," Chattanooga Sunday Times, September 2, 
1956, 1. 
381 Muncy, "A Plan for Revegetation Completion of Tennessee's Copper Basin," 12. 
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between 1970 and 1986, 6.85 million.382  By 1999 over 17 million trees had been planted 
since TVA-funded reforestation efforts had begun in 1941.383  By 2008, most sources 
cited only one unvegetated 30 acre parcel, intentionally left denuded behind the museum 
that, because of dangerous subsidence from a mine collapse, could not be entered to 
remove the volunteer trees successfully reseeding.384  Although nearly 75 years of 
plantings have significantly reduced the desert appearance, a 2008 drive through the 
basin reveals a few remaining bare spots.385
 About the same time as heavy revegetation efforts began, community awareness 
and activism crystallized at a rally of the Tennessee Conservation League held in the 
Copper Basin on May 27, 1950, organized for the kickoff of a state-wide “Keep 
Tennessee Green” campaign and to recognize the successful contributions of local 
industry.  The speakers included Tennessee’s Governor, TCC’s General Manager, and 
regional historian R.E. Barclay among others.  Several focused on the success of early 
reforestation efforts in the district, then about 50% recovered.
   
386
                                                 
382 Ibid., 13. 
  Governor Browning 
remarked that as a nation “conservation of our natural resources must be our aim if we 
are to survive” and “that the human race is just 8 inches from starvation and one-half of 
this has gotten away from us,” referring to lost topsoil in the Basin and reflecting the dust 
bowl just fifteen years earlier.  TCC’s general manager proclaimed that the copper 
company had only just begun remediating and pledged to “Keep Tennessee Green,” 
383 Edward A. Johnson, "Industrial Destruction Reversed at Copper Basin," National Woodlands 25, no. 2 
(2002), 29. 
384 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (3), October 24, 2008. 
385 Personal Observation, October 24, 2008. 
386 "Browning Is Speaker Saturday at Conservation League Meet," Copper City Advance, May 25, 1950, 1. 
208 
 
while R.E. Barclay asserted, after describing the contributions of the copper company to 
community employment and taxes, that communities could rebuild lost houses and cars, 
but that without plants, it would surely perish.  Probably the most telling observation and 
an early indication of changing directions in economic thought, however, came from C. 
P. Swan, State Commissioner of Conservation, who described how state-wide tourism 
had become a $225 million dollar industry by 1949, third only to manufacturing and 
agriculture, and with better managed green spaces, Swan saw no reason why that that 
amount could not be doubled.387
 Efforts to further sway negative, outside public opinion and convince observers 
and potential tourists that remediation was successful included a 1000-acre bluegrass and 
clover-covered demonstration farm that supported a 100-head herd of “purebred 
Aberdeen-angus” cattle, and a nine-hole golf course right in the heart of the district.  
These 1950s projects were designed mainly to serve as “proof that the soil [wasn’t] as 
dead as some of it looks” despite the fact that TCC lost money on their operations.
  (See Figure 5.3) 
388
 
  
Origins of Ducktown Heritage 
 In  popular articles titled “Ducktown-A Post War Challenge” (1943), “Healing the 
Scars” (1956), “Tennessee Valley Today,” (1973), “Copper Basin Cover-up” (1983), 
“Death of Ducktown” (1987), “Industrial Destruction Reversed at Copper Basin” (2002) 
and “Up from the Mines in Tennessee,” (2007), journalists made a point of describing 
                                                 
387 ""Must Conserve Resources If We Survive," - Browning," Copper City Advance, June 1, 1950, first and 
last pages of section 1. 
388 Peters, "Healing the Scars in the Copper Basin," 1. 
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 Ducktown as a landscape mired in environmental conflict and asserting that only near 
super-human effort had ultimately resulted in a resounding remediation victory.389
                                                 
389 See Seigworth, "Ducktown-a Postwar Challenge: Can Man Correct a Century of Land Abuse in 
Tennessee's Copper Basin?  A Start Has Been Made;" Peters, "Healing the Scars in the Copper Basin;"  
Clay Grady, "Copper Basin Cover-Up," Landscape Architecture 73, no. 4 (1983) 49-55; Young and 
Kristoff, "The Tennessee Valley Today;" Wilton Barnhardt, "The Death of Ducktown," Discover 8 (1987), 
35-42; Johnson, "Industrial Destruction Reversed at Copper Basin;" and Chris Dixon, "Up from the Mines 
in Tennessee," New York Times, December 14, 2007. 
   
While these authors represented mostly an outsider perspective about the remarkable turn 
around in just 50 years, others questioned whether such a full restoration was of any 
value to district resident insiders. 
Figure 5.3 Conservation Rally in Copperhill, Tennessee, 1950 to kick off 
“Keep Tennessee Green” campaign. (Source Tennessee State Library and Archives 
website http://tnsos.org/tsla/imagesearch/index.php, accessed March 31, 2009.) 
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 M. –L. Quinn, probably the most prolific writer on Ducktown since R. E. Barclay, 
wrote a 1992 article titled, “Should all Degraded Landscapes be Restored?” in Land 
Degradation and Rehabilitation Journal, complimenting four additional articles she 
wrote on the historical and environmental forces that shaped the Tennessee copper 
mining district’s landscape.  In her Land Degradation article, she reflected on the desires 
of some locals who felt a sense of loss because the heritage landscape they grew up with 
changed so dramatically as the restoration process neared completion.  Quinn argued that 
all reforestation efforts should stop (as of 1992) until the extant mining/smelting 
landscape could be surveyed and documented for its unique and historically important 
characteristics and to determine if remediation efforts conflicted with or diminished the 
cultural and historical value of the Basin—similar to processes required by Federal 
projects under Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA.  Quinn further called for independent 
historical assessments because TVA and the U.S. Forest Service had been too zealous in 
their reforestation efforts and the EPA’s mission of protection and remediation rendered 
it incapable of objective evaluation.390
 Similar themes surfaced in Barnhart’s and Dixon’s Ducktown articles, although 
these authors quoted residents mostly for literary contrast.  Quinn’s notions, however, 
reflected a growing body of literature questioning the extent and value of some 
remediation efforts.  Archeologist Don Hardesty wrote “Issues in Preserving Toxic 
Wastes” (2001) in the Public Historian, specifically questioning the value of remediating 
all toxic sites, especially those that have recoverable archeological data or heritage value 
 
                                                 
390 Quinn, "Should All Degraded Landscapes Be Restored? A Look at the Appalachian Copper Basin," 130-
131. 
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and are not, of course, posing immediate threats to human life.391  Similarly David 
Robertson wrote in “Heaps of History” (2000) in the Journal of Illinois History, that 
despite their negative association to outsiders, there may be greater community value 
than harm in not fully remediating waste streams.  In the case of Toluca, Illinois, he 
described how residents unanimously approved historic landmark status for “Jumbo,” a 
massive coal mine waste pile. 392   Even more critically, Fred Quivik questioned the very 
authority of the EPA to decide remediation treatment options in sensitive cultural areas in 
“Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous 
Materials: An Assessment of Superfunds’ Record” (2001) in the Public Historian.393
 The issue of preserving a portion of denuded basin and counter efforts to fix the 
erosion problem drew considerable outside attention.  Many district residents wanted to 
keep at least a part of their “beloved scar”
  
394and a community survey conducted in 2001 
quoted residents who wished to preserve the “moon-scape.”395  Even as late as 2008, 
when most of the open acreage behind the museum was well on its way to volunteer 
reforestation, Ducktown’s mayor still wanted, but didn’t know how, to keep part of the 
small parcel free from trees to commemorate the region’s history.396
 
  (See Figure 5.4)   
                                                 
391 See Donald Hardesty, "Issues in Preserving Toxic Wastes as Heritage Sites," The Public Historian 23, 
no. 2 (2001), 19. 
392 See David Robertson, "Heaps of History: Toluca and the Historic Longwall Mining District," Journal of 
Illinois History 3, Autumn (2000), 184. 
393 See Fred Quivik, “Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous 
Materials: An Assessment of Superfund’s’ Record,” The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 47. 
394 Quoted in Dixon, "Up from the Mines in Tennessee." 
395 "Community Involvement Plan for the Copper Basin Mining District," 4-5. 
396 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (4), October 22, 2008. 
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But the quandary was to balance local heritage needs while overcoming the real 
and perceived ill effects of the region’s mining and smelting past and somehow tap into 
the “4.5 million stressed out Atlantans, just two hours south” as potential short-term 
visitors.397
                                                 
397 Quoted in Dixon, "Up from the Mines in Tennessee." 
  Unfortunately for the city of Ducktown, the 2008 north-bound excursion train 
from Blue Ridge, Georgia, and the south-bound train from Etowah, Tennessee, run on 
existing tracks and stop in Copperhill completely by-passing Ducktown. So although 
Ducktown has the commercial strip and museum, it doesn’t have the built-in tourism 
Figure 5.4 The 30 acre parcel behind the Ducktown Basin Museum in 2008 
intentionally not revegetated to leave a reminder of the basin’s once denuded 
landscape.  However, because of the success of new species introduced, the 
parcel, off limits because of the visible mine collapse, is reforesting itself 
naturally.  (Source: author) 
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vehicle its sister city has.  It thus struggles for regional identity and greater authenticity in 
its heritage planning.398
 Like other rural mining districts, especially those that functioned for over a 
century and were in some state of economic decline, third and forth generation Basin 
residents sought to commemorate their heritage and celebrate the people and places that 
gave their region distinction.  In 1978, an impromptu mining exhibit began in a 
Ducktown grocery store with some bartered artifacts.  It ultimately grew into a more 
formalized museum where former workers and local residents gathered personal 
collections, stories, and photographs.  Shortly after the museum opened, Cities Service 
abandoned the Burra Burra Mine site in Ducktown that served as the TCC surface 
headquarters from 1899-1976.  In 1982, Cities Service donated the mine site to the 
Ducktown Basin museum, incorporated in 1978, as a historical monument and museum 
space.  In 1988, the museum transferred ownership of the site and artifacts to the State of 
Tennessee, but continued to manage and interpret the mine site, artifacts, and local 
history.
      
399   The museum soon occupied ten buildings on seventeen acres, including the 
office building, machine shop, and ore bin ruins and in 1983 the site was nominated to 
the National Register of Historic Places.400
                                                 
398 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (4). 
  Although the museum interprets 
environmental conditions and copper milling and smelting, it is primarily a mining 
museum and, with the exception of the attempt to preserve the small smelter-denuded lot 
behind the museum, does not fully address the complex and significant (both positive and 
399 Ron Clayton, "Ducktown Basin Museum Hits 30 with Plans to Keep Growing," Chattanooga Times 
Free Press, October 13, 2008, and Communication with Relevant Authority (3). 
400 "Tennessee Historical Commission State Owned Sites," Tennessee Department of Environment and 
Conservation, www.state.tn.us/environmental/hist/stateown/ducktown.shtml, accessed March 9, 2009. 
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negative) smelting operations of the district.  Very similar mining museums operate in 
Butte, Montana, and Hancock, Michigan, but both of these districts have other, more 
formalized efforts to include part of the built smelting landscape. 
 The only other significant heritage movement before the remediation efforts came 
in the 1990s with multiple national register nominations for districts and sites in the 
Basin.  The Southeast Tennessee Development District nominated the Ducktown and 
Copperhill downtown business districts and neighborhoods, the last-standing and 
regionally-unique Central Shaft mine head frame, and two individual non-industrial 
buildings to the National Register in 1992.401
                                                 
401 See Karen Daniels, "National Register of Historic Places Registration Form: Central Headframe," 
United States Department of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1992), ———, 
"National Register of Historic Places Registration Form: Copperhill Historic District," United States 
Department of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1992) , ———, "National Register 
of Historic Places Registration Form: Ducktown Historic District," United States Department of the Interior 
(Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1992) , and ———, "National Register of Historic Places, 
Multiple Property Documentation Form: Historic Resources of the Tennessee Copper Basin," United States 
Department of the Interior (Washington, D.C. : National Park Service, 1992). 
  With the exception of the inaccessible but 
highly-visible Central head frame, all nominated structures and districts, including the 
1983-nominated Museum site, were publicly accessible.  The more significant industrial 
site, the Copperhill smelter and acid and organic plants, however, were left off 
completely.   Relevant Authorities suggest that planners discussed the potential of listing 
the site, but that they were discouraged by the smelter’s Swiss operator, possibly because 
of unfounded fears of federal restrictions on site use.  Further, the large active site might 
not have helped the kind of development regional authorities hoped for.  From its 
website, The Southeast Tennessee Development District:   
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provides and shares a staff to cost effectively plan, promote and implement 
programs that result in the development and improvement throughout the 
southeast region of the Tennessee River Valley Basin.402
 
  
While little evidence supports the assertion that the site may have been too ugly for 
inclusion, from the 1950s to 2008, tourism had been a key, if not the key, development 
issue for the Copper Basin, and the Copper Hill plant site with all of its disarray and 
destructive appearance, never quite fit well with the clean, controlled, and “attractive” 
appearance of its National Register-listed neighbors and shopping districts.  In fact as 
heritage planning and remediation efforts continued after the Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed in 2001, the still-active Copperhill site continued to be largely 
excluded from heritage planning.403
  
 
 Superfund 
 While the most visible effects of smelting operations in the Ducktown district 
were remediated by extensive tree planting over a 75-year period, few contemporary 
articles or studies mentioned the extent of “invisible” toxins remaining in the district until 
the advent of the Clean Water Act (1970), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(1976), and Superfund (1980).  From 1970 to 2001 several studies examined the remains 
of mining and smelting works in the district and determined the extent of environmental 
damage.  At many locations heavy metals including copper, lead, iron, manganese, 
aluminum, and zinc, as well as acids, PCBs, and other chemicals remained in the soils 
                                                 
402 "Southeast Tennessee Development District,” http://www.sedev.org/, accessed March 13, 2009 
403 The Copperhill plant was still operational at the time of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and 
thus fell under other jurisdictional legislation aimed more at controlling active waste streams than 
remediating past pollution.    
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from a century of operations.  For example, one report listed the following contaminants, 
many carcinogenic, in one soil sample taken near the Isabella plant in 2004: 2-
Methylnaphthalene, Benzo(a)anthracene, Benzo(a)pyrene, Benzo(b)fluoranthene, 
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene, Benzo(k)fluoranthene, Chrysene, Fluoranthene, Indeno(1,2,3-
cd)pyrene, Naphthalene, Phenanthrene, Pyrene, Cobalt, Copper, Iron, Lead, Manganese, 
Selenium, and Zinc.404
 Under CERCLA, the EPA retains the authority “to pursue long-term remedial 
response actions that permanently and significantly reduce the dangers associated with 
releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances.”
  
405
Mining and related activities have resulted in the environmental degradation of 
portions of the Copper Basin, including the North Potato Creek Watershed, the 
Davis Mill Creek Watershed, and parts of the Ocoee River. Waste materials from 
mining and processing activities remain as sources of contaminants in the form of 
acidic drainage and high levels of metals in the soils, sediments and surface 
waters of the watersheds that drain into and impact the Ocoee River. Acidic 
conditions and leaching metals have impaired water quality and deforestation has 
resulted in severe erosion. PCB containing oils have been released to the 
environment from abandoned transformers. Abandoned and collapsing mine 
works and other deteriorating facilities and waste piles also pose significant 
physical hazards. In addition, the lack of a healthy soil structure and the poor 
quality of riparian and upland ecosystems contribute to poor surface water quality. 
 This has caused the degradation of large portions of the 10,000 acre North Potato 
Creek and the 3,000 acre Davis Mill Creek Watersheds and 26 miles of the Ocoee 
River. The two creeks that drain the Copper Basin Mining District site, when left 
  However, before EPA can act 
and spend federal money, it needs to first justify the extent of the damage, then initiate 
response actions and pursue those ultimately responsible to pay for it.  From the EPA’s 
description of the Copper Basin on its website (accessed March 13, 2009): 
                                                 
404 "Report of Inventory and Characterization of Former Mining and Processing Areas and Materials 
Located on Public and Private Lands," 4-13. 
405 "Copper Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements toward a Common Goal," 
3. 
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untreated, were releasing over 8,600 pounds of metals and greater than 19,000 
pounds of acid into the Ocoee River every day.406
 
  
 In most Superfund clean-ups, after determining a need for action, the EPA must 
list the locations on the National Priorities List (NPL).  Once listed the EPA can initiate 
clean up actions with Federal funds based on a structured approach outlined in CERCLA 
and pursue the potentially and principally responsible parties (PRP) to pay/reimburse the 
government for the work, although it often attempts to identify a PRP before initiating 
action.  In most PRP-funded clean-ups, the project is federalized and managed by the 
EPA, often with negotiated input from state and local officials and the PRP.  Under such 
conditions other applicable laws pertaining to federal agencies must be followed, such as 
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act requiring mitigation of 
damages to significant cultural resources.   
 In the Copper Basin, the EPA sought to list the district on the National Priority 
List, but the issue was fought by Occidental Petroleum, the only remaining district 
stakeholder with liability.  Despite arguing that it was not directly involved in any 
regional pollution, Occidental had purchased the company (Cities Services) that 
purchased the company (TCC) that, along with a company it bought (DSCI), was 
responsible for the majority of the pollution.407
                                                 
406 "Copper Basin Mining District," U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/copper/, accessed March 
13, 2009. 
 Since the only other surviving district 
entities with any potential liability were either out of business (Tennessee Chemical 
407  “Neither Glenn Springs nor its parent company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, were ever engaged 
in any mining activities in the Copper Basin. Occidental Petroleum acquired Cities Service, Inc. after all 
mining operations had been sold to the Tennessee Chemical Company. Cities Service had acquired the 
Copper Basin assets from the Tennessee Corporation, which operated the Tennessee Chemical Company.” 
See "Copper Basin," http://www.glennsprings-copperbasinproject.com/history.htm. 
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Company), free from prosecution (Boliden Intertrade), or owned by a foreign nation 
(CITGO), Occidental ultimately realized a prolonged fight would entail considerable 
legal fees.  Further, presuming even more legal fees associated with an EPA-managed 
Superfund clean up along with the negative tourism and development impacts for a 
district associated with Superfund, Occidental agreed to assume full financial and 
managerial responsibility for the clean-up, accept federal monitoring, reimburse the 
government for its cost, and abide by the general Superfund procedures and protocols 
outlined in CERCLA in exchange for operational control and the agreement, that as long 
as the clean-up followed Superfund guidelines and activities approved by EPA and/or 
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) under a voluntary 
cleanup and assistance program (VoAP), the operation would remain private. 408
 Although the clean-up remained private, Occidental entered into a legally binding 
Memorandum of Understanding with EPA and TDEC to enforce the clean-up order.
  
409
                                                 
408 See Timothy Fields, "Memorandum of Understanding between Tennessee Department of Environment 
and Conservation, U.S. EPA and Oxy, Inc.," in CECRLA Docket No. 01-10-C, ed. U.S. EPA Region 4 
(Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. EPA Region 4, 2001). 
   
Similar to federalized Superfund clean-ups, potentially responsible party (PRP) funds 
supported studies to determine the extent of damage, proposed and executed clean-up 
actions, and promoted community involvement in the decision process.  A certain portion 
of the money expended was also contributed directly to community projects as reparation 
for damages caused and loss of quality of life.  Occidental, through its Glenn Springs 
subsidiary, contributed significantly to district projects.  It funded annual picnics and site 
tours, funded museum projects, developed a Community Involvement Plan, provided 
409 See Ibid. 
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funds for the community to hire technical experts to assist it in participation, and 
provided scholarships to district students attending state universities.410
 EPA divided the region largely into three main components in the memorandum 
of understanding (MOU), each a separate watershed emptying into and including the 
Ocoee River.  (See Figure 5.5) The North Potato Creek watershed encompassed most of 
the original mining lands, the open pits, and the towns of Ducktown and Isabella, 
including the substantial smelter and acid complex that was largely abandoned by 1987.  
The Davis Mill Creek watershed included some later mining activity but bisected the 
Copperhill site that was active in some capacity through 2008.  Although Glenn Springs, 
as outlined in the MOU, removed a substantial slag deposit adjacent to the Ocoee River 
in Copperhill and implemented water-treatment plans and water diversion controls to 
contain metals and acid run off from Copperhill and significantly reduced contamination, 
most of the clean-up activity focused on the North Potato Creek watershed because Davis 
Mill Creek still contained operating industry governed by other laws.
  However, unlike 
federalized projects, Glenn Springs and the EPA argued when pressed, this clean-up was 
not legally bound to follow laws that applied to government activities or government 
property, such as Sections 106 and 110 of NHPA, and no federal agency or the State of 
Tennessee pursued the issue further.   
411
                                                 
410 "Copper Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements toward a Common Goal," 6 
and Conversation with a Relevant Authority (1). 
 
411 "Copper Basin Mining District," U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/copper/, accessed March 
13, 2009. 
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 Ultimately, much of the remediated area in the North Potato Creek watershed will 
be converted to public park land with hiking and biking trails, and some heritage 
interpretation with the Ducktown Basin Museum serving as the park trustee much in the 
same way it manages the state-owned Burra Burra mine site.412
                                                 
412 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (3). 
  By 2008, Glenn Springs 
had already capped the lead contaminated soils surrounding the Isabella acid plants, and 
Figure 5.5 Copper Basin Mining District showing North Potato Creek and Davis 
Mill Creek watersheds.  (Source: "EPA Proposes Action on Davis Mill Creek," 2003, 3) 
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capped and revegetated the former Isabella slag dump and tailings pond.  It had fenced all 
of the collapsed mines, removed PCB- contaminated soils, and deposited non-hazardous 
acidic wastes into the flooded Isabella mine collapse for “sub-aqueous” disposal.  Glenn 
Springs had also built water treatment plants at the South mine pit to process North 
Potato Creek waters, pumped and treated water from flooded mines, and built an 
experimental wetland to explore natural water treatment alternatives.  All told, according 
to an EPA website, the water treatment plants in the Copper Basin have removed 16 
million pounds of metals and neutralized 28 million pounds of acid.413
 
  
Heritage 
 An important part of any Superfund clean-up, whether publically funded or 
privately managed under consent decree, includes public participation.  Glenn Springs in 
the original MOU agreed to develop and execute plans for public involvement in 
remediation, education, and future use decisions for the remediated lands.  The first page 
of the October 2001 Community Involvement Plan, created by the Community 
Involvement Partnership that included TDEC, EPA, and Glenn Springs, stated the 
partnership’s mission was to “provide consistent, accurate, and timely information, and to 
listen and respond to concerns from citizens.”414
                                                 
413 "Copper Basin Mining District," U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/copper/, accessed March 
13, 2009. 
  In addition to explaining the process 
and legal framework Glenn Springs would follow in remediation, it also included a 
section outlining community concerns, ultimately resulting in a 2003 Future Use Plan. 
414 "Community Involvement Plan for the Copper Basin Mining District," coversheet. 
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 The Community Involvement Plan listed six areas of primary public concern:  the 
cleanup effects on current and future economic conditions,  the need for preservation of 
the unique and historic region, the availability of remediated lands for future use, 
compromised aesthetic land values for future uses, potential site-related health and 
environmental problems, and the cost and duration of clean-up activities.415  In general, 
most residents were happy with the remediation plan proposed and had only minor 
questions about health and safety issues.  Other public viewpoints included relief that the 
region was kept off the National Priorities List (NPL) avoiding the potential negative 
affects on the tourism-market, and a strong desire to preserve the unique character of the 
region and create new recreational opportunities linked with historical and environmental 
education programs.   Still, long-time residents voiced wishful regret that “the unique 
moonscape” and deforested red hills could not be preserved.  However, “most residents 
[accepted and many welcomed] the reforestation efforts that…restored the tree cover 
over the last few decades.”416
 Two years after the Community Involvement Plan, Glenn Springs submitted a 
Future Use Plan to “outline the decision-making process for restoring the Lower North 
Potato Creek Watershed to a condition that is protective of human health, safety, and the 
environment; and provides for re-development of the site so that it becomes an economic 
as well as environmental asset to the surrounding communities.”
  
417
                                                 
415 Ibid., 4-4. 
  This plan only 
applied to abandoned properties in the district and not to the then-active corridor through 
416 Ibid., 4-5. 
417 "A Future Use Plan for Redevelopment of the Abandoned Mine Lands in Copperhill Tennessee," 1. 
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Copperhill.   A significant portion of the report focused on economic development, 
especially tourism, and broke down the demographics of regional visitors and the extent 
of monetary expenditures in the area.  Most of the plan’s new development ideas were 
geared toward tourism and included new hotels, shopping, and restaurants.418
 According to the Future Use Plan, two primary factors shaped the “sense of 
place” in the Copper Basin, Ocoee River, and Cherokee National Forest areas: nature and 
outdoor activities, which the reforested lands complemented, and the mining heritage that 
defined the region’s historic identity echoing the long-standing landscape conflict 
between mining and nature in the district.  While the recreational attributes of the region 
were well established and growing, the plan admitted that, outside of the Museum, “very 
few historic places remain and none currently provide interpretive opportunities.”
   
419
Summing up the importance of heritage to visitors, the Future Use Plan stated: 
“preservation of cultural landscapes such as the barren areas near the Ducktown Basin 
Museum and the mining structures are important, and displays of how the environment 
   Of 
the “few” historic places remaining, the plan cited the structures on the National Register 
and the three Ocoee powerhouses and dams, but also called for additional heritage 
preservation, specifically citing the Central Head Frame and Hoist House, Isabella 
building and acid tank foundations, and parts of the original Old Copper Road.  Noting 
that restored sites fit into a general upswing in nostalgia-based tourism, the plan called 
for additional thematic developments, such as the historic excursion railroad, addressed 
specifically to visitors.   
                                                 
418 Ibid., 10-12. 
419 Ibid., 12. 
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and the people were shaped through the mining activities should be included in the site 
design.”420
Despite Glenn Springs’ significant financial contributions to community 
programs, however, the Tennessee Copper district was beset by complications to heritage 
planning.   Heritage preservation in general is not a simple task, and the decisions about 
what to remember/commemorate/preserve are contested based on relative perceptions of 
value.  A mill building may be seen by some as an important reminder of what made the 
region they live in significant, while to others it may look like an old dilapidated structure 
taking away from natural beauty.   
  The Future Use Plan recognized the community’s desire to include heritage 
in any sort of redevelopment and its understanding that tourism was a key factor in future 
economic growth.  It also demonstrated the commitment of Glenn Springs Holdings to 
the community and its desire to be a more positive corporate citizen, despite accepting 
financial responsibility for pollution cleanup while declining any culpability.   
 Both Ducktown and Copperhill recognized the importance of retaining their 
historic character if they were going to attract the kind of tourism and economic 
development they saw as their only viable means of income after their industry departed.  
While the Ducktown Basin Museum and the Copperhill excursion rail terminals both 
contribute to that end, the district is missing a structured approach to broad heritage-
landscape management.  Tennessee had (and has) its heritage champions, but its 
relatively small copper output ultimately did not generate the type of population density 
that fosters the formation of large, well organized heritage groups.   Polk County (TN) 
                                                 
420 Ibid., 12. 
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only had a 2007 estimated population of 15,000, no university or college to draw in new 
community members, and largely had dedicated individuals, as opposed to organizations, 
promoting heritage projects.421
 Tennessee’s Copper Basin heritage champions, moreover, are beset with 
additional complications.  Because the cleanup is privately-funded on private land, there 
is no legal requirement to consider cultural resources under Sections 106 and 110 of 
NHPA, and therefore decisions about preservation are left to the groups managing the 
clean up.  This does not necessarily mean that the cleanup organization and its public 
monitors do not want active preservation.  Quite to the contrary, they do, but they do not 
base decisions on National Park Service-defined levels of significance but rather on 
practicality without a strong professional heritage group assisting. 
  The Tennessee Copper Basin, unlike the Michigan and 
Montana copper districts, had little means to bring in new people outside of tourists and 
people seeking vacation homes.   
 Ducktown’s mayor, the museum director, and relevant authorities close to the 
clean up have all expressed desires to keep part of the built mining landscape, interpret it, 
and make it accessible to the public.  However, without a legal structure and formal 
procedure as outlined in NHPA, the greater expense of preservation over demolition, and 
the fact that simple steel or concrete structures are easier to care for than more 
complicated buildings, dominate decisions.  Which things get saved largely boils down to 
the cost of preservation and long-term maintenance rather than to issues of significance.  
Under Sections 106 and 110, important structures too damaged to retain would at a 
                                                 
421 "USA State & County Quickfacts," U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov., March 24, 2009 
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minimum receive some sort of documentation prior to demolition.   This is not to suggest 
that Glenn Springs Holdings avoids the issue of preservation, but rather as the funder of 
an expensive clean up whose mission is primarily to remediate the environment, its 
decisions are based heavily on economic considerations.   
 The Ducktown Basin Museum director faces similar constraints.  Ultimately, the 
remediated land will be managed under a trusteeship by the Museum.  As the only 
heritage professional directly or indirectly involved in the project, the director can offer 
opinions on a structure’s historical significance, but has little direct influence over the 
process to select which structures get preserved.  He is further constrained by the future 
responsibility of caring for the old structures and the potential liability of dangerous 
structures.  While mill buildings and smelter foundations may be historically and 
culturally significant, they ultimately will be very expensive to maintain, especially for a 
small regional museum with a limited budget.422
 The selection process for preservation thus becomes very simple in this case.  
Many decisions about heritage preservation are agreed to by handshake based on 
windshield surveys and discussions about the demolition and clean-up costs, public 
accessibility, structural stability, health and safety, and long-term needs.  While these are 
all appropriate considerations for preservation discussions, without significance being 
considered first, the preserved structures are largely limited to concrete bins, masonry 
retaining walls, some foundations, and simple steel structures such as the Central head 
frame.   
   
                                                 
422 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (3). 
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 Although few could argue against the heritage significance and value of the 
Central head frame, other head frames, and museum buildings, some of the other 
structures slated for saving have less significance in their existing context.  For example, 
the partial remains of the concrete fine ore bins at the London Mill site are being kept.  
The site of the cleaned bins in their now-grassy field has stunning beauty similar to 
Stonehenge in the United Kingdom (especially on a sunny summer day), but much of the 
ore bins’ heritage value is lost because they will be the only historic structure left of a 
once very large and important milling complex.  Without a larger context of surrounding 
buildings or at least foundations, the bins are isolated megaliths in a beautiful setting, 
belying their own importance and incapable of relaying the historic processes that took 
place there without extensive interpretation.  (See Figure 5.6) 
  
Figure 5.6  Fine Ore Bins at the London Mill site before restoration (ca. 2000) and after 
in 2008.  (Sources left: EPA “Copper Basin Mining District Case Study: Use of Cooperative Agreements 
toward a Common Goal,” (2005), 1 and right: Author)   
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The decision to save only the fine ore bins reflects the nature of heritage 
preservation in the Tennessee Copper Basin.  The bin’s cleaning costs actually exceeded 
demolition costs, reflecting some compromise with full remediation.  But the desire to 
economically neutralize contaminants associated with chemically hazardous processes at 
other buildings in considerable disrepair at the site led to the demolition of the remainder 
of the facility and thus the loss of the bin’s heritage context.423
 Further, there is no iconic symbol left in the district.  No single entity in the 
Copper Basin serves as a replicateable and brandable banner image.   Although the 
Central Mine head frame comes closest in terms of visibility and recognition by locals, it 
is not used as consistently as landmarks in other districts.  Unfortunately, the one iconic 
feature commonly associated with the Basin, the denuded landscape that appeared in 
myriad photographs and articles for a century, is all but gone. 
   Given a more structured, 
rather than narrow, short-term approach to heritage planning, decisions that included 
greater considerations of cultural and historical significance might have resulted in a 
more complete industrial landscape. 
 
Smelter Heritage 
 The comparative focus of this dissertation is three copper smelting sites in larger 
mining heritage contexts.  If by definition, smelting includes every process after milling, 
then roasting, smelting, and refining and relevant by-products must also be included.  
Therefore, the region affected by smelting in Tennessee includes the entire area denuded 
                                                 
423 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (1). 
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by open-heap roasting, and the effort to preserve the small patch behind the museum 
should be similarly included as smelter heritage along with acid production and the 
smelters themselves. 
 The Isabella smelter site, historic home to significant developments in pyritic 
smelting technology and the construction of large acid production facilities, is among the 
most contaminated in the Basin.  Near Isabella are the historic roasting yards of the 
Buena Vista mine and near Ducktown, the McPherson Roast yards, both of which are 
also considerably contaminated with heavy metals and acids.  All three locations were 
significant to the smelting and mining heritage of the region:  the two roast yards for the 
smelter smoke they generated that led to the lunar landscape and the Isabella smelter 
plant for its technology. 
 Much of the Isabella site, however, was dismantled during the 1970s when metal 
and acid production was fully moved to Copperhill.  It was further damaged by the 
nearby mine collapse that is now serving as sub-aqueous storage for slag waste.   The 
acid plants resulted in considerable lead deposition in the soil, estimated at more than 
1,400 tons.424
                                                 
424 "Report for the Extent of Lead Contamination at the Former Isabella Lead Chamber Acid Plant, 
Ducktown, Tennessee," 2. 
  Part of the approved remediation plan involves covering the contaminated 
soil with an impermeable cap to eliminate potential human exposure.  Other potential 
contaminants at Isabella have either been removed, covered, or in the case of slag, 
dumped in the pit, leaving little available for historic interpretation.  The contamination 
of the area is without doubt, but slag piles and debris that pose minimal human health 
hazards and sound structures are being saved in other districts, even if in a ruined state.  
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Other significant Tennessee structures and features might have been saved too if a more 
structured approach had been attempted. (See Figure 5.7) 
 The other significant smelter location at Copperhill has more potential for 
heritage preservation, but it too is in the process of being dismantled by the company 
operating the site.  Because the Copperhill location was active at the time of the 
memorandum of understanding and not under the jurisdiction of CERCLA, the plant was 
not included in the original clean-up plan and therefore not considered for heritage 
planning.  Because the State of Tennessee is not interested in pursuing heritage 
considerations in the midst of a complicated non-federalized cleanup, little will likely be 
done to preserve any of the significant foundations or remaining structures of what was 
once the largest acid production plant in the world.  (See Figure 5.8) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7   Isabella ca. 1945 and 2008.  (Sources left: “Copper Basin Pictorial Calendar” 
(2008) , right: author) 
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This is not to imply that Glenn Springs is not interested in contributing to the 
heritage of the district.  Its intentions, efforts, and contributions are well documented.  It 
is simply not bound to consider damages or impacts to properties eligible for the National 
Register.  In general, its decisions are made on the basis of practicality and not on 
historical significance.  Ultimately, nearly the entire remediation project area will be 
converted to park with walking and biking trails augmented by some historic features.  
But the features selected are being chosen for their durability based not on study or 
systematic heritage planning, but on hand-shake agreements following windshield 
surveys.   
 In the summary document of the Future-Use Plan submitted to foster public 
discussion, the authors assert that the future-purpose of the remediation is to “develop 
revenue generating” recreational assets to attract tourism to the Ducktown/Copperhill 
Figure 5.8 Copperhill smelter and acid plant as it looked in April 2008 after 
years of successive demolition and removal projects. (Source: author) 
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region and the State.  “Improvements would encourage cultural, historic, and 
environmental tourism through enhancement of historic mining features and would be 
important to the region’s economy.”425  Specific projects included constructing 
walking/biking trails, developing interpretive trails and outdoor classrooms to educate the 
visitor on mining operations, post-mining stewardship practices, and natural history, 
improving educational facilities at the Ducktown Basin Museum, pursuing greater 
national historic recognition, and establishing redevelopment/enterprise zones in 
Ducktown and Copperhill to encourage mixed-use office and festive/thematic retail 
development, and establishing excursion rail service from Blue Ridge, Georgia, and 
Etowah, Tennessee.426
 Although a part of the North Potato Creek site will be converted to an industrial 
park, the fortunes of the county are geared squarely on tourism development.
   
427
                                                 
425 "A Future Use Plan for Redevelopment of the Abandoned Mine Lands in Copperhill Tennessee," 
detached one-page summary. 
  With a 
substantial population in Atlanta just two hours away and sizeable populations in 
Chattanooga just one hour away and Nashville only three hours away, and proximity to 
the Appalachian Mountains and Great Smokey Mountains National Park, the Copper 
Basin seems like an ideal location, and heritage is at the top of the list of attractions.  
Although the smelter landscape is largely conglomerated into the broader mining 
landscape, its historic effects will still be visible despite significant improvements in 
ground cover.  A few small plots of land that do not take to reforestation are exposing 
stark red soil amid the green canopy, while the intentional plot of denuded land is self- 
426 Ibid., detached one-page summary. 
427 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (4). 
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foresting.  Interpretive signs will increase the visitor’s understanding of the historical 
processes that shaped the district.    
The individuals working to save and interpret some of the historic structures of 
the Basin should ultimately be commended for their efforts.  Much preservation in this 
country is geared toward tourism, and with luck the two will go hand-in-hand.  Moreover, 
it is hard to assess how the experiential sensation would be different had a more 
structured approach to significance been applied to determining what parts of the 
landscape were retained, or how more structured interpretation would combat the stark 
realization of some inquisitive visitors who, after a period of time hiking and biking in 
the Copper Basin woods, are suddenly struck by fact that all the trees are exactly the 
same and all the grasses are exactly the same and all the bushes are exactly the same.  
 
If a single underlying theme were identified to tie the history of the Ducktown 
District together from the first mining, through the cleanup and heritage plans, it would 
be the idea of the landscape and the land and the on-going conflict with mining or later, 
mining heritage.  From the beginning the landscape and its characteristics, what M. -L 
Quinn called environmental susceptibility, defined and even drove human interaction 
more than any other factor outside of economics.  The region’s remoteness contributed to 
the first two shutdowns.  Further its geologic basin features tended toward temperature 
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inversions and limited wind, holding in smelter smoke and contributing to the substantial 
denuded moonscape.  The smoke from the land’s sulfur-rich ore killed vegetation and 
elevated erosion, leading to significant toxin and sediment problems for the Ocoee River, 
which, as part of the landscape, generated power for businesses and homes, and prior to 
mining and smelting pollution, provided fish for food.  The ore’s high sulfur enhanced 
the development of pyritic smelting and created a need for sulfuric acid plants both to 
protect the land and, through fertilizer production, enhance the growing capacity of the 
land.   The first remediation treatment, tree planting, was in direct response to the 
landscape degradation, and later remediation efforts ultimately resulted in a substantial 
wooded park, whose sheer size and long-term management challenges are affecting 
heritage decisions.   
Figure 5.9  Central Shaft 2008 towering above State Highway 68 between 
Ducktown and Copperhill, Tennessee.  (Source: author) 
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 The other key issues affecting Ducktown District heritage are the privatization of 
the cleanup effort and the relatively small and isolated community.  The fact that the 
cleanup is private makes many of the active stakeholders’ jobs relatively easier when it 
comes to placing priority on remediation over preservation.  The EPA can carry out its 
mission to protect human health and the environment through MOUs and Consent 
Decrees while not having to be formally distracted by legal considerations for heritage.  
The cleanup company can largely focus directly on the clean up and choose how it wants 
to engage the community.  In terms of public relations, this allows it to respond directly 
to specific needs of the broad community and not necessarily become embroiled in 
controversial heritage decisions.  The company is preserving some structures, as well as 
contributing financially to many other community projects, and most people in the region 
are quite happy with the company’s efforts. 
 It is difficult to argue that the State of Tennessee is not interested in historic 
preservation, but with limited budgets and staffing, the State Historic Preservation Office 
is likely a little relieved that it, too, is not embroiled in assessing significance and 
enforcing Sections 106 and 110.  Certainly the Ducktown Museum would like to retain a 
greater portion of structures in the remediation area, but it suffers from limited budgets 
and staff, and already has a fairly stable collection of mining structures, so the fewer new 
buildings to take responsibility for, the easier it will be for the museum in the long-run.  
Overall, it is difficult to determine how negotiations with the clean up company would 
have evolved if the EPA had been forced to ensure much broader heritage planning and 
enforce payment for greater historic stabilization projects and long-term care. 
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 Moreover, the small population of the Copper Basin means that organized 
preservation groups are small.  Had the mining district been more significant nationally in 
terms of production, then the small preservationist contingent might have had a stronger 
voice for greater preservation.  Had more of the nationally significant smelting structures 
like the Herrshoff pyritic furnaces or part of the world’s largest acid plant survived, then 
preservationists might have had a stronger voice, even if the complexity of remediation 
and preservation increased significantly.  Had the region not been as polluted over 100 
years by copper mining and processing, maybe more outsiders would have been 
interested in visiting and more structures in the contaminated areas could have been 
saved.   But with only a handful of people driving heritage with tourism as their main 
goal, and a general satisfaction with the clean up progress, the community is getting what 
it ultimately argued for—despite largely top-down heritage decisions. 
 The approach to heritage in Tennessee is largely an a-historical and skewed, top-
down process with EPA and Glenn Springs making the majority of the decisions as 
opposed to heritage professionals.  This, however, is not the only approach.  Montana has 
been largely a bottom up process with well organized local groups and members of the 
community largely deciding what they want in terms of heritage, then negotiating with 
the EPA and the PRP to get it.     
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CHAPTER 6.   MONTANA 
The city wasn’t pretty.  Most of its builders had gone in for gaudiness.  Maybe 
they had been successful at first.  Since then the smelters whose brick stacks stuck 
up tall against a gloomy mountain to the south had yellow-smoked everything into 
uniform dinginess.  The result was an ugly town of forty thousand people, set in 
an ugly notch between two ugly mountains that had been all dirtied up mining.  
Spread over this was a grimy sky that looked as if it had come out of the smelters’ 
stack. 
 - Dashiell Hammett, 1929 (Red Harvest, 3-4) 
 
ARCO save that stack, touch not a single brick 
Signify the livelihood that made Anaconda tick. 
Still let it stand there stark against the sky, 
Like a somewhat obscene gesture catching every eye. 
-Tom Dickson (quoted by Mercer 2001 Anaconda, 216) 
 
November 9, 2008 
 Driving west on US 90 fifteen miles from Butte, Montana, travelers get their first 
glimpse and it is dramatic and huge.  It dominates the skyline, but not in the same way 
the Empire State Building towers over New York or the Eiffel Tower stands above Paris.  
The Washoe Smelter stack sits on a geologic shelf 700 feet above the valley housing the 
city of Anaconda and Warm Springs Creek, and in front of a mountain as tall as it.  This 
entire landscape is rooted in the Montana Rocky Mountains, just 10 miles from the 
Continental Divide.  The stack, at 585 feet, is the largest free standing masonry structure 
in the world, 30 feet taller than the Washington Monument, and sits in a view-shed of 
equally tall and imposing geologic features.    
 You know it’s big because the Rocky Mountains are big.  You know it’s big because 
you can clearly see it from more than 10 miles away.  Unfortunately you really can’t get a 
sense of exactly how big it is.  From even a half-mile away, the stack has still not come into 
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its full height.  The chief reason is that the stack is the only remaining part of what was once 
the largest, most complex, and most advanced copper smelter in the world.  There are no 
other buildings or structures left to give it proper scale.  In fact, you can’t get a real sense of 
its immense size until you stand right up next to it and look up.   (See Figure 6.1) 
 It is remarkable that the stack was saved from demolition.  Certainly one of the 
most complex, heavily photographed, and arguably entertaining parts of many copper 
smelter reclamation efforts is the demolition of the stack.  These structures are often 
among the tallest free standing structures in any given county and their demolition is a 
very dramatic event that causes as dramatic a shift in the landscape as their erection.  The 
implosion of the Great Falls (MT) smelter stack, for example, was called slow and defiant 
and touted as one of the city’s most heavily attended events.428
                                                 
428 Keith Haugland, "Stubborn Stack Dies Slowly," Great Falls Tribune, September 19, 1982. 
  Following the 
announcement of plans to demolish the Washoe stack just a few months after the Great 
Falls stack came down, a group of dedicated residents formed a committee to save the 
Anaconda stack, initially as a memorial to the remarkable efforts of the masons who built 
it, but as the movement gained popular support, the soon-to-be-preserved stack came to 
Figure 6.1 Anaconda Smelter Stack, from left to right, approximately six miles, one 
mile, one-quarter mile, and fifty yards away, November 2008.  (Source: Author) 
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commemorate the town and smelter workers as well, both still reeling from the shock of 
the smelter’s closure and the pending disappearance of the other landmarks of their 
history threatened by a Superfund mandated clean-up.   
 Equally peculiar, but for very different reasons, are the remaining slag-wall 
settling ponds in Butte at the former site of the Butte Reduction Works.  This long-lived 
and innovative early 20th century smelter had immense ponds near its site to store copper-
rich tailings.  Instead of erecting masonry walls or earth dikes, the company used a waste 
resource it had on hand: slag.  To create the walls, smelter workers erected temporary 
forms for retaining walls, probably of sheet steel, to create boxes roughly 10’ (l) x 8’ (w) 
x 4’ (h), and poured molten slag into the forms, let the slag set, then moved the walls to 
the next section and poured again eventually building up a substantial series of structures, 
some over 15’ high that impounded an area of approximately 100 acres.  Even more 
interesting, two of the formed walls created a slag-canyon that Silver-Bow creek still 
flows through.  Like the Washoe Smelter, the Butte Reduction Works and all its physical 
plant have long since been demolished, except for these slag walls. But unlike the smoke 
stack, whose function is rather intuitive even if its size is not, the slag walls evoke an 
unknown or little understood historical process until one stumbles upon the interpretative 
sign one quarter mile off the main street. 
 Despite the sometimes confusing nature of seemingly random historic features, 
heritage pervades the Butte-Anaconda region.  A fellow researcher in the Butte-Silver 
Bow archives liked to say that “history is to Butte, what food is to the French.”429
                                                 
429 Personal communication between author and fellow researcher, November 12, 2009. 
  The 
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ubiquitous symbols of the region’s mining history, the gallows frames, are everywhere.430  
The 13 remaining black steel frames dominate the built environment, and are further 
emphasized by red cord-lights that outline and illuminate the gallows frames at night.  
The frames are on license plates, street lights, newspaper banners, phone books, 
brochures, and countless local advertisements.  They decorate city hall.  They are 
modeled in the county courthouse.  They are on business cards and in the City-County 
Seal.  They hold up signs, and are stylized in the logo of the Convention and Visitor’s 
Bureau and Mainstreet-Uptown Butte.431
  
  Several six-foot (appx.) tall gallows frame 
models show up on restaurant lawns, abandoned lots, apartment balconies, and even as a 
mailbox post in one neighborhood.   (See Figure 6.2) 
                                                 
430 Gallows frames are the colloquial term for the structures at the opening of an underground mine, called 
head frames in many other parts of the country. 
431 The City of Butte was settled and developed on Butte Hill, called the “richest hill on earth,” just below, 
or in some instances intermixed with the mines.  The central business district, commonly referred to as 
“downtown” in many cites, is called “uptown” in Butte. 
Figure 6.2 Gallows Frames of the Original Mine in Butte (left) and model frame 
used as a mailbox stand in the Flats (right).  (Source: Author) 
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Heritage symbols fill Anaconda too, but to a lesser degree.  The smaller of the 
sister-towns, it seems to have had less development and pro-active preservation since the 
smelter closed and, except for the stack, was demolished.  In addition to being visible 
from ten miles away and in nearly every part of town except the historic cemetery above 
the county courthouse, reproductions of what locals boast is the tallest freestanding 
masonry structure in the world show up on car dealers’ signs, city web-sites, and 
advertisements.432  “Anaconda Stack” is also the name of the smallest State Park in 
Montana, founded to take ownership of just the stack site and a small viewing area about 
a mile away.   The name of the City of Anaconda’s founder, Marcus Daly, not as 
maligned as in Butte where references to him only shows up in the name of the Montana 
Tech coffee/lunch shop as a pun on “daily,” turns up in Anaconda motel names, coin-
laundry names, and in the name of the local historical society that has had at least four 
different names since its incorporation several decades ago.433
 The other and probably second most recognized smelter heritage site in Anaconda 
is the Jack Nicklaus designed “Old Works Golf Course” built on the location of 
Anaconda’s pre-Washoe smelter site.  Although most of the old works structures were 
removed shortly after the start of the 20th century, Nicklaus incorporated existing 
   
                                                 
432 "Welcome to Anaconda," Community of Anaconda, Montana, http://www.anacondamt.org/, accessed 
April 2, 2009, and personal observation, November 2008. 
433 A life-size statue of Marcus Daly sculpted by Augustus Saint-Gaudens in 1906 sat in a prominent 
uptown intersection until a traffic accident forced the removal of the sculpture to the Montana Tech 
campus.  It is preserved and maintained and as such has heritage value, but maybe not as much as it did 
when it was located in a more prominent location.    
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foundations and waste piles into the course design, and even filled the sand traps with 
Washoe smelter slag, now called “sland” by locals.434
 However, there are not many other popular references to or celebrations of waste 
or toxicity in the region and only one current visible commercial/iconic reference to the 
wastewater-filled, former open-pit mine, the Berkeley Pit.  The Pit Printers sits on Front 
Street in Butte, and at some point in the 1990s the “Bookley Pit” bookstore operated.
    
435
  
  
But, like Ducktown, interpretive signs extol the virtues of cleaning up man-made 
environmental disasters.  The Washoe Smelter site, Old Works Golf Course, Butte’s 
gallows frames, and the Reduction Works slag walls are all part of the largest Superfund 
cleanup in the United States and, at the same time, are part of one of the largest National 
Historic Landmark Districts in the country.  These two competing poles create a rich 
environment for preservation of what was once the greatest copper mining district among 
whose notable achievements included significant landscape degradation.  (See Figure 6.3) 
Shutdown 
 The decline of the great Butte-Anaconda district was not linear.  The Anaconda 
Copper Mining Company’s (ACM) Montana mines and smelters experienced their 
highest production in 1917, but also saw significant peaks in 1929, 1935, and 1943, each 
within 82-85 percent of 1917.436
                                                 
434 See: Maney Telefilm video, “Old Works Vision to Reality,” ca. 1998. 
  Anaconda’s rapid buildup in the early 20th century 
included the 1914 
435 William Wyckoff, "Postindustrial Butte," Geographical Review 85, no. 4 (1996), 45. 
436 Extrapolated from Janet L. Finn, Tracing the Veins : Of Copper, Culture, and Community from Butte to 
Chuquicamata (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 247 and Otis E. Young, "The American 
Copper Frontier, 1640-1893," The Speculator 1, no. 2 (1984), 7. 
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acquisition of International Smelting and Refining and its New Jersey, Utah, Arizona, 
and Indiana smelters.437  In 1915, it became the sole corporate entity of Amalgamated 
Copper holding company and in 1916, built a zinc plant at Great Falls that by 1920 was 
the largest in the world, producing over half of the global supply438  In 1917 Anaconda 
built a copper wire and rod mill in Great Falls as it began to vertically integrate more 
fully.439
                                                 
437 Isaac Frederick Marcosson, Copper Heritage; the Story of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated (New 
York: Dodd Mead, 1955), 143. 
  By 1919 it owned all but two daily newspapers in the state and successfully 
fought off or favorably negotiated very visible pollution-litigation lawsuits from local 
438 Fredric L. Quivik, "The Anaconda Company Smelters:  Great Falls and Anaconda," The Speculator 1, 
no. 2 (1984), 44. 
439 Ibid., 44. 
Figure 6.3 Map of Butte-Anaconda showing selected heritage and remediation sites. 
(Source: Author) 
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farmers and the United States Government.440   Further, suspicious union-hall bombings 
and at least one union organizer murder went unprosecuted.  In 1922 Anaconda bought 
American Brass and in 1929 created the Anaconda Wire and Cable Company.441
 Despite the growth and expansion of the 1920s and new mining techniques 
implemented in the 1950s, several historians argue that Montana copper production and 
the Anaconda Copper Mining Company declined after World War I and never fully 
recovered.
  By 
1930, the Anaconda owned nearly 90% of the copper mining capacity and 100% of the 
smelting capacity in Montana, held considerable local and state political power and 
influence, and had expanded operations into Chile and Mexico. 
442
                                                 
440 Mary Elisabeth Curran, "The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and 
Resiliency" (Master's Thesis, University of Montana, 1996), 93.   ACM “won” the suits brought by the 
United States by negotiating some changes to its operations and avoided others by exchanging good land 
for damaged. 
  Although the decline was gradual for several decades, it often appeared 
worse when compared to the rapidly expanding output of Utah and Arizona.  Following 
earlier copper mining investments in Mexico (1906) and Chile (1917), ACM bought a 
substantial portion of the Guggenheim’s Chile holdings in 1923, including the largest 
single copper reserve in the world at Chuquicamata.  As Chile’s mines increasingly 
buoyed profits, ultimately supplying two-thirds of Anaconda’s copper and three-quarters 
of its income by the 1950s, the once-singularly dominant Butte-Anaconda copper 
producing region became just a division of a much larger multi-national corporation.  In 
the late 1920s, Kennecott’s Bingham, Utah, mine began out-producing Butte, and 
441 David M. Emmons, "The Price of 'Freedom': Montana in the Late and Post-Anaconda Era," Montana: 
The Magazine of Western History 44, no. 4 (1994), 68. 
442 Quivik, "The Anaconda Company Smelters:  Great Falls and Anaconda,” 44; Michael P. Malone, 
Richard B. Roeder, and William L. Lang, Montana : A History of Two Centuries, Rev. ed. (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1991), 247; and Wyckoff, "Postindustrial Butte,” 478. 
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Arizona became the single largest copper producing state in the country.443
 Despite local fears of a corporate pull out, the Anaconda Company continued to 
invest, mine, and produce copper in Montana leading to significant World War II output.  
David Emmons cites combined American and Chilean ACM production figures for 1946, 
by no means a record year, that included 3.7 million ounces of silver, 30 thousand ounces 
of gold, 1.47 million pounds molybdenum, 1.55 million pounds of cadmium, 4,883 tons 
of arsenic, 15.6 million pounds of lead, 1.5 million pounds of zinc, 111,397 tons of 
manganese, and 742 million pounds of copper, all in the midst of a post-war recession.  
The Montana component of this production contributed to a 1948 state-wide per capita 
income sixteen-percent higher than the national average, and likely the second or third 
highest in the nation.  Emmons considers the late 1940s to be Anaconda’s and Montana’s 
“last hurrah.” 
  All this 
happened just 40 years after Montana wrestled the designation of largest copper district 
in the world from Calumet and Hecla and the rest of the Michigan copper mines. 
444
 On paper, however, Butte-Anaconda produced at a fairly steady pace from the 
late- 1940s through the mid-1970s with peaks and valleys averaging out to a slight 
increase over the period.
 
445
                                                 
443 Malone, Roeder, and Lang, Montana : A History of Two Centuries, 249. 
  This trend, however, does not reflect significant changes in 
the mining landscape.  In 1947 ACM began the “Greater Butte Project” to recover lower-
grade ores from deposits under the city because most of the deep veins were so low in 
copper content that they could no longer be profitably mined.  Up until this time 
444 Emmons, "The Price of 'Freedom': Montana in the Late and Post-Anaconda Era," 68. 
445 Finn, Tracing the Veins: Of Copper, Culture, and Community from Butte to Chuquicamata, 247. 
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Anaconda recovered all its copper ore by traditional hard rock stope mining where miners 
tunneled into ore veins, blasted out most of the copper-bearing rock, then proceeded to 
next level of the mine and repeated the process sending ore to the concentrators, smelters, 
then refineries to produce pure copper.  The “Greater Butte Project” initially used block-
cave mining methods that essentially under-cut ore bodies allowing ores and ceilings to 
collapse from gravity and then drawing off ores and considerable amounts of other 
materials from below, substantially reducing labor and mining costs, although entailing a 
substantial increase in rock and ore haulage before concentration.  
 Despite claims of 3.5 billion pounds of recoverable copper, plans for a completely 
interconnected underground system to allow surface-recovery of ores from multiple 
mines at a single head frame, and a nearly 20-year extension of underground working, 
most historians consider the “Greater Butte Project” a bust because it was abandoned 
after only nine years and never produced at the level expected.446
 The Berkeley Pit began just northeast of uptown Butte in 1955 and quickly ate 
away at sections of town.  Not only did the new mine absorb several historic underground 
mine sites and above ground smelter locations on Butte hill, but eminent domain or the 
  However the success 
of the block caving plan was measured, the new underground works were quickly 
overshadowed by an open-pit mining project that recovered even lower-grade ores by 
means large excavators, dump trucks, and far fewer workers.   
                                                 
446 The ACM block caving project was announced in 1947, yielded its first copper in 1952, and ended in 
1961, although other underground mining continued through the late 1960s. See Marcosson, Copper 
Heritage; the Story of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated, 274; Brian Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda 
Revisited:  An Overview of Early-Day Mining and Smelting in Montana, Special Publication 99 (Butte, 
Montana: Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology; Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology, 
1991), 13 and 26; and Malone, Roeder, and Lang, Montana : A History of Two Centuries, 249.   
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threat of eminent domain enabled it to consume the neighborhoods of East Butte, Dublin 
Gulch, Finn Town, Meaderville, and McQueen.447  Many of the displaced families and 
businesses resettled in an area called the Flats, the valley floor south of Butte Hill that 
had previously housed smelters, ancillary industries, streetcar suburbs, and cemeteries.  
The Berkeley Pit owed its success largely to the significant quantities of low grade ores 
that could be mined with relatively few workers, making the poor ore economically 
profitable.  If the late 1940s were the last hurrah for Butte, the opening of the pit and loss 
of neighborhoods and mining jobs heralded the end of the district and the beginning of 
even greater changes to the landscape and identity of the region.448
 As with all other mining districts, as the copper content of the ore diminished, 
considerably more ore was mined to meet production demands.  In addition to greater 
gangue mined per ton of copper produced, the “Greater Butte Project’s” more 
indiscriminant block-caving methods significantly increased the amount of waste tailings 
generated by Anaconda, forcing the company to build extensive new settling ponds to 
keep tailings and dissolved metals from washing into Clark Fork.  Operationally, the low-
grade copper ore became too expensive to transport from Butte to the Anaconda 
concentrating plant, forcing ACM to build a new concentrator in 1964 near the edge of 
the Berkeley Pit.  The erection of this facility effectively closed the concentration 
  
                                                 
447 Mining the Berkeley Pit 1955-1982, (Butte, Montana: Butte Chamber of Commerce, 2004 (est.)) and 
Finn, Tracing the Veins : Of Copper, Culture, and Community from Butte to Chuquicamata, 191. 
448 Open-pit mining in Butte continued beyond 2008 buoyed by high, pre-recession Asian demand, albeit 
on a much smaller scale and with efficiencies requiring far fewer people.    
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department and tailings ponds in the town of Anaconda as ACM opened new ponds and 
disposed of waste tailings closer to Butte mining operations.449
 The population of Silver Bow County (including Butte) peaked in 1920 at 60,000, 
but dropped by nearly 19,000, or about one third, by 1970.  In 1990 the population would 
drop to half of its 1920 high.  Anaconda’s Deer Lodge County, whose population peaked 
in 1960, would not experience significant declines until 1980, but it too would lose nearly 
half its population by 1990.
  
450
 In 1971, a leftist coup forced out the pro-American, pro-Anaconda government of 
Chile, and new president Salvador Allende nationalized most foreign-owned mines and 
smelters in the country.  This action spelled the beginning of the end for the Anaconda 
Copper Mining Company.  That same year, ACM declared a net loss of $357.3 million 
and went into receivership.
  Amid declining mineral output and population loss, the 
company divested itself of its newspapers in 1959 and broke its ties with Montana Power 
in the 1960s, an organization it had once controlled through common board members.   
451
                                                 
449 Personal Observation, November 2008. 
 In an effort to trim costs and overhead, the company sold 
its lumber operations and closed its Anaconda and Great Falls zinc plants.  In 1974 it 
announced it would reduce its workforce by 700-1000 jobs and the next year laid off 
1,500 more workers.  In a further effort to remain viable, the company began plans to 
expand the Berkeley Pit into the uptown area of Butte amid a growing public outcry.  
Despite a rash of unexplained and unprosecuted fires to both uptown buildings and 
popular parks, and an effort by Butte’s mayor to use the progressive Federal “Model 
450 "County Population Census Counts 1900-90," U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/index.html, accessed April 4, 2009. 
451 Emmons, "The Price of 'Freedom': Montana in the Late and Post-Anaconda Era," 69, and Malone, 
Roeder, and Lang, Montana : A History of Two Centuries, 250. 
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Cities” program to fund the relocation of uptown to the Flats (discussed more fully 
below), the pit only got deeper over the next few years, not wider.  By 1977, ACM had 
eliminated a full one-third of its Montana workforce, closed its last underground mines, 
ended operations at its Anaconda foundry, and, in a last attempt to continue Butte 
operations, began mining the East Berkeley Pit, later renamed the Continental Pit to 
avoid association with the pollution-filled Berkeley Pit just to the west.452
 These efforts, however, did not save the Anaconda Copper Mining Company.  
Like Cities Service in the Ducktown district a decade earlier, the Atlantic Richfield Oil 
Company (ARCO), looking for ways to spend-down some of the considerable cash it 
earned during the oil crises of the early 1970s, purchased the substantially de-valued 
holdings and facilities of Anaconda Copper with a promise to invest millions in the state 
and modernize its mines and smelters.
   
453
 
 ARCO’s commitments however, were short-
lived.  In 1980 to the shock and disbelief of Anaconda and Great Falls residents, it closed 
the company’s smelter and refinery operations, citing increased pollution abatement 
costs, and in 1982 it ended operations at the Berkeley Pit and shut off the pumps, 
allowing the pit to fill with toxic water.     
Epilogue to Butte Mining:   
 In 1986, the (Dennis) Washington Construction Company of Missoula, Montana, 
purchased the mine properties of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company from ARCO, 
forming Montana Resources, Inc. (MRI) and began mining the Continental Pit for 
                                                 
452 Malone, Roeder, and Lang, Montana : A History of Two Centuries, 250. 
453 Emmons, "The Price of 'Freedom': Montana in the Late and Post-Anaconda Era,” 69. 
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copper and molybdenum on a significantly reduced scale with non-union workers, an 
unusual arrangement for pro-union Butte, for the first time since 1934.454  It also 
reopened the 1964 concentrator ACM had built at the Berkeley Pit rim and continued 
production through at least 2009.  More significantly for this dissertation, MRI sold 
several historic mine sites to a new venture called the Montana Mining Properties, which 
said it intended to restart underground mining in several of the historic shafts.455
 
   In the 
process of raising additional capital for its operations, however, Montana Mining put 
several of the historic gallows head frames up for sale for their scrap value.  The thought 
of losing the last few remaining frames may have been the final event that galvanized 
the community toward preservation.  Ultimately none of the head frames offered for sale 
were purchased for scrap, and all now make up one of the most unique mining heritage 
landscapes in the country.  
Washoe Smelter Closure 
 Unlike the gradual end of ACM and later ARCO mining in Butte, the end of 
copper smelting came very abruptly to the City of Anaconda and its workers on 
September 29, 1980.  At the time, labor and local management were in the midst of strike 
negotiations, but both groups shared the expectation of a settlement and a quick return to 
work.  Just thee months earlier, the Anaconda Minerals Company (AMC), the name 
ARCO gave its Montana copper mining division, dedicated a new “state of the art” 
                                                 
454 Eugene C. Tidball, "What Ever Happened to the Anaconda Company?" Montana: The Magazine of 
Western History 47, no. 2 (1997), 68. 
455 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited:  An Overview of Early-Day Mining and Smelting in 
Montana, 61. 
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visitors center at the smelter’s main gate, and the company was in the process of 
upgrading air pollution controls.  Further, just three weeks prior to the closure, AMC was 
publically considering switching back to coal to fire its Anaconda smelters.456
Twenty-five years later Mel Stokke, the last general manager of the site, said “the 
closure was a complete shock, I never thought it would come to pass.  Up until the day 
they told us we were shutting down, I never had a clue.”  John Greene, general manager 
of the company-owned Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific Railway, echoed the same 
sentiment: “We were all pretty damn shocked.  It just didn’t make any sense to us.”
 In fact, the 
upper management of the smelter and company-owned railroad were fully expecting to 
resume operations following the strike and until the morning of September 29th did not 
know the smelter would close.   
457  
Even Roger Williams, regional EPA administrator, expressed surprise and deep concern 
at the time, that the company proceeded with the closure especially after having had 
recent discussions with ARCO about alternative solutions to abate sulfur emissions.458
 Despite a mid-1970s effort to bring the Washoe into compliance with state and 
federal environmental air pollution laws that included the installation of electric furnaces 
to melt ores, bag houses to collect dust, and a new acid plant to capture sulfur, the site 
still fell far short of other regional smelters in terms of emissions control.  By the late 
1970s, it was the third largest of fourteen western smelters in terms of output, but 
eleventh in terms of sulfur recovery efficiency, and was cited by the EPA as one of the 
 
                                                 
456 "Anaconda Copper Smelter May Switch to Coal," Chemical Week 123, (1980), 61. 
457 Vera Haffey, "Anacondans Remember Day the Smelter Closed," Montana Standard, September 29, 
2005, A1 and A6. 
458 "EPA Chief Says Closure a Surprise," The Montana Standard, October 1, 1980.  
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largest single sources of sulfur dioxide emissions in the country.459  Attempts to fix the 
problem aside, the company claimed increasing difficulty hitting what it considered a 
“moving target” of federal and state air pollution regulations.460  By the late 1970s, 
ARCO estimated that it needed $300-400 million in upgrades to bring the smelter into 
full and permanent compliance.461 James Marvin, ARCO’s AMC-division president, said, 
announcing the 1980 closure, “the smelter just can’t be retrofitted on any reasonable basis 
and become cost-competitive with modern smelting operations elsewhere in the world.”  
“Since 1972,” reporter Shari Meets paraphrased Marvin’s statements made the day after 
the closure announcement, “the smelter operated on a series of variances granted by the 
state environmental agencies and, as a responsible company, we do not want to, nor do 
we intend to, continue making applications for variances from the environmental 
regulations of this state or union.”462
 Skeptics, recounting conflicting factors in the months leading up to the closure, 
argued ARCO was simply interested in minimizing losses and not protecting its workers 
or caring about their communities.  An EPA study requested by displaced workers under 
  Citing excess smelting capacity in the world in 
1980, most notably in Japan, and the high costs of upgrading, ARCO announced the 
permanent closure of the strike-idled smelter on September 29, 1980.  To lessen the blow, 
ARCO claimed to be considering the construction of a new, state-of-the-art smelter in 
Montana or maybe an American port city, but neither came to be as just two years later, it 
ended all mining in the state. 
                                                 
459 "Role of Clean Air Act Requirements in Anaconda Copper Company's Closure of Its Montana Smelter 
and Refinery," ed. Region 8 U.S. EPA (Denver, Colorado: U.S. EPA, 1981), 5-7. 
460 Tidball, "What Ever Happened to the Anaconda Company?" 63. 
461 Ibid., 67. 
462 Shari Meets, "Anaconda Co. Closes Smelter," Montana Standard, September 30, 1980, 1. 
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the Clean Air Act showed that the smelter could continue operating under current 
conditions without any equipment upgrades for eight more years before having to meet 
new federal air pollution rules and that specific waivers existed for non-ferrous smelters 
under 1977 revisions to the act.463  Further, the EPA concluded that the cost of permanent 
pollution controls was grossly overestimated and instead of $300-400 million dollars, 
should cost ACM between $120-160 million.464
 More damning claims came from the Montana Eagle, a major independent 
newspaper, in early December 1981.  Journalist Bob McCarthy reported that the closure 
and layoff of 1500 Anaconda and Great Falls employees came just months before the 
effective start date of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which 
governed the transportation and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes.  The act, however, 
contained an exemption for companies that ceased operations before November 19, 1980, 
prompting the former Anaconda City Commissioner and several state Health Department 
officials to claim that this date played a significant role in the order to shut down.  The 
acting plant manager, however, denied this claim despite the fact that he too had not been 
informed of the decision to close until the day of the formal announcement.
 
465
To assuage concerns as much as it could, ARCO pledged support to ease the 
transition and soften the economic blow.  Local officials claimed that the closure would 
  Whatever 
factors led to the decision, the McCarthy article demonstrated that the shock of closure 
was still festering in late 1981, nearly fifteen months later.  
                                                 
463 "Role of Clean Air Act Requirements in Anaconda Copper Company's Closure of Its Montana Smelter 
and Refinery,” 8. 
464 Ibid., 13. 
465 Bob McCarthy, "Arco's Lethal Legacy," Montana Eagle 1981, 4. 
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result in $24 million annual loss to the Anaconda community in wages and an indirect 
loss of 1.5 non-AMC jobs for every one AMC job lost.  Although another $16 million 
would be lost each year in Great Falls, the city’s greater population and more diverse 
economy somewhat cushioned its difficult transition away from smelting.466  ARCO 
claimed that it would help place workers in new jobs, pay benefits and severance, and 
pledged $5 million to the city to attract new development.  Hopes were pinned in 1981 on 
a new plastics firm lured with development incentives, but by 1982 the firm had declared 
bankruptcy and defaulted on the $900,000 development loan.  Overall, ARCO 
development funds created only 30 new jobs, while 14 local businesses failed in the two 
years following the closure.467
 Ultimately little could be done to soften the blow of closure.  In the first few years 
following the closure people left the region looking for work.  The state government 
promised task forces and attempted to lure new industry, but most efforts did little to 
stem the rising unemployment and growing economic crisis in the town.  Worse for the 
once proud town, however, was the growing concern for the toxic residue left behind by 
the smelter and the growing interest by the U.S. EPA in exploring the site under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
or Superfund, the new federal legislation to remediate abandoned hazardous waste sites.  
Although ARCO pledged to keep cleaning up problems as they arose, in general, the 
 
                                                 
466 Hugh van Sweringen, "Shutdown Price Tag Will Be $40 Million Annually," The Montana Standard, 
September 30, 1980, 1. 
467 Lynda Chavez, "When Arco Left Town," New York Times, July 25, 1982, 15. 
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company felt it was getting close to the end of its responsibility despite the looming 
Superfund concerns. 
 
Value Transitions 
 Montana’s U.S. Senators had better luck combating the declining economy in the 
Butte-Anaconda region.  As early as 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield’s support for 
magnetohydrodynamics (MHD), a high-tech coal conversion technology, brought a 
development facility to Butte amid significant copper production declines.  Mansfield 
followed this up by sponsoring a bill for the creation of the National Center for 
Appropriate Technology (NCAT) also to be located in Butte.  Signed by President Carter 
in 1976, NCAT was to apply small-scale and renewable technologies to develop new 
means to solve the problems common to low income communities.  Appropriate 
technology ideation, Carrol Pursell wrote, came out of a “broad counterculture 
movement, a reassertion of doubts about the role of technology in American life, and the 
burgeoning environmental movement.”468
 Not that a financially declining ACM, or a financially stable ACM for that matter, 
would be concerned that a few hundred left-leaning professionals moved into the region, 
but Senator Mansfield nonetheless successfully headquartered the NCAT in Butte.  While 
neither it nor the MHD project was intended as an economic replacement for mining, it 
was an attempt to change the culture and perception of the region to reflect a more high-
  NCAT, in many ways, stood at the polar 
extreme ideologically from the Anaconda Copper Mining Company. 
                                                 
468 Carrol Pursell, "The Rise and Fall of the Appropriate Technology Movement in the United States, 1965-
1985," Technology and culture 34, no. 3 (1993), 630. 
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tech and diversified future.  Both projects contributed hundreds of new high-tech 
engineering, science, and social-science jobs, but because the region could not fill them 
locally, they led to the first significant influx of outsiders to Butte since the 1950s.  These 
new residents, discussed below, would play an important role in defining the future 
identity of the region. 
 With the end of operations, the district’s identity changed as well, emphasizing 
the finality at the end of its mining era.  Like Ducktown, several writers and lawyers now 
made a point of emphasizing the environmental destruction in Montana caused by ACM 
mining and smelting operations since the 19th century.  Unlike Ducktown, however, it 
wasn’t until copper production ended in the district and the EPA began exploring the area 
under Federal Clean Air statutes and CERCLA, discussed in the next section, that the 
negative impact of industrial development, beyond smoke-related problems, became 
apparent to the public.  The significant waste piles surrounding mining and smelting sites, 
growing scholarly concern about environmental issues, the dramatic loss of Mill Creek 
housing to contamination in 1987,469
The antique Anaconda Smelter shut down in 1980; the landmark Great Falls 
smokestack was demolished; and the yawning Berkeley Pit now fills slowly with 
 and, more significantly, the feeling that Montana 
residents had been left with a huge toxic liability now visible to the entire nation 
combined to elevate public awareness of the region’s environmental dilemma.  Montana 
historian Michael Malone writing in 1985, summed up the growing ethos in the state:  
                                                 
469 The town of Mill Creek sat just a few miles from the Washoe smelter stack directly under the smoke 
plume.  In the mid 1980s, the EPA discovered very high levels of arsenic inside homes and local soils, and 
CDC tested the town’s children who showed significantly elevated levels of arsenic in their blood.  
Although the first recourse was intended to be a temporary displacement while the EPA supervised 
remediation, it soon discovered levels too high, and ultimately completely leveled the town. 
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toxic water, perhaps a fitting symbol of the wrenching death of what has 
historically been Montana’s greatest industry.470
  
  
David Emmons, writing in 1994, added:  
The discovery that the world no longer needed what generations of Montanans 
had made had a far more chilling effect on the states’ collective psyche than any 
alleged subservience to ACM.471
 
 
 Punctuating the evolving local and national perception of regional defeat and 
contamination, a large flock of migrating white snow-geese landed in the filling Berkeley 
Pit in 1995 resulting in 342 deaths.  Some of the birds died that same day from pit-acids 
and arsenic poisoning, leaving hundreds of highly visible white carcasses floating on the 
pit’s surface.  Others died within a few days as they tried to leave the area.472  Although 
ARCO and the State of Montana hotly debated the reasons behind the snow-geese deaths, 
it nonetheless contributed to the declining general perception of the area.  In 1993, two 
years before the snow-geese incident, Travel and Leisure Magazine called Butte, “the 
ugliest spot in Montana…despite a spirited historic district,” and Anaconda, “a sad-sack 
mining town dominated by a smelter smokestack.”473  By 2009, the region’s reputation 
had hit a new bottom culminating in a travel designation as one of the world’s “must-
miss” vacation places.474
 The designation of “must-miss,” however, is far from fair.  From the mid-1980s 
through 2008 a well organized and dedicated group of Butte and later Anaconda 
   
                                                 
470 Michael P. Malone, "The Close of the Copper Century," Montana: The Magazine of Western History 35, 
no. 2 (1985), 69. 
471 Emmons, "The Price of 'Freedom': Montana in the Late and Post-Anaconda Era,” 71. 
472 See: Duncan Adams, "Did Toxic Stew Cook the Goose?," High Country News, December 11, 1995. 
(www.hcn.org/issues/49/1520, accessed August 10, 2009) 
473 Florence Williams, "Butte, Montana, Seeks a New Life," High Country News, November 29, 1993, 2. 
474 Peter Greenberg, Don't Go There!: The Travel Detective's Essential Guide to the Must-Miss Places of 
the World (Emmaus, Pa.: Rodale, 2009), 33. 
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professionals and volunteers have been carefully watching the Superfund mandated 
cleanup.  They have skillfully managed the legal framework under CERCLA and NHPA 
to create not only a safe environment for new economic development, but also a well 
managed approach to heritage resulting in significant structural preservation and regional 
industrial/environmental interpretation projects, all funded through the Superfund project. 
 
Early Reaction to Environmental Degradation 
The mining and processing of gold, silver, zinc, and copper ores generated 
enormous quantities of solid wastes: those wastes were an inherent and 
unavoidable part of the enterprise.  Clogged streams, mounds of overburden, mine 
dumps, slag heaps, tailings and slime fields and ponds cluttered the landscape of 
historic Western mining camps and smelting towns.  There were occasions when 
the miners dumped their wastes directly into adjacent streams and rivers; at other 
times they stored them, often for decades, behind berms and levee walls.  Some of 
this stored waste became trapped in low-lying marshy areas and some if moved 
through the swamps and was washed into and down streams and rivers. 
Occasionally spreading out for hundreds of yards on either side of the waterway; 
some made its way even further downstream.  Because they signaled robust and 
economically healthy mines, these wastes were not initially seen as problematical.  
While few had anything to say about mining and mineral processing wastes—
whether in place or carried by waters—fewer still had any idea of what to do with 
them.475
 
   
 Much of the early history of land degradation in the Butte-Anaconda district 
centers around important wastes: smelter smoke, concentrator tailings, and, to a lesser 
degree, slag.  Although tailings are not directly part of the smelting process, they figured 
significantly in Superfund decisions in both Montana and Michigan copper districts and 
had clean-up implications at smelter sites in both areas.   
                                                 
475 David M. Emmons, "United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division; United States of 
America v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al; Expert Report of David Emmons, Ph.D.,"  (Butte, Montana: 
1997), 2. 
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 As discussed in chapter 4, Anaconda’s 19th-century sulfur dioxide and arsenic-
rich smelter smoke killed vegetation and sickened livestock, and the problems only 
increased as the region’s smelters increased capacity in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.  The primary recourse for affected parties, however, was through the legal 
system, suing for property damages or injunctive relief.  One of the earliest municipal 
actions in the country against smelter smoke was the 1890 Butte Smoke Ordinance, which 
mandated an end to in-town open heap roasting and tall smelter stacks.476
 Early, the company largely settled lawsuits through court actions or monetary 
payments, or sought a means to minimize damages and potential lawsuits through 
property purchases, while searching for technical solutions to the smoke problem to abate 
future legal action.  In 1902 ACM paid $340,000 to settle claims by farmers and ranchers 
but, in 1903, built the first large stack and flue system at the Washoe for reducing some 
smoke emissions.  During this period it also conducted its own experiments to determine 
the affect of smelter smoke, operated ranches and farms under the smoke plume largely 
to challenge would-be litigants, and acquired smoke (and tailings) easements from some 
  The Deer 
Lodge farmers’ and United States Government’s lawsuits against Anaconda’s Washoe 
works in the first decade of the 19th century were early significant attempts to formally 
combat the smoke itself through the court system.  None of these efforts, however, 
ultimately reduced pollution, especially with increasing output leaving ACM free to 
continue operating nearly unabated for the time. 
                                                 
476 Fred Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in 
Montana 1880-1930" (PhD, University of Pennsylvania, History and Sociology of Science, 1998), 213 
260 
 
property owners.477  It also purchased some affected farm land outright to avoid civil 
penalties and also began purchasing land for tailings storage.  The tailings held 
considerable amounts of copper to be recovered when later technology permitted.  Early 
20th-century land purchases increased Anaconda Smelter holdings in Deer Lodge County 
from 5,945 acres in 1906 to 7,014 in 1917, and Anaconda’s other county land holdings 
from 3,000 acres in 1906 to 19,139 in 1917.478
 Following the Department of Justice’s 1910 lawsuit against Anaconda, DOJ and 
ACM established the Smoke Commission in 1911 to monitor pollution and recommend 
alternative practices to abate future problems.  As long as Anaconda consented to the 
commission’s recommendations in good faith, then the Justice Department would not 
pursue the lawsuit in court.  The commission ultimately had a hand in the decision to 
build the 585’ Anaconda Stack, install Cottrell arsenic precipitators.
 
479
 By 1920, historian Fred Quivik surmises, the Justice Department may have been 
satisfied that the Cottrell precipitators recovered 80% of the arsenic, that the new stack 
sufficiently disbursed smoke, and that no profitable means for sulfur removal was 
available in Montana.  Further, Anaconda was satisfied that the processes and equipment 
recommended by the commission ultimately increased profits by recovering saleable by-
  
                                                 
477 Marcosson, Copper Heritage; the Story of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated, 105 
478 Gordon Morris Bakken, "Montana, Anaconda, and the Price of Pollution," The Historian 69, no. 1 
(2007), 42-45. 
479 Emmons, "United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division; United States of America 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al; Expert Report of David Emmons, Ph.D.,” 8. 
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products without disrupting smelting operations and, since the Government lawsuit was 
not formally prosecuted in court, ACM did not have to pay damages.480
 Although the Justice Department was satisfied with the efforts of Anaconda, the 
United States Forest Service (USFS) was not.  In 1922, it identified 150,000 acres of 
forest, worth $1.3 million in lumber-, land-, and grazing-potential, damaged by smelter 
smoke.  Instead of taking the corporation to court, the USFS proposed a land swap of 
equal value properties, and Anaconda consented.  By 1932, in several separate 
agreements, the United States and Anaconda exchanged 84,000 damaged acres for 95,000 
valuable acres in southwest Montana.  Although additional land swaps were negotiated 
and some later executed with the Forest Service, the Justice Department, feeling there 
was nothing left for it to do regarding the 1910 lawsuit, ultimately abandoned it in 
1933.
   
481
 The acquisition of Deer Lodge and Silver Bow county lands had one major 
culminating effect.  By 1933, when the Justice Department dropped its lawsuit, ACM had 
largely settled all of its early pollution issues by buying or trading the agriculture, ranch, 
and forest lands its smelting operations affected, and, either buying land or purchasing 
easements on all the other lands it needed to dump its waste.  By the 1930s Anaconda 
operated with a pollution-buffer surrounding its operations that would enable it to operate 
without interference until the passage of federal regulations to control the transportation 
and disposal of hazardous wastes starting in the 1970s.  (See Figure 6.4) 
 
                                                 
480 Quivik, "Smoke and Tailings: An Environmental History of Copper Smelting Technologies in Montana 
1880-1930," 457-459. 
481 Ibid., 460 and 489. 
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Figure 6.4 “’E’ Smoke gets in their eyes.”  An 
end to pollution litigation did not mean an end to 
smoke problems or even a denial of its existence.  
This cartoon appeared in The Mining Journal in 
1943 reflecting age-old ideas that smoke was a 
sign of a healthy, robust, and, in this case, patriotic 
industry. (The Mining Journal, Feb. 15, 1943, 11) 
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Origins of the Butte-Anaconda Heritage Movement 
 
She’s battered, and she’s beaten, 
She’s ugly and she’s torn, 
She’s battle-scarred and gutted, 
From the Copper she has borne. 
 
Still she is majestic, 
As she sits upon her throne 
A mile high and beautiful, 
To those who call her home. 
 
-George T. Grosse (1957, Quoted in Chavez, 1982) 
 
 Reading through the secondary literature on the Butte-Anaconda district, one 
comes across many poems and short comments reflecting the view that, although their 
region is regarded as dirty and unkempt, and ACM corrupt, local residents are still proud 
of their communities and their work.  Baum and Knox quoted a retired miner who said, 
“Them times was tough, but we had no worries about that.  Anaconda owned this town, 
and Anaconda put food on the table.”482
                                                 
482 Dan Baum and Margaret L. Knox, "We Want People Who Have a Problem with Mine Wastes to Think 
of Butte," Smithsonian 23, no. 8 (1992), 48. 
  However, as underground mining slowed 
considerably in the 1950s and the Berkeley Pit began consuming neighborhoods, the 
community members remaining after redundant parts of the population left to find work 
elsewhere, began to think about the glory days when its mines and smelters were some of 
the largest producers on earth.  While the decline of mining in Butte-Anaconda may have 
initiated heritage directly, the drive to keep mining and expand the Berkeley Pit had a 
much more powerful influence on the first attempts to document and preserve the region.  
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 In the same manner as the Michigan District in the 1950s and the Ducktown 
district in the 1970s, Butte-Anaconda opened a museum at an abandoned mine site and 
strove to get its significant structures listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 
the 1960s.  The Butte Exchange Club started the museum in 1963, and by 1964 had found 
a permanent home at the Orphan Girl Mine, donated by Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company.  Between its official opening in 1965 and its 1,000,000th visitor in the 1980s, 
the World Mining Museum amassed an eclectic assembly of mining artifacts, many 
donated by workers or ACM itself, and added a mining hall of fame, a recreated 19th-
century wild-West mining town, and above ground, open-air exhibits on mining.  By 
2008, it had added an underground tour, a memorial garden to fallen mine, smelter, and 
railroad workers, and a significant photo archive.483
 While the decline of mining in 1950s and 1960s caused locals to reflect on their 
past and open a museum, the Berkeley Pit and later the threats of pit expansion caused a 
much more dire threat to the district than the decline of mining.  Where the Michigan and 
Tennessee districts built museums and lost structures slowly to neglect during the decline 
and abandonment phases, neither district faced the large-scale destruction of cultural 
resources until the Superfund period.  Butte encountered this earlier.  The expansion of 
the Berkeley Pit destroyed neighborhoods, industrial areas, recreation areas, and 
churches, and caused citizens to react to start preserving their heritage. 
   
 The initial construction of the Pit in the early 1950s and its growth in the ensuing 
years had clear ramifications on the identity of the district.  According to one Relevant 
                                                 
483 "History of the Museum," World Museum of Mining, www.miningmuseum.org/historyofwmm.html, 
accessed April 2, 2009, and personal observation November 2008. 
265 
 
Authority, the growth of the pit in its early years caused local Butte residents to feel 
trepidation about its expansion, and one local resident, the owner of one of the original 
“Copper King” mansions, initiated contact with the National Park Service to get portions 
of Butte listed on National Register.484  This effort, although affording little actual 
protection against pit expansion under eminent domain, resulted in a 1958 survey leading 
to a National Historic Landmark (NHL) designation for Butte in 1961,485 covering 
several uptown blocks and listing at least 31 contributing structures.486  The 1961 
designation would only be the first step.  The original effort would be expanded in 1985 
to include a new section formally documenting buildings and mining sites, and the NHL 
nomination would be significantly enhanced in 2005 to include Anaconda.487
 Two additional series of events struck at the heart of an economically depressed 
Butte in the 1970s.  First were a series of fires, some resulting from faulty wiring in old 
buildings, but more troubling were the scores of arsons and fires of unknown origin.  
Between 1972 and 1975 more than 20 major buildings in the uptown historic district 
burned.
  
488
                                                 
484 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (5). Relevant Authority is a term used to protect the identity of 
individuals providing information during an oral interview.  It is a university requirement. 
  While several of the arsons went unprosecuted, many locals suspected that at 
least some of the fires were authorized by ACM preceding the planned Berkeley Pit 
expansion.  Locals recounted stories about friends of friends who earned $500 for 
burning buildings in the 1970s, and others suggested the company used minors as their 
485 Shovers et al., Butte & Anaconda Revisited:  An Overview of Early-Day Mining and Smelting in 
Montana, 1. 
486See: Donald F. Dosch, "National Register of Historic Places Inventory - Nomination Form for Butte 
Historic District," ed. United States Department of the Interior (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 
1972). 
487 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (5). 
488 Brian Shovers, "Remaking the Wide-Open Town: Butte at the End of the Twentieth Century," Montana: 
The Magazine of Western History 48, no. 3 (1998), 44. 
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primary arsonists to allow them to avoid “adult” jail if caught.489   At the same time as 
fires were burning uptown, new commercial developments were being constructed on the 
Flats including a new shopping mall, airport terminal, restaurants, and housing 
developments.  By 1975 more than 30 businesses had fled the central business district 
(CBD) for new retail developments in the Flats.490  Further, the development of Interstate 
90 significantly altered the traffic patterns of the city because it allowed drivers to bypass 
the older Uptown stores and focus on Flats commercial district.491
 The city of Butte was shifting away from its historic business district uptown to 
the sprawling flats south of the hill.  While suburbanization was a common feature in 
most extra-urban growth areas after WWII, Butte had an additional uncommon external 
pressure on its older surviving neighborhoods: the Pit.  By the 1970s, most community 
leaders seemed resigned to the eventual loss of the uptown area.  A map accompanying a 
revision to the 1960s National Historic Landmark nomination form demonstrated the 
extent of the expected pit expansion. (See Figure 6.5)   
   
With the decline in mining, an operating museum, and a National Historic 
Landmark district, the heritage movement had a fairly typical start, very similar to the 
Ducktown district and many other historic industrial districts in the country.  However, 
the heritage movement in Butte would grow significantly as a result of three more events: 
the “Butte Forward” plan to relocate the CBD, a significant reduction in funding for the 
NCAT, and, like the other districts, the advent of Superfund.  
                                                 
489 Personal communication between author and local residents, November 13, 2008. 
490 Shovers, "Remaking the Wide-Open Town: Butte at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 44. 
491 Wyckoff, "Postindustrial Butte,” 489. 
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Prompted by the December 1975 letter everyone in town had been expecting for 
years from ACM detailing the need to expand the Pit, Butte’s mayor proposed the “Butte 
Forward” plan initiated by the Federal Model Cities program.  This program granted 
funds for infrastructure repairs, administrative training, and reorganizational studies 
under the broad rubric of “urban renewal.”  Under the 1976 plan, city officials created a 
public-private development group called Butte Forward, Inc., to plan for and execute 
 
  
Figure 6.5 Extent of the expected Berkeley Pit expansion from 1970s to 2000 
included the primary central business district, courthouse, and several churches, 
restaurants, bars, and schools.  This particular map was used to argue for the creation 
of the National Historic Landmark district.  Ultimately, however, the pit did not 
expand into the central business district and remained at the size indicated by the 
“present extent of the Berkeley Pit.”  (After Dosch (1972). Author shaded area on map to 
highlight anticipated expansion of the pit through 2000) 
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the relocation of the central business district.  Later in 1976, the group submitted a $50 
million dollar proposal to the city with expected contributions of $11 million from ACM 
and $39 million from the U.S. Government.  Despite a petition effort by uptown 
merchants calling for a public vote on the matter, and some debate on the actual location 
of the new business district, the city council voted 8-5 to move ahead as planned, but, 
because of a procedural matter, tabled the issue and planned to officially reconsider the 
measure two weeks later.492
 To the consternation of the Mayor and ACM, the council rejected the plan on the 
second vote in a move that historian Brian Shovers suggested was possibly the most 
important decision in the City of Butte’s one-hundred year history.   Shovers wrote, “In 
defying relocation [and rejecting the century-long dominance of ACM] Butte not only 
reaffirmed its historic identity, a persona forged by the rigors and spawned by the culture 
of underground mining,…but had drawn the line on how much it might sacrifice in the 
name of a paycheck.” Almost immediately Montana Power, which held several seats on 
the Butte Forward, Inc, board, began purchasing historic buildings and refurbishing them 
for tax credits while other organizations realized that the city made a significant decision 
to embrace its historic identity began shifting priorities. 
  
493
 Although many still did not fully embrace heritage as an economic model, several 
efforts began to funnel money into restoration projects.  In 1979 and 1980, the Historic 
American Engineering Record (HAER), a department of the National Park Service, was 
invited to Butte under sponsorship of the local government to formally document inactive 
   
                                                 
492 Shovers, "Remaking the Wide-Open Town: Butte at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 46-47. 
493 Ibid., 47. 
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industrial features of the landscape.494  At the time, HAER was a part of the Heritage 
Conservation and Recreation Service of the NPS.  While the documentation of historic 
industrial sites was a paramount component of its mission, the HAER team was also 
charged with assisting in the redevelopment of blighted areas and in this instance, 
“analyzing and developing a revitalization strategy for Butte’s uptown historic 
district.”495
 Around the same time as the HAER project began, a local resident noticed large 
dump trucks pulling up to the former ACM office in Butte to dispose of company 
records.  After stopping the destruction of records, he ultimately formed a group that 
worked with the county executive to establish the Butte-Silver Bow Public Archives in 
1981 with $7.5 million of public-approved funding.
   In addition to photographs, drawings, and a written history, the project also 
proposed the creation of a revitalization agency to manage redevelopment in Butte’s 
historic district.  Although parts of Anaconda would be documented during the 1980s, the 
initial project missed the Washoe Smelter largely because it was a still-active site when 
the initial documentation began, then demolished before the later documentation efforts 
began. 
496
In 1980, Butte consolidated with Silver-Bow County into a single governmental 
entity and followed the HAER recommendations and created an Urban Revitalization 
Agency (URA).  URAs are basically planning and development organizations designed to 
  The archives grew to encompass 
considerable regional corporate and labor records.   
                                                 
494 Dale Martin and Brian Shovers, "Butte, Montana: An Architectural and Historical Inventory of the 
National Landmark District,” (Butte, Montana: Butte Historical Society, 1986), 1.  
495 "Butte, Montana: A Project Report," ed. Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (Butte, Montana 
National Park Service, 1980), 7. The HCRS was abolished in 1981and HAER was transferred to the NPS. 
496 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (6). 
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use tax increment financing to promote infrastructure and restoration improvement 
projects, in this case within a specified uptown historic district.497  The additional tax 
collected on the increased value of restored building was then pooled in a fund managed 
by the URA and reallocated for new restoration and development projects in the historic 
district.498
 The growth of heritage interests in the region were further enhanced by setbacks 
to programs which residents had hoped would offset the loss of mining jobs.  In 1980, 
Ronald Reagan was elected president and set out to reduce the size of the American 
government.
 
499  Reagan slashed budgets and social programs without a strong economic 
impact and attacked those who, according to Pursell, refused “to embrace technological 
vanguardism as the finest expression of national virility.”500 Two affected programs were 
the NCAT office and MHD labs in Butte.  Both organizations had brought highly 
educated and, arguably, activist people to the tough, but fading blue-collar mining town 
of Butte to work on high tech and politically-progressive programs.  When budget cuts 
hit, the MHD lost several hundred people and NCAT went from over one hundred and 
twenty people to about ten in a very short time.501
                                                 
497 "Minutes of the Meeting, May 26, 2005," ed. Butte-Silver Bow Local Government Study Commission 
(Butte, Montana: 2005), 9.  The URA loaned money for building acquisitions, redevelopment, and other 
improvements to owners of neglected buildings and houses in the historic district to fund improvements 
which ultimately raised the value of the building.  URA also made facade improvement grants and invested 
in infrastructure improvements. 
  Many of those affected stayed in Butte 
to continue their work and research and would become involved in heritage preservation.  
Several, for example, formed a corporation reflecting the NCAT mission, Renewable 
498 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (7). 
499 Pursell, "The Rise and Fall of the Appropriate Technology Movement in the United States, 1965-1985,” 
630. 
500 Ibid., 636. 
501 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (8) and Conversation with a Relevant Authority (6). 
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Technologies, Inc (RTI), a mixed-mission organization that allowed individuals to pursue 
personal projects, including supporting preservation agendas within the larger superfund 
project.    
 Between the 1960s and 1980s, heritage professionals later reflected, Butte and 
Anaconda’s long-term mining residents still hadn’t fully embraced heritage as either an 
expression of identity or potential market for tourists.  The long-term residents were often 
still numb from the closure of the mines and smelters and psychologically shaken by the 
spate of fires and uncertainty of their town’s physical presence.502
City of Anaconda residents lagged even further behind those of Butte in heritage 
concerns despite a significant effort to preserve the Washoe stack and the creation of a 
local historical society.  Whether it was Anaconda’s smaller population, the “still-
festering” shock of the smelter closure, or the lack of any new economic development, 
Anacondans in general seemed to give heritage a lower priority until the Butte movement 
started thinking of and planning for a larger historic copper production district and 
included Anaconda smelter, foundry, and transportation sites in the late 1990s and early 
 They felt the heritage 
movement was driven in many ways by outsiders who, like ARCO, valued the built and 
cultural landscape differently because it didn’t hold the same meanings for them.  
Further, many of the outsiders came after the demise of the Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company, the loss of neighborhoods with the construction of the pit, the rash of 
unexplained fires, and the “Butte Forward” plan.   
                                                 
502 Shovers, "Remaking the Wide-Open Town: Butte at the End of the Twentieth Century,” 47. 
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2000s.503 In fact, it seems that much of the preservation of foundations and waste piles at 
the old-works golf course came at the insistence of Jack Nicklaus rather than local 
development officials.504
It was ultimately not until the work of the new outsiders began to reshape the 
district and significant infusions of Superfund-generated money became available for 
remediation projects that the perception of the “ugly town, set in an ugly notch between 
two ugly mountains” began to change.   
  
 
Superfund  
 A century of mining and smelting in the Butte-Anaconda district resulted in 
several significant modifications to the landscape.  Not only did it create nearly 3000 
miles of underground mine shafts, adits, and tramways, but it dug one of the deepest open 
pits, built the largest smelter complex in the world in the 1890s and then again in the 
1900s, erected the tallest masonry structure in the world, and produced over 30 billion 
pounds of metals worth over $22 billion.505
                                                 
503 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (10). 
  However, in mining and processing the Butte  
copper lode and extracting significant profits from its sale, industry was ultimately 
responsible for the landscape changes that resulted from dumping and discharging its 
wastes, most of it legally, into the local environment.  The significant problems 
associated with the scale of arsenic and sulfur laden smelter smoke and dusts, acidic and 
504 See: Old Works Vision to Reality, (Butte, Montana: ARCO Environmental Remediation, ca. 1998), VHS 
video. 
505 Jerrold J. Marcus, "Butte: Richest Hill on Earth and Costliest Mine Superfund Site," Engineering and 
Mining Journal 201, no. 2 (2000), 33.  The 30 billion pounds of metals does not include MRI that produced 
1.34 billion pounds through 1999. 
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metal-rich waters emanating from tailings deposits and mine drainage, the Berkeley Pit, 
and significant tailings and slag dumps led, not surprisingly, to serious and extensive 
problems.   From the EPA websites for Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area Superfund Site: 
More that 100 years of mining have resulted in the development of over 500 
underground mines (with roughly 3,000 miles of underground workings) and 4 
open pit mines including the Berkeley Pit with its ancillary tailings ponds, waste 
dumps, and acid leach pads. Operation of silver mills and copper and zinc 
concentrators/ smelters in Butte resulted in the production of a variety of mill and 
smelter wastes including particulates (aerial emissions) and tailings. The long 
period of mining in Butte left the landscape littered with un-vegetated or sparsely 
vegetated mine wastes, often containing hazardous concentrations of metals and 
arsenic. These wastes represent significant sources of environmental 
contamination to Silver Bow Creek and posed human health and risks to the 
environment.  
Ground water, surface water and soils are contaminated with arsenic and other 
heavy metals, including copper, zinc, cadmium and lead. Silver Bow Creek and 
the Clark Fork River contain metals from the cities of Butte to Milltown. The 
tailings, dispersed along the creek and river, severely limit aquatic life forms and 
have caused fish kills in the river. Potential health threats include direct contact 
with and ingestion of contaminated soil, surface water, ground water or inhaling 
contaminated air.506
Similarly for the Anaconda Smelter Superfund site: 
  
The processing facilities at the site were developed to remove copper from ore 
mined in Butte from about 1884 through 1980. Milling and smelting produced 
wastes with high concentrations of arsenic, as well as copper, cadmium, lead and 
zinc. These contaminants pose potential risks to human health, to life in nearby 
streams, and to plants and animals in adjacent lands over some 300 square miles. 
In addition to the millions of cubic yards of tailings, furnace slag, flue dust, and 
square miles of soil contaminated by airborne wastes, millions of gallons of 
ground water have been polluted from wastes and soils. Arsenic is the primary 
COC and drives the remediation.507
 
  
                                                 
506 "Superfund Program: Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area," U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/mt/sbcbutte/index.html, accessed April 18, 2009. 
507 "Superfund Program: Anaconda Co. Smelter Site," U.S. EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/mt/anaconda/index.html, accessed April 18, 2009. 
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 The scale of mining waste emanating from the Butte-Anaconda region ultimately 
led to three separate Superfund listings on the National Priorities List, each with multiple 
individual operable units to coordinate the massive scale of the clean up.508
 The third Superfund site relating to mining and smelting was the Milltown 
Reservoir/Clark Fork River area that included 120 miles of the Clark Fork River from 
Anaconda down to and including the Milltown Reservoir outside Missoula, Montana.   
  (See Table 
6.1)  The Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area, officially listed on September 30, 1983, then 
expanded on July 22, 1987, had 13 individual operable units encompassing Butte mine 
and smelting sites in the Silver Bow Creek watershed, metals-contaminated residential 
soils, contaminated mine, pit, and ground water, and the extensive tailings strewn along 
the length of Silver Bow Creek from Butte down to and including the Warm Springs 
settling ponds outside of Anaconda.  The Anaconda Company Smelter Site, listed on 
September 30, 1983, included 10 operable units in the Warm Springs Creek watershed 
relating to three smelting locations and ancillary industries, contaminated soils and 
house-dusts, and the Opportunity ponds just outside Anaconda.  In each of these regions, 
the chief contaminants were heavy metals that existed in smelter flue dust including 
significant amounts of arsenic and copper that settled on plants, soils, and inside people’s 
houses, and water contamination with dissolved acids and metals including sulfuric acids, 
arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc that flowed from groundwater into wells and 
discharged into waterways. 
                                                 
508 Remediation of a fourth regional Superfund site, the Montana Pole and Treating Plant Site was  also 
funded by ARCO although its contamination came primarily from the treatment of wood poles for bridge 
and road construction, and utility needs from the 1940s-1980s not directly from mining activities. 
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Table 6.1 List of Superfund Operable Units in Butte and Anaconda 
 
This site was broken into just two operable units, the Milltown Reservoir, which entailed 
2.2 million cubic yards of impounded contaminated tailings, and the Clark Fork River’s 
entire length which was strewn with tailings that did not wash all the way down to 
                                                 
509 See: "Second Five-Year Review Report for Silver Bow Creek/Butte Area Superfund Site," ed. Region 8 
U.S. EPA (Helena, Montana: CDM, 2005). 
510 See: "Third Five-Year Review Report for Anaconda Company Smelter Site Anaconda, Deer Lodge 
County, Montana," ed. Region 8 U.S. EPA (Helena, Montana: U.S. EPA, Region 8, 2005). 
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Milltown.  Here, too, the primary concern was heavy metals that precipitated out of water 
and contaminated Clark Fork riparian and impounded Milltown soils.  In both operable 
units, the primary solution was the removal of contaminated soils and tailings and 
depositing them in the still open Opportunity Ponds in Anaconda.   
 Unlike Occidental Petroleum in Ducktown, ARCO accepted the initial listing but 
like Occidental resisted active participation for a decade claiming that the oil company 
didn’t pollute the region directly.511  Further, ARCO contended, as the State of Montana 
and EPA sought additional penalties, that the state and federal governments were also 
potentially responsible parties because they both encouraged mining for regional and 
national gain and did not create or enforce stricter pollution legislation.  ARCO 
eventually hired its own historians to prove it in court.512
Court challenges continued, nonetheless, through the 1990s and into the 2000s, 
especially after both the state and federal governments sought to recover their costs and 
impose civil penalties for reparations and community projects.  ARCO responded to the 
new charges and filed suits against both the U.S. Government and the State of Montana 
to recover its response costs, contributions, and to receive “contractual indemnity, 
equitable indemnification, and declaratory relief” citing the government’s conspiracy to 
  That argument, however, was 
largely lost as early as 1983, when ARCO consented to pay for initial remediation 
projects.   
                                                 
511 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (9). 
512 Emmons, "United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division; United States of America 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al; Expert Report of David Emmons, Ph.D.,”, 96, and "State of Montana 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Consent Decree," ed. Helena Division United States District Court for the 
District of Montana (Helena, Montana: United States District Court, 1998). 
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develop and promote mining in the western United States.513  Ultimately, however, with a 
series of negotiated consent decrees from 1998 to 2008, ARCO agreed to pay additional 
civil penalties, albeit less than originally sought by the lawsuits, and to cover 
governmental cost and oversight expenses.514
 Needless to say, the entire remediation project emanating from mining and 
smelting in the Butte-Anaconda region led to significant Superfund clean-up costs and, in 
terms of geography, became the largest executed in the country.   By 2008, ARCO had 
agreed to pay the State of Montana $230 million for natural resource damages to Silver 
Bow Creek,
   
515 $168 million for damages associated with the Clark Fork River and other 
sites, and nearly $14 million to the U.S. Government for EPA costs and to settle damage 
claims made by the National Park Service and Bureau of Land Management.516
                                                 
513 Emmons, "United States District Court, District of Montana, Butte Division; United States of America 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al; Expert Report of David Emmons, Ph.D.,” 53. 
  
Additional costs included an estimated of $316 million to remove sediments from the 
Milltown Reservoir and even more for other clean ups, community development projects, 
EPA and state fees, and long-term waste monitoring and remediation projects for various 
514 United States District Court for Montana, “United States v. Atlantic Richfield Company, State of 
Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Streamside Tailings Operable Unit and Federal and Tribal Natural 
Resource Damages Consent Decree,” (Helena, Mont.: United States District Court for Montana, 1998) 2, 
and "Summary of 2008 Settlement of Clark Fork River Remediation and Natural Resources Damages 
Claims and Related Restoration Plans," ed. Montana Department of Justice (Helena, Montana: Natural 
Resource Damage Program, 2008), 1-3. 
515 "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Restoration Plan Procedures and Criteria," ed. Natural Resource 
Damage Program State of Montana (Helena, Mont.: State of Montana, 2000), 7. 
516 "Summary of 2008 Settlement of Clark Fork River Remediation and Natural Resources Damages 
Claims and Related Restoration Plans," 1. 
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sites in the districts.517  As early as 2002, ARCO expected its total bill for clean up in 
Montana would exceed $1 billion dollars.518
 Although the Environmental Protection Agency vigorously pursued ARCO under 
CERCLA in pursuit of its mission to protect human health and the environment, it was 
less concerned with ancillary requirements of CERCLA, such as abiding by the 
Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) as required under 
section 121(d).  Almost from the beginning, the EPA eschewed its responsibilities to 
fully consider impacts to cultural resources eligible for inclusion on the National Register 
as required under Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA.   According to a Relevant 
Authority directly affiliated with clean-up monitoring for the U.S. government, the EPA 
met only the minimum necessary requirements of Sections 106 and 110 as it interpreted 
them, and simply took photographs of buildings in 1987 it thought might be impacted.
  
519   
Jerrold Marcus, writing in the Engineering and Mining Journal, stated the EPA only had 
two strategic goals: remediate the site and allocate as much of the costs as possible to the 
potentially responsible parties.  Further, EPA officials understood that as a lead agency, it 
would be “severely criticized” for its decisions by other stakeholders no matter what it 
did. 520
 Mark Reavis, former Butte-Silver Bow County preservation officer, recounted 
that he had to fight the EPA and ARCO to get them to comply with NHPA and retain the 
   Heritage professionals fell into this latter group.  
                                                 
517 Sherry  Devlin, "Arco Recommends Leaving Milltown Sediment," Missoulian, November 6, 2001. 
518 Karen Dorn Steele, "Superfund Revived Butte," Spokesman Review, July 28, 2002. 
519 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (9). 
520 Marcus, "Butte: Richest Hill on Earth and Costliest Mine Superfund Site,” 41-42. 
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region’s significant historic character.521  He later argued that, “Odd as it sounds, those 
dumps are historic resources.  The preservation community here is worried that we’re 
going to lose, bury, and cover-up all signs of mining.  Butte should be a monument to a 
social decision: the quest for minerals.  I’m trying to preserve. They’re trying to clean 
up.”522  Fredric Quivik, who came to Butte to work for NCAT in 1977, wrote in 2001, 
“the EPA…often pursued its mandate to remediate hazardous materials with a single-
mindedness that has not recognized other national priorities, such as the preservation and 
interpretation of important cultural resources.”523  “Local [EPA] administrators seemed to 
see the historic copper industry as the enemy, and they saw the only design alternative for 
remediation to be the obliteration [of] any historic features that happened to be in the way 
of the clean-up and to cover those areas with newly planted grass.”524 A Relevant 
Authority affiliated with preservation management in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County 
acknowledged that Superfund benefited the health of the community but noted that it 
could be detrimental to historic preservation.  Further, this authority cited instances where 
EPA manipulated Sections 106 and 110, claiming that sites it didn’t want to remediate 
were historic while other sites it wanted to clean were not.525
 The Butte-Anaconda district, with the largest superfund sites and one of the 
largest National Historic Landmarks, highlights the inherent conflict between remediation 
and preservation.  Unlike Ducktown, where the heritage decisions were largely left in the 
   
                                                 
521 Curran, "The Contested Terrain of Butte, Montana: Social Landscapes of Risk and Resiliency," 269. 
522 Jeffery St. Clair, "Something About Butte," in Red State Rebels: Tales of Grassroots Resistance in the 
Heartland ed. Joshua Frank and Jeffery St. Clair (Oakland, California: AK Press, 2008), 93. 
523 Fredric L. Quivik, "Integrating the Preservation of Cultural Resources with Remediation of Hazardous 
Materials:  An Assessment of Superfund's Record," The Public Historian 23, no. 2 (2001), 48. 
524 Ibid., 51. 
525 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (10). 
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hands of the remediaters, the Butte-Anaconda district with combative new residents and a 
strong Montana SHPO and heritage community, ultimately established procedures and 
negotiated heritage preservation with both the key national heritage organizations and the 
EPA and ARCO, although during the planning process many sites, like the Washoe 
smelter, were lost.  
 
Superfund-generated heritage    
 In Butte-Anaconda, the clout of heritage preservation advocates grew slowly 
between the mid-1980s and 2005, and included the creation of county-level preservation 
officers to oversee heritage management plans.  (See Table 6.2 for a summary of dates.) 
While Superfund/ARCO funded or contributed to many of these plans, the genesis of 
these efforts were often local reactions to the potential loss of cultural fabric from 
cleanup activity that had mostly been driven by the new, proactive outsiders captivated 
by the region’s rich heritage, but not “affected” as much by its decline.   
According to a Relevant Authority, the URA gave birth to the first comprehensive 
preservation ordinance in the region.526
                                                 
526 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (7). 
  Although the National Historic Landmarks 
(NHL) office established an architectural district in 1961 and Butte established physical 
boundaries for tax increment funded redevelopment in 1980, the URA created a new 
historic overlay zoning district in 1985, twice the size of the earlier urban revitalization 
area to promote the preservation of historic sites, structures, and buildings by “addressing 
preservation issues at the local level and integrating them into the planning and decision  
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Table 6.2 Timeline of Preservation and Remediation Events in Montana 
 
Dates Event Location 
1961 First Butte district NHL listing Butte 
1965 Mining Museum Opens Butte 
1967 Underground mining ends Butte 
1971 Chile nationalizes mines Butte 
1975 MHD lab opens in Butte Butte 
1976 NCAT office opens in Butte Butte 
1976 Threat of Butte CBD relocation Butte 
1977 ARCO buys ACM Butte 
1979 HAER documentation  Butte 
1980 URA begins Butte 
1980 Washoe Smelter closes Anaconda 
1981 Butte Silver Bow Archives begins Butte 
1981 MHD and NCAT budgets slashed Butte 
1982-1986 Washoe Smelter Demolition Anaconda 
1983 Superfund National Priorities List Butte-Anaconda 
1985 First Butte NHL expansion Butte 
1985 Washoe Smelter Stack saved Anaconda 
1985 Butte-Anac. Historic Park Master Plan Butte-Anaconda 
1988 General Work Plan for Anaconda cleanup Anaconda 
1990 RI/FS for Anaconda Anaconda 
1993 Regional Historic Park Plan Butte-Anaconda 
1997 Old Works Golf Course opens Anaconda 
2005 Second NHL expansion, includes Anac. Butte-Anaconda 
2008 Butte Reduction Works slag walls saved Butte 
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making process.”  The ordinances’ specific goals were to “enhance the visual character… 
encourage maintenance of the present housing stock…promote [cultural] tourism… 
enhance property values…foster public appreciation of and civic pride in the beauty of 
the community and accomplishments of the past…and to safeguard the heritage of the 
community.”527
More significantly, the new ordinance specifically included the existing thirteen 
head frames and defined historic buildings to include “appurtenant mining structures.”
 
528
 The years from 1981 to 1986 witnessed several surveys, documentation efforts, 
and planning processes to catalog historically significant structures in Butte, expand the 
original National Historic Landmark district to include industrial sites, consider sites in 
Anaconda, and begin planning for an eventual National Historical Park dedicated to 
American copper.   Following the Historic American Engineering Record documentation 
project in 1979, the Butte Historical Society began a five-year project to survey all 
historic resources in the historic district.
   
It also created a historic preservation commission to administer the preservation 
ordinance and a historic preservation officer to enforce codes that required a review and 
permit process to move, remove, or demolish historic structures, and created appeals, 
enforcement, and penalty policies for violations.   Before defining the boundaries of the 
new district, however, the new ordinance required a new survey to identify structures. 
529
                                                 
527"Council Bill No. 238 ("1985 Preservation Ordinance")," in Ordinance 238, ed. Butte-Silver Bow 
Montana (Butte, Montana: 1985), 8. 
  By 1985 the Butte Historical Society, with 
additional financial support from ARCO, the State of Montana, community development 
528 Ibid., 7. 
529 Martin and Shovers, "Butte, Montana: An Architectural and Historical Inventory of the National 
Landmark District,” 1. 
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grants, and a host of additional sources, funded an RTI planning study of the architectural 
and industrial heritage of the Butte-Anaconda corridor that ultimately created a context 
for preservation.  Not only did these studies put the entire mining/smelting district into a 
single historic context for the first time, but ultimately served to provide reference points 
for restoration projects and long-term planning efforts.530
 Two significant planning documents came from this effort.  First, with the 
realization that so much industrial heritage still existed, the original 1961 National 
Historic Landmark District was expanded to include mining sites on Butte hill.  More 
importantly, the study generated the first comprehensive heritage planning document for 
the combined mining and smelting districts.  The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System 
Master Plan was written by RTI in 1985 and published by the Butte Historical Society 
with funds from Anaconda Minerals Company, the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, Tri-County Historical 
Society (Anaconda), Anacondans to Preserve the Stack, and Butte the Uptown 
Association.   The plan: 
   
grew out of the perceived need to develop a comprehensive and coordinated plan 
of action to protect and interpret the historic features of Butte and Anaconda.  
Many of these nationally significant mining and smelting sites are threatened by 
demolition, vandalism, natural deterioration, and proposed reclamation…This 
study [is] a first step in combating these problems while integrating historic 
preservation and environmental reclamation.531
 
   
                                                 
530 See: Ibid. and Mark Fiege, Fredric L. Quivik, and Brian Shovers, "Industrial Heritage of Butte and 
Anaconda: An Analysis of the Historical Significance of the Surviving Physical Features of the Anaconda 
Copper Mining Company,"  (Butte, Montana: Butte Historical Society, 1985). 
531 "The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System Master Plan," ed. Renewable Technologies Inc. (Butte, 
Mont: Butte Historical Society, 1985), i. 
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The plan stemmed partially from the many requests for support of preservation and 
community projects received by the Anaconda Mineral Company and its desire for a 
coordinated approach to site management.  The master plan provided historic background 
to the region, several interpretive themes for future heritage exhibits, expected 
community contributions and tourism benefits, and a phased approach to implementation.  
While the National Park Service ultimately rejected the idea of a National Historical Park 
in Butte-Anaconda, citing a new copper-industry themed national park in Michigan’s 
mining district, regional planners in Montana hoped to create at a minimum a 
partnership-based National Heritage Area.532
 While the regional park plan was being worked on, the EPA was in the midst of 
evaluating the region under CERCLA and determining the best course of action for 
remediation.  The park plan recognized the significant potential impact to historic 
resources from remediation and that planning would require “creative thinking and 
innovative reclamation” to successfully meet both goals of historic preservation and 
cleanup activities.
     
533
 CERCLA-mandated remediation projects were well under way by the early 
1990s, when the heritage community and the state began raising serious issues based on 
  At the same time as significant planning was being undertaken, the 
Butte Historical Society began a short-lived journal named the Speculator after one of the 
local mines.  Although it didn’t survive beyond three volumes, in its short life the 
Speculator collected a wealth of research on the history and heritage of the mines, people, 
and region.   
                                                 
532 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (5). 
533 "The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System Master Plan,” 56. 
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Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act.  In most Section 106 or 
110 proceedings, the State Historic Preservation Officer monitors and rules on issues of 
National Register eligibility and required mitigation of impacts, often on a case by case 
basis.  However, the extent of this particular Superfund project and the extensive 
potential for impacts required a more formally planned approach.  In 1992 and again in 
1994, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, the Montana Department of 
Health and Environment, the counties of Butte/Silver Bow and Anaconda/Deer Lodge, 
Walkerville, and ARCO entered into a programmatic agreement regarding the creation of 
a regional historic preservation plan (1992) and an implementation strategy for the 
completed plan (1994).  Recognizing the “substantial potential for the loss of historic 
resources…under CERCLA” and the importance of compliance with NHPA, the parties 
agreed to create a comprehensive preservation plan to consider potential impacts before 
they occurred and decide which significant structures would require what type of 
mitigation before impact occurred while recognizing the potential for “undiscovered’ 
resources and mitigation procedures.534
 The Regional Historic Preservation Plan (RHPP), developed by the 27-member 
RHPP Joint Committee and completed in 1993, was the culmination of ten years of 
heritage planning in the district.  It brought together the work of all the previous surveys 
 
                                                 
534 "Programmatic Agreement among the  Environmental Protection Agency Region VIII Montana Office, 
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the Montana State Historic Preservation Office, Montana 
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, Local Governments of Butte/Silver Bow and 
Anaconda/Deer Lodge, Walkerville, and Arco Regarding Development of and Implementation of the 
Upper Clark Fork River Basin Regional Historic Preservation Plan," ed. Environmental Protection Agency 
(Butte, Montana: 1992),1. 
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and plans and included sections on preservation and remediation issues, interpretive 
themes and related sites, revitalization, management, and planning.  It also outlined the 
goals of preservation articulated by CERCLA and included relevant legal documents 
describing Sections 106 and 110 of the NHPA, earlier programmatic agreements, and 
studies.535
 Lastly, in 2005, the Secretary of the Interior substantially expanded the National 
Historic Landmark district beyond its 1961 focus on Butte.  The district grew from the 
original 31 individual contributing structures listed in the 1972 inventory to over 5000.
    
536
 As the planning process progressed, the communities of Butte and Anaconda both 
began backing heritage projects more enthusiastically.  New organizations such as Butte 
  
After successive expansions in Butte, the new NHL district designation, organized under 
considerations expressed in the National Park Service labor theme study, included 
substantial new commercial, residential, and, industrial sites in Butte and Anaconda, and 
the railroad corridor between the two.   This document, with the studies and plans 
executed in the 1990s, completed the transformation of two distinct cities into one single, 
large heritage planning district.  While no single national or state historic park was 
established to interpret the region as a whole, both the RHPP and NHL district 
designation provided a broad coordinated understanding and approach to heritage 
management in the region.  
                                                 
535See: "Regional Historic Preservation Plan: Butte-Anaconda Corridor,"  (Butte, Montana: Regional 
Historic Preservation Plan Joint Committee, 1993). 
536See: Dosch, "National Register of Historic Places Inventory - Nomination Form for Butte Historic 
District,” and "National Register of Historic Places Registration Form: Butte-Anaconda Historic District-
National Historic Landmark Nomination," ed. Department of the Interior (Butte, Montana: National Park 
Service, 2005). 
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Citizens for Preservation and Restoration (CPR) and the Restoration Alliance worked to 
support the efforts of the existing Certified Local Government and Main Street 
preservation and development programs.537
Despite the growing strength of the local heritage movement, the national 
perception of Butte-Anaconda did not evolve equally.  Becoming the second largest 
National Historic Landmark district in the United States was no match for the stigma of 
being the largest superfund site in the nation.  From the 1990s to 2009, the national media 
focused on the environmental devastation.  Articles on Butte-Anaconda appeared with 
titles like, “We Want People who have a problem with Mine Wastes, to think of Butte” 
(1992), “Pennies from Hell” (1996), “Butte America: Poisoned, Ruined, and Self-
Cannibalized” (1997), “Butte Breaks Ground to Mop up a World-Class Mess” (1998), 
“Richest Hill on Earth and Costliest Mine Superfund Site” (2000), “Montanans Weigh 
Options on a Toxic Legacy” (2001), and “In a Town Called Opportunity, Distress over a 
Dump.”  These contributed to existing, and previously cited, designations of ugliest spot 
in Montana (1993) and one of the world’s must-miss vacation spots (2009).  Occasionally 
some glimmer of hope that all had not been destroyed by pollution appeared in articles 
like “In its own decay, Butte Sees a National Treasure (1997) and “Town Pins Hopes on 
Superfund Site” (1997).
   
538
                                                 
537 Butte Citizens for Preservation and Restoration (CPR) and the Butte Restoration Alliance are both 
private non-profit member organizations.  CPR provides grants, education, workshops, and coordination 
with other public and private groups to promote preservation in the National Historic Landmark District. 
(www.buttecpr.org, accessed May 3, 2009)  The Restoration Alliance provides expert advice on spending 
and development to promote safety, neighborhood enhancement, historical and cultural preservation, and 
recreation opportunities.  (www.butterestorationalliance.org, accessed May 3, 2009) 
 
538 See: Baum and Knox (1992), Dobbs (1996), Baum (1997), Robbins (1998), Marcus (2000), Lurgio 
(2001),  Robbins (2005), St. Clair (2008), Egan (1997), and Robbins (1997). 
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Smelter heritage 
 Despite the drive of the Superfund clean up, three significant elements of the 
region’s smelting landscape remained in 2009:  the Butte Reduction Works slag walls, 
the Washoe Stack, and foundations and waste piles of the Anaconda Old Works.  All 
three of these sites were slated for demolition at some point in the Superfund planning 
process, but regional heritage advocates organized to save them.  The rest of the Washoe 
smelter site, however, was not so lucky and was demolished just as the Superfund process 
and more organized heritage planning began in Montana.  
 The Butte Reduction works operated from 1885-1910 at the base of Butte Hill 
along Silver Bow Creek south of town.  Early in its operations, like other smelters in the 
district, it realized existing concentrating technology left considerable copper in the 
tailings and was concerned about potential lawsuits from downstream land owners so it 
stockpiled its tailings.  Unlike the earthen berms of the Anaconda Company, the Butte 
Reduction Works built waste-slag retaining walls to impound its tailings and keep them 
from washing down Silver Bow Creek during spring floods.  Although the smelter itself 
was largely dismantled by WWII, much of the tailings and slag retaining walls remained 
at the start of the Superfund cleanup.   (See Figure 6.6)  
 EPA assigned the two parts of the site to Operable Unit Lower Area One and 
Operable Unit Reduction Works Tailings, and in 1993 began removing 1.2 million cubic 
yards of metals- and arsenic-contaminated tailings and other hazardous wastes.  The 
materials were disposed of in a nearby storage area where they were capped with clean 
soils and covered with an impermeable membrane to prevent water from leaching acids 
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Figure 6.6 Slag walls of the Butte Reduction Works, 2008, showing former 
enclosed tailings ponds and close up of unique slag wall construction technique.  
(Source: Author) 
and heavy metals.  The second phase of remediation involved restoring of the natural 
flow of Silver Bow Creek, creating a buffer wetlands area, installing a groundwater 
treatment facility, and constructing an interpretive trail through the site.539  According to 
a Relevant Authority, however, the initial plan also called for the removal of the slag 
walls that ran throughout the site.  This would have lowered the cost and complexity of 
the remediation project and contributed to a more “natural” looking area, both high 
priorities for the EPA.540
 However, the 1985 park plan called the slag walls at the site “the best preserved 
remnant of [the Butte smelting] component of the local mining history,”
  
541
                                                 
539 A Story of Rebirth (Butte, Montana: ARCO, c. 2004). 
 and cited its 
very high integrity and interpretive potential with minimal safety concerns.  It also called 
540 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (9). 
541 "The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System Master Plan,” 74. 
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for an interpreted, self-guided tour through the site.542 The 1993 Regional Historic 
Preservation Master Plan called the slag walls the primary historic feature of the site and 
asserted that remediation efforts should avoid damaging or removing them as the clean-
up progressed, suggesting that this site be used to interpret the early technology of 
smelting in Butte.543  In an article from 2000, Fred Quivik, who was also a primary 
author of the 1985 Park Plan, referred to the Butte Reduction Works slag canyon as an 
often ignored industrial feature that was not simply worthless waste product, but rather an 
ingenious way to conserve its other wastes (tailings) and prevent property damage and 
potential litigation.544
 In 2009, the Lower Area One and Reduction Works Tailings project was more 
than half-way complete, and the slag walls had been saved as an important cultural 
landscape feature.  An interpretative sign stood near one of the slag walls describing the 
historic use of the site, the clean-up, and the future public-use planned for the site.
 
545
 Anaconda Copper had largely demolished and removed the structures of the 19th- 
century upper and lower smelter sites by the early 20th century.  Although some historic 
building foundations and toppled smoke stacks existed on the site in the early 1990s, 
  The 
slag walls in Butte were preserved because of the heritage planning efforts of the county, 
an early recognition and declaration of significance, and a well thought out approach to 
managing heritage amid clean-up activities.  The two Anaconda smelter sites, however, 
were saved largely by creative thinking in the wake of significant clean-up momentum. 
                                                 
542 Ibid., 82 and 153. 
543 "Regional Historic Preservation Plan: Butte-Anaconda Corridor,” V-21. 
544 See: Fredric L. Quivik, "Landscapes as Industrial Artifacts: Lessons from Environmental History," IA: 
The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archeology 26, no. 2 (2000). 
545 A Story of Rebirth,. Butte, Montana: ARCO, 2004 (est.),  Interpretive Sign 
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large extant waste slag and sinter piles from its smelting period generally had long 
encouraged the residents of Anaconda to use the site as a dump.  The EPA estimated the 
volume of the historic waste piles at over 1.5 million cubic yards of flue dusts, slag, and 
soils contaminated with arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc.546  Although the 
Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis work plan outlined four pages of actions required 
to satisfy the NHPA,547
 The 1985 park plan described both the Upper and Lower Works sites as largely 
foundations strewn with brick, stone, and abandoned waste.  Although of high historical 
importance, the plan noted the multiple locations’ low structural integrity and moderate 
accessibility but still called for a relatively large interpretive center and an interpreted 
trail along the abandoned rail bed. 
 the general work plan called for the stabilization of debris piles to 
prevent further contamination of Warm Springs Creek during high water events which 
included consolidating the various piles into a single waste repository then capping and 
covering to prevent water leaching. 
548
                                                 
546 "Old Works Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis-Preliminary Site Characterization," ed. PTI 
Environmental (Bellevue Washington: ARCO, 1991), 20, and "Old Works/East Anaconda Smelter Case 
Study,"  www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/recycle_old/success/casestud/anaccsi.htm., accessed September 
20, 2008. 
  Although the interpretive center was not built, by 
2009 a paved trail wound through the Upper Works site along a former rail bed with 
signage identifying significant features of the site and others describing the processes and 
people formerly tied to the site.  The rest of the site with its intertwining ruins and slag 
and sinter piles, was capped with 18-20 inches of new soil, revegetated, and protected 
547 "Old Works Operable Unit: Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis Work Plan," ed. U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation (Billings, Montana: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1988), 18-22. 
548 "The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System Master Plan,” 68, 82, and 131. 
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with a new drainage system to prevent leaching into the creek and provide a stable cover 
over a waste deposit, and then converted into a Jack Nicklaus-designed golf course.  
During the planning and design phases, Nicklaus held steadfast to some heritage 
ideals, keeping many aspects of the site’s ruins as part of the course.  The foundations of 
the Upper Work’s smelter building entice golfers along the #3 and #4 fairways, while 
golfers on the #7 tee hit off of the top of a slag mound.  There are no white sand traps on 
the course.  Nicklaus filled all the traps with granulated slag, now called “sland,” from 
the Washoe Smelter waste dump, claiming it was superior in many ways to traditional 
trap sand and less expensive to obtain—it was free and virtually inexhaustible given the 
size of the deposit.549
 Who to credit for the idea of building a golf course among smelter ruins as a boost 
to the local economy and a first step toward rebranding Anaconda an “outdoors” 
destination is unclear.  Several different golf course origination stories circulate, ranging 
from a retired smelter foreman’s joke to a regional developer’s “eureka” moment while 
playing golf in Idaho.  However it started, many claimed that the course was an important 
defining moment for the community.  Just a few years earlier, the EPA had permanently 
relocated the residents of the smelter town of Mill Creek because of significant arsenic 
contamination in homes and local soils, an event that was likely the low point in locals 
perception of their landscape.  The golf course was designed to not only serve as a 
control barrier between the public and the hazardous materials underneath, but to bring in 
 
                                                 
549 Old Works Vision to Reality. Video. Sand + slag = sland. 
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120 full-time jobs and almost $900,000 in income and spending to the community, not 
counting money spent by golfers.550 (See Figure 6.7) 
 
 While some in the preservation community bemoaned the loss of the historic 
character of the old works and others still await the economic rewards from the course, 
the EPA and ARCO believe it has been a large success and that the site is ready to be 
                                                 
550 "Old Works/East Anaconda Smelter Case Study,” www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/recycle_old/ 
success/casestud/anaccsi.htm,  accessed September 20, 2008. 
Figure 6.7 Oldworks Golf Course showing Washoe Smelter stack in the 
background and “sland” traps in the foreground.  The entire ARCO-funded course 
was designed to provide long-term cover for the hazardous wastes stored 
underneath, inject some income into the local economy, and retain some heritage 
features such as building foundations and slag piles. (Source: Author) 
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removed from the National Priorities List (NPL)….All this while in sight of the 
Anaconda stack.  
 Within a year of the 1980 shutdown of the Washoe smelter in Anaconda, the 
ARCO subsidiary, Anaconda Minerals Company, began plans for its demolition and in 
1982 hired Cleveland Wrecking and began removing parts of the site.  Because of the 
extensive contamination of much of the debris and waste piles--estimated at 185 million 
cubic yards of tailings, 27 million cubic yards of slag, and 250,000 cubic yards of flue 
dust551--both Cleveland Wrecking and AMC became subject to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations governing the handling and 
transportation of hazardous wastes.  In 1982 EPA also began superfund procedures and 
listed the site on the NPL in September 1983.552  The EPA-approved demolition plan for 
the Washoe Smelter was rather extensive and called for removing all structures leaving 
only “massive concrete foundations and bulkheads…weathered bedrock, contaminated 
soil, pulverized brick, and some construction debris.”553  Sanctioned demolition work 
began in 1983 and finished in 1986.554
 Despite ongoing demolition and plans for the complete removal of structures, the 
General Work Plan (GWP) written for the smelter site five years after its NPL listing, 
included a five page description addressing the need for a cultural resource assessment.
 
555
                                                 
551 "Final Work Plan for Anaconda Smelter RI/FS," ed. CH2M Hill (Anaconda, Montana: U.S. EPA, 1988), 
1-2. 
  
552 Ibid., 1-4.   
553 Ibid., 1-5. 
554 “Superfund Program, Anaconda Co. Smelter Site,” 
www.epa.gov/unix0008/superfund/mt/anaconda/index.html, accessed July 8, 2009. 
555 "General Work Plan, Anaconda Smelter NPL Site, Attachment I,” (Anaconda, Montana: U.S. EPA 
Region 8, 1988), 28-32. 
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The GWP noted the need for a survey to identify sites eligible for the National Register 
prior to demolition work, recognized that the smelter stack was already so listed, and 
specifically stated that the survey to address historical, archeological, and prehistoric 
resources be completed within 180 days of the order to proceed.  Further, it called for 
consideration of identified and eligible resources during the remedial investigation and 
feasibility study (RI/FS) and in designing remediation alternatives for the site.  
Unfortunately for the smelter’s heritage, the GWP was finished in 1988, six years after 
demolition began and simply assumed that the appropriate Section 106 and 110 actions it 
outlined had taken place.556
 There is no evidence that ARCO and the EPA followed through with the 
historical survey.  In any case, little was ultimately left at the smelter site by 1988 when 
the General Work Plan identified the need for cultural resource assessments.  Despite the 
fact that at a minimum some sort of documentation should have occurred, no record of 
this survey existed in the Superfund repositories in Anaconda, Butte, Helena, or the EPA 
regional office in Denver.  By 1988 what was once the largest and most advanced copper 
smelter in the world had been completely demolished with the exception of the tallest 
free standing structure large stack in the world which would became the smallest state 
park in Montana. 
 The RI/FS was finished in 1991 and largely did not address 
heritage because most of the site was already gone.  
   Following the demolition of Great Falls stack in 1982 and the announcement of 
plans to demolish the Washoe smelter, several community members formed the 
                                                 
556 Ibid., 30 and 32. 
296 
 
“Anacondans to Preserve the Stack” committee (to distinguish itself from the Great Falls 
“Save the Stack” group) to pressure ARCO and state officials to leave the Washoe stack 
in place.  According to a Relevant Authority close to the preservation movement, the 
group recognized it needed both local and state government support before approaching 
ARCO.  Fortunately, committee members were only about an hour’s drive from the state 
capital and could lobby and make meetings on very short notice.  While the group’s 
founders were related to the masons who constructed the stack in a mere three months, 
many in the community and the local press enthusiastically backed the plan as a 
monument to all smelter workers.  According to another Relevant Authority, the 
organizers met with little resistance in Helena, and the state ultimately agreed to create a 
state park.  ARCO for its part was also enthusiastic about stack preservation, largely 
because they expected much greater resistance to the smelter demolition and, the 
community, maybe a little short-sighted, had only asked to save one structure which 
would have also been very expensive for ARCO to remove.557
 The 14-acre Anaconda Stack State Park sits in two parcels.  One is simply the in 
situ stack and a small area around it on smelter hill.  While at some future point, there 
may be limited public access or guided tours to the stack itself, in 2008 the hill parcel had 
restricted access because of existing soil contamination and the potential for falling 
bricks.  The second parcel is approximately two miles away and is called the “viewing 
area.”  It includes interpretive signs describing the operations of the stack and smelter, 
data comparing the stack’s size to other similarly tall structures like the Washington 
  
                                                 
557 Conversation with a Relevant Authority (11). 
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Figure 6.8 Interpretive panels at the Anaconda Stack State Park.  This is a very 
small park in plain sight of the stack, and the interpretive displays focus on smelter 
operations in general and the stack specifically.  (Source: Author) 
monument and Eiffel Tower, and a full-diameter, three dimensional brick model of the 
stack base that exactly replicates the stack’s 75’ external and 60’ internal diameter, while 
only rising four feet from the ground.558
 The 1985 Park Plan discussed the initial public outcry over the planned stack 
demolition, noted that it had been converted into a state park, and largely assumed that 
any hope of saving any other smelter structures had been already lost.
  (See Figure 6.8) 
559
                                                 
558 Personal observation, November 2008. 
  The plan, 
however, recognized the significant interpretive potential of the stack and state park 
viewing area and called for an expanded visitor center and outdoors museum that would 
include salvaged equipment from the site.  Although the state installed interpretive panels 
describing smelter operations, replicated the stack’s cross-section, and placed some 
equipment and ladles around the park, the formal museum and visitor’s center was never 
constructed.   
559 "The Butte-Anaconda Historical Park System Master Plan,” 68. 
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The Anaconda stack and the Butte gallows frames provide single, simple 
representational brands for the heritage of the region.  Although a few people opposed 
saving the stack, most locals embraced its preservation.  Some historians might claim that 
the stack, when operating, was a means of non-verbal symbolic hegemony over the 
workforce, constantly reminding them who controlled their lives.  Some economists 
might claim the preservation of the stack was holding the city back by preventing it from 
looking to the future.560
Almost every person I talked to in Anaconda knows the stack’s height, the fact 
that it is still the tallest masonry structure in the world, and its association with, at one 
time, the greatest copper district in the world.  The same goes for the Butte gallows 
frames.  Although they were responsible for bringing toxic materials to the surface and 
creating acid runoff and mine drainage, their preservation is regarded by locals as a 
monument to the people who worked there.  The other sites in the Butte-Anaconda 
corridor try to balance their story between the toxic and heroic, trying to turn the story of 
human contamination into human triumph both over the land itself and the mess made by 
the copper industry.  Like Ducktown, Michigan, and Butte-Anaconda hopes to use 
  In many ways, however, the stack now stands as a reminder of 
what once gave the place meaning and what the region pins its hopes on for the future.  
Unlike the Berkeley Pit which serves more as a monument to pollution and the negative 
aspects of mining on the environment, the stack, although also responsible for the 
distribution of significant pollutants for more than a century, has become more of an icon 
for positive revitalization.   
                                                 
560 Personal conversations with Michigan Technological University economists, 2009. 
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historic industrial sites to revitalize its economy and draw as many tourists to the region 
as possible. 
 
 If a single word emerges to describe the environmental and heritage development 
of the Butte-Anaconda area it is the word large.  Historians and locals declare that Butte 
had the “richest” hill, the most production, and the biggest non-ferrous minerals company 
in the world (for a time).  Anaconda, both the town and the company, had the largest 
copper smelter in the world that housed the largest reverberatory and largest copper blast 
furnaces, and the tallest masonry structure.  The district also has the largest Superfund 
site in terms of physical size and the largest National Historic Landmark district.  It has 
the largest grass-roots heritage movement and the one of the largest heritage planning 
efforts for a superfund site. 
 While many of these efforts were large in size, the key feature of the heritage 
process in Montana was the organization of a strong bottom-up planning effort.   Many of 
the planners were not locals at first but identified with the landscape and organized and 
planned for the eventual Sections 106 and 110 conflicts with EPA and ARCO with little 
national-level support except for expanding NHL district boundaries.   
Butte also demonstrates the value of place to locals and the complimentary 
perceptions of new-locals who value the landscape as they first see it.  The miners and 
laborers of the region during the 1950s-1980s witnessed the decline of their district, the 
loss of neighborhoods, and considerable demoralizing change.  New people who moved 
into the region in the late 1970s and 1980s, outsiders at first, saw not necessarily the loss 
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of the previous decades, but the considerable wealth of cultural resources remaining and 
organized, along with some long-time locals, to protect those remaining resources.  While 
the efforts produced planning documents and led to important preservation successes, not 
all could be saved.  Then the new comers experienced a sense of defeat over the cultural 
losses, especially as the cleanup gained momentum and made major changes to the 
landscape.  Yet, people new to region in the 2000s, aware of, but not witness to, the 
losses of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, but interested in heritage, are able to 
enjoy the results of planning efforts, preservation projects, and heritage integration into 
the city landscape carried out by local preservationists in the 1980s and 1990s.  It is easy 
to be significantly impressed with the level of what was saved, not with what was lost, 
which is exactly the sentiment civic leaders want visitors to have.  
 Similar to the Butte District, the Keweenaw Peninsula saw considerable declines 
in its mining, leading to efforts to commemorate the past.  Unlike Montana however, 
where heritage planning was largely organized solely from the grass roots and dominated 
by local planning efforts, Michigan heritage planning was driven by a combination of 
National Park Service, top-down planning, and the efforts of long-standing tourism and 
heritage groups that melded into a quasi-structured historical park.    
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CHAPTER 7.  QUINCY SMELTER 
 
WHEREAS, THE Quincy Smelting works is the last remaining historic smelter left 
anywhere in the world and reflects smelting technologies of the late 19th Century… 
WHEREAS, the smelter site continues to severely deteriorate with open windows, roofs, 
and walls… 
WHEREAS, the [Keweenaw National Historical Park] has not been successful in 
securing funds to stabilize buildings nor to restore any of the Smelter buildings for 
historic interpretive purposes; 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Cities of Houghton and Hancock 
City Councils…do hereby support the restoration of the Quincy Smelting Works and 
request the Keweenaw National Historic Park make the restoration of the Quincy 
Smelting Works its highest priority, funded by the Federal FY 2010 budget and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that if this effort to restore the Quincy Smelting Works 
is not funded by the Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Budget, the facility be recommended for 
demolition in the interest of public safety and blight removal, and allow redevelopment 
opportunities to be undertaken by Franklin Township. 
  -Houghton Hancock, Joint City Councils Resolution (2007) 
 
 The first historic mining-related landscape feature a visitor to the Michigan 
Copper Country sees and recognizes is likely a head frame.  Most visitors pass dark sand 
beaches unaware they’re looking at stamp sands and drive through Michigan 
Technological University, not knowing that this is the 21st-century incarnation of the 
Michigan School of Mines founded in 1885.  No, the first physical element that most 
visitors likely notice is the Quincy shaft-rock-house that is part head frame, part sorting 
building.  It sits on the apex of Quincy Hill just up from the Portage Lake waterfront.  
Like the Butte gallows frames, the clean, reclad shaft rock house is a ubiquitous post-
mining symbol appearing in many images and forms throughout the region.   
 But much more like the trip from Ducktown to Copperhill than the trip from Butte 
to Anaconda, as visitors proceed north along US Highway 41 and approach downtown 
Houghton, they may notice a largely disheveled conglomeration of historic buildings in 
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various states of disrepair on the waterfront across the narrow lake.  While not as large or 
imposing as the Copperhill site, this collection of structures, belonging to the smallest of 
the big-three 20th-century smelters on the Keweenaw Peninsula, is almost as intact as it 
was when it closed in 1971 after 73 years of service.  Most people in the region desire 
some sort of positive development of such a visible and valuable piece of waterfront 
property.  While some would like to see the buildings preserved and interpreted as an 
important historic site with mixed-use public function space, others, citing blight and 
decay, call for their complete removal to allow for new residential or commercial 
opportunities.  This dichotomous sentiment is echoed in the Joint City Council resolution 
quoted above. 
 Copper smelters and smelting landscapes in general receive only modest heritage 
attention often because smelters create some of the largest environmental problems.  
They tend to get demolished and remediated quickly after their functional use is gone.  
While many mining museums talk about smelting, there are virtually no copper smelting 
museums and, compared to mining heritage sites, almost no preserved and interpreted 
American copper smelter sites or partial sites exist outside of the fading 30-acre parcel 
behind the Ducktown Museum, the Anaconda Stack, and, to a lesser degree, the Old 
Works Golf Course.  Even in Swansea, Wales, home to the single greatest concentration 
of copper smelters ever, there is little homage to and virtually no remains left of the 
historic industry of the town.   
 The Michigan copper district, however, has an opportunity to change the 
perception of smelting and its technological, social, and ecological effects on the 
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metallurgical production system.  The Quincy is the only near-complete historic copper 
smelter site in the world with in situ reverberatory furnaces and related equipment, 
offices, support buildings, and still-occupied homes of smelter workers.  (See Figure 7.1) 
The site sits within the Quincy Mine National Historic Landmark district, is a former 
Historic American Engineering Record documentation project, and is a significant 
contributing site to the Keweenaw National Historical Park (KNHP).  (See Figure 7.2)  
Unfortunately, the site is also part of the Torch Lake Superfund project and at various 
times has been considered for both full preservation and full demolition.  The smelter’s 
current owner, Franklin Township, does not have the resources to invest in the 
preservation of the site, which has largely sat unattended and unmaintained since its last 
heat in 1971, slowly succumbing to the ravages of harsh winters and vandals.   
 Although the site is a contributing location to the KNHP, the National Park 
Service Washington Headquarters requires careful analysis and consideration before 
allowing its individual parks to own or get too involved with sites saddled with 
contamination or liability issues.  Further, Congress, in the 1992 enabling legislation that 
created KNHP, specifically excluded NPS from acquiring properties that have significant 
Superfund contaminants.  Complicating the preservation of the smelter site, EPA, in its 
zeal to identify at least one potentially responsible party (PRP) to pay for part of its 
Superfund cleanup in the area, named the NPS a PRP because the Park had assisted the 
township with preservation and use planning.  This ultimately forced KHNP to step back 
from assisting the township until the Superfund liabilities were removed.   
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Figure 7.2 Map of the Keweenaw showing selected heritage and remediation sites. 
(Source: Author) 
Figure 7.1 Quincy Smelter Site 2008. (Source: Author) 
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Shutdown 
 During the 1930s both the Tennessee Copper Company and Anaconda Copper 
Mining Company came to completely dominate production in their respective districts, 
controlling almost all mining, milling, and smelting operations.  Both companies 
continued their singular hold over their regions until large, multi-national petroleum 
companies bought them in the 1960s and 70s, but continued to produce copper or related 
chemicals into the 1980s.  Unlike both Ducktown and Butte, Michigan copper mining did 
not coalesce into a single corporate entity.  Instead, three companies of the  300 or so 
native copper mining companies chartered in Michigan survived until the district ceased 
operations, with one of the three, the Calumet and Hecla, outliving and out-producing the 
Copper Range Company and Quincy Mining Company.561
 Although Michigan copper mining production peaked in the late 1910s, its 
prominence on the world stage began declining in the 1880s as Butte copper production 
matched then surpassed Keweenaw output.   From 1847-1880, Michigan copper mines 
produced nearly 75% of US domestic copper, reaching a high of 82% in 1880, just as 
  Also, while Tennessee and 
Montana copper mines both worked the same veins for a century, Michigan’s copper 
mines worked multiple ore types stretched over 100 miles in three different Keweenaw 
Peninsula counties, leading to multiple starts, shutdowns, and abandonment of various 
regional mining districts, often leaving ghost towns scattered throughout a still-active 
mining region. 
                                                 
561 C&H ended mining in 1969 and although Quincy ended native copper mining in 1945, its mills 
continued through 1967 and its smelter until 1971.  Copper Range ended native copper mining in 1967, but 
its copper sulfide operation continued in Ontonagon County until 1997. 
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Montana silver mines reached the rich Butte copper lodes.562  Between 1880 and 1884, 
annual copper production outside of Michigan rose from 10 million pounds to 76 million 
pounds, causing a price drop from $0.20 per pound to $0.14 over the same period, and a 
further drop to $0.11 per pound in 1885.  In an attempt to arrest the growth of Montana 
mines and stabilize the market, Calumet and Hecla dumped excessive amounts of cheap 
copper on the market between 1886 and 1887 and forced the price down to $0.10 per 
pound— lower, it hoped, than the production costs of many newer western mines.  
Despite underground fires at C&H mines in 1887 that reduced its production and forced 
the company to halt its plan to control the market, several small and marginal Montana 
copper producers went out of business.  The plan, however, ultimately failed to affect the 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, whose 1887 output dominated Butte copper 
production and led Montana past Michigan to become the dominant copper district in the 
world.  By 1890, Michigan mines were producing 39% of the US total and by 1900 only 
24%. 563
  Keweenaw copper production, however, continued to grow despite mounting 
complications.  As with all mining districts, the remaining Michigan ores got leaner as 
the richer veins were mined out.  Further, Michigan copper mines became some of the 
deepest mines in the world following copper veins to distances of over 9,000 feet from 
  
                                                 
562 Charles K. Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 
1990s (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 66. 
563 Ibid., 60 and 66.  Perception of the importance of Michigan mines changed too in the late 19th century.  
Once the standard copper for electrical use because of its natural purity, native copper ultimately became 
just another electrical-copper because the purity of electrolytic-refined copper easily matched the 99.9% 
pure Michigan metal.  In fact in 1892, a New York electrolytic-refining copper firm began marketing 
“Nichols-Lake Substitute” copper.  (Curtis Cravens, Copper on the Creek: Reclaiming an Industrial 
History (New York: Place in History, 2000), 11. 
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the surface by 1920, while the deepest Butte mines were operating at 3,800 feet, and 
Arizona mines, largely open pits, did not have to venture further than 2,915 feet down.564   
Despite the increased costs associated with deeper mining of leaner ores, Michigan 
companies were able to take advantage of technologies such as compressed air, 
electricity, and the one-man rock drill to remain cost competitive, produce copper 
cheaper than their Western competitors through the 1910s, and continue to pay dividends 
through WWI.  During the war and after mandated price controls ended, however, the 
production-cost advantage of Michigan mines changed to a 10% cost disadvantage in 
1916, increasing to 30% by 1920.565
 Despite the persistence of profits, adoption of new technologies, and increasing 
production through 1916, the overall productivity of Michigan mines began declining 
before the war.  The largest and costliest strike in the district began in 1913 partly over 
cost-cutting measures such as the one-man rock drill and workers’ wages and hours.  
Although the mining companies prevailed, workforce problems persisted and even worsened 
as miners left the area to find better jobs out West, new immigrants avoided the region 
because of limited work during the strike, and new, well-paid manufacturing jobs 
especially in Detroit, led to a general exodus of workers.  Compounding these problems, 
WWI drew young men into the armed forces, contributing to a cumulative labor-force 
drop from 15,000 mining workers in 1915 to 8,000 in 1920.
 
566
                                                 
564 Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 245. 
 
565 Hyde, Copper for America : The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s., 76-
79. 
566 Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death at the Lake Superior Copper Mines, 244. 
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 Although the post-war economic recession affected the copper industry nation-
wide, the pre-war conditions that began affecting Michigan production worsened in the 
1920s.  In 1921, many Michigan copper mines temporarily shut down to allow stock piles 
to be sold off and, in the process, posted their lowest production levels since 1889 and, 
for the first time since 1847, did not pay a single dividend.567
Discussed in Chapter 4, C&H looked toward alternative sources of income and 
savings and began “mining” its waste tailings in 1915, recovering copper through 
leaching and flotation processes at half the cost of underground work.
  Despite declines and 
difficult economic conditions, mining continued on the Keweenaw, and would continue 
in some instances for almost fifty more years, but the dominance of the region had clearly 
faded as the remaining mines introduced new practices and diversified while they 
struggled to extract the last bits of profit from the local rock.   
568
 Although Quincy ended underground mining the day its last government contract 
expired in 1945, Copper Range and C&H further consolidated existing mines and 
diversified their corporate holdings to remain in metals production.
  In 1919, Quincy 
began installing the largest steam hoist ever constructed, capable of winding 12,000 feet 
of cable and quickly moving men, rock, and materials to and from the deepest parts of its 
9,000-plus-foot-deep mine.  Following depression era mine closures and WWII-era 
production, it too began recovering lost copper from its tailings and operated its 
reclamation mill through 1967 and its smelter through 1971.   
569
                                                 
567 Ibid., 244-245. 
  Copper Range 
568 Ibid., 249-250.  C&H continued to process its tailings until WWII. 
569 Ibid., 259. 
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closed its mills and smelters shortly after WWII, but opened the copper sulfide-bearing 
White Pine Mine in Ontonagon County after the United States entered the Korean War.  
Although the company maintained a native copper mine on the Keweenaw through 1967 
to supply copper to its subsidiary companies and transitioned through several owners, it 
mined, milled, and smelted White Pine sulfide ores until 1997.  C&H, which had 
purchased and developed a number of profitable subsidiary companies by the mid 1960s, 
became attractive to corporate takeover.  In 1967, Universal Oil Products (UOP) 
absorbed C&H and, in 1969, in the midst of significantly declining mining returns and a 
growing labor dispute, closed the last C&H mine, ending the era of native copper 
production in Michigan.570
  
  
Note on Smelting Sites 
 Shortly after Copper Range closed its Michigan Smelter in 1950, the company 
demolished the site and recovered any saleable materials.  It then contracted its remaining 
Keweenaw smelting needs to Quincy, leaving behind only the foundations and abutments 
of its once important smelting works.571
                                                 
570 Ibid., 262. 
  Quincy continued to operate its smelter through 
the end of its tailings reclamation and the closure of Copper Range’s last native copper 
mine (the Champion in Painesdale), both in 1967, and processed scrap copper at the site 
until 1971.  (See Figure 7.3)  When pollution concerns mounted with the State of 
Michigan who began insisting on the installation of pollution control equipment, Quincy  
571 The site still stood in 2009 as a large and open ruin with no complete structures except for the original 
office building that is now serving as a residence. 
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simply abandoned the site without scheduling any demolition or environmental 
reclamation, and transferred ownership to the Quincy Development Corporation, an 
entity formed to manage or sell the mining company’s lands.  The smelter site, one of the 
most complete of any in the world in a heritage context, was ultimately donated to 
Franklin Township in 1999 in lieu of back taxes for development into a museum in 
partnership with the National Park Service. 
The C&H smelter closed in 1969 along with the cessation of mining and sat 
vacant until 1982, when Michigan Tech Ventures, a private corporation created by 
Michigan Technological University (MTU) to generate local business opportunities using 
and promoting MTU-developed technologies, formed Peninsula Copper Industries (PCI).  
PCI, with technological support from MTU, adapted a C&H process to recover copper 
from scrap materials such as circuit boards and electrical wires, to create copper-oxide 
chemicals for commercial purposes.  PCI moved its operations into the 1912 C&H 
Figure 7.3 Quincy 
Smelter ca. 1920.  
(With permission of 
Michigan Tech 
Archives and Copper 
Country Historical 
Collections.) 
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electrolytic plant at the smelter and used the blacksmith shop and former cupola buildings 
for storage.  Most other buildings on site had been or were ultimately demolished, leaving 
a patchwork of foundations and disused transportation corridors in 2009.572
Of the other smelter sites that once processed Michigan native copper in the 
Keweenaw, several sat partially developed or as undeveloped ruins in 2009.  The Dollar 
Bay works site still retained foundations, and a few of the Lake Superior Smelter 
buildings still stood intact, reused by the Houghton County Road Commission in 
Hancock.  The short-lived 1847 Isle Royale and Ohio smelter site on Isle Royale still had 
foundations of demolished structures and some abandoned equipment, while the Lake 
Superior Native Smelter Works site, which was converted to a foundry in the early 20th 
century, had no visible features left except an altered shoreline.  None of the other 
Michigan smelter sites listed in Table 4.2 retain any physical features.
  
573
 
  
Early Environmental Concerns 
 Unlike the noxious gases produced from sulfide smelting in Montana and 
Tennessee that caused visible and severe damages to the environment and personal 
property, Michigan smelting was relatively benign, and as such, did not substantially 
injure non-mining property or generate significant early concerns among residents and 
governments about landscape degradation.  In fact, forest vegetation and insect 
populations were at times so thick because of long summer growing days, that residents 
                                                 
572 Dan Trepal, "The Calumet & Hecla Smelting Works: 1887-2006,” Unpublished graduate paper available 
at Michigan Technological University Archives, (Houghton, Mich.: Michigan Technological University, 
2006), 24. 
573 Personal observations 2006-2009. 
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in some respects looked forward to the winter fallow season and the availability of ice 
roads on frozen lakes and rivers to ease overland transportation difficulties.574  
Michigan’s copper mining operations, like similar operations in other districts, used 
significant amounts of lumber to shore up mines and heat residences and dumped its 
stamp sands in local waterways.  Although its coal-fired boilers and smelters produced 
smoke, none of the ultimate effects were greater than any other industrial district and 
were largely accepted as the price of mining from the 1840s until the 1960s when 
pollution became an important issue across the country and the EPA began examining 
levels of more invisible toxins associated with mining wastes. 575
 
  
Origins of the Heritage Movement 
All three of the broader regions studied in this work became tourist destinations 
because of their rugged mountainous landscapes, perceptions of purity and pristine 
wildernesses, and rich histories.  Butte and Ducktown, however, as specific locations 
within a larger destination region, were largely shunned by early tourists because their 
industrial and urban natures belied the expected pristine wilderness of their surroundings.  
Historical environmental problems only exacerbated this perception.  Smoke-generated 
moonscapes, enormous settling ponds, dirty streets, and the persistent hum of industrial 
                                                 
574 Lankton, Beyond the Boundaries , 12.   
575 Although lawsuits against Michigan Copper Mines for property damages were rare if they occurred at 
all, late 19th century tailings deposits into Portage Lake ultimately resulted in significant obstructions to 
navigation requiring dredging by the Army Corps of Engineers to maintain the waterway.  Strong (2002) 
demonstrated that significant tailings deposits from 1882 to 1886 had reduced the already constricted the 
navigable water by more than 66% at one location in east Houghton.  See: Katherine Strong, "Shoreline 
Change Along the Portage Canal,"  Unpublished graduate paper available at Michigan Technological 
University Archives. (Houghton, Mich.: Michigan Technological University, 2002), 5.   
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activity well in to the 1980s acted to repel most nature-seeking visitors.  While the 
Tennessee Copper Basin was largely remediated by the 1990s, and Butte-Anaconda was 
investing in historic preservation and heritage interpretation in the 2000s, they were both 
far behind the Keweenaw Peninsula in attracting recreational visitors.  While Ducktown 
had an environmental stigma since the 1920s and Butte had a significant stigma since the 
1970s, the Michigan district was never really affected by degradation issues that 
impacted tourists.   
    Michigan copper production began its final decline after WWII.  But unlike 
Montana and Tennessee, its copper industry did not take on new, more destructive forms 
to stay alive, like the open pits of Butte and the continued production of copper-based 
organic chemicals and acids on a very large scale like Ducktown.  Further, because of its 
pure copper deposits, its smelting industry never contaminated the local environment to 
the degree as the other locations.  So, just as the mining industry started seeing significant 
declines in the 20th century and negative associations of environmental degradation were 
nonexistent, the automobile and growing middle class incomes afforded a means for 
people to escape crowded urban areas, and the Copper Country provided a perfect natural 
attraction.   
Geographically, the Michigan copper district was different too.  Both Tennessee 
and Butte copper districts were located close to scenic destinations and national parks, 
and in the case of Butte, on a major interstate thoroughfare.  These enabled automobile 
travelers to avoid industrial areas despite the drive for tourism dollars in economically 
declining regions.   Michigan's copper district happened to be at the end of the road, and 
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its mines were shutting down at a time of increased wealth and a bit of post-war 
wanderlust brought on by returning GIs in the 1920s and 1950s.   Michigan's copper 
district was located in an area of reputed scenic beauty and because it was the destination, 
as opposed to near the scenic destination, it drew more people directly in the 1920s-1960s 
than the much more industrially active Montana and Tennessee copper districts.  Further 
the Keweenaw Peninsula was reachable in a day's drive by millions of people from 
Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and lower Michigan. 
By the late 1930s, tourism was Michigan’s second leading industry after 
automobile manufacturing, and with increased personal incomes, the Upper Peninsula 
became an important draw for its natural beauty and low population density.  Natural 
beauty alone, however, was not necessarily a powerful enough draw to create a tourism 
market in the Upper Peninsula.  According to Aaron Shapiro, tourism required careful 
planning, development, management, and packaging by a variety of people and 
organizations.576  Early in the century, several Michigan development and tourism boards 
created programs specifically to lure Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and 
even Cleveland residents.  They included the Upper Peninsula Development Bureau 
founded in 1911, whose Cloverland publications touted the virtues of northern Michigan 
vacations and whose support of the Hartman-Rushton Act (MI) helped pass the 1929 law 
creating a funded and coordinated tourism-development organization that in 1937 became 
the Michigan Tourist Council.577
                                                 
576 Aaron Shapiro, "Air Conditioned by the Cool Breezes of Lake Superior: Vacationing in Michigan's 
Copper Country," in New Perspectives on Michigan's Copper Country, ed. Alison K. Hoagland, Erik C. 
Nordberg, and Terry S. Reynolds (Hancock, Mich.: Quincy Mine Hoist Association, 2007), 135. 
  A second, more local organization, the Copper Country 
577 Ibid., 137. 
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Vacation League, made up of local merchants, resort owners, and mining company 
representatives formed in the 1920s to promote the Keweenaw Peninsula specifically.   
While the Keweenaw held some of the same toutable vacation advantages as other 
parts of the Upper Peninsula and Northern Wisconsin, it remained cooler in the summer 
with Lake Superior cross winds blowing across the narrow land mass.  Further, the 
Keweenaw offered much greater access to the Great Lake with over 100 miles of 
shoreline, and the opportunity to drive “to the end of highway US 41,” whose southern 
terminus reached the ocean in Miami, Florida.  Enhancing the scenic draw, a fair number 
of early heritage tours sprang up utilizing the area’s abandoned mine sites, ghost towns, 
and historic forts.   To get to Keweenaw County, where many of these were located, 
however, drivers had to pass directly through what was left of the declining Michigan 
copper district centered in Houghton County, and, during the inter- and post-war periods, 
several local entrepreneurs created mining-related attractions to lure tourists.578
The 1926 Cloverland Tourist Guide advertised Houghton, Michigan, as “the most 
cosmopolitan community in the Copper Country….and the gateway and very heart of 
copperdom.”  For tourists, the city offered good boating, bathing, and fishing, no hay 
fever, and interesting historic sites nearby including “Fort Wilkins, the Douglas 
  Where 
Montana and Tennessee copper districts used heritage to create a tourism market, 
Michigan’s early tourism market created the first heritage sites in its mining region.  (See 
Figure 7.4) 
                                                 
578 Ibid., 144-145. 
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Houghton Memorial, and famous copper mines, mills, and smelters.”579
One of the first post-war tourism destinations came out of a failed attempt to 
restart mining in the abandoned Arcadian mine across the lake from Houghton during 
WWII.   While this venture ended with the death of its founder in 1943, it left behind an 
unusual horizontal mine shaft one mile off the main highway to Keweenaw County.  In 
1951, the Arcadian’s new owners developed it into the first underground “tourist mine” 
in Michigan and likely the nation.  For over 34 years, the mine guided visitors 1500 feet 
  Nineteen-thirties 
Works Progress Administration projects supported tourism infrastructure including the 
construction of lodges, golf courses, and scenic drives.  While these were the early 
beginnings of heritage tourism, it was the post-WWII period that saw the creation of 
specific mining-related and heritage attractions on the landscape. 
                                                 
579 Cloverland Tourist Guide (Menomonee, Michigan: The Herald-Leader Company, 1926), 32. 
Figure 7.4 Tourism on Keweenaw Peninsula.  The person on the left worked at 
both the Arcadia Tourist Mine and Copperama before coming to the Quincy Mine 
Hoist.  The sign on the right, touted the salubrious nature of the region from the 
1950s.  (Both images with permission of Michigan Tech Archives and Copper Country Historical 
Collections.) 
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 into the rock face and even garnered recognition from Life Magazine in 1962.580  
Copperama, another site that opened some time in the 1950s or 1960s, sat right on the 
main highway one mile south of Houghton.  While documentation is sparse on this short-
lived attraction, an undated, existing flyer claimed a “fascinating, highly educational 
underground tour at one of Michigan’s oldest copper processing sites” located at the Isle 
Royale stamp mill that closed in 1948.581
One of the longest lived of the mining heritage sites and museums began in 1958 
following a tour of the 1920 Quincy Mine Hoist by the American Institute of Mining 
Engineers (AIME).   The members of the group, captivated by the size of the machine 
and recognizing its significance to mining engineering, formed the Quincy Mine Hoist 
Association with a governing board that included representatives of the local AIME 
chapter, the Nordberg Manufacturing Company (original makers of the hoist), Michigan 
Technological University, the Quincy Development Corporation, and the public.  The 
new organization petitioned the Quincy Mining Company for a 99-year lease on the 
abandoned structure, intent on preserving the hoist and associated buildings as an 
engineering landmark.  The Quincy Mining Company provided initial funding through a 
$50,000 no-interest loan (whose repayment was ultimately forgiven) and a significant 
eight-to-one matching grant fund.
  
582
In 1968 the Quincy Mine Hoist Association opened for its first tours.  In 1970, the 
site was listed on the National Register of Historic Places and in 1978became the center 
   
                                                 
580 "Arcadian Mining Property Once the Rival of C&H," Daily Mining Gazette, June 24, 1978. 
581 unknown, "Copperama "  (ca. 1960) Available at the Michigan Technological University Archives.  
582 "Options for National Park Service Involvement in the Management of Historic Copper Mining 
Resources on Michigan's Keweenaw Peninsula," ed. Midwest Region National Park Service (Omaha, 
Nebraska: National Park Service, 1988), 3. 
318 
 
of a Historic American Engineering Record documentation project that included the 
mining company’s smelter, shaft rock house, mills, and other support buildings. 583
Although many tourist attractions focused on the region’s history, no site had 
been as historically significant as the Quincy Mine Hoist and none had really had as long 
an impact on the region’s heritage.  While the recognition that the site could become a 
tourist stop did not escape the governing board’s founders, they understood that the site 
had greater value than just an income generator.  The preservation of such a significant 
site contributed to a HAER documentation project and National Historic Landmark 
designation, and, in many ways, sparked regional heritage curiosity.   
   The 
preserved buildings ultimately led to a National Historic Landmark designation in 1989 
and became one of the key factors in the formation of the Keweenaw National Historical 
Park in 1992.  
The area’s untouched historic and archeological sites ultimately lured industrial 
historians and archeologists, several previously involved in HAER work and state 
industrial projects, to Michigan Technological University.  This grouping coalesced into 
a graduate program in industrial archeology.  Further, the growing interest in industrial 
history, the importance of Michigan’s copper mining to United States history, and the 
level of preservation in the region led to the formation of the Keweenaw National 
Historical Park in 1992 amid mounting concern about the lasting environmental effects of 
the district’s mines, mills, and smelters. 
 
                                                 
583 Erik C. Nordberg, "Quincy Mine Hoist Association Anniversary Banquet,"  booklet available at 
Michigan Technological University Archives (Hancock, Michigan: Quincy Mine Hoist Association, 2008) 
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Later Heritage – Keweenaw National Historical Park 
 Although the Keweenaw National Historical Park falls into the temporal realm of 
post-mining later-heritage and regional redevelopment, its creation was a direct result of 
early and on-going heritage activities generated from the creation of regional tourism in 
the 1920s and 30s and the preservation of the Quincy Mine Hoist.  Congress created the 
Keweenaw National Historical Park in October 1992, following nearly two decades of 
studies and plans.   
 The first attempt at a regional historical park began in 1972 when Universal Oil 
Products funded the design of “Coppertown, USA,” a large open-air museum intended to 
rival Greenfield Village in Dearborn, Michigan.  The attraction planned to feature mining 
exhibits, copper products displays, ethnic and cultural centers, festival  plazas, arts areas, 
new hotels, and a 70’ tall miner statue.  While the full concept proved a bit too ambitious 
for the time and never was constructed, a much more modest indoor museum in the old 
C&H pattern shop emerged with traditional interpretive displays on the region’s history 
and a not-surprising emphasis on C&H.584
 In the mid 1970s, the Historic American Engineering Record conducted broad 
surveys of American industrial areas to identify significant historic regions and cultural 
resources in its realm of interest.  In 1977, it followed up a survey of Michigan’s Lower 
Peninsula with a survey of its Upper Peninsula.  In addition to identifying iron mining, 
timber, power, and transportation resources, the survey documented Michigan’s Copper 
Country, identifying a significant number of intact mining resources, including the fairly 
   
                                                 
584 "Options for National Park Service Involvement in the Management of Historic Copper Mining 
Resources on Michigan's Keweenaw Peninsula,” 3-4. 
320 
 
complete system of worker housing, and the mine, mill, and smelter sites of the Quincy 
Mining Company.  Because of the high integrity of the Quincy sites, which included the 
mine hoist, HAER scheduled a full site documentation of the Quincy for 1979.  That 
summer a large group of architects and photographers recorded the site’s physical 
features, and a group of historians wrote its technological and social history, providing a 
copious amount of formal historical research justifying the region’s significance.585
 Although the idea of a national historical park first surfaced in 1974, the 
movement reemerged and gained true momentum following a Governor’s tourism 
conference in 1986.  Locals hit on the idea of a national park to stop the decay of 
Calumet, once the center of the region’s copper mining industry, and began to pressure 
Michigan’s influential congressmen.  Ultimately responding to a congressional request, 
the NPS researched and published Options for National Park Service Involvement in the 
Management of Historic Copper Mining Resources on Michigan’s Keweenaw Peninsula 
in 1988.  Although this report neither recommend nor dissuaded a park, it demonstrated 
the feasibility of a park and, if a park were to be established, proposed two units, one at 
Quincy anchored by the existing mine hoist and one in Calumet centered on the 
Coppertown Museum.
  
586  The report also articulated the need for National Historic 
Landmark (NHL) district nominations for the two areas to demonstrate the high integrity 
and national significance required for a national park.587
                                                 
585 Ibid., 4. 
  The Options report and 
subsequent NHL nominations led to a study of alternative designs that examined a variety 
586 "Final General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement," ed. Keweenaw National 
Historical Park Michigan (Calumet, Michigan: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1998), 7. 
587 "Options for National Park Service Involvement in the Management of Historic Copper Mining 
Resources on Michigan's Keweenaw Peninsula,” 6. 
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of potential park arrangements and ultimately recommended a two-unit park managed 
under cooperative agreements with the NPS.  The new park would actually own just a 
few key buildings and relatively little property, but would support affiliated sites both 
within the park boundaries and related sites outside the boundaries that agreed to operate 
and run programs to certain standards, and promote historic preservation and adaptive 
reuse of buildings and landscapes.588
 Congress passed Public Law 102-543 creating the Keweenaw National Historical 
Park (KNHP) in 1992 to: “tell the story of the role of copper in the development of an 
American industrial society and the effects on the Keweenaw Peninsula of providing the 
copper” and “identify, study, and preserve significant historical and cultural sites, 
structures, districts and landscapes…for the education, benefit, and inspiration of present 
and future generations...and develop and sustain into the 21st century the park and the 
community through a blend of private, local, state, and federal management, investment, 
and ownership.”
 
589 KNHP officially came into existence with the signature of the 
President, and the NPS in Washington allowed the new unit to proceed with land 
acquisitions, staff building, and limited financial assistance to partnership sites.  Although 
KNHP had a fair degree of autonomy in deciding how to proceed, one important clause in 
the law, section 4 (b) restricted the park from acquiring lands that were contaminated 
with hazardous substances.590
                                                 
588 "Final General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement," 50. 
  This clause forced KNHP to explore only those parts of an 
589 Ibid., 13-14. 
590 Ibid., 175. 
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industrial landscape that had not housed industrial activity that might have produced 
hazardous wastes, such as mills and smelters.   
Thus the Keweenaw National Historical Park owns only five buildings in the park 
either a former administrative, warehouse, streetcar, or commercial facility but does not 
own any site where industrial processes occurred.  It originally partnered with 23 
existing, privately-owned and operated historic sites, a reflection of the region’s early 
involvement in heritage tourism, to interpret the region as a whole.  Although several of 
the sites have gone out of business over the years, by 2008 the list of heritage partner 
sites in the region included the Adventure Mining Company, A.E. Seamen Mineral 
Museum, Calumet Theatre, Chassell Heritage Center, Copper Range Historical Museum, 
Coppertown Mining Museum, Delaware Copper Mine, Finnish American Heritage 
Center at Finlandia University, Fort Wilkins State Park, Hanka Homstead, Houghton 
County Historical Museum, Keweenaw County Historical Society, Keweenaw Heritage 
Center at St. Anne’s, Laurium Manor Mansion Tours, Old Victoria, Ontonagon County 
Historical Museum, Porcupine Mountains Wilderness State Park, Quincy Mine & Hoist, 
and the U.P. Firefighters Memorial Museum.591
 
   
Superfund 
Concurrent with the formation of KNHP, the Environmental Protection Agency 
was exploring the very same historic landscape for hazardous mining wastes from a 
century of past activity.  The local genesis of the Torch Lake Superfund site began with a 
                                                 
591 "Keweenaw Heritage Sites," National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/kewe/parkmgmt/keweenaw-
heritage-sites.htm, accessed June 25, 2009. 
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Michigan environmental law designed to control pollution.  Michigan’s revised 
constitution of 1963, Article 4, stated that  
…the conservation and development of the natural resources of the state hereby 
declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the health, safety, 
and general welfare of the people.  The legislature shall provide for the protection 
of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from pollution, 
impairment, and destruction.592
 
 
Although this declaration mirrored developments nationally and seemed to suggest that 
human welfare was of equal importance to the future exploitation of natural resources, 
the first laws restricting pollution, implementing Article 4, did not surface until the 
Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 and State’s clean air and clean water 
acts in the 1970s.    
Although Superfund would become the driving policy affecting clean up of 
Michigan copper mining wastes, State of Michigan departments drove the initial 
investigations into contamination in the area.  In 1973, the Michigan Water Resources 
Commission investigated a 27,000 gallon cupric ammonium carbonate discharge that 
occurred in Lake Linden between 1971 and 1972.  Although no “deleterious effects” 
were reported because of the spill, it raised awareness of other potential mining 
contamination and prompted state investigations into regional fish abnormalities called 
locally the “Torch Lake Tumors,” and the long-term deposit of xanthates and creosotes 
from milling operations.  Further, in 1985 an International Joint Commission designated 
the Torch Lake basin a “Great Lakes area of concern” because of potential 
contamination.  Although many of the fish tumors had disappeared by the early 1990s, 
                                                 
592 James M. Olson, Michigan Environmental Law: A Guide to Environmental Law (Traverse City, Mich.: 
Neahtawanta Press, 1981), 10. 
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high levels of mercury and PCBs were found, and fish consumption advisories remained 
in effect in 2009.593
Although the first formal implementation of mining-related pollution controls in 
the Keweenaw came from the State of Michigan and affected the organization and 
construction of the White Pine mine, mill, and smelter in the 1950s, and the final closure 
of the Quincy Smelter in 1971, the state would ultimately cede control over the 
abandoned wastes to the federal government.  The state investigated or supported 
investigations into copper tailings and slag wastes that ultimately contributed to the 
official listing of Torch Lake on the Superfund National Priorities List in 1986.  After 
that EPA became the primary governmental entity to formally document past 
environmental conditions, plan for remediation, and attempt to seek a responsible party to 
pay for the cleanup under CERCLA.  Although the EPA took charge, in most cases, 
studies and remediation plans were developed with the consultation of the State of 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. 
   
 Unlike the Butte and Ducktown districts, the pollution problems in the Keweenaw 
from mining operations were relatively benign and not considered a high human health 
risk.  The EPA classified the region an environmental risk related mostly to the 
deposition of tailings, slag, and airborne dusts, and ancillary industrial activity such as 
chemical leaks and discarded storage drums.  According to the Torch Lake Second Five 
Year Report: 
                                                 
593 "Second Five-Year Review Report for the Torch Lake Superfund Site," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA 
(Chicago: U.S. EPA, 2008), 12 and 18. 
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Torch Lake was the site of copper milling and smelting facilities and operations 
for over 100 years.  The lake was a repository for all mining related 
waste…Copper was extracted through a series of technologies…first by crushing 
or “stamping” the rock…then by grinding… The copper and crushed rocks were 
separated by gravimetric sorting in a liquid medium.  The copper was then sent to 
the smelter.  The crushed rock particles called “tailings” or “stamp sands” were 
discarded along with mill processing water, typically by pumping it into the lakes 
and streams…Dredges were used [starting in 1916] to collect submerged tailings 
which were screened, re-crushed, and gravity separated.  An ammonia leaching 
process involving cupric ammonium carbonate was used to recover copper… 
During the 1920s chemical reagents were used to further increase the efficiency of 
reclamation...[and] included lime, pyridine oil, coal tar creosotes, wood creosote, 
pine oil, and xanthates.  After reclamation…chemically treated tailings were 
returned to the lakes.594
 
 
Over the course of a century, more than 200 million tons of tailings and reclamation 
wastes were dumped into Torch Lake filling approximately 20% of its volume.   Despite 
national prohibitions on creating obstructions to navigable waterways established by the 
Rivers and Harbors act of 1890, Torch Lake was specifically exempted.   The lake was 
further exempted from dumping laws when mining increased during WWII.  
During early site investigations conducted under CERCLA, EPA discovered 
empty drums at mill and smelter sites along Torch Lake, and over 800 drums dumped on 
the lake bottom.  While those determined to have once contained hazardous substances 
were removed and disposed of at a hazardous waste landfill, many of the empty drums on 
the lake bottom were simply left in place.595
Curiously, the EPA did not aggressively pursue Potentially Responsible Parties 
(PRP) at this superfund site despite the fact that Universal Oil Products (UOP), Quincy 
Development Corporation, and the Copper Range Company still existed at the time of the 
 
                                                 
594 Ibid., 17. 
595 "First Five-Year Review Report for the Torch Lake Superfund Site," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: 
U.S. EPA, 2003), 13. 
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NPL listing.  EPA began exploring cost recovery options in 1986, but, following 
unsubstantiated claims from UOP that the EPA would make local private landowners 
fund the clean up or that UOP would sue local land owners if it were required to pay, 
EPA withdrew its pursuit in 1988, claiming it was doing so to assuage local fears about 
protracted federal lawsuits.  A more significant factor in deciding not to pursue PRPs 
may have been that the total cost of the Torch Lake cleanup was estimated at a mere 
$15.2 million as opposed to over $1 billion in Butte-Anaconda and likely several hundred 
million dollars in Ducktown, and that the cost of pursuing UOP, Quincy Development, 
and Copper Range would have incurred attorney fees and time costs much higher relative 
to the cost of the cleanup.596
 While many of the documented incidents of hazardous substances in the 
Keweenaw region were relatively minor, the primary concern and target for remediation 
came from existing tailing and slag waste deposits.  From the First EPA Five Year report 
on Torch Lake: 
  Also, the contamination was not a significant human health 
risk, but rather just an environmental risk and thereby a lower priority cleanup.  In the 
long-run, EPA may have simply found it less costly to pay for the work from the “super-
fund” generated from petroleum and chemical taxes.  
The continuous release of tailing- and slag-borne contaminants via wind, surface 
water runoff, and wave erosion are deemed to represent an unacceptable and 
actionable source of ecological risk.  The most severe ecological impact is the 
degradation of benthic communities (bottom dwelling organisms) associated with 
contaminated sediments in Torch Lake and other water bodies at the site.  The 
benthic community is an integral part of the base of a complex food web in lakes.  
A severely impacted benthic community would impact the entire food web.  
Toxic effects due to heavy metals (especially copper) appear to be related to 
                                                 
596 "EPA Completes Construction at Torch Lake," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 2006), 1. 
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sediment pore space dynamics and seem not to have significant water column 
impacts.597
 
  
The general plan for remediation thus became to arrest the flow of tailings- and slag- 
generated toxins into the air and water, and the EPA identified Torch Lake itself and 13 
specific sites on Torch Lake, Portage Lake, and Lake Superior that had large waste 
deposits.  EPA ultimately broke the sites into three operable units to manage.  The plan, 
according to 1992 record of decision (ROD) was to: 
1. Reduce or minimize potential future risks to human health associated with the 
inhalation of airborne contaminants from the tailings and/or slag located at the site; 
2. Reduce or minimize potential future risks to human health associated with direct 
contact with and/or the ingestion of the tailings and/or the slag located at the site; 
3. Reduce or minimize the release of contaminants in tailings to the groundwater 
through leaching; and 4. Reduce or minimize the release of contaminants in 
tailings to the surface water and sediment by soil erosion and/or air deposition.598
 
 
The thirteen specific locations were divided geographically into Operable Units 1 and 3, 
while Torch Lake made up Operable Unit 2. 599
  
 
OPERABLE UNIT 1 
10. Mason Sands 
11. Hubbell/Tamarack City 
12. Lake Linden Sands 
OPERABLE UNIT 3 
1. Calumet Lake  6. Michigan Smelter 
2. Boston Pond  7. Quincy Smelter 
3. North Entry  8. Isle Royale Sands 
4. Redridge*  9. Dollar Bay  
5. Freda*  13. Point Mills 
 
OPERABLE UNIT 2 
Torch Lake*  
*No action taken 
 
Although the record of decision called for no action regarding OU2 (Torch Lake) 
because the lake was recovering on its own, the general plan of remediation for the 
majority of other sites was a four part system of debris removal and grading of the 
                                                 
597 Ibid., 15. 
598 "Proposed Plan for Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site," 
ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 2008), 2. 
599 Ibid., 3. 
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tailings and slag deposits, followed by a 6 – 8 inch soil cap to arrest blowing and erosion, 
topped by a vegetative layer to keep the cap intact and help shed water and prevent public 
exposure, and finally deed restrictions to ensure the remedy remained intact.600
 Except for one location, none of these sites had significant standing historic 
structures eligible for the National Register, and thus Sections 106 and 110 issues did not 
apply to the EPA’s work despite arguments that the stamp sands themselves could be 
considered a significant historic landscape feature representing major man-made changes 
to shorelines.
  There 
were, however, a few exceptions to this treatment besides Torch Lake.  Portions of the 
Isle Royale Sands southeast of Houghton were being redeveloped for a sewage treatment 
plant, and some of those stamp sands were used in concrete block manufacture.  Part of 
the Point Mills sands were being used for winter road traction, and sands at Freda and 
Redridge were exposed to heavy Lake Superior wind and wave action and thus exempt.   
601
The Quincy Smelter…includes 25 buildings, which historically operated as a 
copper smelting facility during the 19th and 20th centuries until 1969. The 
Quincy Smelting Works is a significant component of the Quincy Mining 
Company National Historic Landmark District established in 1989. This district is 
also within the boundaries of the Quincy Unit of Keweenaw National Historic 
Park.  Franklin Township owns the Quincy Smelter complex and is interested in 
developing and restoring the area as part of the national park. Activities 
conducted under EPA’s 4 Superfund Redevelopment Initiative (SRI) have 
 The lone-exception was the National Historic Landmark-designated 
Quincy Smelter site, built on stamp sands created by the earlier Pewabic and Franklin 
mills.  From the 2008 Proposed Plan for ROD amendments:   
                                                 
600 "First Five-Year Review Report for the Torch Lake Superfund Site,” 16-18. 
601 "Responsiveness Summary, Torch Lake Superfund Site, Operable Units I and II, Houghton County, 
Michigan," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 1992), RS-30. 
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identified Quincy Smelter as having passive recreational use and historical 
representation (historic site) use.602
 
 
The smelter soon became a contentious issue for the region.  The EPA and 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) claimed that the stamp sands 
on which the smelter was built were prone to airborne disbursement and that its slag piles 
contained high quantities of heavy metals and considered demolition as a potential early 
remedy.603  Local developers claimed the deteriorating buildings were an eyesore, that 
prime waterfront real estate was being wasted, and argued that the buildings should, 
therefore, be demolished.604   The National Park Service argued that the smelter buildings 
were not only part of a National Historic Landmark district, but they were affiliated with 
the Keweenaw National Historical Park and part of the one of the last historic copper 
smelter complexes in the world, and represented a significant component of the local 
industry and should therefore be preserved.605  The State Historic Preservation Office, 
generally in charge of Sections 106 and 110 issues, largely deferred to the NPS.606
                                                 
602 "Proposed Plan for Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site,” 
3. 
  
603 "Declaration for the Record of Decision, Torch Lake Site, Michigan, Operable Units I and II," ed. 
Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 1992), 19, and "EPA Proposes Cleanup Plan for Quincy Smelter 
Erosion," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 2008), 1. 
604 Kurt Hauglie, "EPA to Host Smelter Hearing," Daily Mining Gazette, January 12, 2009. 
605 James Corless, "The Significance and Status of the Quincy Smelting Works, Franklin Township, 
Michigan (White Paper)," ed. Keweenaw National Historical Park (Calumet, Michigan: (unpublished ) 
Keweenaw National Historical Park, 2008), 1. 
606 "Programmatic Agreement among the Michigan State Historical Preservation Officer, Michigan 
Technological University and Keweenaw National Historical Park, National Park Service (U.S. Department 
of the Interior), Regarding the A.E. Seaman Mineralogical Museum Adaptive Reuse Project, Er06-107," 
ed. Michigan State Historic Preservation Office (Lansing, Michigan: MISHPO, 2006), 2, and Corless, "The 
Significance and Status of the Quincy Smelting Works, Franklin Township, Michigan (White Paper)", 7. 
While the existence of the Programmatic Agreement does not implicate the Michigan SHPO in avoiding 
Section 106 of NHPA responsibility for the Quincy Smelter site, it demonstrates a willingness to enter into 
agreements to allow other interested parties, such as the NPS, to enforce compliance at sites quite distant 
from the State capital.  The White Paper written by NPS officials suggested that NPS “exercised its 
authority granted by the National Historic Preservation Act to comment on and influence the activities of a 
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Meanwhile, locals split between preservation, commercial development, and complete 
demolition. 
  
Quincy Smelter 
When selecting Keweenaw sites to be documented by HAER, choosing properties 
to include in the National Historic Landmark district, and defining the boundaries of the 
Keweenaw National Historical Park, heritage professionals in each case included the 
Quincy Smelter site on Portage Lake for its integrity as a historic location and 
significance to regional and ultimately national copper production.  While other 
significant contributing sites such as Coppertown Museum and the Quincy Mine Hoist 
were under fairly stable ownership, the smelter had sat largely unused and abandoned 
since its closing in 1971, suffering annually from the insalubrious affects of heavy 
winters and chronic vandalism.  Unfortunately for the site, the KNHP implementing 
legislation forbade the new national park from acquiring the site because of potential 
hazardous wastes and its listing on the NPL.  The Quincy Smelter is the only Keweenaw 
site listed specifically on both the National Historic Landmark District form and National 
Priorities List. 
The EPA and MDEQ evaluated Keweenaw stamp sand and slag deposits based on 
the potential for redevelopment and potential exposure to hazardous substances, primarily 
antimony, arsenic, copper, and vanadium.  While many of the toxins had acceptable 
thresholds for temporary exposure, such as at parks or recreation areas, the exposure 
                                                                                                                                                 
federally funded project with potential adverse affects on a national historic landmark,” (p. 6-7) These 
responsibilities would be the same for the SHPO under those circumstances.  
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threat became much more chronic if people were going to be spending considerable time 
near the deposits, if the deposits were to be disturbed, or if children could be at risk of 
ingestion, primarily the case if the areas were redeveloped into housing.  Because of this 
high risk, the EPA instigated the soil cap and vegetative cover remedy for sands that had 
the potential for new housing. 607
The slag piles and stamp sands at the Quincy Smelter tested high for copper, 
antimony, and chromium, which contributed to its rating of chronic hazard for prolonged 
exposure.  Copper was singled out as the “most pronounced contaminant” for potential 
children residing at the smelter site, but antimony was also rated a high health risk.
 
608 
Further, the slag piles also tested high for cadmium and chromium.609 (See Figure 7.5) 
However, unlike the Torch Lake stamp sands, the smelter site from the beginning of the 
Superfund process had been considered for potential inclusion in the Keweenaw National 
Historical Park with minimal exposure risks for visitors and staff.610
Assuming that the slag pile located in the Quincy Smelter Area (Appx. 25 acres) 
will be developed as part of a National Park, no action will be taken.  If the area is 
not developed in the future, then deed restrictions will be sought to prevent the 
development of residences in the slag pile area.
  In the 1992 
Declaration for the Record of Decision, the EPA stated: 
611
 
 
 
                                                 
607 "Record of Decision, Decision Summary, Torch Lake Sites, Operable Units I & II, Houghton County 
Michigan," ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 1992), 27. 
608 Ibid., 27. 
609 "Final Remedial Investigation Report, Operable Unit III" ed. Region 5 U.S. EPA (Chicago: Donohue 
and Associates, 1992), 4-3. 
610 "Record of Decision, Decision Summary, Torch Lake Sites, Operable Units I & II, Houghton County 
Michigan,” 27. 
611 "Declaration for the Record of Decision, Torch Lake Site, Michigan, Operable Units I and II,” 3. 
b 
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In 1992, the same year the Keweenaw Park was formed, the EPA decided that no 
action was required at the smelter site as long as it was developed as a historic attraction 
without individual long-term exposure to hazardous wastes.  Even if not developed, the 
EPA decided it would only seek deed restrictions before considering taking the site off 
the NPL.  Unfortunately, the enabling legislation for the park prevented federal 
ownership of the site, but not technical and financial assistance provided to the site 
owner.  In 1999 the KNHP worked with the site owner, Quincy Development, to transfer 
the site to Franklin Township with the intention that the park would provide planning and 
technical assistance and at some point in the future, lease, or otherwise develop the site if 
legally permitted.  In addition to funding smelter documentation and research projects, 
and providing technical expertise, restoration cost estimates, and planning concepts to the 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Aerial 
view of Quincy Site 
1990.  Showing 
collections of historic 
buildings (a) and slag 
piles (b).  (Source: 
Michigan Tech Archives 
and Copper Country 
Historical Collections.) 
 
b 
a 
b 
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township over the next five years, KNHP also provided guidance to EPA in the erection 
of a security fence to protect trail users from friable and blowing asbestos.612
Despite the EPA’s 1988 decision not to pursue potentially responsible parties and 
its expectation, if not support, for the inclusion of the smelter site in the KNHP, EPA and 
MDEQ interpreted the expenditure of NPS planning funds and its attempt “to impose 
restrictions on the location of protective fences,” as signs of tacit ownership, and the 
agency’s enforcement branch went after KNHP as a new PRP.
  
613
as a potentially responsible party, to agree to reimburse the U.S. EPA for costs 
incurred to date and to voluntarily perform or finance the response activities 
which the U.S. EPA has determined or will determine are required at the 
facility.
  In a modified form- 
letter received by the KNHP on June 28, 2004, the EPA’s Region 5 Emergency 
Enforcement and Support Section claimed that it was planning to upgrade security, 
prepare health and safety plans, perform comprehensive asbestos sampling, and remove 
asbestos and any other hazardous substances it found at the Quincy Smelter site.  Further, 
the letter claimed to have received “information that [KNHP] owns or operates the 
facility or generated or transported hazardous substances that were disposed of at the 
facility,” and encouraged the park 
614
 
  
While this effort appeared to have little merit based on the intentions of the NPS, it 
caused an immediate cessation of action by the local park staff and an order by the NPS 
regional director to have no further direct involvement with the site beyond technical 
                                                 
612 Corless, "The Significance and Status of the Quincy Smelting Works, Franklin Township, Michigan 
(White Paper)", 7. 
613 Ibid., 7. 
614 "Letter from EPA Region 5 to Frank Fiala, National Park Service-U.S. Department of the Interior," 
(Chicago: 2004). 
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expertise, leaving the care and future of the site to Franklin Township, a governmental 
unit with little excess revenue to fund the preservation and redevelopment of a 25-
structure National Historic Landmark site listed on the National Priorities List.615
The site languished under a perplexing cloud with EPA both supporting and 
subverting potential restoration and redevelopment.  While the EPA was ready to take 
“no action” and delist the site in the 1990s, the State of Michigan DEQ kept insisting that 
the EPA work to remediate known toxins in the stamp sands and slag and remove 
asbestos discovered in the early 2000s.  The EPA did not initially pursue actions because 
of the potential for a PRP, such as the NPS, to pay for the cleanup, but it did remove 
hazardous materials stored in drums and ultimately abated asbestos at the site while 
awaiting resolution of the National Park Service role.
 
616
 Public controversy, however, accompanied this superfund project from the 
beginning.  At early public meetings, residents commended the attempts to save the 
smelter site and criticized the efforts to cover other stamp sands, recommending that 
“EPA establish a defined protocol for the protection of these remarkable resources 
  The NPS, in the mean time, 
could not contribute to restoration planning because of its potential responsibility and 
liability.  Franklin Township could not apply for Brownfield, coastal zone management, 
or preservation grants because of the NPL designation.  Meanwhile, the site continued to 
disintegrate more with each passing winter, leading to further public controversies 
reflected in the joint city councils resolution cited at the beginning of this chapter. 
                                                 
615 Corless, "The Significance and Status of the Quincy Smelting Works, Franklin Township, Michigan 
(White Paper)," 7. 
616 "Proposed Plan for Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake," ed. Region 5 
U.S. EPA (Chicago: U.S. EPA, 2008), 4. 
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whenever they are encountered in any remediation activity.”617  Others clearly 
admonished the EPA for considering an option not to remediate the smelter site and some 
stamp sands because the potential for any toxicity must be addressed.618
required to consider all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements 
(ARARs) in selecting and implementing the remedial action.  National Historic 
Preservation Act and Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act are some of 
the ARARs to be considered… U.S. EPA will work with the MDNR (Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources), local townships, and necessary agencies to 
protect the historically valuable resources.  In addition, based on the development 
of certain areas as a historical park, the U.S. EPA has excluded those areas from 
the selected remedy.
  The EPA 
responded, that by law it was 
619
 
  
The lack of development or preservation activity with the smelter site after more 
than a decade of discussion coalesced a group of local citizens to form a support group 
initially called Save Quincy Smelter, but later formalized into the Quincy Smelter 
Association.  Conceived and formed by non-heritage professionals, the group initially 
called for the development of a shopping area and crafts center in the restored buildings.  
While this approach was not enthusiastically received by other stakeholders, especially 
local city managers whose struggling downtown business districts could use less 
competition, the controversy served to increase discussion about the site in the 
community and force other stakeholders to find more reasonable solutions that could 
satisfy the desires of the community and needs of historic preservation.  While the 
Quincy Smelter Association eventually backed away from the shopping development 
                                                 
617 "Responsiveness Summary, Torch Lake Superfund Site, Operable Units I and II, Houghton County, 
Michigan,” RS32. 
618 Ibid., RS30-RS32. 
619 Ibid., RS32-RS33. 
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concept, it has held several fundraisers and supported small projects around the site and 
been a public voice for the community.620
 In 2006, new inspections demonstrated that stamp sands at the smelter site 
continued to erode into the lake.
 
621   Further, the majority of the 12 superfund sites 
originally listed in the region had been officially remediated and, with deed restrictions in 
place, effectively became eligible for delisting from the NPL and available for 
appropriate redevelopment.622
But no formal activity to expand the national park to include the smelter site had 
occurred, and MDEQ continued to push for remediation projects, while the EPA began 
exploring options to finish its work at the smelter.  With the intent of ultimately 
amending the ROD regarding the smelter site from “no action because of National Park 
formation” to some remediation to meet its primary objective of eliminating existing 
hazards and the requests of MDEQ, EPA began planning for final remediation efforts.  
However, because of the joint Houghton-Hancock City Councils resolution calling for 
demolition of the smelter if no park partnership developed cited at the start of this 
chapter, U.S. Senator Carl Levin (Mich.) convened a series of stake-holder conference 
calls in 2007 with Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Franklin Township, 
the Natural Resource Conservation Service of the USDA, Michigan Technological 
University, and the Keweenaw National Historical Park specifically to engage all parties 
 This action, largely accomplished by 2005, pushed the 
EPA toward finalizing the last remediation plans for lingering sites.   
                                                 
620 Personal observation. 
621 "Proposed Plan for Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site,” 
4. 
622 "EPA Completes Construction at Torch Lake,”1 and 3.  By 2004, the Lake Linden sands and 
Hubbell/Tamarack locations had been delisted from the NPL. 
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interested in the site and find a lasting solution to preserve and remediate the site.623
  Several key decisions came from these meetings.  First, it opened a dialogue 
between the national park and EPA regarding the issue of superfund liability, ultimately 
resulting in a revocation of the EPA’s 2004 PRP claims on the NPS.
 
Curiously, the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office neglected to join the 
conversations, largely relying on NPS for Sections 106 and 110 guidance. 
624  Second, it 
allowed Franklin Township and key heritage experts at the National Park and MTU a 
voice in the final solution for the site.  Third, it encouraged direct discussions with EPA 
and regional stake holders interested in preservation and, with progress, likely 
encouraged Senator Levin, a long-time supporter of Copper Country preservation 
projects, to identify funding in the National Budget earmarked for the smelter site.  
Fourth, with progress toward preservation, Copper Country Preservation, Inc. (CCPI), a 
non-profit organization and wholly owned subsidiary of the KNHP advisory council, 
organized to support the park’s mission and partner sites, decided to support the smelter 
and local appropriations as its first fund-raising project.  In addition to a wide-spread 
letter-writing campaign supported by the National Parks Conservation Association, a 
national parks advocacy group, CCPI successfully lobbied the cities of Hancock and 
Houghton to each pledge $5,000 in 2008 for the restoration of the smelter site, an action 
called for in their 2007 resolution that also identified demolition as a potential option.625
                                                 
623 Personal involvement with the conference calls and follow up meetings. 
 
624 "Letter from EPA Region 5 to Mr. Jim Corless, Superintendant, Keweenaw National Park,"  (2009) 
625 Garrett Neese, "Smelter Group Seeks Money from Council," Daily Mining Gazette, September 25, 2008. 
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The EPA, fully aware of the historic nature of the site from the beginning and 
anxious to finish the project, now decided to remove the exiting slag piles and grade, cap, 
and vegetate all the exposed stamp sands outside the fence EPA erected in 2004 to secure 
the cluster of historic buildings on site to appease MDEQ.  (See Figure 7.5)  But with 
evidence citing the chemical stability of slag, including the Old Works Golf Course slag-
traps in Montana, EPA, following input from NPS and MTU, decided to leave the large 
slag piles in place with some form of passive deterrence to prevent direct public access 
and remediate the rest of the areas outside the fence line much like other stamp sands in 
the district.626   The revised plan was presented to the public at a January 2009 meeting 
with a follow up presentation of final design alternatives and ROD amendment scheduled 
for late July 2009.627
Although the smelter site is a long way from restoration, the decision to pursue a 
historic site rather than demolition and new construction seems to be fairly well 
established in the community.   In late June, 2009, Senator Levin announced an 
additional $1,000,000 for the smelter was expected to be earmarked for the 2010 Federal 
Budget.
  (See Figure 7.6)  
628
                                                 
626 "Proposed Plan for Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site,” 
5. 
  This appropriation, however, still had to be approved by the full Senate and 
survive the Senate/House conference committee and, even if approved, it won’t be able to 
be spent until winter breaks in 2010.  
627 "EPA Proposes Cleanup Plan for Quincy Smelter Erosion,” 1. 
628 Kurt Hauglie, "$1 Million Earmarked for Smelter," Daily Mining Gazette, June 27, 2009. 
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Figure 7.6 Quincy Smelter Base map for proposed final remediation 2009.  
The area inside the dashed lines will be graded, covered with soil, and vegetated 
to arrest erosion.  The slag plies (b) will be left alone but some passive restraint 
will be erected, such as a short fence.  The arrows indicate new water drainage 
from the hillside.  The buildings will not receive any further remediation 
treatment beyond the asbestos removal of 2008.  (Source: EPA, Proposed Plan for 
Record of Decision Amendment for Operable Unit 3 at Torch Lake Superfund Site, 5) 
If the Ducktown district is defined by the landscape and in Montana everything is 
large, then Michigan can be seen as the most diverse and least clustered.  Its mines were 
spread over three counties and 100 miles, it had three large mining companies in its eras 
of high production and declines instead of one.  It had the deepest mines and simplest 
processing.  It had the largest number of individual stakeholders involved in cleanup and 
heritage conflicts including the EPA, NPS, MTU, the State of Michigan, many different 
cities, three counties, and 19 contributing heritage sites. 
But its overall heritage planning was an odd mix of top-down planning coming 
from the National Park Service and, at the superfund sites,  EPA and the only partially 
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active State of Michigan, and, of course, bottom-up planning coming from the many 
heritage sites, the grass-roots groups that advocated the national park designation, and the  
Quincy Smelter Association.  However, because of the partnership nature of the KNHP 
and its limited staff size, the park does not impose much control over the partner sites and 
provides only limited technical and financial assistance.  However, it does have the 
resources and bureaucratic infrastructure to consider district-wide planning initiatives, 
unavailable to and likely unnecessary for individual sites, and the legal department of a 
federal bureaucracy to respond to letters “encouraging it, as a PRP, to pay for 
environmental restoration.”  At the same time, its partnership nature has limited the 
funding available to it for long-term restoration projects, thus forcing the NPS to work to 
find outside funding for projects it cannot afford. 
 The superfund project had only two direct impacts to the heritage of the region.  
First, it covered a considerable area of stamp sands that some considered benign and an 
essential part of the region’s character.   Second, although EPA wanted to walk away 
from the Quincy Smelter in 1992 (and not expend any remediation funding), it was 
forced to find a compromise solution between a slowly developing historic preservation 
plan advocated by a United States Senator, and the MDEQ’s desires for full remediation.  
While the solution does not address either concern fully, it does respect and respond to 
the most important components of both sides: protection of the historic structures and 
slag piles and a cap-and-cover solution for a substantial portion of the stamp sands to 
remediate questionable health dangers. 
341 
 
CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Two key factors combined to drive the dramatic technological change in 
American copper mining and smelting in the 19th century.  First, copper demand 
increased at such a rate in the industrial and modern periods that supply often required 
significant modifications to existing European technologies to reach greater output and 
efficiency.  Second, expansive lean and sulfur-rich lodes were discovered that required 
complex mechanical, chemical, and thermodynamic procedures to economically extricate 
the copper from its ores.  American copper demand was so great, and many of its primary 
ores so lean, that the industry further required massive corporate organizations and labor 
forces to ensure profitable scales of operations.  Important 19th and 20th century copper 
mines operated in more than twelve states.629
By 2008, copper production in the United States was largely concentrated on very 
low grade porphyry deposits in a few mining districts in Arizona, Utah, New Mexico, 
Nevada, and Montana, and processed at one of only three smelters in Arizona or Utah.  
Although the U.S. no longer had the largest output in the world, it still produced 1.25 
million metric tons of copper and processed scrap in 2008, which was a little above the 
  But such extensive copper recovery from 
ores, largely between 0.5% and 2% rich, meant that mining, milling, and smelting 
generated a considerable amount of waste, ultimately leading to significant 
environmental problems and significant Superfund remediation projects managed by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in, among other places, Montana, Tennessee, and 
Michigan.  
                                                 
629 The most important copper mines operated in Vermont, Tennessee, Michigan, Colorado, Montana, 
Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California, and Alaska. 
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yearly U.S. average for the preceding century.630
 Both the 2008 Montana and Michigan copper operations were relatively 
insignificant reflections of what the industry once meant to the economies of both 
regions, but in some small measure, the once dominant regions were still producing 
copper-rich materials using means and methods developed decades earlier.  The 
economic and technological continuity with the past contributed to the heritage and 
identities of both regions, especially as they neared the end of controversial Superfund 
remediation projects.  Although Tennessee had no active copper-related industry left after 
its last chemical plant closed in 2008, it too was nearing the end of active remediation. 
  Montana copper production, the 
smallest of five producing states, came from Montana Resources, Inc. in Butte, and a 
small portion of the total scrap handled in America came from Peninsula Copper, Inc.’s 
reprocessing of discarded copper-rich components and wire at the former Calumet and 
Hecla Smelter site in Hubbell, Michigan.  
 The Superfund projects in each district defined the end, maybe even the bitter 
end, of their once dominant mineralogical periods.  While two districts created 
noteworthy by-product processes, all three developed significant mining, milling, and 
smelting processes on a scale that created jobs, social structures, regional identities, waste 
streams, and significant wealth, the latter mostly for outside investors.  While there 
tended to be a fairly fluid exchange of mining workers and engineers between active 
                                                 
630 "Copper Statistics and Information," USGS Minerals Information, 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/, accessed July 8, 2009, and U. S. Geological 
Survey, "Copper Statistics," U.S. Geological Survey, http:// minerals.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/copper.pdf, 
accessed July 8, 2009.  Despite average production over 2 million metric tons per year in the late 1990s, the 
average annual production of refined copper including scrap in the US, from 1908-2008, was 1.19 million 
metric tons.  In 2008 Chile and Peru were the top two copper producers in the world. 
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mining districts, later and older generations tended to stay put, especially as production 
ended.  Those later residents had to face the ultimate decline of production and the 
indignities of not only deepening mineralogical insignificance, but the implicit culpability 
of being a party to serious environmental degradation without necessarily sharing in 
much, if any, of the wealth generated by mining. 
 
 This dissertation examined the effects of environmental remediation on the 
heritage and preservation of industrial regions, specifically examining copper smelting in 
a broader mining landscape, and the complex negotiations undertaken and compromises 
reached by outside remediaters and inside preservationists as each argued for what they 
considered was the best course of action.  Chapters 1-4 explored the technological and 
environmental history of copper smelting from its pre-historic origins through the 20th 
century when American copper mines and smelters dominated world production and the 
American economy dominated world consumption.  Chapters 5-7 focused on three of the 
most significant 19th-century copper mining districts in the United States—the 
Keweenaw Peninsula of Michigan, the Butte-Anaconda district in Montana, and the 
Ducktown district in Tennessee—and investigated the conflict between historic 
preservation and environmental remediation.   
 The question posed in the introduction of this dissertation asked: 
 How does a community that desires to preserve and commemorate parts of its 
history articulate and negotiate that desire in the face of sometimes overwhelming 
opposition, in this case, from a well-funded organization aimed at remediating the 
waste streams that emanated from that very same historic landscape when the 
historic resources in question stand in the way of the simplest and most linear 
means of remediation?  
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The answer required an initial understanding of the economic, demographic, and 
perception/value systems of the communities being examined.  This analysis suggested a 
predictive model for the experiences of the three districts that could be extrapolated to 
examine other rural mining and smelting locations facing declining fortunes and 
increasing concern about the legacy of industry.  (See Below)  Using the model to 
compare the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana districts ultimately contributed to an 
understanding of the forces that led to the three heritage-remediation compromise 
landscapes.       
 
Mining District Heritage Model 
 
 Each of the three districts went through four distinct phases:  (1) significant 
growth in the 19th century, (2) periods of high production in the early 20th century, (3) a 
period of decline that ultimately led to (4) the abandonment of (most) mining and 
smelting operations by the end of the 20th century.  All three also had significant and 
persistent environmental issues leading to listing on the Superfund National Priorities 
List (NPL) or, in the case of Ducktown, Tennessee, a negotiated non-listing with all the 
legal and procedural requirements of a listed site.  All three also spawned significant and 
expanding heritage movements to commemorate their once-proud history—movements 
that began as the output of each district began to decline. 
 At each phase—growth, high-production, decline, and abandonment—issues of 
economics and environment/landscape change had clear implications for the self identity 
and external perceptions of each region, and many of these issues unfolded along parallel 
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lines.  These parallel effects suggest a model to illustrate how historic districts deal with 
both their contaminated pasts and heritage concerns.  This short section will explore this 
model, which may have implications for future studies of historic industrial districts 
undergoing environmental remediation.  
The life span of any extractive industrial district follows a rough bell curve based 
on the productivity of and income generated from its mines.  (See Figure 8.1) 
In most instances, mines have significant growth in their early lives, leading to varied 
production highs, but as ore quality and quantity dwindle, mining declines.  Some 
districts may have substantial deposits of lower-grade ores that, after the richer early ores 
are harvested, can prolong life, but these usually require a significant increase in the scale 
of operations.631
                                                 
631 In reality, mine productivity and profits do not map to simple bell curves, but rather are significantly 
influenced by the fluctuating demand and price of the commodity, lessening ore quality, and evolving 
technology in complex and myriad ways leading to many productivity peaks and valleys over the life of the 
  Ultimately, however, when the quality of ore gets too low to mine and 
Figure 8.1 Income from Mining, broadly defined and based on productivity, 
increases through growth and high-production periods then declines as ore quality 
decreases to a point that mining becomes unprofitable.  The growth period in most 
profitable and long-lived districts, however, is relatively short and steep and the 
decline is long and slow. (Source: Author) 
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process profitably, the district’s extractive history comes to an end, often leaving behind 
physical remnants of the once-productive landscape including structures, mining cavities, 
and mining and processing wastes accumulated over decades of mining efforts under 
limited or non-existent waste-handling regulations. 
Montana copper production, which, for example, did not exist in any significant 
quantity before 1880, grew to 100 million pounds per year in 1887, out producing the 
reigning Michigan district.  By the late mid-1910s, Montana was averaging over 300 
million pounds of copper per year before declining back to 100 million pounds in the 
mid-1940s.  Although the Berkeley Pit sustained production in the district until 1982, 
underground mining came to a halt in the 1960s.    
Population size of the districts followed a similar early trajectory to income, but 
stabilized after mining ended.  (See Figure 8.2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
mine.  Mining companies, especially in the 20th century, diversified production, opened new ore deposits, 
and vertically integrated to hedge against declining mine production in any one region. 
Figure 8.2 District Population of mining and metal processing regions will 
increase through growth and high-production phases, then as mining declines, many 
people will leave the area searching for work, ultimately leaving a relatively 
stagnant population of long-term residents. (Source: Author) 
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 In many cases in the United States, new mining deposits were found in rural and 
isolated areas as geologists ventured west exploring new territories.  Often after the 
removal of indigenous populations, mining and metal processing expanded rapidly during 
the growth and high-production mining stages with sometimes vast numbers of European 
and Euro-American settlers moving in and building towns with downtown districts, 
theaters, saloons, and new housing developments to support and service the burgeoning 
new populations.  However, when mine production slowed leading eventually to 
operational abandonment, many people, mostly younger, left the regions looking for 
work.  They left behind a much smaller group of people, now many second, third, or 
fourth generation residents, who considered themselves locals with a birthright to the 
heritage of the region and a strong affinity for the landscape.  They tried to sustain their 
communities in the face of declining economic conditions.  Members of this group were 
often the initiators and drivers of the first heritage and commemoration projects, and also 
the key population the EPA was concerned about protecting.  Houghton County’s 
population, for example, increased during the region’s mining growth period reaching a 
recorded high in 1910 of 88,098.  Following peak production later in the decade, the 
county’s population dropped to 71,930 in 1920, then to 52,581 in 1930.  By the 1950s the 
population reached the mid 30,00s and has remained near 35,000 from 1960-2000.632
In the growth and high-production mining phases, regional identity was generally 
favorable and based on the success of mineral operations and the importance of its mines, 
their financial returns, and their associated political power.   (See Figure 8.3)  
   
                                                 
632 “County Population Census Counts 1900-90.” U.S. Census Bureau,    
www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/index.html, (accessed August 12, 2009). 
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The region itself, if not the state within which the mines, mills, and smelters resided, 
sometimes had high average individual incomes and a strong tax base directly derived 
from mining.  The mineral companies themselves often had fairly strong political 
influence on local and sometimes state and national governments, and were thus able to 
keep their operations free from many economically distracting influences like foreign 
competition, waste disposal restrictions, and organized labor.  Most local residents in 
these periods of growth were not really local, but new to the region, lured by the prospect 
of good-paying jobs and had a larger affiliation with the industry and had favorable views 
toward the work.633
                                                 
633 This argument, however, is not intended to minimize the significant conflicts that erupted in mining 
districts between mine management and labor over issues of safety, wages, paternalism, and unionization as 
production increased and then decreased, or to suggest that political conflict did not disrupt the continuous 
development of certain regions, or that mining companies did not garner substantial and unlawful political 
control.  It merely suggests that mining growth and expansion tended to be viewed broadly as providing 
positive economic returns.  While the identity of a region on a broad scale can be seen as positive with 
positive growth, often that positive identity is more clearly focused in later phases when the negative 
   When the Anaconda Copper Mining Company beat Calumet and 
Figure 8.3 General Perceptions and Self Identity of a region are usually 
favorable as the district is producing wealth, but decline as output slows, incomes 
drop, and the reality of environmental contamination set in.  It will likely rise 
again as remediation efforts finish and the region is officially delisted from the 
NPL and heritage projects commemorate the region. (Source: Author) 
349 
 
Hecla’s attempt to shut down the Montana industry and Butte became the largest copper 
mining district in the world in 1887, local newspapers proclaimed the victory.  Similarly, 
during their periods of high production both Michigan and Montana copper districts 
celebrated their contributions to copper mining proclaiming their world-leading output 
and the world’s largest steam-hoist, smoke-stack, and smelter, and the world’s deepest 
copper mines. 
However, as production slows and infrastructure improvements decline, there is 
less investment in the workforce, often causing strikes over unsafe working conditions, 
and, with significant environmental decay, local morale and external perception of the 
once-productive district falls, sometimes to very low levels.  Butte and Anaconda’s 
designation as the “ugliest spot in Montana” and one of the “world’s must-miss vacation 
spots,” and articles on Tennessee’s Copper Basin titled “the Death of Ducktown” and 
“Copper Basin Cover-up” clearly echo the negative perceptions generated during periods 
of decline.  With positive redevelopment in these regions—both in terms of growing 
heritage consciousness and remediation of obvious health risks—perceptions of life in the 
region, both internal and external improve. (See Figure 8.3) 
 While production increases through the first two mining phases, the landscape 
changes accordingly, and sometimes at alarming rates often leading to an awareness by 
some, of growing environmental threats.  (See Figure 8.4)  The wastes generated by 
mining operations were only important to the mining companies if they presented a 
production bottleneck problem, or could at some point in the future be processed for 
                                                                                                                                                 
regional perceptions that accompany production declines, abandonment, and considerations of 
contamination cause reflection on earlier, better times. 
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income-generating by-products or reprocessed for valuable materials lost using earlier, 
less-efficient concentrating methods.  Actual environmental degradation during the first 
phases, however, was only important to those who were not part of the capital-
generating-machine or outside of the company influence and being negatively affected.   
These parties usually had limited recourse except to take the offending industries to court 
and sue for property damages.  In some instances, the offending industry simply paid the 
damages, acquired the damaged properties, or installed pollution control equipment if the 
toxic waste had some salable value.  These options were often considered a less-costly 
alternative to fighting court cases even those a mining company would likely win.  If the 
environmental landscape change was significant enough and highly visible, then the 
problems were written about in newspapers, journals, or textbooks, but little was usually 
Figure 8.4 Environmental Degradation Concern has only a modest effect on 
operations in the growth and high-production phase and declines if the mine has 
enough capital and political influence to buy-out those concerned.  However, it 
increases considerably as mining slows and communities assess the long-term 
environmental costs of having hosted extractive industries that may no longer 
provide any economic benefits to the area.  However, in some instances, growth-
period pollution did not exist on a large enough scale to warrant early concern 
like Michigan, while in other districts, the effects of early pollution did not 
decline, and concern remained high until environmental concern mounted in the 
abandonment and superfund periods like in Tennessee. (Source: Author) 
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done to hamper the income-generating capacity of the industry.   Tennessee/Georgia, and 
Montana farmers and land holders, for example, suffered from the deleterious effects of 
mining and smelting and took the offending companies to court in the early 20th century.  
Anaconda successfully handled its pollution problems with settlements, land purchases, 
and negotiated changes to practice, and, after environmental degradation concern dropped 
in the early 1930s, could continue operating largely without concern about pollution until 
the 1970s.  While the Keweenaw never saw an early concern for environmental 
contamination, the Ducktown district never lost the stigma of pollution.  After lawsuits 
forced them to change practices, albeit to new systems that resulted in significantly 
improved profits, Tennessee copper companies began remediating the landscape and 
continued to do so in 2009.  Its concern never went away, but did increase substantially, 
like Michigan’s and Montana’s, as new toxins were identified in the later abandonment 
and superfund periods.  
  These early concerns about environmental change formed the roots of later 
responses to landscape remediation in the districts, especially after mining and processing 
slow down or are abandoned.   Quieted sometimes, but never extinguished, 
environmental concern grows significantly after mine productivity declines, often 
following, but not necessarily related to, the establishment of national social-political 
conservation movements (especially following EPA investigations of sites under 
Superfund).   
 In the period of decline, as extractive output slows, people and communities do 
not earn as much as they did before, workers benefits and jobs are cut, companies do not 
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invest in infrastructure or productive improvements as much, and the regional population 
starts to drop almost as fast as it grew in the early stages.  With declining mine output and 
community wealth, especially noticeable after another mining region surpasses their 
once-significant productive capacity, communities’ identities start to change, and second, 
third, and fourth generation locals begin to notice how much money has left the region, 
and how much they will soon have to contend with rising unemployment, a declining tax 
base, declining property values, an aging population, and the environmental and health 
impacts left behind.  With declining tax income and lessening corporate support for 
community projects, towns start looking shabbier as structures are torn down, burned 
down, or just abandoned and left to deteriorate, affecting the self identity and external 
perception of the region.  (See Figure 8.3)   
Blame is hard to assign by these communities unless a “new” corporate entity, 
such as a petroleum company, can be targeted for causing much of the economic decline 
and contamination, like in Montana.  But, in other instances, the new corporate entity 
may be seen as the savior fixing the problems to the landscape that no-one in particular is 
to blame for, such as in Tennessee.  In other instances, the communities tacitly blame the 
U.S. Government for its wanton disregard for the region’s well-being during the 
industrial decline and the instigation negative changes in public opinion after the EPA 
declares an area contaminated and in need of significant cleanup.  The government, in 
turn, often desperately searches for someone to blame (pay) for the environmental 
problems, especially if there are acute threats to human health and expensive remediation 
alternatives.  
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Despite varying degrees of culpability among stakeholders, this is also the time 
that locals start thinking back to their times of prosperity (the “golden age”) 
independently and begin commemorating their past, like all three districts in this study, 
with small heritage projects like museums, National Register nominations, and 
interpretive/educational programs in an attempt to hold on to or regain some bit of the 
dignity lost with the decline.  (See Figure 8.5) 
 
Like the early concern for environmental degradation, these early heritage projects often 
serve as the roots for later heritage projects, especially after Superfund statues allocate 
funding beyond remediation and other federal laws mandate consideration of the effects 
of all federal projects on cultural resources.  Both early heritage concerns and early 
environmental concerns reflect the desires of the community, but each needs a powerful 
Figure 8.5  Heritage Values of a region, or the concern for commemorating the 
past, begin to grow as industries decline.  Residents look to commemorate their 
once-glorious past as a means of retaining self-respect and generating tourism and 
economic development opportunities.  Value and perception of the landscape 
become much more important as mining and mining income dwindle in the decline 
phase.  
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agent of change like Superfund to really awaken and drive the formalization of localized 
planning.   
In the 1960s, genuine and mounting concern about the health effects of the more 
invisible toxins generated by industry grew following new studies on hazardous wastes 
and human health.  This concern contributed to a growing social-political movement 
against environmental degradation and led Congress to enact its first statues regulating 
industrial effluent levels.  In the ensuing decades, Congress passed specific laws limiting 
air pollution, limiting water pollution, regulating transportation and disposal of hazardous 
wastes, and regulating the cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste.  Most of these new 
laws were enacted after a century of American industrial dominance had left significant 
scars on the landscape and other nations, with lower production costs and weaker 
environmental laws, came to dominate global mineral production.   
 Near the end of production in a mining district, the environmental effects of the 
once former grand industry seem much more pronounced because they are no longer part 
of an income-generating productive process, and popular opinion turns decidedly 
antagonistic.  Community identity is nearly at its all-time low as locals feel abandoned 
and contaminated by the industry that once gave their community purpose.  Almost 
worse, governmental outsiders judge the town’s environmental problems as a result of the 
new environmental laws.  If they decide it needs significant Federal effort to remediate, 
the decision often undermines hopes of new tourism-based development.  By now the 
region has been completely cleared of its mineral wealth, the community’s tax base is 
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gone, many of the jobs/people are gone too, and all that remains are the toxic residues 
and the negative association of being declared a Superfund site.  (See Figure 8.3)   
External judgment and the remediation process present conflicting alternatives to 
communities.  While a Superfund project in a town reflects the acknowledgment of and 
remedy to past sins leading, hopefully, to a “clean bill of health” and a readiness to 
redevelop damaged lands, the very same clean up announces to the world that this place 
is contaminated and not suitable for immediate redevelopment.  Tourism in many ways 
fits nicely into this scenario, because people visit the region for a short time, not long 
enough to be contaminated, but long enough to inject money into the local economy.  
Ironically, remediation efforts often spur historic preservation and heritage awareness 
because they threaten to destroy remaining potential sources of pride and revenue. 
 At this point preserving and promoting heritage become increasingly effective 
because parts of the clean-up legislation allow for cultural improvement.  However, many 
of the clean-up professionals and managers, without the sense of identity shared by the 
locals, are mostly interested in fixing the threats to human health and the environment, 
not heritage preservation.  The first and often least expensive remediation considerations 
are often to demolish standing features, and grade and cover contamination—even 
historically significant structures—often causing heritage-minded locals, but not 
necessarily development-minded locals, to sense the impending loss of their heritage 
landscape and identity more acutely.  (See Figure 8.5)     
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Landscapes 
 Copper mining and smelting in Montana, Tennessee, and Michigan left important 
legacies for later generations described by the model above and Table 8.1 below.    
 
All three mining districts were developed on important ore lodes, in stunning 
mountainous or hilly surroundings, near rich waterways and thick woods.  All three 
developed or adapted technologies and social structures to overcome the challenges of the 
natural landscape and wrest copper from the local rock.  These actions ultimately 
elevated two of the districts to the top copper-producing-district in the world, and the 
Table 8.1 Legacy and Reaction 
 Michigan  Tennessee  Montana  
Primary Ore Type  Native  Sulfide  Sulfide  
Copper Mining and 
Smelting Operations  
1844-1969  1854-1987  1880-1980  
Superfund Listing  1986  2001  1983  
Contamination Threat 
to Human Health  
Low  High  High  
Key  Environmental 
Problem  
Mill Tailings  Acid Production, 
Smelter Effluent  
Mill Tailings,  
Smelter Effluent  
Expected Cost of 
Cleanup  
$15,000,000 
(fifteen million)  
$100,000,000s 
(hundreds of 
millions)  
$1,000,000,000 
(one billion)  
Cleanup Funder  EPA-”Super-Fund”  Occidental 
Petroleum  
ARCO (BP)  
Post mining Economic 
Recovery  
Heritage, University, 
Continued Industry  
Heritage, U.S. 
Government  
Heritage, Univ., 
Continued 
Industry  
Heritage Priority  High  High  High  
Heritage Planning  NPS-Community-
NHL-HAER  
Cleanup Co.-EPA-
NR  
Community-
NHL-HAER  
Community Size  Medium  Small  Medium  
Earliest Museum  1920s/1958  1977  1963  
Heritage Success?  High  Medium  High  
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third to national importance, and created landscapes that some locals perceived as heroic.  
Those same forces that created the heroic landscape, however, also significantly degraded 
the environment.  The combination of mining decline, economic decline, blight, and loss 
of prestige with the need to clean up past egregious behavior and the stigma of Superfund 
led to an ethos of defeat.   
 Both historic mining and environmental degradation legacies led to important 
decisions regarding these opposing community needs.  On the one side, the desire to 
commemorate the once significant and heroic past and lure visitors to their region drove 
locals to preserve historic buildings and landscapes, develop museums, and try to 
recapture some of the district’s former glory and character.  The value of the tourism 
market, which had become the second or third leading industry in each state by the 
1950s, was not lost on local heritage planners in the economically declining mining 
regions.  On the other hand, the desire to clean up the region and eliminate the stigma of 
sometimes very serious contamination drove efforts to remediate the landscape as 
thoroughly as possible and move on to redevelopment projects not necessarily directed at 
short-term visitors, but instead aimed toward creating investment opportunities for the 
people who already lived there or luring long-term investments from outside the region.  
Negotiating a resolution between these two competing legacies, represented in principal 
by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), ultimately 
created the landscape of compromise.  
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 The heroic landscape of the Butte-Anaconda district reflected its large scale.  
Sitting in a towering and beautiful mountain-scape at the Continental Divide, the one-
time largest non-ferrous mining corporation in the world built the largest smelter complex 
and tallest smelter stack.  Although Michigan mining and smelting structures were built 
on a smaller scale, it sat in a region of arguably equal beauty.  Its one-time world-
dominant copper production began with the first large-scale mining boom in the United 
States, was dispersed over a 100-mile three-county mineral range, produced 82% of the 
nation’s copper at one time, and had some of the world’s deepest hard-rock mines.  While 
Tennessee’s copper production never rivaled Michigan’s or Montana’s, it created, 
although does not celebrate, the largest sulfuric-acid-making plant in the world and 
perfected nearly fuel-free pyritic smelting.  To the residents who live there, however, the 
heroic landscape (barren and treeless) reflected a very long-lived and prosperous 
industry.   
The early landscapes of defeat in Montana and Tennessee reflected mostly the 
pollution residue from processing and smelting sulfide ores which had created significant 
and early smelter smoke problems and led to important lawsuits against the mining 
companies.  Although the Anaconda Copper Mining Company resolved many of the legal 
challenges to its operations by 1933, the Tennessee Copper Company (TCC) and 
Ducktown Copper Sulfur and Iron Company (which TCC bought in 1936) were, in the 
1930s, just coming to terms with the scale of vegetation loss and erosion left by 19th 
century smelting operations.  Although Anaconda (as an ARCO subsidiary) would 
eventually use the cost of compliance with pollution regulations to justify closing its 
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expensive and out-dated Washoe smelter in 1980, it had largely operated without 
significant concerns about environmental litigation from the 1930s until EPA came in 
under Superfund in the 1980s.  The Tennessee Copper Company, or one of its later 
corporate incarnations, on the other hand, would work with federal and state agencies for 
75 years to remedy the pollution-generated denuded landscape before it too faced larger 
remediation issues under Superfund in the 1990s, reflecting a very different experience 
with federal agencies than Montana or Michigan. 
The Michigan landscape, however, never suffered from significant environmental 
problems in its early phase.  It generated coal-smoke, denuded some of the surrounding 
forests for mining needs, and dumped its tailings into waterways, but its mines were so 
spread out in the district that timber was never that far away, and its major 20th century 
mills, more centrally located in Houghton County, simply moved to nearby locales on 
larger or non-navigable streams or lakes when the Army Corps of Engineers complained 
that their mill wastes interfered with navigation.  
 The more serious landscape of defeat for all three districts occurred during the 
declining or post-mining periods after most metals processing had ended and concern 
about contamination swelled.  Tailings in Montana after a century of mining were heavily 
contaminated with a variety of carcinogenic materials including heavy metals, arsenic, 
and processing chemicals.  Tailings, often dumped directly into nearby streams, were 
washed up to 125 miles down the Clark Fork during spring floods, littering and 
contaminating its entire length from Butte to impoundment dams in Milltown.  Further, 
arsenic dust from smelting was distributed through smoke and settled on soils and in 
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homes creating especially dangerous conditions near smelter stacks.  Acidic waters 
drained from the mines, and chemical residues from mining and smelting, slag, and ash 
were all dumped on or indiscriminately disbursed into the landscape creating 
groundwater and air contamination.  All of these conditions led to the largest Superfund 
site in the country, and one of the costliest.    
Building- and community-loss furthered the sense of defeat in the Butte-
Anaconda landscape.  Significant loses began with the opening of the Berkeley Pit in 
1952, and continued in the 1970s with the threat of pit expansion, the rash of arsons, and 
general neglect.  Exacerbating these loses were the growing complexity and cost of the 
Superfund project, beginning in the 1980s.  EPA planners often considered 
(contaminated) building demolition a cheaper alternative to remediation and preservation 
as at the Washoe Smelter in Anaconda.  Exacerbating these conditions were highly 
visible events such as the relocation of Mill Creek residents in 1986 and the death of 342 
snow geese in 1995. 
 Tennessee was also forced to deal with significant contamination including large 
lead accumulations from its several acid plants, slag and ash dumps near former smelting 
sites, chemical spills, acid mine drainage, and heavy metal- and chemical-laden 
sediments that washed into the Tennessee River watershed from major erosion.  Further, 
the smoke-denuded moonscape in the middle of heavily-wooded East Tennessee became 
a national, if not international spectacle after a two-page photo spread appeared in 
National Geographic Magazine in June, 1973.  Adding to the defeat, several of the 
district’s underground mines collapsed creating areas that were (and are) inaccessible to 
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people, and even the community’s effort to preserve a small portion of the denuded 
landscape behind the museum failed.   
While Glenn Springs Holdings (GSH), the environmental arm of the responsible 
party in Tennessee, negotiated to keep the EPA from listing Ducktown on the National 
Priorities List (NPL) to avoid, it claimed, the stigma of Superfund-association, it agreed 
to fund the cleanup as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by 
EPA, Glenn Springs, and the State of Tennessee.  Further, to stay off the NPL, GSH was 
required to follow the same public-involvement, remedial investigation, work-planning, 
execution, and EPA- oversight procedures as if the site had been listed.  Despite the 
success of staying clear of the NPL, the region continued to carry the stigma of a 
distressed and degraded landscape because of persistent imagery, public involvement, 
and the on-going EPA-guided cleanup. 
Nonetheless, the cleanup remained privately funded and privately managed on 
private land, and, although Glenn Springs publically promoted its efforts to remediate the 
area and contributed to numerous community projects, it was still a private project and 
not required to abide by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act as 
interpreted by the EPA, Tennessee SHPO, and GSH.  Over the entire process from the 
cessation of mining, Ducktown, like Butte-Anaconda, lost much of its structural 
character, not only due to economic decline and neglect, but also to cleanup decisions 
that selected less expensive remediation alternatives to preservation. 
Michigan, on the other hand, never suffered heavily from environmental problems 
or stigmas.  The district, because of its age and disbursed mining locations, lost many of 
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its structures to neglect, abandonment, or redevelopment as mining and economic centers 
moved closer to Houghton over 100 years.  Despite this loss, the abandonment of places, 
in some ways, led to the growth of early heritage tourism and the exploration of ghost 
towns.  The biggest problem the EPA identified in Michigan under Superfund was copper 
and heavy metal-contaminated stamp sands that only posed a human health threat if the 
sands were going to be redeveloped into residential property, otherwise the sands were 
considered less critical environmental threats.  The EPA covered the tailings with a soil 
and vegetative cap, a preventable loss to some in the district who considered the tailings 
an important and largely benign historic feature of the landscape. 
In all three districts, many of the environmental remedies simply erased character 
and identity.  In Montana and Michigan, re-graded landscapes and smoothed out bumps 
designed to keep new soil intact while non-native grasses grew left a muted and 
somewhat subdued, or even boring landscape.  The revegetation efforts in Tennessee 
were limited to the few tree and grass species that could tolerate the contamination, 
leading to significant lack of biodiversity in the “new” woods that feel more like a tree 
farm than a forest.   
 
Landscapes of Compromise 
 In all three of the districts the two opposing schools of landscape restoration were 
represented by those that wanted the landscape’s natural beauty and cleanliness restored 
(to acceptable levels) so they could get back to the business of economic redevelopment, 
and those that wanted historic landscape features preserved or restored to celebrate the 
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past and revitalize the declining economy through tourism.  However, the three regions 
did not hold onto their historic character equally.  An important key to successful 
preservation negotiation was often the size and diversity of the preservation-minded 
population and their successful arguments against certain types of remediation 
alternatives.  
 Similarities existed among the districts.  Both Montana and Tennessee had large 
petroleum companies ultimately take responsibility for the remediation, spending from 
hundreds of millions of dollars to one billion dollars, some of which went to preservation 
projects in both districts.  Both had significant air pollution problems from sulfur smoke 
disbursed over a wide area and significant tailings or water runoff problems affecting 
rivers that spread their contaminants downstream.  Both had air and water problems that 
affected areas far away from the mining district.  Both had large, post-mining 
contaminant disposal problems and highly visible landscape degradation.  Both the 
Tennessee Copper Company and Anaconda operated demonstration farms in the 20th 
century in a vain attempt to prove there was no contamination.   
Michigan and Butte shared different characteristics.  Both regions led world-
production at one point.  Both had relatively large populations and diverse heritage 
planning communities augmented by new arrivals to the region.  Both had state 
technological universities in the mining district.  Both had significant heritage projects 
leading to National Historic Landmark designations and HAER documentations.   
Tennessee and Michigan each had early mining histories impacted by the Civil War, were 
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in naturally beautiful areas, and wished to celebrate their pasts, but little else relevant in 
common for this dissertation. 
  Where Ducktown had a relatively small, stable, population of long-time 
residents, Butte-Anaconda had a larger population with influxes of new people at various 
times related to new government programs in the 1970s and the presence of Montana 
Tech.  Butte also had a major interstate and airport that easily brought people into and 
through town.  Its larger population allowed Butte to generate several special interest 
groups focused on preservation.  Many of its new residents were educated, and some 
even had interests in the preservation of industrial remains.  These outsiders came to 
Butte-Anaconda with something to contrast it to as well.  Few people came from a region 
with a Berkeley Pit, gallows frames dominating a hillside, a structure like the Anaconda 
Stack, or a Superfund site as large, and the new residents evaluated the landscape as it 
stood when they arrived, not how it used to be.   
The special interest groups and preservation-minded newcomers augmented a 
preservation movement begun by locals in the 1950s.  Together, they generated National 
Historic Landmark nominations, created a museum, started an archive, and passed several 
local preservation ordinances that included historic mining and industrial features.  They 
pursued many projects and, with knowledge of preservation law and well-organized 
efforts, were able to exert political pressure, articulate preservation desires, and negotiate 
long-term plans to confront the pending loss of cultural resources and historic landscapes 
by Superfund projects.  Even the State Historic Preservation Office ceded control over 
Section 106 issues to the local counties (to insure speedy resolution of issues generated 
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by the cleanup).  Overall, the Butte-Anaconda district preservation population was the 
most organized, bottom-up oriented, and successful of the three. 
 Although Butte-Anaconda, and by extension Milltown, had the largest Superfund 
site, in some ways it was the also best set up to negotiate and promote heritage, or to 
corrupt a concept from M- L. Quinn cited in Chapter 5, the region had heritage-
susceptibility.  With a sizeable population of educated, preservation-oriented, and 
planning-minded people aware of the law, an established National Historic Landmark 
district, maybe even a bit of historic activism left in the once heavy-unionized 
community, and a very wealthy, but not necessarily cooperative, responsible party with a 
desire to end the expensive cleanup as soon as it could, heritage compromises were frank 
and decisive.   Further, the district was successful in getting National Park Service 
recognition through the HAER project and successive National Historic Landmark 
district expansions, although unsuccessful at getting a national historical park in Butte-
Anaconda.  Whether or not a formal unit of the National Park focused on historic mining 
and smelting would ultimately have helped the active heritage community or complicated 
negotiations, in the long-run, the Butte-Anaconda community was able to define what it 
wanted and how it wanted it, and negotiate/compromise to get much of it.    
One of the key factors influencing the Ducktown heritage process, on the other 
hand, was a heavy EPA and corporate presence that largely overshadowed the local 
preservation population, which was relatively small.  Although both the EPA and Glenn 
Springs Holdings (GSH) considered and interacted with the locals, many of whom were 
not dissatisfied with GSH, the company largely drove both the remediation process and 
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heritage process, making heritage decisions with limited public consultation.  Further, the 
population of the region, many of whom wanted heritage and the 30-acre denuded 
landscape behind the museum preserved, was small.  While the small size of the 
population ultimately made it easier for Glenn Springs to make effective community 
contributions and generate local support, the population was not large or diverse enough 
to generate planning committees to oppose certain heritage decisions or even lobby for 
different actions.   Often the cleanup company talked to the same group about 
remediation, as mandated by the MOU, as it did about heritage issues.  Further the 
Ducktown Basin Museum, the key heritage organization in the area, was too underfunded 
and understaffed to really push for a strong heritage plan it would have to administer in 
the long-run.  Despite some well intentioned GSH- and EPA-managed heritage projects 
in the overall work plan, these conditions ultimately led to a relatively weak voice for 
preservation that was further worsened by the inapplicability of Section 106.  In many 
ways this was the most top-down planning of the three districts.  Moreover, heritage 
decisions were being made largely by the remediation experts, not heritage experts.  
 The key difference between the Michigan cleanup and the Ducktown and Butte-
Anaconda cleanups was its simplicity.  Michigan’s Superfund project dealt mainly with 
tailings dumped in and exposed in Torch Lake, Portage Lake, and Lake Superior.  
Outside of relatively minor removal of contaminated wastes and storage containers, the 
project mostly simply graded, capped, and covered exposed tailings at 10 of the 13 
locations.  This relatively small area and relatively simple work resulted in a 
comparatively inexpensive cleanup compared to the other two and also likely influenced 
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EPA’s withdraw of its normally aggressive pursuit of potentially responsible parties.  
Although the project was federally funded and managed making Section 106 applicable, 
only one of the sites, the Quincy Smelter, had properties determined eligible for the 
National Register. 
The Michigan Copper Country, like Butte-Anaconda, had a fairly stable 
population and a means of drawing new people in through a local university that had an 
active program dedicated to industrial heritage that sponsored heritage research 
throughout the region.  Further, after 1992 the new Keweenaw National Historical Park 
(KNHP) brought in additional educated historians and historic architects to work with the 
19 formal community-partner sites and many other related sites, and also completed 
regional management planning documents and cultural landscape reports that supported 
the NPS mission.  In addition, unlike the other regions, the Keweenaw had a well 
established patron in the U.S. Senate who actively pursued funding earmarks for heritage 
projects, including the smelter.  So in many ways, Michigan’s landscape diversity 
extended to its preservation community too.  With similar community groups as Butte, 
Michigan’s Copper Country hosted a relatively large cadre of professional heritage 
practitioners.  Michigan copper heritage, as opposed to Montana and Tennessee, 
however, had neither a strictly bottom-up nor top-down approach to heritage 
management.    
Of the three sites, Michigan had the simplest heritage conflict with Superfund but 
also the least amount of money available for alternate projects like preservation.  
Although the remediation plan seemed simple, EPA both encouraged preservation by 
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recognizing the importance of the smelter (which also simplified its workload and final 
costs), but also complicated preservation when it attempted to extract money from NPS to 
pay for asbestos removal at the site, forcing the most active heritage professionals away 
from the project for nearly two years.   
In the long-run, however, EPA worked to find compromise solutions to 
remediation issues at the Quincy Smelter to appease environmental concerns generated 
by the State of Michigan, while respecting the heritage of the site to appease the NPS, 
Sections 106 and 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act, and many members of 
the community.  In the long run, however, copper mining and smelting heritage in 
Michigan was not affected very much by Superfund.  EPA focused on stamp sands, but 
not all of them, and Michigan’s other historic copper mining resources were spread out 
over a wide area, most of which EPA was not interested in, so preservation had to do 
much more with combating neglect and inappropriate redevelopment than anything else, 
which is ultimately part of the KNHP’s mission.  This is not to argue that all sites in the 
region need preservation either, which is not only not necessary, but impossible.    
 In the end, all three regions successfully commemorated their pasts with 
museums, historic sites, and National Register nominations, but they were not equal in 
how their heritage was expressed in their landscapes.  The two larger districts, with more 
significant production, elevated their sites to National Historic Landmark Districts and 
welcomed HAER documentation projects.  All three districts had interpretive signage 
explaining historic processes that gave their districts significance, but Ducktown and 
Montana, home to more significant environmental damage and cleanup, interpreted the 
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desecration of the environment caused by mining and the  near-heroic efforts to 
remediate it alongside the technological and social histories.  Part of the success in 
Michigan and Montana has to reside with the influx of newcomers interested in the 
landscape.  While many people involved in preservation in both communities were local, 
newcomers brought a perception of the landscape not compromised by loss and defeat 
and helped coalesce local heritage preservation into a movement. 
On the other side of the negotiation, EPA’s mission to protect human health and 
the environment drove its activities and defined how it approached other, less mission-
direct activities.  In superfund projects, EPA project managers, often from district 
headquarters far-removed from the region, approached an NPL-listed site to find a quick 
“fix” for the problem of contamination without the attachment or regional identity of a 
local resident.  While this detachment may make remediation decisions simpler and 
appear less biased, it also meant that managers who participated in heritage decisions 
were missing an important heritage value associated with local identity.   
EPA managers understand that the community must be involved and that the EPA 
must consider residents’ opinions and factor those opinions into remediation, especially 
since there are and will always be multiple ways to approach and negotiate remediation 
remedies.  They also understand that heritage concerns must be addressed if raised.  It is 
in this dialog that most heritage decisions are discussed and the more forceful the heritage 
voice, the more preservation is considered.   
While in general its mission drives EPA’s activities and decisions, and the agency 
does not have a strong culture of heritage-protection, some individual EPA managers at 
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least respect a community’s desire for heritage even if they don’t share it.  In both 
Tennessee, where the EPA manager came from Atlanta and actively participated in 
heritage decisions with the Glenn Springs project manager, and Michigan, where EPA 
planners from the beginning considered the Quincy Smelter an important historic 
resource, individual EPA managers demonstrated compassion for, and at times even 
enthusiasm for some preservation, but they do not share the understanding of a 
professional heritage planner or even a heritage-oriented community member.   
The Butte-Anaconda district, however, was different.   Because of its size, the 
EPA staff contingent was spread from local offices in Butte and Anaconda, to a regional 
office in Helena, Montana, to the District office in Denver, Colorado.   Because of the 
size of the project, the EPA also hired local people to run the local offices, and those with 
a regional association and identity with the landscape, identified with the strong local 
heritage community, and although they were still EPA mission-driven, they were able to 
soften the negotiations. 
 
Resolving a heritage-remediation conflict.  
As we have seen, because of different historical, demographic, economic, 
geographical, and political circumstances, heritage-remediation conflicts were resolved in 
varying manners in the Michigan, Tennessee, and Montana copper districts, and heritage 
proponents enjoyed varying degrees of success.  What then are the most basic lessons 
that we can take away from this in-depth study of heritage-remediation conflicts in the 
three nationally important copper mining and smelting districts; and, in the face of often 
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aggressive remediation and development efforts, what steps can those who wish to 
preserve the heritage of industry in their regions take to insure maximum preservation?  
Based on our three case studies, there are four keys to success in promoting heritage in 
the face of large, environmental remediation projects: organization, knowledge, 
persistence, and political sympathy or support from key state agencies or political patrons 
in Congress. 
Organization is the first key.  As our three case studies have shown, the better the 
preservation elements in a community are organized, the stronger their message and 
political influence becomes, ultimately resulting in a social-force that must be confronted 
much more formally by remediation-minded authorities than a small group or individuals 
would be.  The successful organization of grass-roots groups in Butte-Anaconda 
illustrates this directly and the affiliated heritage partners of the Keweenaw National 
Historical Park, a large, even loosely, coordinated group, have provided the old Michigan 
copper district with preservation advocates capable of encouraging remediation and 
development advocates to negotiate and compromise on heritage issues rather than 
simply bulldoze everything in its way. 
Second, knowledge of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) a.k.a. “Superfund” or other environmental 
statutes is critical.  The laws normally used to initiate and coordinate environmental 
remediation specifically state that project planners must consult with local communities 
and consider other relevant legislation, such as the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA) and other preservation laws.  This knowledge allows an organized group to 
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make strong legal arguments because neither CERCLA nor NHPA refutes the other, and 
on-site conflicts usually arise out of the inconsistent interpretation of standards outlined 
in the laws or ignorance of their intended aims.  Further, knowledge of successful 
alternative approaches to similar remediation problems gives decision-makers more 
options, like the example of the Old Works Golf Course slag-based sand traps in 
Montana.  Knowledge that smelter slag was being safely used in direct contact with 
golfers was cited by heritage advocates in Michigan to influence slag-heap preservation 
at the Quincy site.  Of course, recruiting a local attorney interested in heritage 
preservation to work, hopefully gratis, with local heritage proponents would also 
contribute to the local knowledge base on legal issues and recourses.  
Third, hedging against heritage loss requires persistence.  Butte-Anaconda and the 
Keweenaw each pursued heritage planning over decades.  Butte’s first heritage plan 
began in the 1950s, and continued with successive plans and expanded plans in the 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and its latest plan and National Historic Landmark district 
designation were finalized in 2005.  The Keweenaw, too, started with preservation 
projects in the 1950s and, in 2009, was working on its latest National Park Service-
sponsored regional cultural management plan.   
Lastly, heritage preservation and environmental remediation are both, ultimately, 
political in nature.  Recognition of this fact and taking the appropriate steps to gain 
political support can be critical to the level of success heritage proponents can secure in 
preservation-remediation conflicts.  Of course, the previous keys--organization, 
knowledge, and persistence--can contribute significantly to the ability of local heritage 
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advocates to secure such political support too.  At the state level, securing the active 
support of key state agencies, especially the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO), 
the agency specifically charged by the NHPA with oversight of cultural resources, can 
lend significant negotiating weight to heritage proponents in conflict with remediation 
agencies.  For example, in Butte-Anaconda, the Montana SHPO enhanced local heritage 
planning and preservation efforts, while the weak involvement of the Tennessee SHPO 
all but sealed the fate of important cultural resources there.  At the national level, too, 
securing political patronage or support is important, especially since the primary 
remediating agency—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—is federal.  A 
political patron at the national level can help reign in an overly-aggressive EPA, secure 
funding to enhance heritage preservation, or help secure formal national-level recognition 
of “historical significance,” such as Michigan Senators did in the formation of the 
Keweenaw National Park and identifying earmarks for the Quincy Smelter, and 
Montana’s senators did in the establishment of high-tech projects in Butte. 
All four of the keys outlined above—organization, knowledge, persistence, and 
political support—are important.  Together, they give heritage proponents significant 
clout and encourage remediation authorities to seek compromise, because, in the long 
run, compromises are cheaper than prolonged debates and court battles. 
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